@article{Makki:173316,
      recid = {173316},
      author = {Makki, Shiva S. and Tweeten, Luther},
      title = {Agricultural trade negotiations as a strategic game},
      journal = {Agricultural Economics: The Journal of the International  Association of Agricultural Economists},
      address = {1994-01},
      number = {968-2016-75718},
      pages = {10},
      year = {1994},
      abstract = {This study views multilateral trade negotiations as a  strategic game among nations or regions, including  taxpayer,
consumer, and producer components. Payoffs are  calculated from an intermediate-run international trade  model
initialized with 1989 data. For the public at large,  the Nash equilibrium and socially optimal outcome is  liberalization
of trade - unilateral or multilateral.  Maintenance of the status quo of market distortions costing  the world billions of
dollars each year is rational only if  producer payoffs are sovereign so that strategies optimal  for producers are
considered optimal for nations. Remedial  policies are discussed, including opportunities for  economic education,
political system reform, and less  incentives for producers to scuttle multilateral trade  negotiations.},
      url = {http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/173316},
      doi = {https://doi.org/10.22004/ag.econ.173316},
}