@article{Bontems:201521,
      recid = {201521},
      author = {Bontems, Philippe and Dhar, Tirtha and Chavas, Jean- Paul},
      title = {Role of Bargaining in Marketing Channel Games of Quality  Choice and Profit Share},
      address = {2007-12},
      number = {1803-2016-142515},
      series = {FSWP},
      pages = {44},
      year = {2007},
      abstract = {Since the 1980s, increased concentrations across marketing  channels have
changed bargaining relationships between  retailers and manufacturers both in North
America and in  Europe. At the same time contract mechanisms within the  marketing
channels have become more complex and private  label market share have grown rapidly.
This paper Örst  investigates the implications of bargaining between  manufacturers and
retailers. The analysis applies to an  arbitrary number of manufacturers and retailers, and
holds  under general technology and product di§erentiation  conditions, assuming that each
retailer acts as a  monopolist on its own market. Under Nash bargaining, we  show that two
widely used types of contracts (quantity  forcing contracts and two-part-tari§ contracts) are
su¢  cient to obtain e¢ ciency in the channel conditionnally on  products speciÖcations but
importantly generate a di§erent  sharing of surplus. We then investigate the implications  for
non cooperative quality choices made before the  bargaining stage. We examine how the
bargaining power of  retailers and manufacturers a§ect the quantity, pricing and  quality
decisions. This provides useful insights into the  changing relationships between
manufacturers and retailers.  Our analysis helps explain the recent growth of private  labels,
exclusive products for retailers designed by  national brand manufacturers, the growing use
of side  payments and other emerging trade practices.},
      url = {http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/201521},
      doi = {https://doi.org/10.22004/ag.econ.201521},
}