@article{Hsu:20788,
      recid = {20788},
      author = {Hsu, Shi-Ling},
      title = {A MODEL OF ENVIRONMENTAL COMPROMISE BETWEEN REGULATORS AND  REGULATED PARTIES},
      address = {1998},
      number = {370-2016-18947},
      series = {Selected Paper},
      pages = {14},
      year = {1998},
      abstract = {Environmental regulations implemented by administrative  agencies have often been met with fierce political  resistance from regulated parties.  In some instances,  regulated parties have turned to legislative and judicial  bodies for relief from environmental regulation.  As these  political and legal battles have escalated, several forms  of compromises have evolved.  The U.S. Fish and Wildlife  Service, in its administration of the Endangered Species  Act, has often utilized the tool of "Habitat Conservation  Planning" as a means by which some regulatory relief is  granted in exchange for an agreement by the regulated party  to undertake mitigation measures to aid endangered or  threatened species.  As a further inducement for regulated  parties to enter into the Habitat Conservation Planning  process, the Service has also adopted a "No Surprises"  policy of guaranteeing regulated parties that if certain  additional mitigation measures are taken, then if in the  future any further mitigation measures are deemed necessary  to protect endangered or threatened species, they will only  be undertaken at the expense of the Service.  This paper  develops simple models of the conditions under which such  compromise agreements are offered by a regulator, and the  conditions under which the regulated party either accepts  such an offer or pursues a strategy of appealing to  legislative or judicial bodies for relief from regulation.},
      url = {http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/20788},
      doi = {https://doi.org/10.22004/ag.econ.20788},
}