@article{Sartzetakis:202440,
      recid = {202440},
      author = {Sartzetakis, Eftichios S. and Xepapadeas, Anastasios and  Yannacopoulos, Athanasios},
      title = {Regulating the Environmental Consequences of Preferences  for Social Status within an Evolutionary Framework},
      address = {2015-04-24},
      number = {824-2016-54697},
      series = {CCSD},
      pages = {27},
      month = {Apr},
      year = {2015},
      abstract = {Taking as given that we are consuming too much and that  overconsumption leads to environmental degradation, the  present paper examines the regulator's choices between  informative advertisement and consumption taxation. We  model overconsumption by considering individuals that care  about social status apart from the intrinsic utility,  derived from direct consumption. We assume that there also  exist individuals that care only about their own private  consumption and we examine the evolution of preferences  through time by allowing individuals to alter their  behavior as a result of a learning process, akin to a  replicator dynamics type. We consider the regulator's  choice of consumption taxation and informative  advertisement both in an arbitrary and an optimal control  context. In the arbitrary overconsumption control context  we find that the regulator could decrease, or even  eliminate, the share of status seekers in the population.  In the context of optimal overconsumption control, we show  that the highest welfare is attained when status seekers  are completely eliminated, while the lowest in the case  that the entire population consists of status seekers.},
      url = {http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/202440},
      doi = {https://doi.org/10.22004/ag.econ.202440},
}