@article{Chavez:202164,
      recid = {202164},
      author = {Chavez, Daniel and Palma, Marco},
      title = {Off the reservation: Pushing the bounds of rationality in  experimental auctions},
      address = {2015},
      number = {330-2016-13597},
      series = {Paper6482},
      pages = {33},
      year = {2015},
      abstract = {The use of experimental economics in valuation of market  and non-market goods has grown considerably over the past  few years. The ability of experimental auctions (EAs) to  reveal consumer preferences and their malleability have  been greatly praised by researchers across the profession.  Because of the high cost of conducting EAs, researchers  have a vested interest in extracting as much information as  possible from the research sample, usually presenting  multiple products or product alternatives to participants.  In the last decade large amounts of work has been done to  improve the methodology and design of EAs. However,  choosing how many products or product alternatives to use  has no clear guideline. Findings of this study support a  “choice overload” phenomenon even with a relatively small  number of products used for auction. Mean willingness to  pay was found to be a decreasing function of the number of  alternatives presented to participants. A heteroscedastic  error variance scaler was estimated and it was found to be  a decreasing function of the number of alternatives  presented, implying more variance across responses as the  number of alternatives increases.},
      url = {http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/202164},
      doi = {https://doi.org/10.22004/ag.econ.202164},
}