@article{Alston:174973,
      recid = {174973},
      author = {Alston, Julian M. and Smith, Vincent H. and Acquaye,  Albert K.A. and Hosseini, Safdar},
      title = {Least-cost cheap-food policies: some implications of  international food aid},
      journal = {Agricultural Economics: The Journal of the International  Association of Agricultural Economists},
      address = {1999-05},
      number = {968-2016-75756},
      pages = {12},
      year = {1999},
      abstract = {Many low-income countries pursue cheap-food policies in  which consumers pay subsidized prices for bread, rice and  other
staples. This paper addresses the issue of why  different governments select different food subsidy  policies, using multiple
instruments rather than a simple  across-the-board subsidy to provide consumers with access  to cheap food. It examines the
optimal structure of  cheap-food policies in the context of a partial equilibrium  model in which the country may be large in
trade, and is  able to combine import subsidies or tariffs, and output  taxes or subsidies, to transfer income to consumers  through
the market. The model allows for a marginal  opportunity cost of government revenues greater than one  dollar. In addition, in
the model, food aid from overseas  may be either given away to the consumer, or given to the  government for subsequent sale
in the domestic market. The  results indicate that only by happenstance will a country  choose to use a pure consumption
subsidy or a pure import  subsidy to transfer income to consumers. In addition, an  increase in international food aid does not
necessarily  lead the government to reduce producer and consumer prices  for a commodity.© 1999 Elsevier Science B.V. All
rights  reserved.},
      url = {http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/174973},
      doi = {https://doi.org/10.22004/ag.econ.174973},
}