@article{Schmitz:19980,
      recid = {19980},
      author = {Schmitz, Troy G. and Seale, James L., Jr.},
      title = {COUNTERVAILING DUTIES, ANTIDUMPING TARIFFS, AND THE BYRD  AMENDMENT: A WELFARE ANALYSIS},
      address = {2004},
      number = {377-2016-21031},
      series = {Selected Paper},
      pages = {20},
      year = {2004},
      abstract = {The so-called "Byrd Amendment" effectively empowers  producers and processors, who successfully petition the  U.S. government to impose ADCV duties on competing imports,  to keep the proceeds of those tariffs. We determine the  effect that the Amendment has on domestic producers,  consumers, and taxpayers. We derive the "optimum  antidumping tariff" that would maximize the welfare of  producers that receive payments under the Amendment. We  compare and contrast this newly derived optimal antidumping  tariff (that maximizes the sum of producer surplus and  tariff revenue) with the optimal revenue tariff (that  maximizes tariff revenue alone) and the optimal welfare  tariff (that maximizes the sum of consumer surplus,  producer surplus, and tariff revenue).},
      url = {http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/19980},
      doi = {https://doi.org/10.22004/ag.econ.19980},
}