000195718 001__ 195718
000195718 005__ 20210122074413.0
000195718 0247_ $$2doi$$a10.22004/ag.econ.195718
000195718 037__ $$a1784-2016-141901
000195718 041__ $$aeng
000195718 084__ $$aQ57
000195718 245__ $$aAccounting for enforcement is essential to improve the spatial allocation of marine restricted-use zoning systems
000195718 260__ $$c2014-01-09
000195718 269__ $$a2014-01-09
000195718 270__ $$mkatrina.davis@research.uwa.edu.au$$pDavis,   Katrina
000195718 300__ $$a27
000195718 336__ $$aWorking or Discussion Paper
000195718 490__ $$aWorking Paper
000195718 490__ $$a1406
000195718 500__ $$aPlease cite the peer-reviewed version of this working paper. The paper has been published as:
Davis, K., M. Kragt, S. Gelcich, S. Schilizzi, and D. Pannell. 2014. Accounting for Enforcement Costs in the Spatial Allocation of Marine Zones. Conservation Biology. DOI 10.1111/cobi.12358
000195718 500__ $$aPlease cite the peer-reviewed version of this working paper. The paper has been published as: Davis, K., M. Kragt, S. Gelcich, S. Schilizzi, and D. Pannell. 2015. Accounting for Enforcement Costs in the Spatial Allocation of Marine Zones. Conservation Biology. 29, 226-237. DOI 10.1111/cobi.12358
000195718 520__ $$aGrowing industrial and consumer demands are negatively affecting fish stocks, which are increasingly extracted above sustainable levels. Successful management of marine resources through restricted use zoning systems such as reserves and territorial user rights schemes relies on support from marine stakeholders; particularly coastal fishing communities. Restricted use zoning results in both management costs and benefits to stakeholders. To increase support for management decisions these need to be taken into account when designing optimal marine management. 
A linear spatial optimisation model was developed to identify zoning solutions which maximize fishers’ revenue, while meeting conservation targets. Targets were based on maximum population abundance levels for two invertebrate and three reef fish species in Chile. Revenue was maximised by allocating the study area to different management zones: no-take, territorial user rights for fishing (TURFs), or open access. Costs are incurred to enforce no-take and TURF areas; but enforcement results in higher species abundance by preventing poaching and overfishing. Several scenarios were analysed to determine the impact of enforcement on revenue. 
Results demonstrated net benefits from enforcement: revenue under scenarios with enforcement was approximately 50% higher than under scenarios without it; and enforced-TURF areas were preferentially selected over other zones. Enforcement costs are one of the chief reasons that fishers in the study area stop actively managing TURFS. However, our analysis demonstrates that the often hidden benefits of enforcement far exceed the visible costs. These findings highlight the importance of accounting for both the benefits and costs of management in marine spatial design; particularly as they relate to marine stakeholders.
000195718 650__ $$aEnvironmental Economics and Policy
000195718 6531_ $$aSpatial optimization
000195718 6531_ $$aconservation planning
000195718 6531_ $$alinear programming
000195718 6531_ $$amarine stakeholders
000195718 6531_ $$areserve design
000195718 6531_ $$aterritorial user rights
000195718 700__ $$aDavis, Katrina
000195718 700__ $$aPannell, David J.$$1https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5420-9908
000195718 700__ $$aKragt, Marit
000195718 700__ $$aGelcich, Stefan
000195718 700__ $$aSchilizzi, Steven
000195718 8564_ $$9ec48b8ea-235d-4069-a64c-01ff2201d30e$$s1862445$$uhttps://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/195718/files/WP1406_Davis%20et%20al_%20AccountingR.pdf
000195718 887__ $$ahttp://purl.umn.edu/195718
000195718 909CO $$ooai:ageconsearch.umn.edu:195718$$pGLOBAL_SET
000195718 912__ $$nSubmitted by Theresa Goh (theresa.goh@uwa.edu.au) on 2014-12-19T05:38:27Z
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  Previous issue date: 2014-01-09
000195718 913__ $$aLicense granted by Theresa Goh (theresa.goh@uwa.edu.au) on 2014-12-19T05:20:45Z (GMT):

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000195718 980__ $$a1784
000195718 982__ $$gUniversity of Western Australia, School of Agricultural and Resource Economics>Working Papers