@article{Ouchida:166524,
      recid = {166524},
      author = {Ouchida, Yasunori and Goto, Daisaku},
      title = {Environmental Research Joint Ventures and Time-Consistent  Emission Tax},
      address = {2014-03},
      number = {824-2016-54742},
      series = {CCSD},
      pages = {23},
      year = {2014},
      abstract = {This paper presents an examination of the socially  efficient formation of environmental R&D in Cournot duopoly  in a setting where a regulator has no precommitment ability  for an emission tax. The results reveal that if the  environmental damage is slight, alternatively, given severe  environmental damage and large inefficiency in  environmental R&D costs, then environmental research joint  venture (ERJV) cartelization is socially efficient.  However, if environmental damage is severe, and if a firm’s  R&D costs are limited, then, in stark contrast to results  of previous studies, environmental R&D competition is  socially more efficient than the other three scenarios  (i.e., environmental R&D cartelization, ERJV competition,  and ERJV cartelization), although R&D competition is the  case of “NO information sharing and NO R&D coordination.”},
      url = {http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/166524},
      doi = {https://doi.org/10.22004/ag.econ.166524},
}