@article{Giannakas:175327,
      recid = {175327},
      author = {Giannakas, Konstantinos and Fulton, Murray},
      title = {The economics of coupled farm subsidies under costly and  imperfect enforcement},
      journal = {Agricultural Economics: The Journal of the International  Association of Agricultural Economists},
      address = {2000-01},
      number = {968-2016-75748},
      pages = {16},
      year = {2000},
      abstract = {This study relaxes the assumption of perfect and costless  policy enforcement found in traditional agricultural  policy
analysis and introduces enforcement costs and  cheating into the economic analysis of output subsidies.  Policy design and
implementation is modeled in this paper  as a sequential game between the regulator who decides on  the level of intervention,
an enforcement agency that  determines the level of policy enforcement, and the farmer  who makes the production and cheating
decisions. Analytical  results show that farmer compliance is not the natural  outcome of self-interest and complete deterrence  of
cheating is not economically efficient. The analysis  also shows that enforcement costs and cheating change the  welfare effects
of output subsidies, the efficiency of the  policy instrument in redistributing income, the level of  government intervention that
transfers a given surplus to  agricultural producers, the socially optimal income  redistribution, and the social welfare from
intervention.  ©2000 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.},
      url = {http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/175327},
      doi = {https://doi.org/10.22004/ag.econ.175327},
}