@article{Barrett:174962,
      recid = {174962},
      author = {Barrett, Christopher B.},
      title = {The microeconomics of the developmental paradox: on the  political economy of food price policy},
      journal = {Agricultural Economics: The Journal of the International  Association of Agricultural Economists},
      address = {1999-03},
      number = {968-2016-75548},
      pages = {14},
      year = {1999},
      abstract = {A longstanding puzzle in comparative economics is the  'developmental paradox', the tendency for government  support for
agriculture to increase with national income  and to decrease with the proportion of economic activity  and of the population in
agriculture. This paper offers a  microeconomic explanation for that puzzle. It establishes  analytically the microeconomic basis
for coalition  alignments with respect to food price policy, then  numerically simulates the comparative static effects  of
alternative food policies on coalition structure. A  parsimonious household model applied to a heterogeneously  endowed
society demonstrates how variation in individual  welfare effects might beget distinct coalitions in the  debate over food price
policy and how those policies are  inextricably linked to land, population, and technology  policies in food agriculture.
Moreover, coalition  alignments on particular policy debates are path-dependent.  In particular, food price policy creates its own
political  support. © 1999 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.},
      url = {http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/174962},
      doi = {https://doi.org/10.22004/ag.econ.174962},
}