The Real Rate of Protection: The Stabilizing Effect of Price Policies and Direct Payments

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Presented at the annual meeting of the American Agricultural Economics Association, Chicago, Illinois, August 5-6, 2001

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Abstract

Traditional indicators of protection refer to the level effect of price policies on income and ignore the stabilizing effect. We derive a measure of the real rate of protection which incorporates these dual dimensions. The income stabilizing effects of price policy protection lead to a greater level of real protection than would be measured conventionally. Computed real protection rates for the European Union wheat market over the pre- and post-MacSharry reform periods were found to be some 3-5 percent greater than traditional indicators. Moreover, the compensatory payments to farmers following the 1992 reforms had a major risk reducing impact.
The Real Rate of Protection: The Stabilizing Effect of Price Policies and Direct Transfers

I. Introduction

Despite the efforts of the WTO to reduce trade barriers, the successful elimination of all barriers remains elusive. There are many different reasons why countries protect their agricultural sectors from international competition. Protectionist policies of individual developed countries are often entrenched in long histories of political and economic compromise. The objectives are often multi-faceted and complex. In general two basic types of policy support to agriculture are used: market-price supports and government subsidies. Price policy supports often take the form of price interventions supported by trade barriers such as tariffs and quantitative restrictions (Valdez). On the other hand, subsidies take the form of government financed surplus storage or removal, indirect input subsidies or direct transfer payments to producers. These policies are largely intended to support the level of producer incomes, however, unintended risk benefits may result. In this paper we propose a method to evaluate both the level and risk components of protection.

Traditional indicators of protection rates only refer to the level effect of price policies on income. For instance, the nominal protection rate simply indicates the percentage by which the domestic price exceeds the border price, the effective protection rate incorporates a value added dimension, and PSEs attempt to account for all domestic policy transfers to producers. These measures by themselves, however, ignore the price stabilizing effect. In fact, agricultural price policies in developed countries aim at protecting farmers against both low world market prices and volatile world market prices. This kind of “double protection” can only be calculated on the basis of an expected utility approach, measuring the percentage increase of the expected utility of income or of the certainty equivalent of income, respectively. Following Newbery and Stiglitz (1981), we use the mean-coefficient of variation approximation with log-normally distributed incomes to derive an expression for the real rate of protection (RRP). Algebraically, the RRP is determined by the effective protection rate, the coefficient of variation of income and, the coefficient of relative risk aversion.

II. Methodology

We apply an expected utility approach that incorporates the first (mean) and second (variance) moments of the probability distribution of real income. Assuming a log-normal distribution of real income, The mean-coefficient of variation formula of expected utility of income is\(^1\):

\[ E[U(y)] = E(y) - \frac{1}{2} A \text{var}(y) \]

\(A\) = coefficient of absolute risk aversion.

\(^1\) Perhaps more familiar, if one alternatively assumes that real income is normally distributed, the simple mean-variance formula of expected utility of income is: \(E[U(y)] = E(y) - \frac{1}{2} A \text{var}(y)\) where \(y\) = income and , \(A\) = coefficient of absolute risk aversion.
(1) \[ E[U(y)] = E[y] \left[ 1 + cv_y^2 \right]^{-\frac{1}{2}R} \]

where, \( U \) = utility, \( y \) = income, \( cv \) = coefficient of variation of income and, \( R \) = coefficient of relative risk aversion.

If we define this double protection rate, or the real rate of protection, as the percentage change in the expected utility of income with protection \((\hat{y}_a)\) \textit{vis a vis} without protection \((\hat{y}_i)\), we can derive (see Appendix A):

\[
2) \quad RRP = (1 + EPR) \left[ \frac{\left( 1 + cv_{\hat{y}_a}^2 \right)^{0.5R} - 1}{\left( 1 + cv_{\hat{y}_i}^2 \right)^{0.5R}} \right]
\]

where, \( EPR \) = effective protection rate (percent change in income), \( cv_{\hat{y}_i} \) = coefficient of variation of income: \( i = 0 \) without protection and \( i = 1 \) with protection and, \( R \) = coefficient of relative risk aversion.

In order to compute the coefficient of variation of incomes \textit{with} \((y_i)\) and \textit{without} \((y_0)\) double protection two further steps are necessary.

First, world market price fluctuations \((cv_{pW})\) have to be transferred to domestic \textit{price} fluctuations \((cv_{pD})\). This can be accomplished by use estimated price transmission elasticities, \( \eta \) (see Appendix B)

\[
(3) \quad cv_{pD} = \eta \cdot cv_{pW}.
\]

Next, the price fluctuations have to be transferred into \textit{income} fluctuations by considering the inverse profit ratio as a multiplier (see Appendix C),

\[
(4) \quad cv_y = \left[ \frac{\text{production value}}{\text{income}} \right] \cdot cv_{pD}.
\]

III. \textbf{Empirical Illustrations—the Case of European Wheat}

\textit{The data}

Twenty-four years of annual wheat data in the European Union were available to implement our theoretical model. World wheat prices, CIF Rotterdam ($US), were obtained from the Economic Research Service of the U.S. Department of Agriculture. Since price data for the entire EU were not available, prices received by German producers were used as a proxy and obtained from the CRONOS data bank of
EUROSTAT\textsuperscript{2}. Currency exchange rates from the IMF were used to place world prices on a local (German Mark) currency basis. Both price series were deflated by the consumer price indices of their respective countries. Wheat production data were obtained from the Economic Research Service and the Foreign Agricultural Service of the USDA. Cost of production data was available from Stanton (1986), Bureau \textit{et al.} (1992) and personal correspondence with Jean-Pierre Butault. The data list provided in Appendix D.

\textit{The Policy Environment}

We identify two fundamentally different policy regime periods of the European Union’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP): the “old CAP” and the “new CAP”. These two periods define the “protection” and the “without protection” periods, respectively. The CAP policy regime during the period 1976 to 1992 is characterized as the “old CAP”. The policy objective during this period was to support farm incomes at a high and stable level. The general result was that EU prices were in excess of and more stable than world prices. In order to keep internal market prices from falling below the administratively set intervention price (set well above world market levels), intervention agencies would buy wheat at the intervention price, store it and sell it on the world market at a loss or, more commonly, provide private exporters a subsidy (restitution) equal to the difference between the intervention price and the world price.

The first major structural adjustment in European agricultural policy took place with the CAP (MacSharry) reform of 1992. The changes were considered so significant to warrant the name the “new CAP”. Although truly significant changes occurred, they were implemented within the existing CAP structure of variable levies, export restitutions and the like. This structure continued to isolate European agriculture from the world economy. Implemented in July 1993, the MacSharry reforms called for compensatory payments to farmers and a continued lowering of price supports to levels closer to expected world prices. The three major components of this reform were: (1) a substantial cut in intervention prices (30 percent), phased in over a three-year period, (2) compensation to farmers for the price cuts through subsidies per hectare (area premiums), and (3) land “set-aside” requirements; preference was given to small farmers who were eligible to receive payments without the set-aside requirement. Even thought the compensatory payments were not truly decoupled from cropped area, this was a major step toward a market-oriented grain economy.

This “new CAP” period also includes the 1995 Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA). The old system of threshold prices and variable levies was abolished under the process of tariffication; these and other non-tariff barriers were converted to conventional tariffs and reduced over time. The first of the tariff cuts took place in July, 1995, and the new arrangements limited the import tax so that the landed price could not exceed 155 percent of the intervention price or the tariff equivalent, which ever was less. The tariff equivalent was to be reduced 36 percent over a six-year period. Constraints on the total level of support provided by the CAP were also imposed.

\textsuperscript{2} Germany is second only to France in volume of EU wheat production.
Model Implementation

In order to implement our measure of the Real Rate of Protection (RRP) we need to compute the individual components of equation (2). First, we compute the traditional ERP measure as the percentage change in real producer incomes over the two periods: period 1 (1988-92) and period 2 (1993-98). Income is defined as a gross margin, price minus variable cost. This simply represents the percent that profits during the highly protected pre-MacSharry period (76-92) exceeded those of the post-MacSharry period. Without compensatory payments, our ERP is estimated to be 2.37. This indicates that average real farm income was 136 percent greater during the period 1988-92 than during the subsequent 1993-98 period. In other words, the post-MacSharry period real farm incomes were only 37 percent of the pre-reform average. However, when compensatory payments are added (variable C in appendix D), the estimated ERP is 0.36, meaning that pre-MacSharry incomes were 36 percent higher than the post-reform average.

Second, we compute the coefficients of variation of world prices for the two periods. Equation (3) is used to transform these to domestic price coefficients of variation. As shown earlier, the coefficient of variation of domestic price is simply the product of the price transmission elasticity and the coefficient of variation of world price. Instead of computing the coefficient of variation of domestic prices directly, we estimate them under alternative assumptions of the price elasticity of transmission. Tyers and Anderson (1992) refer to these elasticities as “price policy parameters” while Dutton and Grennes describe them as a summary measure of all government policies that separate foreign and domestic markets. Thus, as a general measure of domestic market insulation from world markets, the transmission elasticity increases as markets are liberalized. Drawing upon the empirical work of Thompson et al. (2000), we illustrate the sensitivity of RRP to transmission elasticities of 0.15, 0.25, 0.30. Even with the MacSharry and subsequent Uruguay Round reforms, EU wheat price transmission elasticities greater than 0.30 for the EU have not been empirically found. A transmission elasticity of 1.0 implies perfect transmission of world market price signals back to domestic markets.

Third, we transfer the coefficients of variation of domestic prices into coefficients of variation of income. For each period, this computation is made according to equation (4). The coefficients of variation of real incomes are measured as trend-corrected coefficients of variation following the approach of Cuddy and Della Valle (1978). Finally we need to assess the coefficient of relative risk aversion, R. Drawing upon the work of Saha, Shumway and Talpaz (1994), we posit three possible levels of increasing risk aversion, 1.0, 2.0, and 3.0, respectively.

The term in the square bracket of equation (2) adjusts the traditional effective rate of protection (ERP) by the relative volatility of income for a risk-averse producer. Three cases are identified. First, this term is larger than 1.0 if the trend-adjusted coefficient of income with protection is lower than without protection. On the other hand, this term is smaller than 1.0 if the trend-adjusted coefficient of income with protection is greater than that without protection. And, this term is 1.0 if the trend-adjusted coefficient of income is unaffected by the level of protection.
In the first case above, the value of RRP is larger than the traditional ERP. This means the real rate of protection (RRP) is evaluated as higher than the traditional evaluation because of the dampening effect on income volatility resulting from protection. In the second case, the value of RRP is smaller than ERP and in the third case we have the same evaluation. Again in the first case, the more risk averse the producer the greater the term in the square bracket. This is because the more risk averse the producer, the greater the benefit from decreased income volatility. The opposite is true in the second case. In general, the greater the level of relative risk aversion, the greater the real rate of protection.

This adjustment for risk aversion is reasonable for a risk averse producer because his utility is higher as the volatility of income decreases. Although the traditional way of evaluating price support protection programs takes the expected value of income into consideration, it does not considered the volatility of income; a reasonable approach only if producers are risk neutral.

In Table 1 estimates of the real rate of protection (RRP) for the EU wheat market are shown without compensatory payments. We examine the effects on RRP of increased price transmission elasticities and levels of relative risk aversion. Recall our estimate of ERP was 2.37. Thompson, Herrmann and Gohout (2000) found the price transmission elasticity during the pre-MacSharry period to be about 0.15.

These authors further found that the MacSharry and subsequent Uruguay Round reforms increased the transmission of world price signals to domestic EU wheat markets such that the post-reform elasticity was near 0.30. In other words, the price transmission increased as policy reforms evolve. The relationships shown in Table 1 are consistent with expectations. In particular, the real rate of protection is positively related to both the price transmission elasticity and the degree of relative risk aversion. For all reported vales in Table 1, the real rate of protection exceeds the traditional measure. More concretely, because income volatility was found to be greater during the post-MacSharry period than before, a greater degree of wheat industry protection has actually occurred than traditional measures would have revealed. Thus, without accounting for the effect of price policy protection on producer income volatility, traditional measures of protection are misleading. In the case of the EU wheat market, the traditional ERP is smaller than the real rate of protection by some 3-5 percent (for R =2.0 and η = 0.30). Also as the degree of risk aversion increases from 1.0 to 3.0 (η = 0.30) the ERP is 4-5 percent smaller than RRP.

Some interesting results are obtained when the compensatory payments are added to real incomes (Table 2). The addition of these payments had the effect of reducing the importance of risk in the RRP calculation. In this case, as R increases from 1.0 to 3.0 the ERP is less than 1 percent smaller than the RRP. In this case, the direct payments substantially reduced the role of risk in the measurement of protection. Even a small difference in protection measurement, however, can be economically important.
IV. Conclusions

Traditional indicators of protection refer to the level effect of price policies on income and ignore the stabilizing effect. We derive a measure of the real rate of protection which incorporates these dual dimensions. The income stabilizing effects of price policy protection reveal a greater level of real protection than would be measured conventionally. Computed real protection rates for the European Union wheat market over the pre- and post-MacSharry reform periods were found to be some 3 to 5 percent greater than traditionally conceived. The addition of direct (compensatory) payments to farmers narrowed the gap between the traditional and our risk-adjusted protection measure. Direct payments had a major risk reducing impact.
References


Table 1. Estimated Real Rates of Protection Without Compensatory Payments 1988-98.

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<th>Post-MacSharry Price Transmission Elasticity ($\eta$):</th>
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*a The pre-MacSharry price transmission elasticity was 0.15.

Table 2. Estimated Real Rates of Protection With Compensatory Payments 1980-98.

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<th>Post-MacSharry Price Transmission Elasticity ($\eta$):</th>
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*a The pre-MacSharry price transmission elasticity was 0.15.
Appendix A
Following Newbery and Sgilz (p.89),

(A.1) \( E[U(y)] = E[y][1 + cv_y^2]^{-\frac{1}{2}R} \)

(A.2) \( \hat{y} = \frac{E[y]}{(1 + cv_y^2)^{0.5R}} \)

Define protection (RRP) as the percentage change in the expected utility of income with protection vis a vis without protection.

or

(A.3) \[ RRP = \frac{\hat{y}_1 - \hat{y}_0}{\hat{y}_0} \]

(A.4) \[ \frac{E[y_1]}{E[y_0]} = \frac{(1 + cv_y^2 y_1)^{0.5}}{(1 + cv_y^2 y_0)^{0.5R}} - 1 \]

(A.5) \[ \frac{E[y_1]}{E[y_0]} \cdot \frac{(1 + cv_y^2 y_0)^{0.5R}}{(1 + cv_y^2 y_1)^{0.5R}} - 1 \]

Now, let

\[ \frac{E[y_1] - E[y_0]}{E[y_0]} = ERP, \]

or \[ \frac{E[y_1]}{E[y_0]} = (1 + ERP) \]

substituting into (A.5) gives,

(A.6) \[ RRP = (1 + EPR) \cdot K - 1 \]
Appendix B

The price transmission elasticity ($\eta$) is given by

(B.1) \[ p_d = \alpha p_w^q \]

(B.2) \[ E[p_d] = \alpha E[p_w]^q \]

(B.3) \[ \text{var}[p_d] = \text{var}[p_w] \cdot [\eta \alpha p_w^{q-1}]^2 \]

\[ = \text{var}[p_w] \cdot \eta^2 \left( \frac{\alpha p_w^q}{p_w} \right)^2 \]

\[ = \text{var}[p_w] \cdot \eta^2 \frac{p_d^2}{p_w^2} \]

(B.4) \[ \sigma_{p_d} = \sigma_{p_w} \eta \frac{p_d}{p_w} \]

(B.5) \[ cv_{p_d} = \frac{\sigma_{p_d}}{E[p_d]} \]

\[ = \frac{\sigma_{p_w} \cdot \eta \frac{p_d}{p_w}}{\alpha E[p_w]^2} \]

(B.6) \[ cv_{p_d} = \eta \cdot cv_{p_w} \]
Appendix C

Step three was derived as follows:

\( (C.1) \quad y = p_d \cdot q - v \cdot x \)

where,  
\( y = \) income (profit)  
\( v = \) factor prices, and  
\( x = \) factor inputs.

\( (C.2) \quad E[y] = E[p_d] \cdot q - v \cdot x \)

\( (C.3) \quad \text{var}[y] = q^2 \cdot \text{var}(p_d) \)

\[ \sigma_y = q \cdot \sigma_{p_d} \]

\( (C.4) \quad cv_y = \frac{\sigma_y}{E[y]} \)

\[ = \frac{q \cdot \sigma_p}{E[p_d]} \cdot q - vx \]

\[ = \frac{p_d \cdot q \sigma_p}{y \cdot p_d} \]

\( (C.5) \quad cv_y = \frac{p_d \cdot q}{y} \cdot cv_{p_d} \)
## Appendix D: The Data List

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$^a$millions of hectares/DM