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**Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics  
University of California, Davis**

## **CGIAR Reform—Why So Difficult?**

**Review, Reform, Renewal, Restructuring, Reform Again  
and then “The New CGIAR “ —So Much Talk  
and So Little Basic Structural Change—Why?**

**by**

**Alex F. McCalla**

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**Giannini Foundation of Agricultural Economics**

# CGIAR Reform-Why So Difficult?

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## Review, Reform, Renewal, Restructuring, Reform Again and then “The New CGIAR “- So Much Talk and So Little Basic Structural Change-- Why?

Alex F. McCalla\*

9/11/2013

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\*Alex F. McCalla is Emeritus Professor of Agricultural and Resource Economics at the University of California, Davis

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## Centers of the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR); date of entry and Headquarters location

### Current Centers

**Africa Rice Center** – formerly West Africa Rice Development Association –**WARDA**; 1974 Cotonou, Benin.

**Bioversity International** – formerly **IPGRI** –International Plant Genetic Resources Institute- formerly International Board for Plant Genetic Resources –**IBPGR**; 1974 Rome, Italy

**CIAT** – Centro Internacional de Agricultura Tropical –International Center for Tropical Agriculture; 1971 (1967) Cali, Colombia

**CIFOR** – Center for International Forestry Research; 1993 Bogor, Indonesia

**CIMMYT** – Centro Internacional de Mejoramiento de Maiz y Trigo – International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center; 1971 (1966) Mexico City, Mexico

**CIP** – Centro Internacional de la Papa -International Potato Center; 1972 Lima, Peru

**ICARDA** – International Center for Agricultural Research in the Dry Areas; 1976 Aleppo, Syria

**ICRISAT** – International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics; 1972 Patancheru, India

**IFPRI** – International Food Policy Research Institute; 1979 Washington, D.C. USA

**IITA** – International Institute of Tropical Agriculture 1971 (1967) Ibadan, Nigeria

**ILRI** – International Livestock Research Institute; 1994 Nairobi, Kenya - formed by merger of

**ILRAD** – International Laboratory for Research on Animal Diseases; 1973 Nairobi and **ILCA** – International Livestock Center for Africa; 1975 Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

**IRRI** – International Rice Research Institute; 1971 (1960) Los Banos, Philippines

**IWMI** – International Water Management Institute – formerly **IIMI** –International Irrigation Management Institute; 1991 Colombo, Sri Lanka

**World Agroforestry Centre** – formerly **ICRAF** –International Center for Research on Agroforestry; 1991 Nairobi, Kenya

**WorldFish Center** – formerly **ICLARM** –International Center for Living Aquatic Resource Management; 1992 Penang, Malaysia

### Former Centers

**INIBAP** – International Network for the Improvement of Banana and Plantain; 1991 -merged into **IPGRI** 1994

**ISNAR** – International Service for National Agricultural Research; 1980 The Hague, Netherlands closed 2004

## **ABSTRACT**

This paper reviews 40 years of tortured history of the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research's (CGIAR) attempts at structural reform. Yet the basic structure of independent centers created in the 1960' and 70's remains in place despite repeated attempts to restructure the basic building blocks of the system. Instead successive layers of super structure: eco-regional programs; Challenge programs; CGIAR Research Programs (CRP's); and finally a Consortium with another Board and CEO have been added to foster inter-center and interdisciplinary research. The failure of reforms is attributed to the unwillingness of donors, and the World Bank leadership of the CGIAR, to take on entrenched center interests. Some success in modest reform has occurred at the sub-system/center level but only with much difficulty. The paper concludes with some suggestions as to how reform might be fostered.



### List of Acronyms Used

- AVRDC** – Asian Vegetable Research and Development Center
- CBC** – Committee of Board Chairs
- CDC** – Center Directors Committee
- CDMT** – Change Design and Management Team
- CEO** – Chief Executive Officer
- CGIAR** – Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research
- CP** – Challenge Program – CGIAR
- CRP** – CGIAR Research Program
- DG** – Director – General (of CGIAR Center)
- EPMR** – External Program and Management Review
- EPR** – External Program Review
- ExCo** – Executive Committee of CGIAR
- FAO** – Food and Agriculture Organization - of the United Nations (UN)
- GEF** – Global Environment Fund
- IADS** – International Agricultural Development Service - (Rockefeller Foundation)
- ICW** – International Centers Week - of the CGIAR
- ISPC** – International Science and Partnership Council - of the CGIAR -successor to SC and TAC
- IUFRO-SPDC** – International Union of Forestry Research Organizations-Special Program for Developing Countries
- MTM** – Mid Term Meeting – of the CGIAR
- NARS** – National Agricultural Research Systems
- NGO** – Non- Governmental Organization
- QQR** – Quinquennial Program Review – of the CGIAR (predecessor of EPR's and EPMR's)
- RF** – Rockefeller Foundation
- SACCAR** – Southern Africa Center for Cooperation in Agricultural Research
- SADCC** – Southern Africa Development Coordinating Conference
- SC** – Science Council- of the CGIAR
- TAC** – Technical Advisory Committee –of the CGIAR
- USAID** – United States Agency for International Development

## **Review, Reform, Renewal, Restructuring, Reform Again and then “The New CGIAR “ - So Much Talk and So Little Basic Structural Change-- Why?**

### **1. Introduction**

In the 40 years of the existence of the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR), the world's population has doubled. Global agricultural research priorities have changed radically from the simple goal of “doubling the pile of rice”, to environmentally sustainable production systems, food security, and poverty reduction. There has been a revolution in biological science, and natural resources management, global warming, desertification and the loss of biodiversity have all emerged as critical global issues in addition to food supplies.

Over the same 40 years, committees, study teams, ministerial consultations, task forces, change design and management teams, steering groups, independent reviews, transition management teams and restructuring consultants have sought to reform the CGIAR. So much talk, analysis and study and yet little fundamental change in the basic building blocks of the CGIAR System –a loose federation of independent Centers- has occurred<sup>1</sup>. Yet many System governance and program mechanisms have been added sequentially over time-- Oversight, Finance, Executive, Steering, Private Sector and NGO Committees, System-wide and Eco-regional Programs, Challenge Programs and now a Consortium- with a Board, a CEO, and an Office, a Fund- with a, a Fund Council and Fund Office, and CGIAR Research Programs (CRP's).

Perhaps a word on terminology used in the CGIAR will help, as it is used throughout this document. The Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) refers to the entire system -donors, centers, committees and administrative offices. For short it is sometimes called the CGIAR, or the CGIAR System or just the System. The donors are called the Group of CGIAR Donors or just the Group. The set of CGIAR research institutes are called the CGIAR Centers or just the Centers.

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<sup>1</sup> Autonomous international centers, with their own Boards, management structure, and policies.

So in what follows “System” and “CGIAR” are used interchangeably for the entire System, the “Group” means donors only and the “Centers” the centers only.

Over the last 20 years, the System has added in excess of 20 Inter-Center Initiatives, System wide and Eco regional Programs (of which 13 remain on the books), 5 Challenge Programs (CPs); and now the 15 CGIAR Research Programs (CRP’s). The Technical Advisory Committee (TAC), the only original committee, has been reorganized and renamed at least 4 times. Much also has been added in terms of subject matter-20 more food commodities; forestry; fisheries; water management; policy; and capacity building.

Since the CGIAR’s founding in 1971, 14 new Centers have been added to the original 4. In the 1990’s 2 pairs were merged<sup>2</sup> but only one has been terminated<sup>3</sup>, so 15 remain. Despite innumerable findings of: center mandate overlap; duplication and inefficiencies; inter-center competition leading to NARS overload and smothering; serious research gaps; lack of critical mass to keep up in biotechnology; and high governance and management costs, **the CGIAR System’s basic building blocks remain 15 Centers** which now contribute to and manage **15 new CRP’s**, (the same number of CRP’s as Centers must be by coincidence, of course).

There have been 4 occasions when the System has come close to restructuring the CGIAR’s basic building blocks – the Centers- and yet every time it stopped short and instead added more layers of super structure and bureaucracy to try to fix the “problem” without having to face the hard task of dealing with viciously protective independent centers. The basic problem is recognized - the Centers’ mandates-- designed in the main in the 1960’s, 1970’s and 80’s-- no longer efficiently and effectively cover the new research priorities. Yet the CGIAR seems incapable of fixing the problem. Why?

The purpose of this essay is to explore that question by reviewing past attempts for structural and organizational change, and probing why they failed to address the fundamental changes required

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<sup>2</sup> ILCA and ILRAD to become ILRI, and IPGRI (now Bioversity) and INIBAP.

<sup>3</sup> ISNAR was starved of funds and was closed in 2004.

to re-position the CGIAR for the new challenges it faced. From that review it is hoped some lessons to guide future more successful reforms may emerge.

The paper is in **two sections** –the **first** is a stylized time line of the evolution of the CGIAR, highlighting major points of agitation for change. More detailed attention is given to **seven System wide (top down) episodes of structural debate**: **1.** the expansion, circa 1988-1992; **2.** a formal request for TAC to propose comprehensive restructuring in 1992-94 aborted by a new CGIAR Chair; **3.** the establishment of System wide and Eco-regional programs 1994; **4.** the Third Review of the CGIAR and its aftermath, including the stillborn Federation of CG Centers 1998-2002; **5.** The Challenge Programs and “market driven reform” -2001-2006; **6.** the most recent Change Management Initiatives 2006 –2008; and **7.** the “New CGIAR” 2008-2011.

Likewise special attention is given to **seven sub- System events i.e. center and/or regional (bottom up) reform efforts, some successful and some not**: **1.** relay centers and WARDA- mid 1980's ; **2.** forestry/agro forestry- 1990/91; **3.** ILCA/ILRAD merger -1991-1994, **4.** INIBAP/IPGRI merger- 1994/95; **5.** abolition of ISNAR- 2002-04; **6.** ICRISAT EPMP and the Africa Task Forces- 2003-2005; and **7.** the CIMMYT/IRRI merger attempt of 2003-2005. Again the purpose is to ascertain why individual Center /regionally focused attempts didn't always work. But some did -what can we learn from both outcomes?

These episodes and sub-system events are discussed when they occur in the time line so the reader can keep track of the sequence of events. After the discussion of each episode or event the **structural outcome** is summarized before moving on with the time line.

The **second** section summarizes the outcomes, looks ahead and suggests what combinations of incentives and penalties might lead to more success in the future.

## 2. Sustainable Research Organizations

But before starting, let us be clear on the premises underlying this analysis. The author firmly believes there are three critical propositions which determine the sustainability and effectiveness of research organizations. For scientists to be productive they must be part of a stable research organization. For such an organization to be effective and sustainable there must be stable core funding. Thus the three critical necessary conditions are:

- The scientist **must have a stable intellectual, physical, and administrative home** which includes colleagues, peers, and leadership, and provides the professional support structure that hires, mentors, nurtures and rewards scientists for excellence, relevance and impact. **Let's call this an intellectual home;**
- The researcher/scientist **needs a functioning research platform**, on which to work including access to the tools of his/her research subject or discipline - libraries, laboratories, experimental fields, gene banks, computing capacity, technical support, etc;
- The institution **needs a stable core of non-project funding** to finance the functioning of the home base: infrastructure, financial management, purchasing, personnel, security, transport, direction and governance. Core funding provides the physical space for the research platform with the necessary basics to keep the doors open, the laboratories ready to function and experiment farms available; and provides the necessary accesses to information, data analysis and management. For universities the stable funding base is provided by students who pay tuition and/or receive state subsidies to attend, and from their endowment income, if they have any. For Government research entities it is the core budget appropriations it receives. Non-profit research institutes like Scripps, Danforth, and Boyce Thompson draw their core funding from earnings from their endowments and/or gifts. Commercial consulting/research firms such as the Stanford Research Institute (SRI) build it into their profit margins. **There is to my**

**knowledge no long term, successfully functioning, quality research organization which thrives solely on time bound project funding and indirect cost recovery.**

These three conditions delivered together create the **sufficient conditions** for the existence of a functioning research entity ready to undertake project, grant, or contract funding for research activities. For the first two, the CGIAR throughout its existence has relied solely on Centers to provide the intellectual homes and research platforms for CGIAR scientists. Unrestricted core funding of the Centers provided the third necessary condition to deliver the sufficient conditions. Or stated conversely System-wide, eco-regional and inter-center initiatives, challenge programs and CRP's would be non-functional without a network of research institutions to draw into temporal projects.

Unfortunately not all funders of research understand these sufficient conditions as well as do the NSF and NIH for example. Aid agencies in particular are usually deficient here as their time frame is usually short and funding transient; –they see themselves as seed money providers. One of the geniuses of the founders of the CGIAR was to craft a system that encouraged aid funding of long-term research institutes but kept aid professionals from setting research agendas and hiring scientists. This was made possible by long term commitments of core funding of the System by two founding donors, the World Bank and USAID (sometimes as high as 35%of total System costs). Independent Centers, independent donors and independent scientific advice were the three core principles. The CGIAR *per se* was an informal forum for these elements to interact on an annual basis.

## **PART ONE- A STYLIZED HISTORY**

### **3. A Quick and Stylized History of the CGIAR, Highlighting System-wide **Episodes** and Sub-System/Center **Events** in CGIAR Structural History**

Through out its history the CGIAR has periodically subjected itself to self analysis and debated propositions for reform, renewal and/or restructuring. These periods have usually been caused by a

small number of recurring issues, perceived crises, and events: (a) financial demands growing to exceed available resources; (b) priority research topics increasingly requiring more than one Center (and more recently external partners) because of changes in donor preferences and perceived priorities around core issues of food supply, food security and poverty reduction; (c) concerns about System relevance, impact and efficiency; and (d) changes in leadership. The following incomplete historical time line highlights these epochs of self flagellation, highlighting episodes and events of system wide, regional and individual center reform attempts.

### 1960's - ORIGINS OF THE CENTERS

The Centers have their origins in a partnership between the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations dating from the late 1950's. Their vision was to create independent research institutes focused on critically important issues of food security in the developing world. It was to be a two-pronged approach. The **first** prong was to focus on the most important food grains—rice, wheat, and maize (corn) -- because these commodities provided over 50% of global caloric needs. Therefore yield breakthroughs would increase available global food supplies. But **secondly** the vision recognized that most poor people lived in rural areas and were small farmers and landless laborers. In the tropics and sub tropics these people depended on complex small scale farming systems, rather than a single commodity, for subsistence. Thus understanding how to improve the productivity of complex farming systems in the tropics was a second parallel priority.

To meet a growing concern about global food shortages, the original two commodity centers –IRRI (1960) and CIMMYT (1966), had highly focused programs –breed higher yielding varieties. The objective was to “double the pile of rice” said the first DG of IRRI. These Centers, building on substantial previous research, introduced dwarfing genes into wheat and rice producing “green revolution” semi-dwarf varieties very quickly. These seeds, with appropriate agronomic practices including water and fertilizer management, rapidly increased yields. The second pair of centers –IITA

and CIAT initiated in 1967 - focused on small-scale tropical and sub tropical farming systems in Africa and Latin America.

*“The early successes of IRRI and CIMMYT with semi-dwarf rice and wheat, and felt needs to expand research efforts both in existing centers, and in additional ones being proposed, exceeded the Foundations capacity to finance them. This led the Foundations to seek external support for the four centers first from the US, and then Canada, the Kellogg Foundation and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) but progress was spotty and slow. It seemed a concerted international effort would be needed to finance the rapidly growing research enterprise”* (McCalla, 2007).

#### ✚ 1971 - CREATION OF CGIAR

As they say in the movies ‘the rest is history’. Three Bellagio meetings in 1969 and 1970 resulted in interest by more potential donors, including the World Bank, and in May of 1971 the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) was formed. **The initial parameters were with 11 donors contributing 15 million dollars to 4 Institutes (Centers).** Technical advice was to be provided by an **Independent Technical Advisory Committee (TAC)**. The Group, by convention, would always be chaired by the World Bank Vice-President (VP) whose portfolio included agriculture. A Secretariat for the CGIAR would be provided by the Bank and the Secretariat for TAC would be housed at FAO in Rome. (See Baum, Partners Against Hunger, 1986 for full details)

#### ✚ 1971-76 - RAPID EXPANSION

The new System was soon deluged with supplicants at the gate seeking support; most of these supplicants were outgrowths of research and development programs already started by one or both of the Foundations. In its **first five years the CGIAR grew rapidly, donors increased to 26, contributions increased to 63 Million \$US and 7 new research enterprises were added:-**



**ICRISAT- 1972; CIP-1972; ILRAD-1973; IBPGR-1974; research program of WARDA- 1974; ILCA-1975; and ICARDA-1976.** Three were commodity focused-CIP, WARDA and ILRAD-, three were ecology/systems oriented- ICRISAT, ILCA and ICARDA-and one focused on the preservation of genetic resources-IBPGR.

The early successes (semi-dwarf rice and wheat) of two original highly focused commodity centers skewed new donor interest strongly towards commodity breeding/productivity improvement rather than farming system productivity. Thus promising systems programs at IITA (understanding and managing cleared tropical soils) and CIAT (understanding complex crop/livestock systems using systems modeling) were abandoned and the Institutes were quickly converted into commodity focused Centers. The newly admitted ecology oriented centers also fought for and acquired commodity mandates, both regional and global.

A new CGIAR Chair (# 2) (see Appendix 2 for a list of all CGIAR Chairs) took over in 1974 bringing with him World Bank and donor concerns about Center program quality and relevance. The result was the initiation of Quinquennial Center Program Reviews (QQR's) later to be renamed as External Program and Management Reviews (EPMR's). But more importantly they were really concerned about budgetary costs rising at over 30% per year, so the donors commissioned the First System Review which functioned in 1975/76 (CGIAR, 1976). That Review recommended a "period of consolidation" - i.e., stop adding centers so fast. The First Review also raised issues of the scope, boundaries and management of Centers. In addition to slowing up acquisitions of new enterprises, the report suggested that the Group might consider limiting Center growth/size as a fiscal control measure. Finally the Review recommended, but the group rejected, an Ad Hoc Budget Committee to allocate resource shortfalls should they actually occur in future years for the first time.

## **1977-81- PERIOD OF CONSOLIDATION AND THEN MORE CENTERS**

The Group waited just three years before adding two more Centers, ISNAR in 1979 and IFPRI in 1980, so **at the end of the first decade the parameters of the CGIAR were 13 Institutes, 35 members and its budget had doubled again in five years to a 130+ million dollar enterprise.**

ISNAR was the first pure CGIAR center having been created as most European donor's preferred alternative to adopting yet another Foundation created entity- the International Agricultural Development Service (IADS) - which was already providing consulting services to National Agricultural Research Systems (NARS).

## **1981-84 - SECOND SYSTEM REVIEW & BUDGET SHORTFALLS**

In 1981 the **Second System Review** was commissioned, with the exercise again driven in the main by concerns about budget short falls. Among other recommendations, the Review recommended the creation of a Budget Committee to deal with allocating limited resources. In 1981 initial Center budgets totaled US\$156 million and it was clear that less than US\$138 million was likely to be pledged. The era of basically unrestrained budgets was over. TAC was pressed into being the budget committee when donors could not agree on even a temporary Finance Committee to make allocations. No new centers were added in the 1980's, as budgets remained tight.

## **1984-87 - NEW LEADERSHIP, WARDA AND AFRICA TASK FORCE**

The third CGIAR Chair took office in 1984 and he had clear ideas about how to make the CGIAR more efficient. By 1985 the System budget had reached 170 million but cumulative Center budget requests were regularly exceeding pledged funding which meant WB "donor of last resort" funding could not make all Center budget requests whole. A three year budget cycle was introduced, and TAC was drawn in, reluctantly, to give advice on how to allocate shortfalls. Centers presented TAC with +/- 10% forward, and fall back, lists based on the previous year's budget.

TAC presented its Draft 4<sup>th</sup> Priorities and Strategies Paper in November 1985 drawing attention to a growing issue of Center overlap and competition, especially in Africa. The new Chair noted that on a visit to Eastern and Southern Africa he had listened to small underfunded NARS complain about being besieged by Center after Center demanding special attention for their commodity. He proposed designating an indigenous regional organization, the Southern Africa Center for Cooperation In Agricultural Research (SACCAR), which was part of the Southern Africa Development Coordinating Conference (SADCC), as the relay entity through which CGIAR centers would have to work with NARS.

### ***Sub-System Event # 1 –Africa Task Force***

The reaction of the Centers was hostile. This led the Chairman to convene a Bellagio meeting in January 1986, which reported to the CGIAR Mid-Term Meeting (MTM) in Ottawa in May 1986. Also on the agenda in Ottawa was a TAC ad hoc review of WARDA which concluded that WARDA in its then current form was not worthy of CGIAR support. Given that WARDA was an Intergovernmental entity owned by 12 West African countries, that proposal drew animated and heated ire from the WARDA Governing Council. (WARDA survived to be later reorganized into an effective center)

This set of events led to the creation of an Africa Task Force charged with recommending how the CGIAR should be reorganized to deal with inter-center conflicts in Africa. Examples cited included: - IITA-CIMMYT over maize; IRRI-WARDA-IITA rice; IITA-CIAT cassava; and IITA-CIP sweet potato. The Africa Task Force concluded that relay centers were not the way to go, recommending instead that Centers involved in Africa should organize themselves to cooperate more effectively. The proposal was to encourage efforts by a Center Directors Standing Committee for Africa to enhance inter center collaboration. Better inter-center cooperation in their view would solve the problem of overlap and center competition.

**Structural Outcome:** A new Center Directors Committee on Africa was established and functioned for a period of time. No further action by the Group was taken because the next new CGIAR Chair concluded growing the CGIAR was easier than reforming Centers. This is the first case where the idea of raising new money trumped structural change.

#### 1987-90 - NEW CHAIR - EXPAND FUNDING BASE BY ADDING CENTERS

The 4<sup>th</sup> CGIAR Chair took office in 1987 and found funding flat –there had actually been negative nominal growth in 1985. **His solution was not reorganization but expansion.** If the CGIAR expanded its mandate to include natural resource management, especially forestry, it would get access to “big” new pots of money devoted to newly emerging issues such as the environment. How to do that quickly he argued, was to invite a heterogeneous set of 10 existing international research entities to join the CGIAR. Their addition would expand the mandate to include among other things: agro-forestry; forestry; water management; soils; fisheries; bananas; insect physiology; and trypano-tolerance. Of course, as these entities already existed, they would bring their funding with them. It would have represented a massive expansion of the CGIAR from 13 to 23 Centers/Entities. The Group resisted taking action without careful analysis.

After much debate, the Group asked TAC to do a two stage review - first to determine the relevance of the subject matter represented by the proposed additions to CGIAR priorities; and second to review whether the entity representing a new priority subject matter was up to CGIAR standards in terms of research quality and impact delivery. The Chair, impatient for action, pushed the CGIAR at MTM in Canberra in 1989 to agree that expansion would at least include forestry and agro-forestry. The Group agreed in principle but wanted to wait for TAC’s analysis before taking specific decisions.

TAC began its analysis by producing a working draft of the 5<sup>th</sup> Edition of its Priorities and Strategies paper which was discussed in 1989 at International Centers Week (ICW).

**By 1990 CGIAR membership had grown to 40, the budget was now US\$ 235 million and the number of Centers remained at 13.**

## 1990-94 - EXPANSION, LONG TERM VISION and CALLS FOR RESTRUCTURING

### ***Episode #1 -System-wide Restructuring (Expansion)***

CGIAR leadership changed again in mid 1990 so a new Chair (# 5) dealt with the decisions on expansion. In doing its analysis TAC presented a **Long Term Vision** of the CGIAR, the time frame being the necessary period of time for National Agricultural Research Systems (NARS) to grow strong enough to do their own applied and strategic research. When that occurs, TAC argued, the appropriate role for an international public entity would be to focus on international public goods because these would be underprovided by individual nations and/or the private sector. The CGIAR must “...*continue to be selective and deal with issues which are truly transnational and global.*” (TAC, 1992)

Thus the CGIAR at maturity should be delivering only international public goods. **Four** areas were identified as appropriate for the CGIAR: **1. genetic resources and biodiversity; 2. trans-national resource management issues** of the seas, rivers, and forests, and international externalities of national policy choice; **3. international policy issues** such as trade, transnational common property treaties, and intellectual property rights; (Global warming would cut across both these topics); and **4. independent and objective global information** of relevance to the CGIAR mission.

TAC also presented a **Medium Term Vision** which it used to frame its recommendations on which entities should be admitted, and later TAC used these Visions in its analysis of structural options. The Medium Term Vision identified 5 global commodity, genetic resource, and policy activities to be supported and named five eco-regions to be served. More detailed excerpts from the TAC vision statements are presented in Appendix 1.

In 1990 TAC made its recommendations on expansion: (a) create a integrated Forestry/Agro-Forestry Center asking the International Center for Research on Agroforestry (ICRAF) to expand its mandate to include the land use continuum from monoculture agriculture to native forests; (b) admit the International Irrigation Management Institute (IIMI) with a mandate focusing on the management of traditional irrigation systems; (c) conditionally admit The International Center for Living Aquatic Resource Management (ICLARM) subject to developing a new strategic research agenda for research in fisheries; (d) admit the International Network for Improvement of Banana and Plantain (INIBAP) and merge it into the IITA banana and plantain program; and (e) add vegetables to the CGIAR agenda by admitting the Asian Vegetable Research and Development Center (AVRDC) which was located in Taiwan, if political issues could be overcome.

Not all of TAC's recommendations were accepted. ICRAF refused to expand its mandate and European donors insisted on a traditional forestry center. European donors also promised new money to support forestry research which never materialized. The result – a new center, the Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR) was added along with ICRAF. Donors preferred to bring INIBAP in as a free standing network on a five year trial basis, though it later would be merged with IPGRI (now BIOVERSITY). TAC's recommendations to admit IIMI, ICLARM and AVRDC were accepted but later the AVRDC admission was quietly vetoed. So five new entities joined –ICRAF, CIFOR, IIMI (now IWMI), INIBAP and ICLARM (now WorldFish) and the CGIAR was now 18 Centers.

**Structural Outcome: The CGIAR added 5 new Centers/Entities bringing the total to 18 Centers, each with full blown administrative and governance structures.**

## ***Sub-System Event #2- ICRAF, CIFOR and INIBAP***

A brief analysis of why the Group did what they did is useful as we try to understand the rationale behind the Group's particular decisions on expansion. The first recommendation considered

was regarding **Forestry**. It was immediately clear that there was a sharply divided donor group. European donors saw forestry as a distinctly separate activity from agriculture. In fact agriculture was seen as the major cause of forest destruction. Therefore to put them together in the same institute did not square with European perceptions and experience.

Second **ICRAF** was very much the creation of the Canadians, especially CIDA and McGill University. They believed they had created a new discipline and it should be left to mature. Thus don't burden ICRAF with all the rest of forestry. Most other donors including the US, while not totally convinced the land use continuum concept used by TAC would work, were reluctant to create yet another Center and also add ICRAF. But after a donor sub-committee further probed the issue the Chair decided he did not have the necessary support to get a consensus to challenge the European view. **The lesson learned is that, in an informal organization operating by consensus, pockets of strongly held donor views have veto power.**

The **INIBAP** debate was one of form vs. substance. The subject matter of INIBAP was banana and plantain improvement and its *modus operandi* was as a network which had little internal research capacity. IBPGR (later IPGRI and BIOVERTSITY) was more similar in that it operated with a guidance committee and operated by networking with gene banks around the world. Therefore, said some donors, if INIBAP was to be merged with an existing center, it should be with IBPGR not IITA even though IITA had a banana breeding program and was a member of INIBAP. INIBAP also had a core of strong supporters who wanted it in on its own. A minority won again, so INIBAP was admitted for a five year trial period to allow sorting out of where it should fit. This kind of incomplete decision, delaying final action until later, became characteristic of many CGIAR decisions.

The other recommendations of TAC were accepted. There was however much debate about the Group decision not to accept "factor of production" or single discipline entities. This position kept out entomology (International Center for Insect Physiology and Ecology - ICIPE), soils (International Board for Soil Research and Management-IBSRAM), and fertilizer (International Fertilizer Development

Center-IFDC). In the end 6 were conditionally accepted, one new center approved (CIFOR to include IUFRO-SPDC) and 4 were rejected. The political problems of where AVRDC headquarters were located (Taiwan), was not solved.

**Structural Outcome:** Two more Centers/Entities than TAC had recommended adding to an already complex system.

### ***Episode #2 –System-wide Restructuring - Aborted***

Final decisions on expansion dragged on into 1991 and another new CGIAR Chair (# 6) took office in late 1991. At ICW 1991 an Advanced Working Draft of TAC's 5<sup>th</sup> Review of Priorities and Strategies paper was debated again. Confronted now with a much enlarged CGIAR, the new Chair and many donors expressed concerns about:

- the administrative structure of the System including whether existing governance and management systems were still appropriate;
- whether the number of centers had grown too large;
- and whether the CGIAR had a clear system wide strategy.

The CGIAR Chair convened a consultation in London in February 1992 that recommended among other things, the need for a revised budget process, an Executive Committee, and a hard look at decision making by consensus. At MTM 1992 the results of the consultation were reported and a final version of the Priorities paper was approved. In that discussion there were increased calls for a hard look at restructuring the CGIAR. Partly as a result of the governance consultation, an *ad hoc* donor working group recommended the creation of two new committees -Oversight and Finance- which were established in 1993.

At ICW 1993 TAC was asked “... ***to initiate a critical examination of CGIAR programmes in the context of the long-term vision, presented in 1990, and current funding trends, and to present MTM94 with options for structural change***”. In December of 1993 when yet another new



CGIAR Chair (# 7) learned of the proposed TAC analysis, he ordered TAC to stop. The then TAC Chair refused on the long established grounds that TAC took its instructions from the Group only. In April 1994 the new Chair organized a “Preparatory Consultation for MTM94” with a majority of CGIAR donors, where he argued that he had a plan to expand funding for the CGIAR and that he “... **didn’t want his legs cut out from under him before his renewal program could be put in place**”. He argued that the CGIAR engaging in a debate about downsizing and possibly eliminating Centers would do just that. The Consultation asked TAC to present its analysis in two parts- the first containing “...*the analytical framework used by TAC to underpin its deliberations and provides the Committee’s views on options for a CGIAR structure in the longer term*”. (AGR/TAC:IAR/94/6- **The CGIAR in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century: Options for Structural Change.**)

TAC indicated it was prepared to proceed, if requested by the Group, with PART 2 and present specific recommendations for structural change. The new Chair made his pitch for renewal including indicating that the World Bank was prepared to put up an extra one time matching grant of US\$ 20 million. The Group asked TAC to table Part 2. It has never been lifted from the table despite the fact that TAC, in March 1994, had discussed and agreed on the basic outline for Part 2. It was, as can be imagined, a highly confidential discussion in TAC and all draft copies were retrieved and all but three shredded. (As far as the author knows there remains only one copy in existence and it is in his personal file. He feels bound by the CGIAR group request to table it, not to release the document *per se*.)

It should however be permissible to at least outline what the tabled draft contained. The proposals followed directly from TAC’s Medium Term Vision discussed above. It would have presented the CGIAR with three restructuring options- *A Radical Option* which would stop CGIAR support entirely for 3 Centers and scale back support to two more large Centers by closing down their Headquarters locations. The second *Consolidation Option* would have consolidated and reorganized the 18 centers into 10 Centers. The third *New Institutional Mechanisms and Options* would have created 10 new entities by merging pieces of the existing 18 centers.

**Structural Outcome:** None: The most concrete restructuring proposal yet developed was buried never to be seen again. For the second time the CGIAR preferred to go after new money rather than adjusting to live within its means.

### ***Episode #3- System-wide Restructuring –Ecoregional and System-wide programs***

Recall that the review for the expansion process had included a TAC revision of its Review of Priorities and Strategies Paper. That review introduced the concept of eco-regional programs and recommended direct funding of system-wide programs as well as new eco-regional programs. **With restructuring on hold**, four new subject matter system-wide programs were started in 1994 which added to two earlier externally funded inter-center programs-Rice/Wheat Farming Systems in Asia, and Alternatives to Slash and Burn Agriculture-. This meant 6 programs were up and running by 1996 and more were added in the late 1990's. The 2012 CGIAR web page listed 13 as still operating. These new types of programs were seen as a possible way of dealing with research issues which increasingly fell between and beyond individual Center mandates.

**Structural Outcome:** The eventual result was the addition of upwards of 20 of these kinds of initiatives each with its own administrative and governance structure adding clearly to the management costs of the System.

### ***Sub-System Event #3 - ILCA/ILRAD Merger = ILRI (1991-94)***

In 1991 TAC and the CGIAR Secretariat took the unusual step of commissioning parallel External Program and Management Reviews of the two livestock Centers, ILCA and ILRAD, with one member common to both reviews and each review being asked about the advisability of merging the two centers. When the Review Teams reported at ICW 92 they advised against an immediate merger but recommend closer interaction and joint programs. TAC at the same meeting presented a draft

Livestock Research Strategy which favored further exploration of a merger. There followed over the next year, two more reports from a Working Group and a Steering Committee recommending CGIAR endorsement of proceeding to explore a single CGIAR entity on livestock research. At ICW 93 the Group endorsed further exploration setting up a Strategic Planning Task Force which presented in August 1994 a plan for a new Center to be called the International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI). The establishment, after much debate, was approved by the Boards of Trustees of both Centers and ILRI was formally approved in late 1994.

This is only one of two “voluntary” mergers that have occurred. The lessons to be learned are that first and foremost the integration of CGIAR livestock research activities into one entity made scientific sense, and it allowed a broadening of the overall research focus to the global context whereas before it had been focused only on Africa, and there limited to two diseases and one nomadic grazing ecosystem. Second, it was widely explored by TAC and the donors, and before the Center Boards were moved to act, it was clear there was a strong CGIAR consensus to proceed. Thirdly, it satisfied at least part of the growing donor desire for a smaller, more integrated system.

**Structural Outcome:** Two existing centers closed and component parts become the core of a new center. One less entity CGIAR now = 17.

#### ***Sub-System Event #4 – INIBAP Joins With IPGRI.***

As noted earlier, INIBAP was admitted for a five-year trial period in 1991. In 1992 an EPMP of INIBAP recommended that the sunset clause be removed and INIBAP be admitted permanently. That was not agreed to by the CGIAR which, as usual, set up a Task Force to review the future of INIBAP. The Task Force recommended a Banana and Plantain Consortium including INIBAP, IITA and IBPGR with a new Board of Trustees. The Group rejected the notion of a separate Board and management structure and proposed INIBAP move under the Governance and administrative structure of IPGRI

(IBPGR became IPGRI over this same period). The INIBAP donor support group, after much debate, agreed and INIBAP became part of IPGRI in 1994.

**The lesson learned here is that careful analysis and sufficient time for donor debate and consensus building allowed the CGIAR Chair to declare a consensus (a decision we can live with) and move forward.**

**Structural Outcome: One center merged with another reducing the CGIAR to 16 centers.**



### **1994-97 - NEW LEADERSHIP, REFORM, BROADER MEMBERSHIP AND NEW PROGRAMS**

The new Chair's (#7) "... *plans for renewal called for reaching out to a broader set of stakeholders, including the private sector and the NGO community, convening a major pledging meeting in Lucerne in early 1995 and persuading the World Bank to put up an additional US \$20,000,000 if donors would match it 2 for 1 with "new" core money.*

*The matching was eventually completed, in part by allowing centers/donors to convert "Special Project" funds to restricted core funds. This fundamental change in financing meant that many projects which had been outside the Centers core program became core without TAC/CGIAR review or full knowledge of what was in the projects by other donors. In the same period the World Bank shifted part of its funds from its historical role as "donor of last resort" to "donor of first resort", arguing that in its "last resort role" it was spending its money on Centers others chose not to fully support and therefore was supporting "the dogs" of the system. But the impacts of these two actions fundamentally altered the nature of the CGIAR. TAC review of core programs (and keeping bilateral activities out of core by reviews of new Special Projects), and the Bank's selfless funding procedure, basically ensured that TAC priorities were implemented, giving a corporate CGIAR wide programmatic coherence to an otherwise highly decentralized organization (Kapur, Lewis and Webb, p. 400, ftn 43). But these changes, essentially taken unilaterally by the Bank, **effectively severed any linkage between System/TAC priorities and fund allocation, meaning that, in fact, the Program of the CGIAR was the sum of decisions taken independently by 18 Centers.***

*These events, plus a less than fully engaged TAC, and a CGIAR Chair who did not appreciate contrary advice, fundamentally and irreversibly changed the CGIAR". (McCalla, 2007 p.11)*

The renewal process and the Lucerne Ministerial also resulted in a significant expansion of Southern membership which increased the number of members around the table but did little to expand the funding base as the price of admission was lowered to ½ million \$ US.

**Structural outcome:** So instead of attempting to rationalize a system that had just experienced a 40% increase in the number of Centers, the CGIAR proceeded to add a new set of overlays to deal with a larger set of priorities that fell in the growing cracks between Centers. Later, a Third System Review was commissioned which was to include reviewing structure and governance.

#### 1997-2000 - THIRD SYSTEM REVIEW, FEDERATION OF CENTERS

##### ***Episode # 4 Governance Restructuring- The 3<sup>rd</sup> System Review***

The **Third System Review** had two distinct parts - one dealing with Programmatic Issues and the second focusing on Governance and Structure. Only the second part is addressed here. When it reported in 1998, The Review recommended formally transforming the CGIAR into a single legal internationally established non-profit Corporation, with a Central Board, a high level Board Chair and a full time CEO. The centers would be components (Divisions) of the corporation reporting to central management. It also recommended streamlining of committees and management processes. The Review recognized the need for greater synergies among centers, the potential need for consolidation and the need to address the thorny issues of merging legally independent Centers into a corporate structure. But the Review ducked these issues by recommending the CGIAR commission a separate management review to make detailed recommendations of how to do it.

While the CGIAR membership mulled over the corporate model between ICW 98 and MTM 99, the Centers, fearing they were going to be restructured, decided they would prefer to drive the restructuring themselves. Their proposal was to form a Federation of Centers which would handle corporate business for all the Centers. Their discussions included looking at restructuring options but these deliberations understandably were never made public.

While the Group firmly rejected the formal corporate structure in 1999, they agreed with the Review's conclusions that issues of institutional change needed to be addressed. The group asked TAC to relook at vision and structure together with the Centers. Also there were reported to be active discussions of restructuring options on going among European donors.

**Structural outcome: By the turn of the Century everybody was scrambling to come up with reorganization plans they could live with.** But before all of these were brought into the open, the CGIAR Chair who had commissioned the Review stepped down and things were left hanging again.



## **2000- 2006 - NEW LEADERSHIP, CHANGE DESIGN & MANAGEMENT, & CHALLENGE PROGRAMS**

**By 2000 the CGIAR membership had risen to 58 (from 40 in 1990), expenditures had risen to over US\$ 330 million but the share of those funds that were unrestricted was falling rapidly and fell to 50% in 2000. There were now 16 instead of the 18 centers that existed after expansion but still 3 more than in 1990.**

CGIAR leadership changed unexpectedly in May 2000 and a new Chair (# 8) took over at ICW 2000. There also was a new Executive-Secretary of the CGIAR now titled as the Director of the CGIAR. He preferred to be identified as the CEO. At ICW 2000 there was widespread anticipation that the time to seriously address restructuring had come. The new Chair however in his first address, titled

“Charting the Future of the CGIAR”, argued that the CGIAR needed “to elevate its game” and address urgent global issues as a coherent System. From this came his idea of Challenge Programs (CPs), which would attract new resources and elevate the CGIAR to a more prominent place in Global consciousness and to a permanently higher funding plane.

Yes there were short “quick wins” of efficiency to be had but as he said, “**substance should drive structure**” and proposed setting up a Change Design and Management Team (CDMT) to coordinate the change process. The CDMT was to develop a restructuring plan for the system, a streamlined governance system and an efficiency improving business plan.

When the Federation of Centers proposal came on the agenda, the Chair declared it to be premature after 2 of the first 3 donors to speak had “serious questions” about the proposal, and he pulled it off the agenda effectively killing the idea.

**Structural outcome:** The Centers had dodged the bullet again as yet a third new CG Chair dangled the promise of news funds as the System’s salvation.

The CDMT made four recommendations about the future of the CGIAR:

First, it should be a System that focuses: “... *a major part of its efforts on large multi-institutional research programs which address specific problem areas...*” These were called Global Challenge Programs. The three remaining recommendations dealt with governance bureaucracy: –the establishment of an Executive Committee which effectively put an end to consensus decision-making by all members; the transformation of TAC into a Science Council and stripped it of any role in resource allocation; and the establishment of a CGIAR System Office.

The recommendations lead to first 2, then 3 and finally 4 Challenge Programs, a 21 member ExCo, an 8 member Science Council focusing on major future strategic global research topics and a virtual Systems Office. The early evidence suggested that the funding strategy might work as the first

Challenge Program on Water and Food seemed to be successful in generating at least US\$ 25 million in new funds out of a different pocket of an existing donor and the second on bio-fortification (Harvest Plus) brought in, first at modest levels, a new potentially major donor. The new money for water “evaporated” with a change in the donor governments priorities. The result was that instead of generating “new” money, the first Challenge program became a competitor for existing money and was charged with drawing money away from other programs within the CGIAR, something that was not supposed to happen. The addition of the new donor was more positive as that donor has grown to be one of the largest CG donors.

Finally there was a CGIAR Charter approved in 2003/04 and the Centers proposed a new form of collaboration -an Alliance of CGIAR Centers- that came into effect in 2006.

### ***Episode # 5 Restructuring by “Market Forces” & the CBC***

The CDMT did not directly address the structural issue arguing that if Challenge Programs (CPs) were successful in moving new and existing money in their direction, Centers that could not or would not participate would fade away -**restructuring by ”market forces”**. It also argued for an **evolutionary bottom-up approach, leaving it to elements of the System to explore options.**

This did occur in 2003-04 when the **Committee of Center Board Chairs (CBC)** discussed possible restructuring options. The CBC discussed options again in 2006 when a two page anonymous set of options was tabled (It is attached as a confidential document in Appendix 3). The document proposed that the CGIAR should consist of 4 Ecoregional entities-2 for Africa, one in Latin America and one a Rainfed/Drylands center, and 5 Global Entities –one for Cereals/Food Grains, one for other Food Crops, one for Livestock and Fisheries, one for Water, Forests and Natural Resource Management and a Global Policy center. The proposal argued for 4 Boards of Trustees for the 9 entities and claimed it would allow the closing of 4 or 5 headquarters. It would reduce governance and management costs substantially and provide a “more coherent structure of programs”. This document was also forwarded to the next round of reform in 2008.



**Structural outcome:** None

### **Sub-System Event # 5 The Abolition of ISNAR**

But below the surface there were issues at individual centers and at regional levels. **WARDA** was forced out of its headquarters in Cote d'Ivoire by civil war and moved into IITA facilities in Benin. Here was an opportunity for readjustment which was however deferred to the Africa Task Forces discussed below.

The EPMP of **ISNAR** in 2002 raised serious questions about that Centers value to the System. This began a messy and poorly handled process of forcing a Center, using budget pressure, to close in 2004, although part of its program was saved and merged into IFPRI. The process was contentious and in the end costly. It began with an EPMP of ISNAR, which identified three options: re-tool and re-staff; become a decentralized service entity; or phase out and transfer viable components to other centers. The EPMP recommended the second option but the Group at its AGM 02 disagreed and set up a Task Force –the ISNAR Restructuring Team -as it was called, to study the issue further. The Team's report recommended transferring governance and some of ISNAR program to IFPRI, essentially recommending closure. The Group agreed. Its decision at AGM 03 read: "*The CGIAR requests the ISNAR Board to adopt a resolution dissolving ISNAR and to submit to ExCo a plan for the disposition of ISNAR's assets for approval by the CGIAR*". So in 2004 ISNAR ceased to exist but the whole process left a sour taste in many mouths and has probably made future restructuring more difficult.

**Structural outcome:** After a difficult and rancorous process one center is dis-established reducing the CGIAR to 15 Centers.

**Sub-System Event # 6 ICRISAT EPMR and the Africa Task Forces (#2)**

The **ICRISAT** EPMR in 2003 recommended that ICRISAT transfer its headquarters and most its program to Africa leaving only strategic germ plasm activities in India. Needless to say India and other developing countries reacted strongly to the potential loss of CGIAR activities and again the CGIAR put off taking a stand by forming two Africa Task Forces, one on **programmatic alignment** and the other on **structural options and organizational alignment**.

These task forces recommended reorganization of the CGIAR activities in SSA, arguing that regional reorganization was a possible first step towards system reorganization (The Tervuren Consensus, April 2005). The propositions for two new CGIAR structures- one for West and Central Africa which proposed combining IITA and WARDA under single Board, and a second for East and Southern Africa which was to be a new entity built out of pieces of ICRAF, ILRI and ICRISAT-, were rejected because the Group needed to wait to see if and how the rest of the System could be reorganized in parallel- a sort of Catch 22.

**Structural outcome:** None. Action on an explicit regional restructuring proposal was deferred until a yet to be developed System restructuring plan was agreed to.

**Sub-System Event # 7 CIMMYT-IRRI Merger-Proposal Goes Nowhere,****2003-05.**

In 2003 CIMMYT and IRRI asked the Rockefeller Foundation (RF) to lead a review of potential options for closer cooperation between the two Centers. The idea was first discussed in 2001 by the IRRI DG and the CIMMYT Board Chair when both centers were debating whether remaining in the CGIAR, with its increased bureaucracy and declining core funding, was worthwhile. They believed a larger Center made up of a merger of the CGIAR's "two flagship centers" was a better bet for independent survival. The President of RF chaired the review committee which included CG Members. The RF Review's recommendation was for a closer integration of the two centers under a single Board

as a first step towards full integration. This initiative, fully supported by the CIMMYT Board, foundered when significant changes in the IRRI Board, which occurred between 2003 and January 2005, led IRRI to reject the single Board model and to agree to only limited collaboration in three areas. Provision was made for one common Board member on the two Boards instead of merging the Boards.

**Structural outcome:** Nothing. However, many at CIMMYT believed that if IRRI and CIMMYT had merged it would have triggered more structural change in the CGIAR. It was reported that, while the IRRI/CIMMYT discussions were on-going, CIFOR and ICRAF had engaged in merger discussions. It is also known that ICRISAT and ICARDA had discussed plans for holding a joint Board meeting to discuss closer interactions if the merger moved forward. These plans were cancelled when the IRRI/CIMMYT joint Board meeting in Shanghai failed to move in the direction of a merger. If these outcomes had played out the CGIAR would have been down to 12 Centers. Another opportunity lost



## **2006-2008 - NEW CHAIR, INDEPENDENT SYSTEM REVIEW, DEEPER REFORMS**

By 2006 the leadership regime of the CGIAR changed again. With a new Chair (# 9), and new Director, a new round of structural discussions started yet again. **The CGIAR now had 64 members, still 15 Centers, a budget of US\$ 450 million of which now only 42% was unrestricted.**

Also in 2006 the Centers formed the Alliance of CGIAR Centers with the former Center Directors Committee (CDC) becoming the Alliance Executive and the former Committee of Board Chairs (CBC) becoming the Alliance Board. The purpose was to allow the Centers to speak collectively and to facilitate and implement joint actions.

**Episode # 6 Restructuring - Change Management Initiatives, 2007-08.**

The new Chair was soon pressed to deal with a variety of alignment issues leading to an Alignment Forum in 2007 which in turn called for a “facilitated change management process”. So a new Change Management Initiative (CMI) was launched that proceeded in parallel with a World Bank required Independent Review of the CGIAR. The CMI was led by a Change Steering Committee and had four working groups: -visioning; partnerships; governance at System and Center level; and funding mechanisms.

The result was an Integrated Reform Proposal with a revised vision, strategic objectives and a set of principles to guide reform. These principles included separating organizationally the “doers” of research –the Centers- from the “funders “of research – the Donors. The Centers would form a *Consortium of CGIAR Centers*, with a Board, CEO and Consortium Office and the donors would form a CGIAR Fund, with a Fund Council as its executive arm and a Fund Office (reorganized CGIAR Secretariat still in the World Bank). The second principle was that funding should go through Mega Programs (since renamed CGIAR Research Programs-CRP’s) which were designed to contribute to a Strategy and Results Framework (SRF). A reconstituted Independent Science and Partnership Council (ISPC) would provide strategic scientific advice to both groups. The Consortium would enter into Program Performance Contracts (PPC) with the Fund for each Mega Program and a new Independent Evaluation Mechanism would be set up by the Fund Council to monitor performance. Centers would contribute to, and some would manage as lead centers, Mega Programs and would be accountable to the Consortium. And the Consortium, as a quasi-corporate entity, would be accountable to donors.

**Structural outcome:** A proposal to radically change the CGIAR by adding a new super structure of Governance bodies.

All of this was going on during a period when agricultural commodity prices soared starting in 2007 and peaking in 2008. Wheat and maize prices tripled and rice and soybean prices more than doubled. Food security and agricultural productivity issues rose rapidly on the global agenda, a radical change after years of declining shares of ODA investments going into agricultural research and agricultural development. Rhetoric was abundant: the UN Secretary General's High Level Task Force on Food Security; the G-8 "L'Aquila" Joint Statement on Global Food Security; the FAO World Food Summit Declaration; etc., There was talk of doubling the CGIAR budget and all seemed concerned about whether the System could and would respond. Many felt a more centralized organization of the Centers with performance contracts would increase the chances of the CGIAR significantly increasing its budget.

## 2008-2011 - "THE NEW CGIAR", CONSORTIUM, FUND COUNCIL, MEGA PROGRAMS-CRP'S

**In 2010 CGIAR membership stabilized at 64; funding had risen to over US\$ 650 million, but only 34% of it was core; and there were still 15 Centers, 14 system-wide programs, and 5 Challenge Programs. Preliminary estimates placed 2011 funding at US\$ 717 million.**

### *Episode # 7 Restructuring "The New CGIAR"*

The reform package was approved by the CGIAR at Maputo in late 2008 and the "New CGIAR" was to be in place by January 1, 2010. So the old informal structure known as the CGIAR, with its annual meetings (ICW's and earlier MTM's), Secretariat, and Science Council/TAC was replaced on June 30, 2010.

**Structural outcome:**

A new layer of super structure is created with two new entities –the **Consortium of CGIAR Centers** and the **CGIAR Fund**, two supporting offices, a yet again revised **Science and Partnership Council** and a **new Evaluation mechanism**. The Consortium has a new 10 member **Board of Trustees** and High level Board Chair and a new **CEO** (this is added super structure as the 15 Centers and 15 Boards of Trustees continue to exist), The Fund has a Fund Council and Executive Secretary. So far 16 Mega Programs, now called CGIAR Research Programs (CRP's) have been approved or are in the process of approval. Each of necessity will require leadership, administrative capacity, and advisory mechanisms to allow inputs from a broadened set of research partners. These will add substantially to central administrative costs. The 5 Challenge Programs are to be folded into the CRP's over the period up to 2013, but in the interim it appears no existing structures will be discontinued.


**WHERE DO WE STAND NOW?**

It is still too early to pass judgment on how effective the new structure will be. In the transition there is a proliferation of entities and layers as old mechanisms persist and new ones are added. Perhaps the adage should be “**Old structures never die, they are just added to.**”

Progress has been slower than anticipated and new higher funding levels have yet to materialize. In fact in the transition period after 2010, funding constraints and cash flow problems seemed to have been exacerbated. If this is a harbinger of things to come, the CGIAR will be more costly administratively to run leaving fewer funds available for research. Again the argument that restructuring at the top will increase financial support will, for the 4<sup>th</sup> time, mean that adding structure to access more money has over ridden needed basic structural change at the Center Level.

It is, in my view, quite possible that an appropriately restructured system of Centers could easily have addressed the seven broad topics that make up the list of CRP's: CRP 1-Integrated Production Systems; CRP 2 - Policies, Institutions and Markets; CRP 3 -Productivity Improvement of Crops and

Livestock; CRP 4 - Nutrition and Health; CRP 5 - Water and Land; CRP 6 - Forests; CRP 7 - Climate Change; without creating additional administrative structures.

So our brief stylized history ends here. It is a history which, in terms of the CGIAR's Research, Science and Productivity Impacts, has been, in most people's judgment, as an incredibly successful informal International Organization. The CGIAR as it emerged was an international success story others sought to emulate. Yet it has constantly been buffeted by internal and external forces which want to reform the original basic structure: its loose, informal, consensus governance system; its source of independent scientific advice; its set of *ad hoc* administrative structures; its independent donors; and its basic building blocks of a loose Confederation of independent Centers. The System's Founders genius was to deliberately design a system to attract aid funding but not give aid bureaucrats and politicians centralized power to set scientific priorities and manage long-term research organizations.

That genius has always run afoul of management experts, especially from the World Bank and the private sector, who are imbued with a top down corporate model with one Board, one Chair, one CEO and corporate divisions reporting to head quarters. Each successive pass at "System Reform" has tried to move in that direction but has never quite been willing to take on the independent Centers who now, after surviving for all these years, have become quite good at holding their own.

## SECTION TWO- WHAT SHOULD WE LEARN FROM OUR HISTORY?

### 4. The CGIAR's History of Repeatedly Backing Away From System Restructuring. A Summary.

Until the proposal to add 10 centers at once hit the CGIAR in 1988, the System had grown one center at a time without an overt structural vision of where the CGIAR was heading. Clearly the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations had a clear vision in the 1960's in terms of needed subject matter and necessary research strategies, and these played out not only in the original 4 Centers but also in most of the Center additions in the 1970's. All those added in that period, except for ISNAR, had clear origins in previous Rockefeller and/or Ford programs. But as Foundation influence waned so did their clarity of vision's influence on the emerging CGIAR. Centers were proposed one at a time, reviewed by TAC and admitted or rejected by the Group's consensus as declared by the Chair. (The Chair has always played a critical role in the CGIAR although he/she never had any formal power except to declare the consensus and set the agenda).

But when the CGIAR was confronted with a proposal to add 10 disparate centers at once, it seemed a vision was needed. That is why we began our review of System wide restructuring with the Expansion episode rather than the Consolidation episodes that followed. The massive proposed expansion forced the CGIAR to think about its long term future. It asked TAC to take the lead in evaluating which entities should be admitted. TAC's analysis of the expansion proposals began by presenting their 5<sup>th</sup> Review of CGIAR Priorities and Strategies in order to assess whether the subject matters represented by the applicants for membership fitted within CGIAR future priorities. This time the priority assessment was expanded beyond determining priorities based on food needs and poverty intensity (food needs of poor populations) to include attention to: commodity mix by ecology; ecological constraints and demands; regional balance e. g. Africa vs. Asia vs. Latin America; and national research capacity. An attempt was made to use weights for these additional factors to modify the basic priority based only on population and income dimensions. For example fragile ecologies/



countries –eco regions-, with weak NARS would receive heavier weights than ecoregions with fertile ecologies and better developed NARS. This presumably allowed for a more comprehensive analysis of the potential contributions the proposed new Centers would bring to the CGIAR.

With the expanded and revised strategy in hand TAC laid out its Long and Medium Term Visions. (See Appendix 2) The **Long Term Vision** identified four types of *International Public Goods* needing indefinite international investment –**germplasm** and **biodiversity**; **trans-national natural resource management issues** e.g. river basins, fisheries, global warming; **international policy issues** e.g. IPR, trade; and, **global information crucial to food security**. The **Medium Term Vision** focused on two types of activities –global and ecoregional, and it proposed then, and again later, how these concepts could be used to restructure the basic building blocks of the CGIAR –the international research institutes –the CENTERS. Their restructuring proposals would have all involved voluntary mergers or joint ventures among sovereign centers. The CGIAR can change mandates, and no longer fund removed ones, but they do not have the authority to order Centers to merge or disband. Yet the Group (the CGIAR donors) never was willing to follow through with a comprehensive restructuring of the System and all the consultation and compromise it would entail.

As our structural history reveals the CGIAR gets worked up about structural change and then is always distracted by the potential of new funding possibilities or more likely, *funding dreams*. Starting with the first Africa Task Force in 1986-87, pressures for Center reform, lead by one new CGIAR Chair (#3), were set aside by the subsequent new Chair (#4)proposing to get more money by expanding the System and broadening its priorities. New money did not flow and at the end of the expansion in 1992 the CGIAR was again asking TAC for recommendations on consolidation and restructuring. The majority of donors seemed committed to getting on with it, and the Centers were reluctant but resigned to having something happen.

But yet another new Chair (# 7) had visions of revitalizing and expanding the funding base by organizing a High Level Pledging Session, which occurred in Lucerne in 1995. Thus he pleaded with

donors to ask TAC to withhold (table) their specific proposals, so they were never formally presented. The CGIAR Chair, seeming to want to avoid the conflict that might come from contraction, chose an approach of “high level” fund raising at the expense of system coherence.

But by 1997, the restructuring issue was back on the table with the Third System Review recommendations for a corporate structure and proposing a further look at center structure. Along comes another new CGIAR Chair (# 8) who, based on his experience at the Global Environment Fund (GEF), wants the CGIAR “to elevate its game” and create Global Challenge Programs. He is convinced the reform will surely cause more money to flow. Anyway as he argued “structure should follow substance”, thus deferring the structural reform issue yet again.

In the period 2002 -2005 there were three opportunities for structural reform building on center levels events—WARDA’s forced relocation from Cote d’Ivoire, ICRISAT’s EPMP and the IRRI-CIMMYT merger negotiations- yet all were passed up. This included a well developed proposal for restructuring the System starting with Africa –The Tervuren Consensus. Yet the Group was reluctant to move using the excuse that there was no System wide reform proposal into which Africa reform could fit.

Most recently high commodity prices in 2007 and 2008 lead to a flurry of interest in increasing funding to agriculture and agricultural research which in turn rekindled the debate about the CGIAR’s capacity to respond quickly and decisively. The most recent restructuring seems based again on the premise that if the CGIAR can integrate and aggregate its capacity, sign performance contracts and have a single agency “enforce” delivery, money will flow. As yet there is little evidence that money is flowing at the rate needed to make the CGIAR a billion dollar enterprise by 2013 as some have forecast.

### **5. Why Doesn’t It Happen?**

So why is it that the siren calls of more money always divert CGIAR attention from having a hard look at the structure i.e.- mandates in terms commodities, ecologies and research tasks- of its

basic building blocks –the Centers? The solution is clearly not to get rid of the Center construct because, as noted at the beginning, an institutional platform for housing researchers is a critical necessary condition for delivering priority research programs. The Centers provide what Departments and Colleges provide to a University or Research Institute. What is needed is flexibility to adjust mandates to reflect changes in science and global food security priorities. The CGIAR may be better served the future by having different configurations of commodities, agro-ecologies and research tasks built into their science delivery platforms. It seems reasonable that research activities could be better delivered with fewer platforms configured in different ways. There should be nothing sacrosanct about the particular structures that were created 20 or more years ago.

So why have there been so few successful attempt to restructure the Centers? Does the CGIAR still need 15 centers each with Board's, DG's and core central administrations to deliver the original 7 CRP's? Could they be reconfigured in such a way as to minimize the need for parallel administrative structures for the now 16 CRP's? Why not explore the efficiency and effectiveness consequences of 10 or 8 or 6 Centers?

The reason it seems to me is quite obvious. The CGIAR System was/is “A Voluntary Association” made up of **independent Centers** (the only legally constituted entities in the System), **independent donors** who are either sovereign states or other forms of legal national or international entities, **independent technical advice** from TAC and an informal mechanism which provides a forum, or bazaar, if you like, where Donors can meet Centers, listen to technical advice, view Center wares and exchange money. That's the way the System was deliberately designed so researchers would be free from bureaucratic direction by Aid agencies and other donors. While the new super structure -The Consortium of CGIAR Centers -has recently been granted International Status it is not clear that, that status alters their authority over the Centers. Thus in my view, It remains true that **there is no central legally constituted authority in the CGIAR System which can order and enforce change in the**

**Centers.** Yes you could starve them to death by cutting off their funds but the ham handed way ISNAR was dispatched suggests that is not a very easy or popular way to go.

Thus it is not surprising that the only successful restructuring done in the CGIAR has been at the center level and has come about when all elements of the System are on the same page about the need for change. The ILCA-ILRAD = ILRI merger took two EPMR's, a TAC livestock priority paper, a working group, a task force, a CGIAR non-binding resolution, and a strategic planning committee to finally persuade two Boards of independent Centers to voluntarily disband and create a new center, 4 years later. And in this case the whole process made eminent scientific and priority sense. The INIBAP experience again in the end was a voluntary merger under of course some donor pressure about what might happen if it did not proceed.

It is my belief that if the CIMMYT-IRRI merger exploration had been handled more publicly, with the Group able to express their views about the merger in advance of the joint Board meeting in Shanghai (rather than cutting core funds from both centers after it failed, as one donor did), things might have gone differently. If they had, I believe it would have set off a chain reaction of mergers and reform that would have resulted in a different CGIAR today. More details on the process and possible ways it could have been improved can be provided.

Thus prospects for future restructuring, given the current form of the CGIAR will depend on building solid scientific, efficiency, and priority rationales for structural change. Those would be the necessary conditions. Promises of at least stable future funding (or better yet increased funding) for the altered entity, would move in the direction of sufficient conditions for Centers and their Boards to voluntarily merge, or in the extreme, put themselves out of business. I believe this was the case for ILRI.

I think the chance for the independent scientific advice mechanism (originally TAC, the third independent pillar of the CGIAR) to play a critical role today is unlikely because the Science Council –

now the Independent Science and Partnership Council (ISPC) has been so weakened, and is so far out of the resource allocation loop, that what positive role it could have played in 1994, could not happen now. Further constituting some external panel to come in and propose restructuring is doomed to failure because the CGIAR has no power to force implementation of their findings. Legally constituting the Consortium of CGIAR Centers will, in and of itself, not change the situation unless it gets all the Centers to **voluntarily cede** their autonomy to the Consortium. This is because the Centers each have very different legal structures, countries of registration and international legal personas. There is not an international government that can forcibly transfer their rights to another entity.

A careful review of the Consortium Constitution does not reveal any obvious ceding of Center authority over fiscal and governance to the Consortium Board. Unless the Consortium Board has other plans I am unaware of, their ability to legally enforce performance contracts with the Centers seems extremely limited. But perhaps I must stop here because I am not an international lawyer nor am I privy to the Boards plans.

## **6. What Could the CGIAR do in the Future to Foster Reform?**

So here are only some preliminary thoughts which could be expanded upon later. First the CGIAR is a voluntary organization made up of independent parts who agree to come together because of mutual interests. In a voluntary association people change because they want to change and change generally can be encouraged by positive incentives, or threats of negative consequences. In an organization like the CGIAR the biggest incentive is money and fortunately that is what donors bring to the table. So donors have the potential to influence, but not to control, Center behavior.

Historically the incentives for the Centers to belong to the CGIAR were three and they were powerful. **First –core unrestricted funding**-access to multiple funding sources with the vast majority (in early years in excess of 80%) of the funding unrestricted core- i.e. the Centers and their scientists could decide how to use it. **Second –limited reviews** - core donors agreed that annual reports, and

only one comprehensive independent review every five years were sufficient to justify continued funding, and the **third** was **international status** which greatly facilitated international exchange of plant materials and findings, imports of scientific equipment and chemicals and facilitating the deployment of human capital through having access to international visas.

These advantages have significantly eroded over the years as funds have become more and more restricted, often coming now in the form of bilateral project funds, with core funds now in the neighborhood of only 35% of Center budgets. Project funds bring with them endless bilateral, often annual, reviews by many donors. Because raising restricted funds is the only way to survive or grow, fund raising becomes an additional major demand on time as well as a financial burden. Finally the internet and modern information system have greatly changed international exchanges of information, never the less the third advantage remains important.

**So option one is to reverse the growing disincentives of membership by increasing unrestricted core funding, reducing annual individual donor reviews and explicitly rewarding inter-center cooperation.** On this later point one could develop a **sliding scale of core funding rewards for “good system citizenship”**- so much core support for real collaboration; more for joint ventures; more yet for sharing of facilities and human resources; and even more for merging Boards and Centers. **Funding increases could come for merging individual center country offices into one CGIAR office per country or for merging multiple center programs such as cereal breeding programs into a single CGIAR program.** For example CIMMYT and IRRI could have been rewarded for the three joint programs they did create, rather than being punished for not going further. There are many possible places where an explicit and open system of rewards and punishments can work remarkably well.

**Second** our review of sub system events shows that a **minority of centers, or even one Center, and their closest supporters can,** in a voluntary consensus organization, **prevent change and even obstruct others who want to change.** This is the tyranny of the minority in a consensus

organization. Some have argued that there should be a “**bad donor list**” in the CGIAR for donors who deliberately encourage center behavior that is contrary to CGIAR collective priorities. Also there should be the possibility of **revoking the membership** of a donor who behaves against the collective interests of the CGIAR or penalizing a center for anti-CGIAR behavior by ceasing to fund a Center component or, in the extreme, stop funding the Center.

**Third** one should explore **whether Centers can cede some but not all of their autonomy** to the Consortium Board. Centers could voluntarily agreed to return funds received as part of a CRP performance contract if they did not deliver what they promised.

**Fourth** there are powerful reasons why **combining Boards makes sense** both financially and programmatically. **Why not one Board for all cereal research in the CGIAR?** That might be as far as it goes. Recalling the IRRI/CIMMYT discussions, IRRI was not as negative about one Board as they were about a single DG. Combining Boards could be an end in its self or it could be the first step towards phased integration.

**Fifth**, why not promise that any savings Centers make by combining research, administrative and governance activities across centers is theirs to add to their research budgets and that it will be **matched** by the Fund with core support over a fixed period of time. The Fund Council could set up a Consolidated Reward Fund for these kinds of programs.

**Sixth** If large donors are major donors to particular centers, why not use that leverage to nudge Centers towards closer integration. If for example there are one or more large donors who are major funders of both CIMMYT and IRRI why don't those donors ask/urge the two Centers to revisit the merger issue they passed on in 2005. They would be fools not to listen to that suggestion. If these two Centers merged, three CRP's -3.1, 3.2 and 3.3- would be mainly centered within one institution and would not require new costly administrative and governance mechanisms. If you added all cereals to the mix (which would make eminent sense), CRP 3.6 would also be covered. And 16 CRP's becomes

13 and the number of Centers is reduced by at least one and potentially more if ICRISAT and ICARDA merged. Even more obvious on the subject of Center redundancy is the question of why does the CGIAR need two forestry centers to deliver one sensibly structured CRP (#6)?

**Seventh** there is need to comment on the relationship between the Consortium Board and individual Center Boards. While the Constitution gives the Centers a Yes or No vote on a nominee proposed by the Board, the Consortium Board could, by controlling the nomination process, become overtime in an adversarial position with the Centers. This happens all the time in Corporate Boards and their relations with share holders (The Centers). One possibility would be to aggressively move towards fewer Center Boards as is proposed for example in the CBC proposals in Appendix 3. Perhaps as few as four or five super boards with each Board providing oversight to two or more Centers. Then the Consortium Board could be made up of an Independent Chair and Vice Chair, four independent members selected as prescribed now and four members being the chairs of each of the super –Boards. This would provide more of a shared governance character to the Consortium and potentially reduce potential stand-offs between the Consortium Board and CEO, and the Centers, which based on many years of experience in central entities of the CGIAR and in Center governance is very likely to happen.

## 7. In Summary

It seems the time is ripe to reopen the structural question in a bottom up fashion now that the subject matter is in place with the development of the CRP's. The next task is to deliver those CRP's efficiently with an appropriate smaller set of basic research building blocks. I am still of the belief that the kinds of ideas put forward by TAC in the 1990's merit reexamination and a new long and medium term vision for the CGIAR in terms of high priority international research activities, efficient management structures and effective governance is worth exploring again. There is language in the Consortium Constitution (Article 5, 2d) that encourages/charges the Board with reviewing " ...the efficiency and optimal organizational structure of the system of Member centers with a view to increasing operational efficiency" (Constitution p.4). This clearly needs to happen.



## ***Author's Statement of Interest***

*The author of this paper has been involved with the CGIAR off and on for 37 of its 42 years of existence. Over that period, I have developed an enormous respect and affection for the organization.*

*I have seen the CGIAR from a number of different perspectives: External reviewer-Study Director of the First System Review 1975-76; Advisor- member of TAC 1984-88, Chair of TAC 1988-1994; World Bank cosponsor representative and Chair of the Finance Committee 1998-99; Board Member and Board Chair-CIMMYT Board Chair 2001-2006 and Board member CPWF 2009-2011.*

*Therefore, I think I know how the organization works but I am not a disinterested observer.*

*Alex McCalla 04/25/12*

## APPENDIX 1. TAC Visions

TAC presented their version of a Long Term Vision of the CGIAR. Long term was defined as a period long enough for most National Agricultural Research Programs (NARS) to have developed their own capacity to meet their national strategic and applied, as well as adaptive, research needs. The details of the Long term vision are presented here because it plays a continuing role in subsequent episodes. TAC saw four areas of continuing need for a CGIAR Like organization:

*Germplasm: "It is clear from the analysis that there will be, for the foreseeable future, an international need for activities in germplasm collection, characterization, conservation and basic genetic manipulation for plants and animals that have transnational and/or global utilization. Included here must be the presentation of biodiversity. The research related to these activities would be likely to be strategic and involve applications of modern molecular biology as well as more traditional scientific techniques. These activities should include as a minimum the following: (a) annual plants of significance to meeting food needs and sustaining viable farming systems; b) perennial plants, particularly trees, of importance to the continuum of land use described earlier; (c) animals of economic significance, including appropriate aquatic species."*

*Natural Resource Management: "Despite the fact that natural resource management and its components - agronomy, natural forest management, soils, water, plant nutrition, and agroecological characterization - are often categorized as being "location specific", there are and will remain strategic research issues and environmental problems which will transcend specific production systems and geographical and ecological regions."*

*Policy and Management: "The current trends towards the internationalization of commerce, resource management and science will clearly continue and intensify in the foreseeable future. Global interdependence is a growing and permanent reality. Thus the number of major policy issues which are international - e.g. trade, capital investment, and science – will become more complex. In addition, the international ramifications of national policy choice, especially of large countries, will become more critical. "*

*Global Information: "With the information explosion and the rapid development of multimedia communication techniques, the need for international mechanisms of collection, evaluation and dissemination of research findings will increase. Improved mechanisms to facilitate international exchange of results, ideas, methods and personnel will be critical. The major issue to be recognized is*

*that these activities too have great economies of scale and significant spillover. These are truly international public goods which will be under produced if left only to individual nations.”*

But until that long term was reached TAC saw the CGIAR in the medium term focusing on two distinct but related types of activities. Again I quote TAC in some detail because the concepts recur in subsequent episodes as well.

TAC's "A Possible Medium-Term Vision"

*“In the medium term the CGIAR could have major activities of two types - global and ecoregional. Global activities would be focused on commodities and selected subject matter areas, such as policy, management, conservation of germplasm and the maintenance of biodiversity. Ecoregional activities would focus on applied and strategic research on the ecological foundations of sustainable production systems, commodity improvement in collaboration with global commodity activities and interfaces with national partners.*

TAC sees emphasis on at least the following:

*Global Activities*

*A series of global germplasm/plant improvement activities on the following groups:*

- *-cereals, especially rice, wheat, maize and selected other cereals*
- *-roots and tubers, especially potato, sweet potato and cassava*
- *-selected legumes and pulses of global or particular regional importance*
- *-vegetables*
- *-multipurpose trees*

*A livestock activity addressing strategic and applied research issues in an integrated fashion on selected species of global significance*

*A fisheries and aquaculture activity on selected topics of international importance*

*A genetic resources activity focusing on conservation of genetic resources and the maintenance of biodiversity*

*A set of activities addressing strategic policy and management issues of global significance*

### *Ecoregional Activities*

*Evolving ecoregional activities would focus on coverage of major agroecological zones and ecosystems but TAC does not-see the necessity of complete coverage of all agroecological zones. Embedded in these ecoregional activities would be research on natural resource management, sustainability, the land use continuum including crops, trees and livestock and commodity based farming systems all done in collaboration with national partners. Major ecoregions that could be covered are:*

*Latin America - principally humid and subhumid warm tropics and subtropics (summer rainfall)*

*Sub-Saharan Africa - humid and subhumid warm tropics & semi-arid warm tropics*

*West Asia and North Africa (WANA) - semi-arid subtropics (winter rainfall)*

*Asia - principally semi-arid and subhumid tropics and subtropics (summer rainfall) & humid warm tropics and subtropics (summer rainfall)*

*Asia and WANA - irrigated ecosystems*

*Other ecological zones such as cool highlands in the tropics and subtropics (summer rainfall) could be covered selectively in conjunction with several of the global activities identified.*

*It is difficult to escape from the conclusion that, in future, there will be a need for at least two types of international institutional mechanisms; those with an ecoregional focus and those with a commodity focus, each dependent on the other, and collaborating closely to meet the needs of developing countries. On this basis, it is possible to envisage two interconnected sets of mechanisms, one based on ecoregions and the other on commodities” (A Possible Expansion of the CGIAR (AGR/TAC:IAR/90/24 Sept 1990)*

## APPENDIX 2. CGIAR CHAIRS

### CGIAR & CGIAR FUND CHAIRS 1971- 2012 - ALL WORLD BANK VP's

#### Chairs of CGIAR 1971 - 2009

Number	Name	Dates of Service
1	Richard H. Demuth	1971-1974
2	Warren Baum	1974-1983
3	S. Shahid Husain	1984-1987
4	W. David Hopper	1987-1990
5	Wilfried Thalwitz	1990-1991
6	V. Rajagopalan	1991-1993
7	Ismail Serageldin	1994-2000
8	Ian Johnson	2000-2006
9	Katherine Sierra	2006-2009

#### CGIAR Fund Council Chairs 2010-

1	Katherine Sierra	Jan-June 2010
2	Inger Andersen	2010-2011
3	Rachel Kyte	2012-

## APPENDIX 3. Anonymous CBC Discussion Document Circa 2006

### CONFIDENTIAL--DRAFT FOR DISCUSSION -12/18/06

A Remodeled CGIAR –Some Anonymous Thoughts to Get the Discussion Going

The revision proposes 4 Ecoregional Entities (Decentralized Mode Centers) and 5 Global Entities which function in partnership with NARS, ARIs and the Private Sector.

There are a couple of possible governance models that could be applied to the 9 entities.

#### ECOREGIONAL ENTITIES:

1. **RDEC** -Rainfed/Drylands Ecoregional Center; merge ICRISAT & ICARDA crops and natural resource management programs. **Regional Focus:** WANA, Sahel, Dry Southern Africa. **Headquarters:** ICARDA.
2. **ESAEC** -Eastern and Southern Africa Ecoregional Center; Single program for region drawing on pieces from at least ICRISAT, CIMMYT, ILRI, ICRAF, CIP, IFPRI,ETC. **Regional Focus:** Ethiopia/Sudan to South Africa. **Headquarters:** Nairobi (ICRAF Campus) which shares administrative services with ILRI campus
3. **WCAEC** -West and Central Africa Ecoregional Center: merge crops and resource management programs of IITA, WARDA, and ICRISAT. **Regional Focus:** West and Central Africa including Angola. **Headquarters:** IITA
4. **LAEC** -Latin America Ecoregional Center; merge regional management programs of CIAT, CIP, CIMMYT. **Regional Focus:** Mexico south to Argentina/Chile. **Headquarters:** CIAT.

#### GLOBAL ENTITIES:

5. **WCC**- World Cereals Center; covering major cereals-- rice, wheat, maize, sorghum, millet and barley. Merge IRRI/CIMMYT and add breeding programs for millet and sorghum from ICRISAT, wheat and barley from ICARDA, maize from IITA and rice from IITA and CIAT. A large but decentralized entity operating gene banks in Mexico, Philippines, Syria and India. **Headquarters:** IRRI or CIMMYT. Economies of scale will permit concentration of entire CGIAR effort in biotechnology in one institute. Could also contain a global program of intensive, irrigated multi-cereal systems wheat/rice/maize. Would do all regionally focused work through joint programs with ecoregional entities.
6. **WCIC**- World Crop Improvement Center; Covering roots, tubers, legumes/lentils and tropical forage. Potato and sweet potato from CIP, cassava from CIAT and IITA, yams IITA, lentils ICARDA and ICRISAT, tropical forages from CIAT. **Headquarters:** CIP/ IITA/ ICARDA. Would operate in a decentralized partnership role with all ecoregional entities.

7. **GPC-** Global Policy Center; all international policy including development, trade, investment, intellectual property and common property resources. Merge IFPRI (including ISNAR Division) and IPGRI and develop a major thrust in policies for global common property resources such as fisheries, forests, range lands and genetic resources drawing on policy programs at CIFOR, ICRAF, IWMI, WFC. **Headquarters:** Washington or Rome.
8. **WLFC-** World Livestock and Fisheries Center; Focus on high protein food sources and small farmer income generation. Merge ILRI and WFC- there is more in common than you think. **Headquarters:** dual Nairobi and Penang.
9. **WF&BMI-** World Forestry and River Basin Management Institute. Merge CIFOR and ICRAF (should never have been separate in first place) and IWMI to focus on the land use continuum from monoculture agriculture to monoculture forests which inevitably is involved in every international river basin. Water management from catchment basin to final use. **Headquarters:** CIFOR

#### GOVERNANCE OPTIONS:

1. 8 Boards of Trustees- one each for each global entity-WCC, WCIC, GPC, WLFC, WF&BMI; three ecoregional Boards one each for Latin America, Africa and Asia. It makes no sense to have separate Boards for east and west Africa.
2. 4 Boards for 9 entities. a. Global Crop Improvement Board –WCC and WCIC; b. Natural Resource Management Board- WLFC, WF& BMC; c. Ecoregional Center Oversight Board- RDEC, ESAEC, WCAEC, LAEC; d. Policy Board - GPC

#### SUMMARY: Savings

Headquarters closed out; 4 or 5: CIMMYT or IRRI; WARDA; IFPRI or IPGRI; IWMI, ICRISAT India.

Governance and Management Reductions: a minimum of 7 fewer Boards of Trustees and Director General's Offices.

More Coherent Structure of Programs which should save transaction costs and reduce inter-center competition.

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