@article{El-Sayed:172435,
      recid = {172435},
      author = {El-Sayed, Abeer and Rubio, Santiago J.},
      title = {Sharing R&D Investments in Cleaner Technologies to  Mitigate Climate Change},
      address = {2014-04},
      number = {824-2016-54752},
      series = {CCSD},
      pages = {42},
      year = {2014},
      abstract = {This paper examines international cooperation on  technological development as an alternative to  international cooperation on GHG emission reductions. It is  assumed that when countries cooperate they coordinate their  investments so as to minimize the agreement costs of  controlling emissions and that they also pool their R&D  efforts so as to fully internalize the spillover effects of  their investments in R&D. In order to analyze the scope of  cooperation, an agreement formation game is solved in three  stages. First, countries decide whether or not to sign the  agreement. Then, in the second stage, signatories (playing  together) and non-signatories (playing individually) select  their investment in R&D. Finally, in the third stage, each  country decides its level of emissions non-cooperatively.  For linear environmental damages and quadratic investment  costs, our findings show that the maximum participation in  a R&D agreement consists of six countries and that  participation decreases as the coalition information  exchange decreases until a minimum participation consisting  of three countries is reached. We also find that the grand  coalition is stable if the countries sign an international  research joint venture but in this case the effectiveness  of the agreement is very low.},
      url = {http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/172435},
      doi = {https://doi.org/10.22004/ag.econ.172435},
}