@article{Alkan:172704,
      recid = {172704},
      author = {Alkan, Ahmet and Tuncay, Alparslan},
      title = {Pairing Games and Markets},
      address = {2014-05},
      number = {824-2016-54736},
      series = {CCSD},
      pages = {50},
      year = {2014},
      abstract = {Pairing Games or Markets studied here are the  non-two-sided NTU generalization of assignment games. We  show that the Equilibrium Set is nonempty, that it is the  set of stable
allocations or the set of semistable  allocations, and that it has several notable structural  properties. We also introduce the solution concept of  pseudostable allocations and show that they are in the  Demand Bargaining Set. We give a dynamic Market Procedure  that reaches the Equilibrium Set in a bounded number of  steps. We use elementary tools of graph theory and a  representation theorem obtained here.},
      url = {http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/172704},
      doi = {https://doi.org/10.22004/ag.econ.172704},
}