@article{Gow:176212,
      recid = {176212},
      author = {Gow, Hamish R. and Streeter, Deborah H. and Swinnen, Johan  F.M.},
      title = {How private contract enforcement mechanisms can succeed  where public institutions fail: the case of Juhocukor a.s.},
      journal = {Agricultural Economics: The Journal of the International  Association of Agricultural Economists},
      address = {2000-09},
      number = {968-2016-75897},
      pages = {14},
      year = {2000},
      abstract = {The enforcement of contracts is necessary for efficient  exchange and investment in economic activities. Contracts  can be enforced
through a variety of mechanisms, both  public and private. However, in many developing and  transitional countries these
public institutions are either  absent or ineffective in ensuring contract enforcement.  Under such conditions, private enforcement
mechanisms may  provide a suitable replacement for public enforcement  institutions. This may be done externally through a
third  party or internally through self-enforcing agreements. This  paper analyzes the use of "self-enforcing" arrangements  or
"internal" private enforcement mechanisms. Using a case  study of an agri-business in a transition economy-  Juhocukor a.s.,
a Slovakian sugar processor- we show that  the use of "internal" private contract enforcement  mechanisms can have a significant
positive effect on output  and efficiency for both partners to the exchange  transaction in an environment characterized
by the absence  or ineffectiveness of public enforcement institutions.©  2000 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.},
      url = {http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/176212},
      doi = {https://doi.org/10.22004/ag.econ.176212},
}