@article{McCorriston:201443,
      recid = {201443},
      author = {McCorriston, Steve and Sheldon, Ian},
      title = {Tariff De-Escalation with Successive Oligopoly},
      address = {2009-01},
      number = {1803-2016-142468},
      series = {FSWP},
      pages = {30},
      year = {2009},
      abstract = {In this paper, we explore the issue of a simultaneous  reduction in tariffs at different
stages of a  vertically-related market where each stage is  oligopolistic. When
vertically-related markets are  characterized as a successive oligopoly, reducing  tariffs
by an equivalent amount on upstream and downstream  imports will have a differential
effect on market access  and hence profits at each stage due to a combination  of
horizontal and vertical effects. As a consequence, in  order to maintain parity between
the upstream and  downstream stages in terms of changes in domestic firms’  profits,
tariffs on downstream imports should be reduced  proportionately more than tariffs on
upstream imports. This  provides a rationale for tariff-reduction formulae aimed  at
reducing tariff escalation.},
      url = {http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/201443},
      doi = {https://doi.org/10.22004/ag.econ.201443},
}