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# MAJOR THEMES IN OUR FOREIGN POLICY

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American aims can be grouped under three headings. The first is security—the preservation of our own safety. The second is the creation and the maintenance of a tolerable world order. The third is the pursuit of a better life for all men. The three objectives are interdependent, and it is quite clear that we shall never get very far in one of these areas unless at the same time we are making progress in the other two.

What prevents us from moving more quickly in these directions? There is no simple answer. Some would say that the difficulty lies in the frailties of man—in his aggressive tendencies, his greed, his cruelty, his lust for power. Others would point out flaws in human societies—their raw nationalism, or the human exploitation that they tolerate.

These are matters for the social and political philosopher. Men have cooperative as well as competitive instincts, and that interdependence may be as powerful a factor in the future of man as divisive group rivalry. If this should not be the case we are inevitably doomed to a frightful Armageddon.

## PRESERVATION OF SECURITY

I would suggest that free governments offer far more hope for the ultimate supremacy of man's constructive instincts than the totalitarian regimes existing beside them. The free world must act to preserve its freedom if the options of progress are to continue to remain available to us. There is in fact a potential—perhaps an actual—conflict between the Communist sector and the non-Communist areas of the world. And by virtue of our size, strength, and fortune, it is our responsibility to exercise leadership in the free world's resistance to those who would subvert and destroy it.

We do not seek to fulfill our responsibilities by dominating others. We are not crusading against Communist governments where they exist. But neither can we permit Communist states to press their own campaigns of conquest down a one-way street of non-resistance to an ultimate triumph. If the first purpose of our foreign policy is national security, surely here is the ground on which we must preserve it.

Sometimes we are accused of being mesmerized by an imaginary Communist menace. Some of our foreign friends have argued with us that communism, at least in Europe, was acquiring the mellowness of maturity; that it was becoming respectable and even a bit bourgeois; that by building up contacts between East and West we could hasten the day when we no longer need to fear Communist aggression.

But the accent must be on prudence. We must not forget that a regime which calls for peaceful coexistence can suddenly precipitate a Cuban missile crisis. Communist states differ from one another, it is true; but as the Secretary of State has remarked, they differ in the method of carrying out their goal of world domination, not in the end itself.

I hope you will read the revealing statement of Chinese Communist Defense Minister Lin Piao, issued September 3 in Peking. It is an astonishing diatribe which starts from Mao Tse Tung's brutal thesis that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun," and notes his contention that "the seizure of power by armed force, the settlement of the issues by war, is the central task and the highest form of revolution." The statement as a whole is a summons to the so-called peoples' revolutionary movement in the rest of the world to reduce North America and Western Europe by encirclement and conquest. The statement attacks what it calls "Khrushchev revisionists," too, for alleged appeasement of the United States, but this can provide only limited comfort.

Hence, the first aim of our policy—the preservation of our own security—continues to require an alert and resolute response to Communist aggression wherever and however it occurs. We cannot accept piecemeal encirclement. We need a full spectrum of the instruments of power, running from the thermonuclear deterrent which safeguards us from massive intercontinental attack to the counterinsurgency weapons which must be used against so-called "wars of national liberation." We have no desire to be the gendarme of the world, but we have a responsibility to ourselves and to others which we cannot shirk.

As the record shows, we have used our power with restraint. When guerillas moved from Bulgaria and Yugoslavia into Greece, we did not attack those countries. We mounted a Berlin airlift rather than respond to the blockade by engaging in large-scale fighting on the ground. We did not use atomic weapons in Korea, though at the time our principal adversaries had none. We did not make it impossible for the Soviet Union to retreat peacefully from the Cuba missile

crisis. And four and one-half years passed between North Viet Nam's covert attack on the South and our initiation of a limited attack on the North. As President Johnson has stated: "We seek no wider war."

It follows, then, that we are deeply concerned with Communist threats. Such a threat exists in Viet Nam. What is taking place in Viet Nam is a massive attempt at subversion, supplied, directed, and controlled from the North. We are committed to help preserve the independence of South Viet Nam. Our troops are fighting alongside those of Viet Nam to demonstrate that we mean to honor that commitment. Let us make no mistake—the integrity of the commitments of the United States is a foundation stone of the entire free world. We have made similar commitments to some forty allies. If we flinch here, the validity of all those commitments is necessarily impaired. The effects of a defeat might be felt first in Southeast Asia, but the shock waves would travel clear around the globe.

We make no unreasonable demands for a settlement on the Viet Nam problem. We seek no bases there; we want no permanent armed occupation. We have no territorial designs on North Viet Nam. We do ask that, as the Secretary of State puts it, Hanoi and its allies leave their neighbors alone. We believe that the people of South Viet Nam should be permitted to select their own government through free elections, and that the people of all Viet Nam should be able to participate under international supervision in a free determination of their political future, in accordance with the Geneva Agreements of 1954.

Moreover, we are ready at any time—and have been since President Johnson's address of April 7 last—for unconditional negotiations with the governments concerned, looking toward an honorable settlement. Something like fifteen attempts have been made to initiate discussions—directly, through allies, through uncommitted nations, and through the United Nations. All have so far been fruitless, because the other side has had no interest in reaching a peaceful settlement. The United States will persist in its efforts.

In our own hemisphere, we have applied the same basic doctrine in the Dominican Republic. Again we have used our power with restraint to preserve a free nation's independence against a possible Communist take-over.

Thus, on both sides of the world, we have moved to protect our security by opposing Communist designs. The decision to do so has not been easy, nor lightly taken. History has imposed a burden of responsibility on the American people, and they have accepted it in a spirit of calm resolution.

## INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

Our security must be relative and precarious, however, unless it is established in a framework of world organization which encourages international cooperation, not only for peace-keeping but for the improvement of the conditions of human existence. Since the end of World War II, we have worked at the task of building that framework, in many regions. I would single out in particular our efforts in Europe, in the Americas, and in the United Nations.

First, a word about our policies in Western Europe, where we are most intimately involved. It is the center of strength of the free world, the heartland of the West. And it is the spawning ground of the great world conflagrations of this century.

We sometimes forget the dramatic results the North Atlantic nations have attained through international cooperation over the last twenty years. It was clearly about to lose—and has indeed lost—its colonial underpinning. One could have been excused for saying, as many did, that “Europe is finished.”

What a contrast today! Free Europe has a political and social stability and a dynamic economy which far surpasses that of its Eastern European neighbors.

The United States played an important part in the striking recovery of Western Europe after World War II. Through Marshall Plan aid and the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization—two great acts of statesmanship—we involved ourselves in the affairs of Europe in an unprecedented way. Our economic assistance has long since ceased, but the presence of close to 400,000 American military personnel in and around Europe still provides one of our firmest guarantees of peace.

At the same time the Western European states have made exciting progress in the direction of economic integration and ultimate political federation. We have watched this development—centered in the institution-building of the European Economic Community—with admiration and approval. It has seemed to us to offer an alternative to the divisive internal quarrels of Europe.

Today Europe tends to look critically at these institutional arrangements. On the political and military side, some Europeans question the Atlantic relationship as it now exists. They are inclined to believe that by its very success, NATO has worked itself out of a job.

The thesis is enticing, but we believe it is dangerous. Europe has

attained no automatic and eternal guarantee against attack from the East. Berlin remains a perennial hostage to the Communist world, and a potential irritant in East-West relationships. The growth of nationalism in Eastern European states could create elements of instability which might lead to presently unforeseen military action along Iron Curtain frontiers—action which could escalate disastrously. It seems to us that the integrated military structure of NATO, and the political structure of the Atlantic partnership, are as necessary today as ever. We see no other means of coping most effectively with the poised weight of Soviet power; and we know from the experience of two wars that Western European security is in essence our own.

In fact, it would be a mistake to assume that the most adverse views on NATO within the Atlantic Alliance—those of the French government—are widely shared in the rest of NATO Europe. No other member proposes radical changes in the NATO structure. Far from being restive under the weight of American influence in Europe, the NATO nations would view with alarm any move for American retrenchment there. Even the French government, with its insistence on the independence of Europe from America, has not denied that the American presence, and American nuclear power, are essential to European defense. Even if the French should exercise their option of withdrawal from the organization in 1969, as matters now stand the remaining partners would continue to organize their defenses within it.

Yet NATO is confronted with many problems—problems of strategy, problems of burden-sharing, problems of collective responsibility in Alliance matters. I should like to dwell briefly on two in particular.

The first is the problem of nuclear responsibility. Since the organization of NATO, the United States has possessed virtually the entire nuclear armament of the West. And it has retained the power to use or to withhold that armament. As the European members of NATO have grown in strength, they have naturally come to desire some voice in the nuclear defense of their territory. They are, after all, the target zone for hundreds of Soviet missiles.

To meet these desires by giving nuclear weapons and delivery systems to our allies would be starting a competitive process of nuclear proliferation. This could result in making the world a tinderbox subject to incineration as a result of some accident or miscalculation by one of the many possessors of nuclear power. For the danger of nuclear war may be said to increase in geometric proportion as the

number of nuclear powers increases; and the hard-won nuclear stabilization existing between the two major powers—the United States and the Soviet Union—would soon lose much of its effectiveness if the number of national nuclear forces grew rapidly.

NATO is therefore faced with the task of sharing nuclear responsibility without stimulating the spread of nuclear weaponry to country after country. In fact, a good deal has been done to cope with the problem. Under the NATO stock-pile arrangements, we have made available to a number of our allies important nuclear delivery vehicles, maintaining the nuclear warheads themselves under our control and subject to our release. We have worked out with our NATO allies guidelines for the use of nuclear weapons in specific contingencies, methods of involving NATO officers of European nationality in the day-to-day work of targeting and planning for the use of nuclear forces, and facilities for exchanging important nuclear information.

It seems clear, nevertheless, that unless ultimate responsibility for the actual control and use of nuclear weapons can be more fully shared, this basic problem of the Alliance will continue to exist. For this reason we have joined with our allies in exploring ways to create some new form of NATO collective nuclear force which would give the Europeans the share to which they are, in fairness, entitled without giving them national control of nuclear weaponry. That has been the purpose of the lengthy studies of a NATO Multilateral Force or an Atlantic Nuclear Force which have been under way since 1960. A solution has thus far eluded us, and the growth of independent national forces in France and in Communist China is an inhibiting factor. But we remain willing to respond to allied demands for further studies, bearing always in mind the connection between what we may do in this field and what we may want to do—when we can—in working toward effective disarmament arrangements.

The second problem of NATO relationships to which I shall refer today is political rather than military. It is a problem of organization and purpose. Though the military aspect of NATO has bulked largest since its inception, the NATO Treaty makes it perfectly clear that it has far-reaching purposes in the political field as well. Very few people realize the extent to which the NATO Council in Paris is used from day to day as a forum for the exchange of views on problems of common concern to the allies.

In this respect NATO is unique. But much more can be done and needs to be done. If we accept the view that the problem of maintaining free world security against Communist threats is a single

and interrelated whole, and that free world responsibility cannot be partitioned off by those lines on the map which the NATO Treaty designates as the NATO defensive area, then it is clearly right to expect that the resurgent European members of the Atlantic Alliance should play their proper role in helping to carry the burden of free world defense. What we need to do in NATO is to work out ways in which we can harmonize the policies of the members of the Alliance, so that we have greater mutual support for those enterprises, military, political, and economic, which need to be undertaken for mutual security purposes. The process of developing the political consultative functions of the NATO Alliance may in the long run prove to be the most difficult NATO problem of them all.

### ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES

In our search for a better world order we have also worked with our neighbors to the South to improve and modernize our association in the Organization of American States. It is a historic relationship. It has grown from the protective shielding of new and weak Latin American states under the Monroe Doctrine into a true cooperative venture for collective regional defense.

In recent years we have suggested to our Latin American allies that the main danger now confronting us in this hemisphere might no longer be outright aggression by armed forces marching across frontiers. What was more likely was Communist infiltration and subversion, probably from bases within the hemisphere—guerrilla action supported and directed from abroad. At a number of Inter-American meetings we have stressed the point that a strategy of this kind could destroy the independence of one Latin American country after another just as surely as military conquest, and that obligations of mutual assistance ought consequently to apply.

This is not an easy point to make in a region where the doctrine of nonintervention in the affairs of other countries is so deeply ingrained. It requires a psychological readjustment, and some painful rethinking.

The Cuban missile crisis certainly demonstrated the threat to the free world which a Communist regime could pose once it was established in Latin America. The discovery of Castro arms and agents in Venezuela and other countries—directed against the free governments of those countries—was a further object lesson. But the clear and present danger of Communist exploitation of political revolt in the Dominican Republic brought the lesson home to us and to the Latin American countries in still more striking fashion.



For ourselves, we had no doubts about the basic elements of the situation. But hard choices were posed to the Organization of American States. Most OAS members believed that any military activity in the Dominican Republic by any outside power, including ourselves, smacked of intervention. Yet the OAS decided that it had to act. A number of the Latin American states joined their armed forces with our own to organize an Inter-American Peace Force, which maintained a balance in the Dominican Republic until the three-man OAS negotiating group arranged for the establishment of a provisional government in Santo Domingo.

No one believes that a crash operation of this kind, however successful, can in the long run prevent Communist incursions. The only sure response to Communist infiltration is the creation of healthy and progressive political and economic structures in the countries concerned. Latin America has a crying need for economic-social and political development. In large areas a feudal land system, a one-export-product economy, an inequitable tax structure, weaknesses in government, an uneducated and unhealthy population—all these handicaps—present a massive barrier to real stability. Our friends in Latin America are just as aware of their need in this respect as we are. That is the genesis of the Alliance for Progress, the great cooperative effort through which we in the American Hemisphere expect to raise the standard and the quality of Latin American life.

After some initial difficulties, it is now encouraging to note that the prospects for the Alliance are increasingly bright. Progressive, forward-looking governments are appearing on the scene in increasing numbers. Despite the highest population increases in the world, the economic indices and the export figures are up. Tax and land reforms and housing development are making headway in many countries; self-help rather than outside aid alone is increasingly emphasized. A modern private sector of the economy is taking root. There will, of course, be very difficult periods ahead. The entrenched forces of the past do not yield easily, even to this concentrated treatment. We may hope, however, that the end result will be a free, stable, and prosperous Latin American society.

#### UNITED NATIONS

Whatever the security afforded by regional alliances, it is quite clear that there is an overriding need for an organization substantially world-wide in scope.

For the United States, the Charter of the United Nations and the United Nations organization represented the best arrangement

that could be attained in the world of 1945 to create the opportunity to prevent another world war catastrophe. In retrospect it is possible that the hopes of at least some Americans were raised too high. Progress toward effective international organization is difficult and slow, and clearly no match for the dizzying pace of man's scientific and technical progress in the art of more efficient destruction.

Nonetheless, as we see it, the United Nations remains the best instrument we have to diminish conflicts, persuade nations to settle them peacefully, and get at the root causes of war. UN machinery has operated to keep the peace in a dozen cases, some of them involving quite sizable military forces committed on behalf of the organization. The United States has consistently favored the strengthening of UN peace-keeping machinery, in every practical way. We shall continue to do so.

The present conflict on the Indian subcontinent provides a useful illustration of both the utility and the limitations of United Nations action in the peace-keeping field. The controversy between India and Pakistan over the status of Kashmir was brought to the United Nations very early in its history. For seventeen years a United Nations observer group has supervised the cease-fire line dividing Indian and Pakistan forces in Kashmir.

Now that we face the misfortune of renewed warfare between the two parties to the Kashmir dispute, it is interesting to note that the United Nations is the primary agency of the international community in the search for restoration of peace and a satisfactory political settlement. We fully support the efforts of the United Nations Secretary General to carry out the Security Council resolutions of September 4 and September 6 looking toward a cease-fire and a withdrawal of the armed personnel who have advanced in both directions. With all its weaknesses, no other agency could perform the same function as the United Nations in cases of this kind.

The peace-keeping functions of the United Nations have been impaired by the unfortunate controversy over the application of Article 19 of the United Nations Charter. The issues presented in this celebrated case were complex, but the main problem was simple: Should the no-vote sanction imposed in the United Nations Charter be applied to members who by choice lag more than two years behind in payment of their share of legally assessed expenses, including peace-keeping expenses of the organization?

We feel that the charter is clear on this point. The Soviets, the French, and ten other states took a contrary view. Contending

that only the Security Council, with its veto procedures, could operate for the UN to keep the peace, they have refused to regard as obligatory assessments the large expenditures made for UN military operations in the Congo and in the Gaza strip between Israel and the UAR.

The controversy over this matter almost paralyzed the United Nations General Assembly for a year and still threatens the financial solvency of the UN. We have been forced to recognize that the bulk of the General Assembly would not wish to risk the break-up of the United Nations by imposing the no-vote sanction against the countries in arrears. In these troubled times we ourselves would not want to precipitate the collapse of the UN. Accordingly, we have agreed that, without prejudice to our legal position, the normal work of the United Nations General Assembly should be resumed. But we have made it quite clear that if some countries insist in exercising the right to refuse to pay their share of legally assessed expenses because they object to the nature of the expenditures, the United States must reserve for itself a similar option. In short there can be no double standard.

The Article 19 dispute is thus for the moment settled. Contrary to some assertions, the outcome does not signal the destruction of the UN's peace-keeping capability. To be sure, it will be more difficult to finance such operations in the future, and the role of the General Assembly as opposed to the Security Council in peace-keeping activities may be somewhat impaired. But where a sufficient consensus among the members exists, the UN will still be able to find ways to make that consensus effective. And we can now get ahead with the work of the entire United Nations system, including its specialized agencies and its many economic and social activities.

#### FUTURE DIRECTIONS

Thus far we have been looking at the problems of survival and the organization of peace. To complete the picture, we need to note that there are other ways, in the long run more effective, for eradicating the causes of war by attacking human poverty, misery, and ignorance.

Foreign aid is, of course, a case in point. Though its future has sometimes seemed precarious, it has remained a fixture in our foreign policy. Our programs have been beset with obstacles and frustrations. There has been disagreement concerning objectives and the means of attaining those objectives.

Yet great progress has been made. Our aid program has been sharpened and streamlined to serve the requirements of our over-all

foreign policy, in accordance with the directions of the President and Congress. A decade ago, two-thirds of our aid consisted of military assistance, and much of the remainder was defense support to help threatened countries to survive in the short term. Today, two-thirds of our aid is economic, and long-term development rather than emergency aid is increasingly stressed.

Furthermore, there is a new look in our aid policies. First of all, we have increased the concentration and selectivity of our foreign assistance, concentrating the bulk of it on a relatively small number of countries in Latin America, Asia, and Africa, in countries of priority need and best performance. Second, we are stressing more heavily the need for self-help by recipient countries as a condition for continued assistance. Third, we are encouraging both foreign and domestic private investment in the recipient countries, because we know from our own experience that this will facilitate vigorous growth in conditions of freedom. Finally, we have tightened and rationalized the management of our own programs and reduced their operating costs. And we are, of course, influenced by the attitudes of recipients to the aid program itself.

An additional point deserves attention. We have found it increasingly useful in many instances to channel our aid through multi-lateral agencies. In this way we minimize the sensitive political implications of a donor-recipient relationship, and by combining our contribution with the contributions of others, we multiply the total effect. The work of United Nations programs and International Bank agencies has bulked steadily larger in the foreign aid field. We welcome this development and will continue to encourage it. In addition, we expect to continue to coordinate our foreign aid activities with those of the other major free world donor countries through the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD in Paris.

We recognize that in the long run trade may be just as important as aid for the developing countries. Through the Kennedy Round Program, we are gradually coming to grips with the problem of the massive reduction of trade barriers in the interest of greater world prosperity. The task is most complex and difficult; entrenched economic privilege nowhere yields easily. Nevertheless, we mean to pursue our efforts to strike the shackles from the world's trade in the interest of greater general prosperity.

One of our special problems in this field is the need for arrangements which will give equitable assistance to producers of primary products. There are sharply differing views regarding the extent to which preferences of one kind or another ought to be given

to the underdeveloped countries, and regarding the guarantees they should have of reasonable and stable prices for their exports. The multiplex controversies here defy easy solution. We intend, however, to persevere in the search for agreements which will balance advantages fairly in the interests of all parties.

Given a sounder economic base, the possibilities would increase for exporting to other countries some of the ideas we are putting into practice here in the Great Society. Let me merely mention a few fields in which we are actively exploring the possibility of new or improved foreign policy initiatives.

There is the area of outer space—not merely the possibility of joint new ventures to celestial bodies, and joint experimentation, but also of great practical advances in the fields of meteorology and communications through the use of satellites.

There is the area of the peaceful uses of atomic energy—the advent of an era of practical nuclear power and of other potential uses of atomic fission and fusion.

There is the area of food production and distribution—not merely the massive contributions of foodstuffs under our Food for Peace Program and the expanding World Food Program of the UN Food and Agriculture Organization, but also the improvement of agricultural techniques in underdeveloped areas, and the processing and preservation of foodstuffs.

There is the area of water resources development—the possibility of finding and using more water, of desalting water economically to open new lands to new populations, and of fuller utilization of the sea and the sea bed.

There is the field of health, where the remarkable progress now being made in combating so many diseases can be carried much further with additional resources and knowledge.

There is the field of education: Illiteracy remains one of the great handicaps of humanity; it can yield to treatment.

There is the field of urban planning and housing, where we can move toward the elimination of slums and squalor and all the attendant social ills.

There is the population problem, now increasingly recognized as one of man's principal preoccupations for the future.

There is the field of human rights—the long struggle to do

away with bigotry and privilege and move toward a fuller life for man everywhere.

And last but not least, there is the need for disarmament with suitable controls—a problem which is so far almost intractable.

In every one of these fields, the United States will be making a principal contribution to progress. That is why, in his speech at San Francisco last June, President Johnson called upon all UN members “to rededicate themselves to wage together an international war on poverty . . . to raise the goal for technical aid and investment through the United Nations; increase our food and health, and education programs, . . . and face forthrightly the multiplying problems of our multiplying populations.”

These are the directions in which we must look for the achievements of the future. We have an enormous contribution to make. I am not referring just to our wealth or our techniques or our size. What is really significant is what we have to offer in terms of ideas.

The world is not sufficiently aware of what, for lack of a better word, I shall call the revolutionary character of our approach. We are—or we should be—a nation which is known to stand for self-determination, for government by consent of the governed, for equality of rights for all human beings, for the possibility of free spiritual and creative development for all, for flexibility and diversity, and for the endless pursuit of novel concepts and institutions. We do not need to apologize to anyone in this realm—certainly not to Communist countries which are trying to retain nineteenth century doctrines of politics, ethics, and economics in a twentieth century world and which rely on totalitarian tactics for their success. Our task in this country is to make the true picture come clear to all men, here and abroad, and to foster a proper appreciation of our long-range objectives.

There is a very wide realization of this need in Washington. And there is a united determination to get on with the job.