A test of whether millet acreage in Niger is determined by official or private market prices

B. Wade Brorsen¹ and Akinwumi A. Adesina²

¹Department of Agricultural Economics, Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN 47907 (U.S.A.)
²International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT), B.P. 320, Bamako (Mali)

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ABSTRACT


Niger has two separate marketing channels for grain: one is the official system operated by the government; the other is a parallel channel of private traders. Researchers or policy-makers wanting to study effects of price policies on producers are faced with two sets of prices. This paper seeks to answer the question, which prices matter? Non-nested hypothesis tests are conducted for millet-acreage response equations. The results show that prices from the larger private market are the prices that matter.

Introduction

Niger has an official grain market operated by the Office de Produits Vivriers du Niger (OPVN) and a parallel grain-marketing channel of private traders. The OPVN, set up in 1970 as the officially recognized grain-marketing agency, is an official monopoly for the marketing of grains in Niger (Enger, 1979; Cullen and Waldstein, 1983; Scott et al., 1983; Adesina, 1985). The activities of the OPVN include (a) setting uniform nationwide producer prices, (b) setting uniform nationwide consumer prices, and (c) balancing grain supplies between the six agricultural departments in Niger. In doing this, the OPVN subsidizes the transportation of grains from the major grain-production zones (Maradi and Zinder) to all parts of the country. The private grain-marketing channel, although not officially recognized, is an important part of the marketing system. The government of Niger, although aware of its existence, allows it to operate. This network of private...
traders controls a major share of the total volume of grains marketed in Niger. Elliot Berg Associates (1983) estimated that the OPVN handles between 15% and 35% of the grain marketed in Niger. Borsdorf (1979) estimated that the official market handles 15% of total grains marketed.

The reason for the low market share of the OPVN is that the uniform producer prices are set lower than the corresponding prices on the private grain markets (Cullen and Waldstein, 1983; Proulx et al., 1983; Elliot Berg Associates, 1983; Adesina, 1985). How relevant are the OPVN prices in grain production? Opinions of researchers vary from that of non-relevance to scepticism. Borsdorf (1979) contends that grain production is not responsive to the official prices. Maina (1982), in an econometric estimation of production responses, asserted that Nigerien farmers do not respond to official market prices. The study concluded that farmers grow crops to satisfy subsistence requirements. However, Adesina (1985), in a mathematical-programming analysis of grain production, indicated that farmers should generate marketed surpluses, given the adoption of fertilizer technology. The study indicated that private market prices should be important in production and marketing decisions. Maina (1982) estimated acreage responses econometrically using only official producer prices, while Adesina and Brorsen (1987) estimated acreage response using private-market prices.

Although past research has argued for or against the relevant prices, no attempt has been made to determine which prices affect acreage decisions. The objective of this study is to test whether Nigerien millet farmers respond to private market prices and/or official prices. These hypotheses are tested using non-nested hypotheses tests. Given the different views on which prices are relevant for producers, non-nested test procedures are appropriate in testing for the relevant prices in grain production (Godfrey and Pesaran, 1983). Policy-makers in Niger need information about the relevant prices in grain-producers' decisions. Such information can be useful in designing official pricing policies.

Theoretical model

Millet is the major crop in Niger, accounting for 85% of the total area cultivated in 1983. The other crops—sorghum, cowpeas and peanuts—represent a small fraction of total production. Sorghum and cowpea acreage were 10% and 8% respectively of total acreage cultivated in 1983. Peanuts have become a minor crop. Only millet acreage equations are considered in this study, since millet is the most widely cultivated crop. Sorghum is grown on higher-quality land, and thus only cowpeas and millet compete for the same land.

Let \( Y_j (j = 1, \ldots, n) \) represent the output of the \( n \) crops produced on
the farm, and \( X_{ik} \) (\( k = 1, \ldots, K \)) represent the quantity of input \( k \) used in production of crop \( j \). The fixed amount of land available for production is \( \bar{X}_1 \). The assumption of a fixed quantity of land is appropriate for Niger, where most of the land is sandy and the amount of arable land is limited.

The production possibility set for the farm can be written following Varian (1982) as:

\[
Y(X) = [X, Y: F(X) \geq Y; X_1 = \bar{X}_1]
\]

where \( Y(X) \) represents the restricted production possibility set with a fixed amount of land available for production.

Following Just et al. (1983), p. 772), inputs are assumed to be allocatable among production activities (i.e., inputs used in producing \( Y_1 \) do not affect the production of \( Y_2 \)). Thus, the production technology derived from (1) can be written as:

\[
Y_j = f_j(X_{1j}, X_{2j}, \ldots, X_{kj}) \quad j = 1, \ldots, n
\]

and

\[
X_k = \sum_{j=1}^{n} X_{kj} \quad k = 1, \ldots, K
\]

\[
X_1 = \bar{X}_1
\]

The derived production function in (2) will display decreasing returns to scale since the amount of one input (land) is limited (Varian, 1982, p. 20).

Various researchers have argued that the grain-marketing system in Niger satisfies the requirements of a competitive market (Kohler, 1977; Elliot Berg Associates, 1983). Elliot Berg Associates (1983) asserted that 'the structural characteristics of Niger's markets give a strong presumption of competitiveness. There exist many buyers and sellers, and barriers to entry are few.' Therefore, the farmer can be viewed as a profit maximizer, operating with perfectly elastic output and input markets. Let \( P_j \) (\( j = 1, \ldots, n \)) represent crop prices at harvest. The farmer's decision can then be represented as:

\[
\text{Max } \sum_{j=1}^{n} P_j Y_j - \sum_{k=2}^{K} W_k X_k
\]

where \( \sum_{j=1}^{n} P_j Y_j \) represents the total revenue from all the crops produced, and \( \sum_{k=2}^{K} W_k X_k \) represents the total variable costs of production. The first-order conditions for this maximization problem yield the unconditional output supply and input demand equations:
Equation (3) is the input or factor demand function, while (4) is the supply function. Since we are investigating acreage decisions, (3) is the relevant portion of the farmer’s maximization problem. The farmer decides on the acreage of the crops to cultivate, based on market output prices and factor prices. Equation (3) is used to specify the acreage demand equation for millet.

The question addressed in this paper is, what set of prices are relevant? Alternative specifications of millet acreage demand equations are specified, using official and private market output prices. The major inputs in grain production are labor and fertilizer. Labor constraints during the critical weeding periods have been found to limit millet production in Niger (Adesina, 1985). No satisfactory price for labor could be obtained, and so price of labor could not be included. Fertilizer is important in grain production (Reeser, 1980; Adesina, 1985). Soils in Niger are low in nitrogen (N) and phosphorous (P). Most fertilizer is applied as simple superphosphate (P) or urea (N). Jomini (1989) found that phosphorous limits yields when rainfall is not a constraint. Therefore, the price of simple superphosphate is used as the price of fertilizer.

**Empirical model specifications and non-nested hypothesis testing procedures:**

Based on the previous theoretical considerations, the following alternative empirical model specifications are hypothesized for the millet acreage demand equations. These equations are estimated with ordinary least squares:

\[ AM_t = a_0 + a_1 \text{OMP}_t + a_2 \text{OCP}_t + a_3 \text{FD}_t + e_{1t} \]  
\[ AM_t = b_0 + b_1 \text{PMP}_{t-1} + b_2 \text{PCP}_{t-1} + b_3 \text{FD}_t + e_{2t} \]

where \( AM_t \) is the acreage of millet harvested in time period \( t \) (1000 ha), \( \text{OMP}_t \) official millet price at time \( t \) (FCFA/kg), \( \text{OCP}_t \) official cowpea price at time \( t \) (FCFA/kg), \( \text{PMP}_{t-1} \) private market price for millet at time \( t-1 \), (FCFA/kg), \( \text{PCP}_{t-1} \) private market price for cowpeas at time \( t-1 \) (FCFA/kg), and \( \text{FD}_t \) official fertilizer price at time \( t \) (FCFA/kg of P\(_2\)O\(_5\)). Equation (5) specifies millet acreage as a function of official market grain prices (i.e., OPVN prices), and fertilizer price. The alternative model specifies acreage as a function of private market output prices, and fertilizer price.
price. Neither equation is a special case of the other and, therefore, non-nested testing procedures can be used (Pesaran, 1980; Davidson and MacKinnon, 1981; MacKinnon et al., 1983).

A number of statistics have been proposed to test non-nested hypothesis tests (Cox, 1961, 1962; Pesaran, 1974; Pesaran and Deaton, 1978; Davidson and MacKinnon, 1981; Godfrey and Pesaran, 1983). These tests include the Cox Non-Nested Test (Cox, 1961, 1962), the J-test (Davidson and MacKinnon, 1981), the orthodox test and the Adjusted Cox Test (Godfrey and Pesaran, 1983). Non-nested tests allow rejecting or accepting both alternative model specifications. Let the first hypothesis (H₁) be that official prices are the relevant prices in millet production. Let the second hypothesis (H₂) be that private market prices are the relevant ones in production.

The orthodox test is the least powerful of the three tests. For the J-test procedure, the predicted values in equation (5) and equation (6) are obtained. The predicted values from these equations are denoted by $\hat{A}_{m0}$ and $\hat{A}_{m1}$, respectively. To perform the J-test: $\hat{A}_{m0}$ is included as an additional explanatory variable in (6), while $\hat{A}_{m1}$ is included as an additional explanatory variable in (5). A t-test is used to test the coefficients on $\hat{A}_{m0}$ and $\hat{A}_{m1}$.

Suppose the coefficient on $\hat{A}_{m1}$ in the millet acreage equation specified with official market prices is statistically significant, while the coefficient on $\hat{A}_{m0}$ in the alternate model is not significant. The conclusion will be to reject the official price specification and fail to reject the private market price specification (i.e., private market prices are the relevant prices in millet acreage decisions).

In this study, the two test procedures used are the J-test and the Cox non-nested test procedures. Monte Carlo studies have shown that the J-test has low power in small samples (Godfrey and Pesaran, 1983). The Cox non-nested test may reject more often than it should in small samples. The two tests are used in this study because of the possible fragility of results to alternative test procedures. The data for crop area and private market output prices were obtained from the Niger Ministry of Rural Development Rapport Annuel Statistiques (1976, 1981, 1986) and the FAO Production Yearbooks (1970–1982). The official market prices are from Elliot Berg Associates (1983). The data for the retail price index used in deflating the output and input prices were obtained from International Monetary Fund (IMF, 1988) and World Tables (World Bank 1976). Fertilizer prices are from the FAO Fertilizer Yearbook (1978–1986). Exchange rates to convert some of the fertilizer data to the Niger currency are from International Monetary Fund (IMF, 1988).

Data from different sources are not perfectly consistent. This is especially true for the fertilizer price data. To aid later researchers in reproducing the results, the data used in the study are displayed in Table 1. The private-
market prices shown in the table are substantially higher than the official prices. The private-market millet and cowpea prices are calendar average prices for Niamey, which is basically a retail market. Private-market prices away from Niamey would be less due to transportation costs and marketing margins. In most, but not all, years official market prices were the same at all locations. Prices in Niger are also highly seasonal. Thus, even though the private-market prices shown in Table 1 are substantially larger than official prices, official prices could still be higher during the seasonal low following harvest or in remote areas.

Empirical model results and discussion

Use of the private market gives estimates of the structural parameters consistent with theoretical expectations (Table 2). In the official price acreage equation, neither coefficient on the lagged official prices is statistically significant. Millet and cowpeas are competing crops in production. Economic theory suggests that the cross-price effect between millet acreage and price of cowpeas should be negative.

Based on the correct signs on the coefficients of the explanatory variables,

TABLE 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Acreage millet harvested (1000 ha)</th>
<th>Private millet price (FCFA/kg)</th>
<th>Private cowpea price (FCFA/kg)</th>
<th>Official millet price (FCFA/kg)</th>
<th>Official cowpea price (FCFA/kg)</th>
<th>Fertilizer price = (FCFA/kg P_2O_5)</th>
<th>Retail price index (1980 = 100)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>2356</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>105.9</td>
<td>36.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>2370</td>
<td>45.9</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>111.8</td>
<td>40.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>45.4</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>111.8</td>
<td>44.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>2230</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>123.1</td>
<td>46.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>1623</td>
<td>45.7</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>93.3</td>
<td>50.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>2527</td>
<td>60.7</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>117.0</td>
<td>62.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>2728</td>
<td>81.8</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>98.3</td>
<td>76.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>2747</td>
<td>96.3</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>85.0</td>
<td>84.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>2922</td>
<td>91.5</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>90.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>3072</td>
<td>97.0</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>106.1</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>3037</td>
<td>178.0</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>143.1</td>
<td>122.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>3066</td>
<td>167.0</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>184.2</td>
<td>137.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>3135</td>
<td>113.0</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>175.0</td>
<td>133.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

FCFA, 275.02 French Community Francs per Standard Drawing Rate (1980 conversion code).
## TABLE 2


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Equation</th>
<th>Intercept</th>
<th>Official millet price</th>
<th>Official cowpea price</th>
<th>Fertilizer price</th>
<th>Parallel millet price</th>
<th>Parallel cowpea price</th>
<th>A₀</th>
<th>A₁</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>3799.5</td>
<td>-142</td>
<td>-728</td>
<td>-375.7</td>
<td>N A</td>
<td>N A</td>
<td>N A</td>
<td>N A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(6.52)ᵃ</td>
<td>(-0.09)</td>
<td>(-0.70)</td>
<td>(-2.11)ᵇ</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6)</td>
<td>2661.8</td>
<td>N A</td>
<td>N A</td>
<td>-300.6</td>
<td>1334</td>
<td>-597</td>
<td>N A</td>
<td>N A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.74)ᵃ</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(-2.25)</td>
<td>(2.12)ᵇ</td>
<td>(-2.13)ᵇ</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(7)</td>
<td>-374.0</td>
<td>-1325</td>
<td>815</td>
<td>-10.7</td>
<td>N A</td>
<td>N A</td>
<td>N A</td>
<td>1.198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-0.19)</td>
<td>(-0.97)</td>
<td>(0.73)</td>
<td>(-0.05)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(2.23)ᵇ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(8)</td>
<td>1742.2</td>
<td>N A</td>
<td>N A</td>
<td>-193.8</td>
<td>1310</td>
<td>-525</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>N A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.29)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(-0.27)</td>
<td>(1.91)ᵇ</td>
<td>(-0.95)</td>
<td>(0.15)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N Aᵃ: Not applicable; values in parentheses are computed t-values of the coefficients.

ᵃ Significant at 5% level.
ᵇ Significant at 10% level.
it seems the private-market price specification is more appropriate for modelling millet acreage demand decisions. The two non-nested hypotheses considered are:

H₁: The official price specification provides sufficient information in explaining acreage decisions.
H₂: The private-market price specification provides sufficient information in explaining millet acreage decisions.

Using the J-test procedure the official price specification is rejected at the 10% level (5% level if a one-tailed test is used), but the private price specification could not be rejected. This implies that the private-market price specification has important information relevant in explaining acreage decisions. To validate this conclusion, an alternative test procedure — the Cox Non-Nested Test — is used. The test statistics, which have an asymptotic Z-distribution for official and private markets, are -0.29 and -4.42, respectively. The conclusion is the same as for the J-test. The implication is that private-market prices provide important information in explaining millet acreage decisions and that official market prices are not necessary to explain acreage decisions.

The elasticity of millet acreage demand to market prices is important for policy analyses in Niger. The millet acreage elasticities with respect to private market prices are 0.53 for millet prices and -0.33 for cowpea prices. This inelastic response of millet acreage to price may be due to technological constraints in production. The amount of arable land in Niger is limited. Since the available fertile land is already in use, acreage is increased by cultivating less-fertile land. Long-run acreage elasticity estimates from Maina (1982) (official price elasticities) were 0.03 for millet prices. The supply elasticity computed from yield and area elasticities was 0.06. This study's results indicate that Nigerien farmers are more responsive to market prices than was asserted by Maina (1982).

Summary and conclusions

This study was undertaken to determine whether Nigerian millet producers respond to private market prices and/or official market prices. Alternative specifications of millet acreage equations were hypothesized and non-nested hypothesis test procedures were used to test the hypotheses. The model with official market prices was rejected, and the null hypothesis that private market prices were sufficient for explaining acreage demand could not be rejected. The private market specification also gave results closer to theoretical expectations than did the official market specification.
The conclusion from this study is that private market prices are relevant for Nigerian millet production. Past research has often not considered the role of these prices in grain production. In specifying millet acreage equations, researchers may need to consider only private market prices. Farmers respond to private market prices rather than official market prices.

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