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## **The Challenges of Sustainably Feeding a Growing Planet**

**By Thomas W. Hertel**

In collaboration with Uris L.C. Baldos  
Purdue University

Contributed paper prepared for presentation at the 59th AARES Annual Conference,  
Rotorua, New Zealand, February 10-13, 2015

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# **The Challenges of Sustainably Feeding a Growing Planet**

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
<sup>1</sup> Plenary address to the 59<sup>th</sup> annual meeting of the Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, Rotorua, February 11, 2015

# Overview of the talk


- **Demand-side drivers:**
  - Changing relative importance of pop and income
  - Energy prices are the wildcard
- **Supply-side:**
  - Technological progress is key to food security
  - Reconciling slowing yields and rising TFP
  - Climate impacts and implications for food security
- **Emerging issues:**
  - Urbanization
  - Water scarcity
  - Food waste/loss as new sources of supply
  - Climate regulation
- **How does it all add up?**

# Historical analysis of global crop prices: 1961-2006

## SIMPLE model, based on past trends of key drivers



# Naïve projections of global crop price to 2050: SIMPLE model, based on past trends of key drivers




Based on Baldos and Hertel (2014a)

*Future replicates past!!* **Population** remains a dominant driver of food demand in naïve forecast




# Global population in 2100: 9 or 11 billion?

- **UN: population stabilization unlikely this century**
- **IIASA: female education will lead to pop peak in 2070**





Sources: UN – Gerland et al. 2014  
IIASA – Lutz and Samir, 2014



# Fortunately for us, much less uncertainty/ disagreement about 2050


- **UN: 2050 population will be 9.6bill**
- **IIASA: 2050 population of 9.3bill**



Sources: UN – Gerland et al. 2014  
IIASA – Lutz and Samir, 2014




# With slower global growth rate, the absolute decadal increment is shrinking




Annual increments to global population (10-year average), 1750-2050: Source: UNPD, 2000, 2011

# Population growth is *most rapid* in Africa: where capita food consumption is more modest

World Population Growth, 1950–2050 (medium variant)




# When we impose future population growth rates, projected change in global crop prices falls sharply...



*Relative contribution of population drops sharply by 2050*


# But income growth will affect food consumption : 2006 vs. 2050

Food consumption (grams/cap/day)



Source: Baldos and Hertel (2014b)

# More rapid growth in developing economies translates into larger impact of income growth on demand



*For the first time, **income dominates population** as a driver of agricultural demand*


# Overview of the talk

- **Demand-side drivers:**
  - Changing relative importance of pop and income
  - **Energy prices are the wildcard**
- **Supply-side:**
  - Technological progress is key to food security
  - Slowing yields and rising TFP
  - Climate impacts and implications for food security
- **Emerging issues:**
  - Urbanization
  - Water scarcity
  - Food waste/loss as new source of supplies
  - Climate regulation
- **How does it all add up?**

# Low oil prices and environmental concerns have curbed growth in biofuels; lowered cost of intensification


- Biofuel subsidies and mandates gradually being rolled back
- Low oil and gas prices lessen economic incentive; lower cost of intensification of agriculture
- Further biofuels growth looks less likely – unless oil prices rise or 2G biofuels become part of climate policy

## US corn used in ethanol to grow modestly



Source: USDA Agricultural Projections to 2023

# Most of biofuel growth from 2006 has already been felt



*... this is the IEA 'Current Policies' scenario*



# Overview of the talk


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**Technological progress is key to food security, but there are divergent views... *Pessimists focus on slowing crop yield growth***

- **Yield growth has slowed in key breadbaskets has slowed to less than 0.5%/yr (Fischer et al.)**
  - *Actual yield = yield gap ratio x potential yield*
- **Fischer et al. project slowing of *potential yield growth*:**
  - **Interception of photo-synthetic radiation by leaves**
  - **Radiation use efficiency**
  - **Harvest index**
  - **Biophysics limit first and third to 20% maximum increase**
  - **Radiation efficiency has more potential for improvement**
- **Potential yield growth *depends critically on R&D*:**
  - **Alston, Beddow and Pardey document slowdown in US R&D, mirrored in Japan and Europe (also Australia)**
  - **Also, funds increasingly diverted from farm-level research**
  - **Reluctance to embrace GMOs slowing potential yield gains**

# Pessimists focus on slowing crop yield growth



- Yields can also grow by closing the yield gaps
- Gaps are the result of a variety of factors:
  - Poor infrastructure/lack of market access
  - Absence of irrigation
  - Limited information about technology
  - Lack of credit
- These challenges will take time to address



Darkened areas are more efficient – serve to “set the frontier”.  
Circled areas are inefficient; primary source of production inefficiency labeled

# Pessimists focus on slowing crop yield growth


- Simple arithmetic means linear trending yields must result in slower growth rates as yield levels rise
- Plateaus evident for wheat and rice



**Technological progress is key to food security, but there are divergent views... *Optimists tend focus on strong TFP growth***

- **Slowing yield growth has been due to economic factors:**
  - declining prices from 1980 to 2005 reduced incentives
  - intensification fell to just 10% of global output growth in 90's
- **This process can be reversed in the face of rising scarcity**

Annual growth rate by decade, global average




Source: Fuglie (2012)

# Optimists tend to focus on strong TFP growth


Source: Economic Research Service, USDA.

- US output growth since 1960 almost entirely due to TFP/MFP growth
- Although we see a pronounced slow-down in TFP/MFP growth in the United States in past decade....




Source: Alston et al., 2010

Figure 12-1 U.S. Agricultural Output Value Attributable to Productivity Growth, 1949–2002



# Optimists tend focus on rising TFP growth


- But *global* TFP growth has risen to historic levels in 2000's
- Alston and Pardey (JEP, 2014) show that *global* land and labor productivity grew more rapidly over past two decades than over 1961-1990 period (driven heavily by China where continue to benefit from reforms)



Source: Fuglie (2012)

# And global public spending on R&D has responded strongly to the food crisis

- China, India and Brazil lead the way
- CGIAR spending has grown sharply
- Private agr R&D is also up strongly (43%) from 2000-2008 (Fuglie et al.,)
- If sustained, should see payoffs over coming 5 decades (Alston et al., 2010)




Source: Pardey, Alston and Chan-Kang, 2013



# There is room for reconciliation of the two schools of thought


- **Divergence of TFP and yields arises due to intensification**
- **Divergence of staple grains and total agr TFP in India:**
  - **Nick Rada:** agricultural TFP has been rising, even as staple grains yields have been falling
  - Due to productivity gains in high value crops
- **Also:** yield growth may be slowing, but so too is population; required growth is just half 1961-2007 period (Bruinsma)
- **Ultimately, yields and TFP play different roles in the food system:**
  - Yields = primary driver of land use, given TFP and aggregate demand
  - TFP drives prices, given input levels

Indexes of TFP and Yields (PFP) for China Crops



Source: Ludena et al.


# Productivity growth is critical for future outcome; slower growth could lead to food price rise – but baseline flat to declining



Ludena et al Global Crops TFP Growth	p.a.	Years
Baseline	0.94	2001-40
Slow Rates	0.70	2031-40
Fast Rates	1.30	2001-10


**Based on  
projected growth  
rates in the core  
drivers of  
change:  
population,  
income and  
technology....**

**....we expect a resumption of the downward trend  
in long run crop prices**



**Factoring in uncertainty about *all* drivers and economic responses, we find that the majority of outcomes *point to a long run price decline***


**Monte Carlo  
Analysis: 1,000  
model simulations  
sampling from  
distributions of  
drivers and  
responses**




# Implications for food security in 2050

- **Simulated with SIMPLE model**
  - **Validated over historical period (Baldos and Hertel, 2013, 2014)**
  - **15 regional markets are either:**
    - **Segmented (historical economy)**
    - **Integrated (future world?)**
  - **Baseline driven by:**
    - **Population and income growth**
    - **Productivity growth in crops, livestock and food processing**
  - **Analyze full distribution of caloric intake to predict malnutrition headcount and gap**
  - **Combination of TFP and income growth greatly reduces malnutrition in 2050**

Malnutrition Headcount, by Region



Sub Saharan Africa: Baseline 2006-50




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# How will this be story be altered by climate change?


- IPCC WGII states:
  - “median yield impacts from 0 to -2%/decade over rest of century”
  - “negative impacts of more than 5% are more likely than not after 2050”



Source: Rosenzweig et al. 2013, PNAS; Results from 7 crop models (dashed lines omit CO<sub>2</sub> effects)

# But impacts at mid-century are more modest

- IPCC WGII states:
  - “negative impacts on avg yields become likely in the 2030’s”
  - “median yield impacts from 0 to -2%/decade over rest of century”




Source: Rosenzweig et al. 2013, PNAS; Results from 7 crop models (dashed lines omit CO2 effects)




# AgMIP global yield impacts due to climate change *in 2050* for staple grains & oilseeds vary widely by region, crop model & CO<sub>2</sub> fertilization on/off


Global avg. crop impacts are *positive under CO<sub>2</sub> fert at mid-century mark*



Temp and precip changes shift most impacts are *negative in absence of CO<sub>2</sub> fertilization*




# Impact of climate change on global malnutrition in 2050




- **Uncertainty inherited from both climate and crop models**
- **CC generally boosts global malnutrition in 2050 – possibly by as much as 50%, relative to baseline;**
- **Some model combos result in slight improvements in 2050, relative to baseline**

# Impact of climate change on regional malnutrition in 2050: HADGEM/LPJmL combination

- Greatest potential for adverse impacts are in South Asia (up to 120% rise in malnutrition, *relative to the 2050 baseline*)
- Sub Saharan Africa, maximum rise, *relative to 2050 baseline*, is 80%, while Rest of World small
- HADGEM/LPJmL only combination shown here



# Market integration moderates most severe nutritional impacts



Source: Baldos and Hertel (forthcoming)

# However, crop impact models do not reflect full extent of uncertainty

- Most biophysical crop models were developed for other purposes – *not focused on impacts of extreme temps*
- White et al. review 221 studies using 70 crop models to assess climate impacts and find *only a handful consider*:
  - Effects of elevated CO<sub>2</sub> on canopy temperature
  - Direct heat effects on key stages of crop development
- Only a subset of relevant processes are included in any one model; *often the omitted processes are*:
  - those that become *more damaging with climate change*
  - empirically *more important in context of tropical systems* (e.g. VPD, heat stress on crop development and pests and disease)
- As a consequence, IAMs likely *understate impact of climate change in the low income tropics*

# Climate change in the context of other drivers of change

Crop Model: LPJmL GCM: HADGEM

No CO<sub>2</sub> fertilization

CO<sub>2</sub> fertilization




# Main effect of market integration is to moderate malnutrition under worst case CC scenario

Crop Model: LPJmL GCM: HADGEM

No CO<sub>2</sub> fertilization

CO<sub>2</sub> fertilization




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# Future water scarcity will also shape food trade


## Index of irrigation water availability



**Increased scarcity of  
water for irrigation –  
particularly in South  
Asia and China**


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


*Year 2000*

Increasing water scarcity alters the geography of food trade




*Year 2030*



**Regions facing the most severe water scarcity are most likely to increase net food imports**


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


*Year 2000*

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
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
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


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Increasing water scarcity alters the geography of food trade



*Year 2030*




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



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


Increasing water scarcity alters the geography of food trade



**Regions facing the most severe water scarcity are most likely to increase net food imports**


# Urbanization and water scarcity are likely to have minor impacts on the global price trajectory



*...but will likely have significant impacts on local economies*

# Food waste and post-harvest losses are another source of food ‘supply’

- Food “waste” *mainly related to consumer behavior* in medium & high-income countries
- “Post-harvest crop losses” are main source of food loss in low-income countries
- However, requires investment and innovations




Source: FAO, 2011

Post-harvest crop losses

**Impacts on cropland and caloric consumption due alternately to *1/3 reductions in postharvest losses or food waste*, using 3 different policy instruments**

- **Postharvest productivity improvements, food tax and waste reduction subsidy all lower global crop land conversion and GHG emissions**
- **However, the food tax has an adverse impact on caloric intake**






# **Climate regulation: Pricing carbon will change the way we manage the world's resources**

- **When the world decides to move ahead on climate policy carbon pricing could significantly alter global land use**
- **Land based mitigation (forestry and agr) could provide up to 50% of efficient GHG abatement at \$27/ton CO<sub>2</sub> (Golub et al.)**
- **Carbon vs. commercial timber: Brent Sohngen estimates that, at \$5-\$15 per ton CO<sub>2</sub>, the *value of carbon in most forests is greater than the value of timber*; therefore, the management of carbon stocks can play a large role in carbon sequestration**
- **And presently less than 500million of the 3.5 billion hectares of global forests are actively managed; this could change**

# Leading to more intense competition between food, fuel and environmental services from land


## Amazon Deforestation: 2000-2012



- Golub et al (2012) explore implications of implementing REDD+ worldwide in conjunction with Annex I emissions taxes (\$27/tCO<sub>2</sub>e) on fossil fuels combustion as well as non-CO<sub>2</sub> gases
  - Carbon incentive payments limit further deforestation
  - Encourage afforestation increased carbon intensity

Source: Hansen et al., Science, November 15, 2013


# Global carbon sequestration incentives have a big impact on future *forest land*



*Forest cover expands in nearly all regions, relative to baseline!!*



# REDD+ has could also have a big impact on cropland after 20 years of implementation




# Overview of the talk

- Demand-side drivers:
  - Changing relative importance of pop and income
  - Energy prices are the wildcard
- Supply-side:
  - Prospects for closing yield gaps
  - Technological progress is key to food security
- Emerging issues:
  - Urbanization
  - Water scarcity
  - Food waste/loss as new source of supplies
  - Climate regulation
- **How does it all add up?**




# As recently as 2013: there was apparent consensus that were in a ‘new normal’

- World Bank (2013)  
*“...high and volatile food prices have become the “new normal”...”*
- FAO (2013) noted that the *long-term trend in declining food prices has been reversed*
- OECD-FAO (2013) projects *“Higher priced agricultural products over the coming ten years...”*



Data Sources: CPI data from Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis (2014)  
Historical corn prices from USDA ERS (2014)

**However, commodity prices have subsequently dropped ... where is the new equilibrium? Will they bounce back? Was this just a bubble?**



Data Sources: CPI data from Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis (2014)  
Historical corn prices from USDA ERS (2014)

# The ‘Scarcity Syndrome’:

“Pessimism has arisen about the ability of the Earth to feed its people .... [Due to]

- Burgeoning *population growth*...
- Doubts about the adequacy of the agricultural resource base...
- Misgivings about *weather* in the years ahead..”


— *1981 USDA Yearbook of Agriculture: “Will there be enough food?”*

From the opening paragraph of Don Paarlberg’s chapter:

“Enough Food? Sure, If We Don’t Play it Dumb.”




# Where are we headed?



Data Sources: CPI data from Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis (2014)  
Historical corn prices from USDA ERS (2014)  
Hurt (2014) *personal communication*

- But we believe that this “consensus” is misguided and is heavily influenced by the 2007/08 and 2010/11 spikes in commodity prices
- *We argue that long-run global crop prices will “likely resume their historical pattern of decline”*

# But lower prices do not mean lower returns



Source: Abbott, Hurt and Tyner 2011; updated by Chris Hurt (2014)

# Conclusions

- **Population and income drivers are changing**
- **Energy prices remain a wildcard**
- **Technological progress is key for food security**
- **Food waste/loss offers additional source of ‘supply’**
- **Water scarcity and urbanization will have local/regional impacts and shape future trade**
- **Climate mitigation policies will change the way we manage the world’s land resources and could have significant impacts on agricultural land and prices**
- **Recent price rise seems to be a repeat of 70’s; the long term price trajectory is likely to continue downwards – albeit more slowly**



**Thank you to my  
collaborators!**



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