



AgEcon SEARCH
RESEARCH IN AGRICULTURAL & APPLIED ECONOMICS

The World's Largest Open Access Agricultural & Applied Economics Digital Library

This document is discoverable and free to researchers across the globe due to the work of AgEcon Search.

Help ensure our sustainability.

Give to AgEcon Search

AgEcon Search
<http://ageconsearch.umn.edu>
aesearch@umn.edu

*Papers downloaded from **AgEcon Search** may be used for non-commercial purposes and personal study only. No other use, including posting to another Internet site, is permitted without permission from the copyright owner (not AgEcon Search), or as allowed under the provisions of Fair Use, U.S. Copyright Act, Title 17 U.S.C.*

THE RELEVANCE OF DISTRICT CONTEXTS IN THE UTILISATION OF RURAL DEVELOPMENT POLICIES: EXPERIENCE FROM ITALY

JEL classification: Q12, Q18, R58

Silvia Chiappini* and Daniela Toccaceli**

Abstract. *The agri-food sector is characterised by the presence of small companies organized into agri-food districts, recognised by the Italian law n. 228/01 as “virtuous models of territorial development”. Agri-food districts show considerable ability to capture and create value, with a positive impact on rural areas. This ability is sustained through the rural development policies of the EU, which aim at improving the competitiveness of farms and diversification of economic activity in rural areas. These*

opportunities, however, are not always well exploited by potential beneficiaries: the purpose of this article is to check the existence of a “district effect” in the implementation of rural development policies in Italy. To this end, the authors analyse demand for and funds obtained by farms, by comparing in-district and off-district farms.

Keywords: *rural development policies, district effect, policy utilisation funds, farms.*

1. Introduction

The debate about the persistence of local systems of production (LSP) is currently relevant, as these systems show a high ability to compete in an increasingly global scenario¹. This can be observed also in the agri-food sector and in rural areas, where the main characteristic is the presence of small companies organized in agri-food districts (Terluin and Vanema, 2003; Iacoponi, 2002; Brunori, 2003; Fourcade, 2006). As a matter of fact, LSP highlight a remarkable capacity for persistence and sustainability, even in an increasingly globalized and competitive scenario, due to a strong association between the productive and the socio-institutional components. The persistence of local production systems has been widely explained: researchers underline the local systems' competitiveness through the action of “atmospheric”, Marshallian-like phenomena, the flexible organisation of production (Pyke and Sengenberger, 1992), the presence of untraded interdependencies (Storper, 1997) and, consequently, the significant reduction in transaction costs (Becker, 1981; Pollack, 1985; Ben-Porath, 1982).

* University of Cassino and Southern Lazio - Department of Economics and Law (Italy).

** University of Florence - Department of Economics and Enterprise (Italy).

¹ A local system of production is a territorially-based, endogenous model of development, where small family firms achieve adequate economic performance, due to the availability of tangible and, above all, intangible assets, which produce a particular model of organisation, commonly called “districts” (Becattini, 2004).

The literature highlights the role of the performance of agricultural districts (Brasili and Fanfani, 2010; Becattini, 1990), the dynamics of local consumption (Crevoisier and Jeannerait, 2009), the current reproducibility of the model not only in agriculture, but also in consumption (see for example the gastronomic districts evaluated by Bonnard, 2013). A general item of research concerns the persistence of agricultural and rural districts through time. On this topic, a relatively neglected field of research is the ability to gain access to rural development policies as a factor contributing to the endurance of territorial systems of production. Recent policies for rural areas have therefore stressed territorial dimensions: the neo-institutional perspective of local development (Amin and Thrift, 1994) proposes ascendant policy approaches, or *bottom-up*, in which the responsibility for territorial development is totally assigned to local subjects, according to EU guidelines. Community-led local development approaches, recently introduced within the framework of the future plans for rural development in the period 2014-2020, confirm these perspectives, by encouraging the involvement of local stakeholders as drivers for rural development².

As a consequence, rural development policies propose ascending and bottom-up approaches, where the responsibility for territorial development is taken by local actors, in a framework aiming to promote endogenous development models. This policy ensures resource availability that, if well exploited, can generate considerable opportunities for farms and for local development.

EU's rural development policy is a revealing example of this type of approach: available resources operate on two essential dimensions of rural development: the sectorial dimension, through measures for the competitiveness of farms, and the territorial one, in the promotion of an endogenous and integrated model of development (De Castro *et al.*, 2011; Berriet-Sollicec *et al.*, 2009; Hodge and Midmore, 2008).

The access (and its relative cost) to economic policies for local development is a particularly interesting theme of analysis; more precisely, a relevant topic for territorial production systems concerns higher propensity for gaining access to funds provided by rural development policies for businesses in a district context as compared with that for off-district ones. The underlying hypothesis is that what is called socialization space in district contexts engenders higher levels of access to rural development policy. This is due to the classic marshallian district ingredients: reduced costs of access to policies, for example the costs of bureaucracy³ or cognitive limitations, that cut down transaction costs⁴. Have these elements the same relevance in district areas as in off-district territories? This paper attempts to analyze this issue by placing it in a territorial perspective, linked to the attitude towards adopting policies for rural development. The aim is to verify if the district atmosphere also produces regional differences in the economic and market policies. We argue that the location in district areas fosters higher access to policies.

After a brief survey of the Italian legislation about rural and agri-food districts, and after a brief methodological note, the paper continues by demonstrating the differences in the market access policies, with particular reference to inclusion or exclusion from districts (district/off-district). Some interpretative hypotheses and conclusions will end the paper.

² See the European Network for Rural Development.

³ DG AGRI 2007.

⁴ The reduction of transaction costs in district contexts has been well demonstrated in literature. See, among others, Dei Ottati, 1986, Serarols *et al.* (2008).

2. Agricultural districts in Italy

The debate about agri-food districts (ADs) in Italy raised in the early 90's (Iacoponi, 1990, Cecchi, 1992), has been led by the success of the studies about industrial districts⁵ (IDs) and the introduction of the law for IDs⁶. It continued during the following decade (Pacciani, 1997, 2003; Becattini, 2000; Iacoponi, 2000, 2002; Angeli, 2000; De Benedictis, 2000; De Filippis 2000; Albisinni, 2002; Carbone, 2000; Masini, 2001), up to the introduction of the law for ADs⁷.

The Italian authorities introduced this tool pursuing a dual purpose⁸: a support for farm competitiveness and an incentive for integrated development in rural areas. In fact, in order to shape ADs, the Italian government has looked at IDs as well as at Leader methodology (EU Rural Development Policy) and even at the French *Contrat de Pays* experience (Albisinni, 2002; Toccaceli, 2012).

The effect of devolution from central to regional governments is that ADs are regulated and recognized by Regions in different ways. Nevertheless, a common (although implicit) methodological pattern can be read through the different regional laws and two basic components are highlighted. At a local level, the partnership among different local actors (farms, firms, municipalities, and civil society), stimulates higher participation in rural development programs. Rural governance also plays the lever role in this socio-economic mechanism in different European experiences (Torre and Rallet, 2005; Angeon and Lardon, 2008). The second component refers to the institutional level, and concerns the (formal or informal) insertion of district projects into planning, programming and implementing policies, particularly at a regional level⁹. In this territorial-institutional mechanism, governance again plays a lever role bringing better coordination in government actions (Jessop, 2006) and a change for more successful implementation of policies (Stoker, 1998).

The expected results are both higher levels of effectiveness and efficiency in public spending (or in policy application), a growth in rural economy, and often a better management of environment resources.

This means that when an AD is identified and recognized by a Region, this is only the beginning of its path for achieving those expected results. So, ADs which are not following their own path nor getting results can be called "not virtuous" or "paper" districts¹⁰.

Regarding the "district effect" (DE), there is a wide difference between IDs and ADs. Much literature has been generated on IDs,¹¹ with the aim of understanding the real causes behind their higher efficiency in productivity and persistence. Different paths were tested, both in accordance with the "new economic geography" approach, which considers the location of economic activity

⁵ An industrial district is "a social and territorial entity that is characterized by the active presence of both a community of people and a group of enterprises in a natural and historically determined area" (Becattini, 1990).

⁶ Law 317/1991 article n. 36.

⁷ Legislative Decree 228/0, article n. 13.

⁸ Both are defined as *local production systems* (such as IDs). Agri-food districts "are characterized by significant local economic presence and interrelationship and interdependence of farms, as well as one or more certified products and safeguarded in accordance with applicable Community or national regulations, or by traditional or typical products." Rural Districts "are characterized by the homogenous historical setting and territorial identity derived from the integration between agricultural activities and other local activities, and the production of specific goods or services, in accordance with traditions and natural and territorial vocations".

⁹ In Italy, European structural policies are planned and implemented by Regions.

¹⁰ Some reasons, but not exhaustive, for district failure are analysed in this paper.

¹¹ General synthesis in Becattini and Musotti (2004), and in Becattini *et al.*, (2009). Italian examples: Signorini (2000) and Sforzi (2009).

over space, and a micro-economic approach, which focuses the firms' production functions in an off- and in-district area.

A concept of district effect for ADs was introduced by Pacciani (2003), with regard to a macroeconomic effect resulting at a local level in the first Italian experience of rural district in Tuscan Maremma. In this case, particular attention was paid to the capacity for organising demand and supply of financial resources in order to implement a well organised block of entrepreneurial projects. On the other hand, this means that a significant effect was produced regarding policy implementation.

District effects for ADs have been less analysed in recent literature: it has been demonstrated with respect to the economic performance of farms and organizational models; however, little attention has been dedicated to the ability to obtain funds through rural development policies.

In this paper, we try to highlight the differences between in-district- and off-district areas located in the Region of Lazio and to evaluate the *district effect* in the access to rural development policies

3. Materials and methods

In this paper, we define application of policies as the ability to obtain funds from 2007-2013 Rural Development Plans (Rdp). The reference to rural development policies leads us to compare intra-regional areas, ruled by Rdp's regional context. Therefore, the text presents the results of empirical analysis conducted in the Lazio Region, in Italy. This study looks into the adoption of policies by farms operating in districts compared with off-district farms. More precisely, the research analyses all the agricultural farms located in the recognized districts of the provinces of Rome, Latina and Frosinone.

The following officially recognized districts have been considered:

- *agri-food quality districts*:
 - in the Province of Rome, the Agri-food District of Excellence of the Roman Castles and Prenestini Mountains (it includes 24 municipalities);
 - in the Province of Latina, Agri-food Quality District of Fruit and Vegetable (it includes 15 municipalities);
- *rural district*:
 - in the Province of Frosinone, Rural District and Agro-energy Valley of the Latins (it includes 20 municipalities).

All farms located in the remaining communes in the provinces and outside the district areas, have been included in the analysis as off-district areas, and more precisely:

- the comparison with the fruit and vegetable district of Latina has been carried out with fruit and vegetables farms located in the areas classified as A and B by the regional plans for rural development¹²;
- agricultural farms located in the district of the Roman Castles and Prenestini Mountains have been compared with other agricultural farms of central and southern Latium, located in A and B areas of the regional rural development plan;

¹² The municipalities of the agri-food district of latina are prevalingly located in similar areas (A+B), as well as the municipalities of the Roman Castles district.

- to compare farms of the agro-energy district, we have taken into account all farms located in rural areas, that is area C and D of the rural development plan.

Before moving on to empirical analysis, it is appropriate to highlight the peculiarities that emerged due to the amendments of the Lazio Region. The scenario has 3 different developmental stages of the district:

- 1) the Agri-food District of Excellence of the Roman Castles and Prenestini Mountains (in the Province of Rome), is operating at a local level, which corresponds to a local community identity. It is a clear example of a multi-specialized district, which started its activity with the launch of Rdp 2007-2013. In addition, the district has been successfully carrying out integrated rural development projects, thanks to the good organization and relational capacity between farms, institutions and territory;
- 2) the Agri-food Quality District of Fruit and Vegetable (in Latina) is an active and evolving district;
- 3) the Rural District and Agro-energy Valley of the Latins (in Frosinone) is a district which has not yet been started, but has only been recognized by the regional law.

To verify the *district effect* with reference to the exploitation of rural development policies, we will analyse the number of funded farms, distributed according to the measures of the Rdp for the period 2007-2013; we have considered the measures according to the Ist and IIIrd axes, which are measures of investment. All the available measures for single farms have been taken into account, as provided by the single axes of the Rdp in the programming period 2007-2013. Our data refers to the end of October 2013. Specifically, the Ist axis of the Rdp focuses on improving the competitiveness of the agricultural and forestry sector, with the purpose of supporting each measure to increase sector competitiveness. The IIIrd axis addresses the issue of quality of life in rural areas and diversification of the rural economy with particular attention to areas risking marginalization or abandonment¹³.

An index of association is calculated, in order to bring out the associations between the variables discussed, aiming to verify the degree of attraction between the political and territorial context. The assumption is that the in-district area is more attractive than the off-district areas, in terms of obtaining funds from Rdp. In this case, the degree of association may be estimated by an index which compares the incidence of the specific class with respect to a particular response, with the overall incidence on the sample. The index is the ratio between the two incidence rates:

$$A_{i,j} = \frac{n_{i,j} / n_{.j}}{n_{i.} / n}$$

Where:

- $A_{i,j}$ is an indicator of the degree of association between the dimensional class i and answer j ,
- $n_{i,j}$ is the number of farms that fall in the size class i that have responded positively to the question j ,
- $n_{i.}$ is the number of farms that fall in the size class i and n is the total number of farms.

¹³ RDP 2007-2013, Lazio Region

- n_i is the number of farms that fall in the size class i and n is the total number of farms.
- $n_{..}$ is the total number of farms.

The indicator takes on a value greater than 1 in cases of positive association. Finally, in order to emphasise possible district effects, we will put forward a comparison between the motivation in applying policy referring to farms located inside the district area and farms outside it. To this end, a questionnaire was proposed to a sample of farms. The sample was extracted through a self-weighting sampling plan: a total of 264 farms (146 farms outside the district and 118 farms within the district) answered the questionnaire; 83% are considered to be valid answers.

4. Results

Table 1 highlights the main results¹⁴, by comparing district and off-district areas: off-district farms show a greater tendency to utilise policy measures, the only exception being that of the fruit and vegetable district in the province of Latina. On the other hand, 8.9% of farms in the agri-food districts of Rome gained access to Rdp funds, against the 14.3% of farms in off-district areas. In the rural district of Frosinone, the share of access was 4.1% against 7.1% of other farms located in rural areas.

Therefore, a *district effect* limited to the case of agri-food district of Latina has been found¹⁵. On the other hand, the two districts in the provinces of Rome and Frosinone get lower levels of funding with respect to off-district areas.

The association index confirms what has been previously stated. A positive index of association in the agri-food district of the province of Latina emerges, while a substantial indifference in the district of Rome is evident.

¹⁴ The authors thank Prof. Luca Bartoli for suggestions about data.

¹⁵ This result confirms previous empirical analysis (Bartoli *et al.*, 2010).

Tab. 1 - Adoption of RDPs by district and off-district areas (number of farms)

Area	No	Yes	Total
Agri-food fruit and vegetable district (Latina)	2,912	693	3,605
Agri-food district (Rome)	3,695	362	4,057
Rural district (Frosinone)	6,216	268	6,484
Outside agri-food district	7,298	1,222	8,520
- fruit and vegetable farms	624	118	742
Outside rural district	31,750	2,413	34,163
Total	51,871	4,958	56,829
Row percentages			
Agri-food fruit and vegetable district (Latina)	80.8	19.2	100.0
Agri-food district (Rome)	91.1	8.9	100.0
Rural district (Frosinone)	95.9	4.1	100.0
Outside agri-food district	85.7	14.3	100.0
- fruit and vegetable farms	84.1	15.9	100.0
Outside rural district	92.9	7.1	100.0
Total	91.3	8.7	100.0
Association index			
Agri-food fruit and vegetable district (Latina)	0.9	2.2	
Agri-food district (Rome)	1.0	1.0	
Rural district (Frosinone)	1.1	0.5	
Outside agri-food district	0.9	1.6	
- fruit and vegetables farms	0.9	1.8	
Outside rural district	1.0	0.8	

Source: own calculations.

From the first empirical analysis, a sort of “territorial indifference” emerges, due to the lack of a systematic district effect. More detailed information can be gathered from the average amount obtained by farms (tables 2 and 3): 1,344 farms obtained funds from the first axis (total expenditure equal to € 118,421,355.00), while only 112 obtained funds from the IIIrd axis¹⁶ (€ 11,924,878.00). Our data on average sums countervail previous information. A considerable sum of money has been granted to district contexts of Latina and Rome, thus providing partial evidence for a stronger district-effect as compared with the access of farms.

As far as the Ist axis is concerned, the highest average amount obtained by farms is located in the agri-food district of Latina, followed by the district of Rome. That means these two districts have proved attractive to funds from rural development policies; on the contrary, off-district attract higher average sums as compared with district contexts. This appears to show that there is a lack of specific financial assistance for implementing the programme in the district, even with programming from “the top” of the mesh of the districts on this portion of territory.

¹⁶ As well-known, the total available funds are higher for the first axis.

Tab. 2 - Funding streams and funds obtained from RDP by axis (number of farms)

Area	Ist Axis	IIIrd Axis
Agri-food fruit and vegetable district (Latina)	369	18
Agri-food district (Rome)	70	4
Rural district (Frosinone)	81	7
Outside agri-food district	215	23
- fruit and vegetables farms	23	4
Outside rural district	609	60
Total	1,344	112
Funds obtained		
Agri-food fruit and vegetable district (Latina)	€ 44,062,734.00	€ 1,858,173.00
Agri-food district (Rome)	€ 6,826,211.00	€ 291,863.00
Rural district (Frosinone)	€ 6,271,820.00	€ 371,260.00
Outside agri-food district	€ 22,367,295.00	€ 4,980,887.00
- fruit and vegetable farms	€ 1,593,891.00	€ 580,854.00
Outside rural district	€ 38,893,295.00	€ 4,422,695.00
Total	€ 118,421,355.00	€ 11,924,878.00


Source: RDP 2007-2013, Lazio

Tab. 3 - Average funds per farm RDP by axis

Area	Ist Axis	IIIrd Axis
Agri-food fruit and vegetable district (Latina)	€ 119,411.20	€ 103,231.83
Agri-food district (Rome)	€ 97,517.30	€ 72,965.75
Rural district (Frosinone)	€ 77,429.88	€ 53,037.14
Outside agri-food district	€ 104,033.93	€ 216,560.30
- fruit and vegetable farms	€ 69,299.61	€ 145,213.50
Outside rural district	€ 63,864.20	€ 73,711.58
Total	€ 88,111.13	€ 106,472.13

Source: own calculations.

Figure 1 synthesises the results and confirms the relevance of district contexts in just one district and only for measures of the first axis. On the contrary, as far as the third axis is concerned, higher average sums have been gained by off-district farms. This is coherent with the sectorial characteristics of the district considered. With the exception of the rural district of “Valle del Sacco”, the other districts are agri-food districts: as a consequence, higher inclination to support farm competitiveness (measure of the Ist axis) is revealed.



Two considerations stem from the foregoing analysis: the first is related to the low percentage of farms which have gained access to Rdp funds: it is necessary further to investigate the reasons for which policy has not been applied (see next paragraph). The second concerns the unclear influence of the district context in the access to Rdp funds. Only in one district a full district effect is evident (percentage of farms and average funds obtained higher than off-district contexts), while in another district a partial district effect is evident; finally in the district of Frosinone, no district effect has been detected. In the next paragraph we will call this a non-virtuous district.

To obtain more information about the access to policy, the next paragraph investigates the causes impeding full access to policies for farms.


4.1 Reasons for not applying policies

The reasons why farms fail in applying for funding can be classified into three areas:

- the high level of transaction costs: the use of transaction costs (TC) to explain the access to rural development policy is strictly linked to informational markets and to the costs of bureaucracy. To this end, we put forward Dahlman's scheme (Dahlman, 1979) by dividing up TC into two categories: *ex ante* and *ex post* transaction costs. In our framework, the application for funds is like a transaction whose *ex ante* costs are linked to search for essential information to gain the funds. The costs of bureaucracy come to light after the application and are classifiable as *ex post* TC. The long delay in actually obtaining the funds completes this scenario; it also increases the total amount of costs of access to policy;
- low interest in access to Rdp (or no interest at all), due to negative past experience or other unspecified factors;
- lack of requirements such as, for example, age, farm location etc.

Geographical differences may be found in figure 2.

Fig. 2 - Reasons for not applying policies (% farms)



Source: own calculations

The absence of interest in applying policies is certainly the most important reason for about half of the farms in all areas, without any difference between district and off-district contexts. Transaction costs are the second reason for non-application in district areas (34%), followed by the absence of requirements for application; on the other hand, in the off-district territories, the second reason is the absence of requirements, while the transaction costs become the third leading cause of non-application. This data is significant when the transaction cost is expected to be significantly lower in 'real' districts.

A more detailed analysis suggests, however, that results should be examined distinguishing non-virtuous districts (or 'paper districts') from the "pure district" and, secondly, within the transaction costs, those relating to bureaucracy (which explain the inefficiencies of Local Public Administration) and those due to information asymmetry (highlighting the costs of information). Table 4 details our results.

Tab. 4 - Reasons for not applying policies

Reasons		No district	Virtuous district	"Paper" district
Transaction costs	Costs of bureaucracy	11.1	21.4	21.7
	Information asymmetry	4.8	0	16.7
Absence of requirements		32.4	21.5	11.6
No interest		51.7	57.1	50
Total		100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: own calculations.

By distinguishing between costs of bureaucracy and cost-related asymmetric information, some differences emerge. As a matter of fact, in the "pure district", the costs of access to market information are practically zero, while those of the bureaucracy are relevant and even higher than

in off-district areas. As evident from the table, the absence of Marshallian atmosphere characterises the difference between the paper district and the pure district (16.7% of informational asymmetry). Therefore, transaction costs are greatly accentuated by the lack of availability of information that penalizes local farms, with higher costs than those in the areas outside the district.

5. Conclusions

The paper has analysed the relevance of district contexts in the access to rural development policies; however, this is not observed to be uniform in the recognized districts: in fact, some gaps in the applications for Rdp were evident, with high transaction costs or bureaucracy. On the other hand, in pure districts, a genuine Marshallian atmosphere favours attraction of funds and avoidance of the aforementioned problems. This aspect detracts from the idea that territories exist as such, and it supports the hypothesis expressed by Colletis and Salle (2009), referring to the dynamic combination of three dimensions of proximity: spatial, organizational and institutional. The “district effect” becomes evident through the action of these three types of proximity, which allow a better use of the opportunities provided by the policy and determine the paths of sustainable development that do not neglect the history of the district.

On the other hand, a common element that links the district and off-district contexts is related to the high percentage of farms that are reluctant to apply: the motivations of those who do not apply are lack of interest, high costs, absence of necessary requirements, elements that should be drawn to the attention of policymakers.

Our results may have normative consequences: the presence of “district effects” suggests empowering, consolidation of the intangible ingredients of district especially through the political processes of relational planning. It suggests, moreover, some caution in identifying territorial district in order to avoid “district-mania”, because, in many cases they are recognized according to policy logic, rather than a real presence of the classical attributes. That could give rise to situations of failure of rural governance. The call for a major prudence in identification of a district should be strongly considered by regional policy makers: in the future programming period 2014-2020, the relevance of district elements is evident. The importance of clustering of enterprises, together with the relevance of networks both of firms and of community-led local development, is strongly emphasised in the recently published regulation n. 1305/2013. As a consequence, a careful evaluation of the effective ingredients shaping organizational models of rural territories could be of help in addressing methods of district recognition, in order to avoid further cases of failure of rural governance.

REFERENCES

- Albisinni F. (2002), “Comunità locale e spazio rurale nelle regole dell’agricoltura e per l’agricoltura”, *Scritti in onore di Giovanni Galloni*, I, Roma.
- Amin, A., Thrift N. (1994), Living in the global, in: *Globalization, Institutions and Regional Development in Europe*, Amin A., Thrift N. (eds.), Oxford, Oxford University Press.
- Angeli L. (2000), L’atmosfera di Artimino e noi economisti agrari, *La Questione Agraria*, n. 3.
- Ageon V., Lardon S. (2008), Participation and governance in territorial development projects: the ‘territory game’ as local project leadership system, *International Journal of Sustainable Development*, XI (2-4), pp. 262-281.

- Bartoli L., De Rosa M., Sabbatini M. (2010), Farm family business: the relevance of district-contexts in the consumption of rural development policies, *Electronic Journal of Family Business Studies*, IV, n. 1, pp. 71-85.
- Basili C., Fanfani R. (2010), The Agrifood Districts in the New Millennium, 4th International European Forum on System Dynamics and Innovation in Food Networks, Igls/Innsbruck, February 8-12.
- Becattini G. (1990), The Marshallian industrial district as a socio-economic notion. Pyke F. *et al.* (eds.), 1990, pp. 37-51.
- Becattini G. (2000), Distrettualità fra industria e agricoltura, *La Questione Agraria*, n. 2.
- Becattini G. (2004), *Industrial districts, a new approach to industrial change*, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar.
- Becattini G., Musotti F., (2004), Measuring the “district effect”: reflections on the literature. Becattini G., (eds.) *Industrial districts: a new approach to industrial change*. Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, pp. 88-111.
- Becattini G., Bellandi M., De Propriis L. (2009), *Handbook on Industrial Districts*, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar.
- Becker G. (1981). *A treatise on family*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press.
- Ben-Porath, Y. (1982), The F-Connection: Families, Friends, and Firms and the Organization of Exchange, *Population Development Review*, VI, n. 1, pp. 1-30.
- Berriet-Sollicec M., Leroy A., Trouvé A. (2009), Territorialiser la politique agricole pour plus de cohésion, *Economie Rurale* n. 313-314, pp. 129-146.
- Bonnard Q. (2013), Les district gastronomiques, Lth meeting ASRDLF, Mons, 8-11 July, Belgium.
- Basili C., Fanfani R. (2010), The agrifood districts in the new Millennium, *Rivista di Economia e Diritto Agroalimentare*, n. 2, pp. 153-178.
- Brunori G. (2003), Sistemi agricoli territoriali e competitività, in: SIDEA, *La competitività dei sistemi agricoli italiani*, Padova, Franco Angeli.
- Carbone A. (2000), Mobilità sociale e produzioni di “elite” in agricoltura, *La Questione Agraria*, n. 2.
- Cecchi C. (1992), Per una definizione di distretto agricolo e distretto agroindustriale, *La Questione Agraria*, XLIV, pp. 81-107.
- Colletis G., Salle M. (2009), Eléments pour la construction d’une ontologie du territoire, XLVIth meeting ASRDLF, Clermont Ferrand, 6-8 July, France.
- Crevoisier O., Jeannerait H. (2009), Les dynamiques territoriales de connaissance: relations multilcales et ancrage regional, *Revue d’économie industrielle*, IV, n. 128, pp. 77-99.
- Dahlman C.J. (1979), The problem of externality, *Journal of Law and Economics*, XXII, n. 1, pp. 141-162.
- De Benedictis M. (2000), Economia agraria e distrettualità, *La Questione Agraria*, n. 2.
- De Filippis F. (2000). “Distrettualità e politica agraria”, *La Questione Agraria*, n. 2.
- De Castro P., Adinolfi F., Capitanio F., Di Falco S. (2011), Building a New Framework for the Common Agricultural Policy: a Responsibility Towards the Overall Community, *Eurochoices*, X, Issue 1.
- Dei Ottati G. (1986), Distretto industriale, problemi delle transazioni e mercato comunitario: prime considerazioni, *Economia e Politica Industriale*, n.51.
- DG AGRI (2007) Study to assess the administrative burden on farms arising from the CAP, Final Report, October.
- Hodge I., Midmore P. (2008), Models of rural development and approaches to analysis, evaluation and decision-making, *Économie rurale* 307, 23-38.
- Iacoponi L. (1990), Distretto industriale marshalliano e forma di organizzazione delle imprese in agricoltura, *Rivista di Economia Agraria*, n. 4, pp. 711-744.
- Iacoponi L. (2000), Distrettualità agricola: una difficile (e breve) navigazione tra opposti paradigmi economici, *La Questione Agraria*, n. 4.
- Iacoponi, L. (2002), Dal distretto agricolo al distretto rurale, in Valorosi F. (eds.) *Lo sviluppo del sistema agricolo nell’economia post-industriale*, pp. 65-91, Milano, Franco Angeli,

- Jessop, B., (2006), Governance, Fallimenti della Governance e Meta-Governance, by Cavazzani A., Gaudio G. e Sivini S. (2006), *Politiche, Governance e Innovazioni per le Aree Rurali*, pp. 189-210, Napoli, (Studi & Ricerche INEA), Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane.
- Masini S. (2001), Dall'impresa al distretto: per una lettura territoriale dello sviluppo dell'agricoltura, *Diritto e Giurisprudenza Agraria e dell'Ambiente*, anno X, n. 9/10.
- Pacciani A. (1997), Il progetto "Maremma Distretto Rurale d'Europa, atti dell'Accademia dei Georgofili, Anno 1997, XLIV, Firenze, Industrie Grafiche Fiorentine.
- Pacciani A. (2003), La Maremma Distretto Rurale: un nuovo modello di sviluppo nella consapevolezza della propria identità, Grosseto, Editrice Il mio Amico.
- Pyke, F., W. Sengenberger (1992), *Industrial districts and local economic regeneration*, ILO.
- Pollack, R. (1985), A Transaction Cost Approach to Families and Households, *Journal of Economic Literature*, XXIII, n. 2, pp. 581-608.
- Serarols i Tarres, C., Co, M.J., Spohn, D. (2008), A transaction cost approach to analysing industrial districts, *International Entrepreneurship and Management Journal*, IV (2), pp. 235-252.
- Signorini L. F., (2000), *Lo sviluppo locale. Un'indagine della Banca d'Italia sui distretti industriali*, Roma, Donzelli.
- Stoker G. (1998), Governance as theory: five propositions, *International Social Science Journal*, L, n. 1.
- Storper M. (1997), *The Regional World*, New York, Guilford.
- Terluin, I.J., Vanema G. (2003), Towards regional differentiation of rural development policy in the EU, *Agricultural Economics Research Institute (LEI)*, The Hague.
- Toccaceli D. (2012), Dai distretti alle reti. Distretti in agricoltura nell'interpretazione delle Regioni e le prospettive verso il 2020.
- Torre A., Rallet A. (2005), Proximity and Localization, *Regional Studies*, XXXIX.I, pp. 47-59.