000201684 001__ 201684
000201684 005__ 20210122074715.0
000201684 0247_ $$2doi$$a10.22004/ag.econ.201684
000201684 037__ $$a905-2016-70615
000201684 037__ $$a905-2016-70782
000201684 041__ $$aeng
000201684 245__ $$aOn the performance of unitary models of household labor supply estimated on “collective” data with taxation
000201684 260__ $$c2006
000201684 269__ $$a2006
000201684 336__ $$aJournal Article
000201684 490__ $$a81
000201684 520__ $$aCet article compare les modèles unitaire et collectif sur la base de données collectives simulées en présence de divers types de taxation des revenus. Nous distinguons en particulier un système d’imposition individuelle et un système d’imposition jointe. En spécifiant un modèle unitaire flexible, du type de ceux utilisés dans la littérature empirique, nous obtenons des estimations assez différentes selon le régime fiscal utilisé pour simuler les données. Nous trouvons aussi des différences substantielles dans les ajustements de l’offre de travail prédits à la suite d’un changement de régime fiscal. Nos résultats illustrent également le fait que le calibrage des paramètres d’une réforme fiscale peut être lui-même fortement affecté par l’utilisation d’un modèle unitaire lorsque les données sont générées par un modèle collectif. Enfin, nous discutons les distorsions qui affectent l’analyse de réformes fiscales en termes de bien-être dans une telle situation. Les résultats suggèrent que des efforts accrus devraient être consacrés à la recherche sur l’estimation de modèles collectifs dans les situations complexes auxquelles on est confronté lors de l’analyse de réformes fiscales. Ceci inclut des contraintes budgétaires donnant naissance à des ensembles de budget non convexes, ainsi que la modélisation de solutions en coin pour les offres de travail des conjoints.

On the performance of unitary models of household labor supply estimated on “collective” data with taxation Summary – This paper compares collective and unitary models on the basis of simulated collective data with income taxation. We distinguish the cases of individual and joint taxation. Estimating a flexible unitary model, we obtain strikingly different “preference” parameters depending on the type of taxation. We also obtain substantial differences between predicted adjustments to labor supply following a switch between tax regimes. Our results show that even the design of revenue-neutral reforms may be heavily distorted by the use of a unitary model on collective data. Finally, we discuss distortions affecting the welfare analysis of reforms on the basis of unitary estimates when the model generating the data is a collective model. The results suggest that increased efforts should be devoted to the estimation of collective models with taxation.
000201684 650__ $$aAgricultural Finance
000201684 6531_ $$aPareto optimal allocations
000201684 6531_ $$apolicy evaluation
000201684 6531_ $$asimulated data
000201684 700__ $$aBeninger, Denis
000201684 700__ $$aLaisney, François
000201684 773__ $$q5$$o36$$tCahiers d'Economie et de Sociologie Rurales (CESR)$$j81$$d2006
000201684 8564_ $$9b8743015-505c-4617-ae7d-187efc7881d0$$s488524$$uhttps://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/201684/files/81-5-36.pdf
000201684 887__ $$ahttp://purl.umn.edu/201684
000201684 909CO $$ooai:ageconsearch.umn.edu:201684$$pGLOBAL_SET
000201684 912__ $$nSubmitted by Laure Latruffe (raestud@rennes.inra.fr) on 2015-04-15T13:03:20Z
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  Previous issue date: 2006
000201684 913__ $$aLicense granted by Laure Latruffe (raestud@rennes.inra.fr) on 2015-04-15T12:59:25Z (GMT):

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000201684 980__ $$a905
000201684 982__ $$gCahiers d'Economie et de Sociologie Rurales (CESR)>Volume 81, 2006