



AgEcon SEARCH
RESEARCH IN AGRICULTURAL & APPLIED ECONOMICS

The World's Largest Open Access Agricultural & Applied Economics Digital Library

This document is discoverable and free to researchers across the globe due to the work of AgEcon Search.

Help ensure our sustainability.

Give to AgEcon Search

AgEcon Search
<http://ageconsearch.umn.edu>
aesearch@umn.edu

*Papers downloaded from **AgEcon Search** may be used for non-commercial purposes and personal study only. No other use, including posting to another Internet site, is permitted without permission from the copyright owner (not AgEcon Search), or as allowed under the provisions of Fair Use, U.S. Copyright Act, Title 17 U.S.C.*



FCND DP No. 103

FCND DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 103

**TARGETING THE POOR IN MEXICO: AN EVALUATION OF
THE SELECTION OF HOUSEHOLDS FOR PROGRESA**

Emmanuel Skoufias, Benjamin Davis, and Sergio de la Vega

Food Consumption and Nutrition Division

International Food Policy Research Institute

2033 K Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20006 U.S.A.

(202) 862-5600

Fax: (202) 467-4439

March 2001

FCND Discussion Papers contain preliminary material and research results, and are circulated prior to a full peer review in order to stimulate discussion and critical comment. It is expected that most Discussion Papers will eventually be published in some other form, and that their content may also be revised.

ABSTRACT

This report reevaluates PROGRESA's targeting methods since the program began adding beneficiary households through a process called "densification." The authors first evaluate PROGRESA's accuracy in targeting both at the community and household levels. Second, they evaluate the targeting in terms of its impact on poverty alleviation relative to other feasible methods assuming the same total budget. The first step is accomplished by comparing PROGRESA's method to an alternative selection method based on household consumption. For the second task, the costs associated with different schemes are compared for their effects on the budget available for poverty alleviation. Schemes considered include uniform transfers that involve no targeting, targeting based on consumption, and targeting at the locality rather than the household. The authors find that PROGRESA's marginality index performs quite well when contrasted to a consumption-based model of locality selection. The consumption-based model results in a more precise categorization of poverty, which implies that geographic targeting based on the marginality index is more likely to result in leakage rather than undercoverage. The fit between the two methods is particularly tight for the low and very high marginality categories, and is more diffuse in the middle categories. This suggests that the PROGRESA marginality index loses its power of distinction between medium-marginality localities. The analysis also showed that PROGRESA's targeting appears to accurately identify extremely poor households, but makes more errors identifying moderately poor households. This finding raises serious concerns about PROGRESA's

current targeting method for the less-poor areas. However, in comparison to other schemes, PROGRESA's targeting appears to miss fewer extremely poor households. In addition, households that are included erroneously in the list of beneficiaries appear to be closer to the poverty line than households that are included incorrectly by other methods. In short, the errors of exclusion and inclusion occurring with PROGRESA's targeting are less serious than those occurring with other feasible target and transfer schemes. Finally, the authors performed a number of simulations comparing PROGRESA's targeting in terms of its impact on poverty alleviation relative to other schemes assuming the same total budget. For the social objectives of reducing the depth of poverty, PROGRESA's targeting appears to be the second most effective scheme to "perfect" targeting based on consumption. However, it should be noted that the reduction in the higher-order measures of poverty accomplished by household targeting over and above those accomplished by simply including all the households in the locality are relatively small.

CONTENTS

Acknowledgments.....	vi
1. Introduction.....	1
2. Evaluation Framework	2
3. Evaluation of the First Stage of the PROGRESA Targeting Mechanism	4
Description of Community Selection by PROGRESA.....	5
Evaluation of the Selection of Communities	7
4. Evaluation of the Second Stage of the PROGRESA Targeting Mechanism.....	12
A Brief Description of PROGRESA’S Selection of Beneficiary Households	12
Evaluation of PROGRESA’s Selection of Families	14
Construction of the Standard of Comparison.....	15
Comparison of PROGRESA with the Consumption-Based Targeting.....	17
PROGRESA’s Leakage and Undercoverage Rates Relative to Alternative Targeting Methods and Transfer Schemes.....	20
5. Evaluation of PROGRESA’S Impact on Poverty Alleviation Relative to Alternative Targeting Methods and Transfer Schemes	25
Alternative Transfer Schemes	26
Targeting Costs	28
Results	31
Impact on Inequality	34
6. Conclusions	37
Appendix: Structure of Benefits	40
References	44

TABLES

1	PROGRESA’s selection versus consumption-based selection of localities	9
2	Undercoverage and leakage rates of PROGRESA with different poverty lines	19

3	PROGRESA's undercoverage rates, using the FGT weighting scheme	24
4	PROGRESA's leakage rates, using the FGT weighting scheme	25
5	Poverty indices under various targeting/transfer schemes with a fixed budget and including costs of targeting	31
6	Comparing the impact of poverty under more or less restrictive targeting rules.....	35
7	Inequality indices under various targeting/transfer schemes with a fixed budget and including costs of targeting	36

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The authors thank Jose Gomez de Leon, Daniel Hernandez, Monica Orozco, and Susan Parker from PROGRESA, and David Coady, Jere Behrman, Lawrence Haddad, and participants at PROGRESA workshops for comments and discussion on successive versions of this paper. We also thank Humberto Soto of PROGRESA for helping us with data and calculations for a number of sections of the paper.

Benjamin Davis
Emmanuel Skoufias
International Food Policy Research Institute

Sergio de la Vega
Programa Nacional de Educacion, Salud, y Alimentacion (PROGRESA)

1. INTRODUCTION

In 1997, the government of Mexico embarked on a new program aimed at alleviating extreme poverty in rural areas. PROGRESA, the Education, Health, and Nutrition Program, adopts an integrated approach to combating the different causes of poverty. Its distinguishing characteristic is that cash benefits are targeted directly to households on the condition that they send their children to school and visit health centers on a regular basis. For Mexico, PROGRESA represents a significant change in the provision of social programs. The earlier anti-poverty program, PRONASOL (1988–1994), was a decentralized, community-based, demand-driven program, which though achieving a high profile, was susceptible to local political influences and not very effective at reaching the extremely poor.¹ In contrast, under PROGRESA, statistically rigorous methods are used at the headquarters in Mexico City to identify extremely poor households and assure objectivity in the selection process. As part of the renewed effort to fight poverty, general food subsidies, such as the tortilla price subsidy, are also phased out, as they have a high cost to government with a negligible effect on poverty.

In this paper, we conduct an evaluation of the method used for selecting beneficiary households in the PROGRESA program. Our analysis of the PROGRESA targeting method comes at a crucial time, as other Latin American countries (e.g., Honduras, Argentina, Nicaragua, Ecuador, and Venezuela) are all considering following Mexico's example in the application of targeted cash transfers to poor rural families. Our

¹ See Yashine (1999) and Levy (1994) for a description of the program.

evaluation is formulated in the following terms: how well does PROGRESA's targeting perform in terms of its objective after taking into account the costs and the constraints (financial and political) of achieving these objectives? Our answer to this question consists of two parts. First, we evaluate PROGRESA's accuracy in targeting both at the community level, and at the household level (Sections 3 and 4). Second, we evaluate the performance of PROGRESA's targeting in terms of its impact on poverty alleviation relative to other feasible methods and transfer schemes assuming the same total budget (Section 5). The first step is accomplished by comparing PROGRESA's method to an alternative selection method based on household consumption, which is our preferred measure of welfare. For the second task, the list of feasible alternatives includes uniform transfers that involve no targeting at all, targeting based on consumption, and geographic targeting (i.e., targeting at the locality rather than the household level). The costs associated with these schemes affect the budget available for poverty alleviation.

2. EVALUATION FRAMEWORK

Our evaluation is based on a framework consisting of three key elements: a social objective; a set of economic, political, and social constraints under which policy has to operate; and a range of instruments available to attain these objectives. Although PROGRESA has interlinked objectives with respect to health, education, and nutrition, we will measure the social objectives or benefits derived from PROGRESA's targeting solely in terms of its potential impact on poverty alleviation. Even though we limit the

objectives of PROGRESA to alleviating poverty, our analysis highlights that the relative efficiency of transfer schemes depends on whether the government is concerned about the number of poor households as a percentage of the total population (i.e., the headcount poverty rate) or the depth and severity of poverty among poor households.²

The economic constraints, and some (though by no means all) of the social and political constraints, under which policy has to operate are reflected in the budget available for PROGRESA. The budget is assumed to be fixed and limited in the sense that it is not sufficient to eliminate poverty completely. A wide variety of instruments may be utilized for the attainment of these social objectives. Policy instruments range from uniform transfers that apply no selection criteria at all to those that involve varying degrees of selection criteria. Each instrument has different costs and benefits associated with it. The primary benefit derived from targeting at the household level is that classifying households into those eligible and ineligible for receiving benefits is a more effective way of using limited funds toward the achievement of the social objective (Van de Walle 1998; Besley and Kanbur 1993). This, however, involves a variety of costs such as administrative (targeting and service delivery), incentive, and sociopolitical costs. For example, the mechanism used to identify the poor so that they can be given benefits incurs certain costs. As discussed in further detail below, in the case of PROGRESA, this mechanism involves the collection of a household survey within all the localities selected

² As Atkinson (1995) points out, the relative efficiency of different transfer schemes may be hard to pin down when objectives are not clearly defined.

as marginal (or as more likely to contain poor households). Such costs are taken into account appropriately reducing the fixed budget available for poverty alleviation.³

3. EVALUATION OF THE FIRST STAGE OF THE PROGRESA TARGETING MECHANISM

A few countries, such as Chile and Colombia, have used a variety of proxy means tests to target social programs.⁴ Conceptually, Colombia's SISBEN index is most similar to that used by PROGRESA. SISBEN has become primarily a uniform, nationwide standardized test for household inclusion into a variety of programs. PROGRESA, on the other hand, using a different statistical routine, combines community and household targeting and is linked with a specific policy intervention. The selection of households as PROGRESA beneficiaries is accomplished in three stages. First, communities are selected using a marginality index based on census data. Second, within the selected communities, households are chosen using survey data collected at the household level. Third, the list of potential beneficiaries is presented to a community assembly for review and discussion and the list is changed according to established criteria for the selection of beneficiary families. Given that the importance of the third step is minute, we describe

³ We assume that the budget is fixed, although we recognize the possibility that the instruments used, such as targeting, may affect the degree of political support for the program and hence the funds available for poverty alleviation. In Section 5, we discuss our simulations with locality-based targeting in relation to the political economy aspects of targeting.

⁴ See Grosh (1994) for Chile and Velez, Castaño, and Deutsch (1999) for Colombia.

and evaluate the first and second stages of PROGRESA's targeting.⁵ A more detailed description of the three stages of PROGRESA and of the household survey used for our evaluation can be found in Skoufias, Davis, and Behrman (1999).

DESCRIPTION OF COMMUNITY SELECTION BY PROGRESA

Communities were brought into PROGRESA using the following process. Using census data, a marginality index was created and applied to each of over 105,000 localities in Mexico.⁶ Localities deemed to have a high or very high degree of marginality⁷ (76,098 localities covering 14,751,628 people) were considered priorities for inclusion in the program. Logistical and financial considerations, as well as program components that require the use of school and health services, brought to bear other criteria on the selection of PROGRESA localities: geographic location, distance between localities, and the existence of health and school infrastructure. Combining data from the Public Health and Education Secretariats with computerized geographical information,

⁵ In the third stage, of almost 341,000 selected households, only 1.5 percent were not incorporated, and the vast majority of these for reasons of having moved from the locality. Only 423 households, or 0.1 percent of the total number of selected households, were disputed and left out of the program. Also, we did not have access to data on the numbers of households added as beneficiaries due to feedback from the local assemblies.

⁶ Data were taken from the 1990 census (XI General Population and Housing Census) and 1995 population count (Population and Housing Count) carried out by the Instituto Nacional de Estadística Geografía e Informática (INEGI), the national statistical institute. For those communities with missing data, regression techniques were used to estimate the marginality index. Details on the construction of the marginality index can be found in CONAPO-PROGRESA (1998).

⁷ The marginality index was divided into five groups based on the degree of marginality. The cutoff points were determined by the Dalenious-Hodges (1959) statistical procedure (for details of this application, see de la Vega 1994).

service zones were established, whereby localities were characterized by their access to these required services, taking into account the availability and quality of roads when the services were not located in the same community (PROGRESA 1998).

Localities with access to all three services were considered candidates for selection and used in the next phase of selection. The localities were then grouped to form what were called “marginality zones,” with the following steps. First, localities with fewer than 50 or more than 2,500 inhabitants were excluded. Second, using software, remaining localities were grouped based on geographical proximity using a routine that identified relatively isolated communities. These localities were then also excluded from the selection process.

The geographical and service access restrictions imposed on localities are more than likely to have excluded localities with higher concentrations of poor households. These communities tend to be very small and relatively isolated. We take the view that these restrictions are necessary to the operation of PROGRESA as it was conceived, and do not consider this latter aspect as mistargeting but rather a consequence of the nature of the program.⁸ Thus, our evaluation of the first step of PROGRESA is based on the set of localities with a marginality index.

For the record, Phase I of PROGRESA was implemented in 1996 in nine states (Campeche, Coahuila, Chihuahua, Guanajuato, Hidalgo, Puebla, Queretaro, San Luis

⁸ PROGRESA is primarily aimed at increasing household usage of existing health and schooling facilities. It is arguable that an alternative way of alleviating poverty could be achieved by building new school and health facilities in localities where these do not exist. We consider such issues as outside the scope of this evaluation.

Potosi, and Veracruz). Selecting only among localities that had all three services, 3,461 localities in 202 municipalities were chosen. Phase II was implemented in 1997. This involved two steps. First, the requirement that localities have access to health clinics was dropped, allowing additional localities to be included in the original 202 municipalities. Second, new municipalities and states were added. Overall, 8,749 localities in 483 municipalities (including the states of Chiapas, Guerrero, Michoacan, Nuevo Leon, and Oaxaca) were added to the program. Phase III was implemented in 1998. With the exception of the Baja Californias, Aguascalientes, and the Distrito Federal, the remaining states were brought into the program, including an additional 23,478 localities in 1,311 municipalities. Furthermore, in this phase, a number of localities previously excluded due to geographical isolation were brought into the program. Overall, as of the end of 1998, PROGRESA covered over 1.9 million beneficiary households in 35,688 localities in 1,488 municipalities and 28 states.

EVALUATION OF THE SELECTION OF COMMUNITIES

The main objective of constructing a marginality index is to identify poor households, or more specifically, to identify localities where most poor households are likely to be located. Thus, the ultimate test of how well the marginality index performs is whether it is an effective method of identifying where poor households are located (Baker and Grosh 1994; Hentschel et al. 1998). In short, our evaluation consists of constructing a consumption-based criterion of identifying localities where poor households predominate and then contrasting this alternative to the selection made by PROGRESA.

In constructing its marginality index, PROGRESA relied on information available at the locality level from the census. Unfortunately, census data contain little direct information on household resources and, by default, preclude use of any information at the household level such as consumption per adult equivalent. We thus adopt the following approach. Using the nationally representative 1996 Mexican National Survey of Income and Expenditures (ENIGH),⁹ we first construct household-level consumption per adult equivalent, classify households as poor or nonpoor using the 25th percentile as the poverty line, and then estimate a probit model of poverty status, restricting the set of explanatory variables to those that are also available in the census data used by PROGRESA. Next, we take the coefficients from the poverty probit and apply them to the 1990 and 1995 population census data at the locality level. Using a sample prediction technique, each community is assigned a predicted probability of being poor. Based on the predicted probabilities, we use the statistical method developed by Dalenius and Hodges (1959) to separate communities into five groups, from low to high marginality. This classification is then compared to the PROGRESA marginality index with a 5 by 5 matrix using the concepts of undercoverage and leakage (Cornia and Steward 1995). The undercoverage rate (exclusion error) is calculated by dividing the number of localities that are not covered by PROGRESA but should be according to our criterion by the total number of localities that should be covered (the target population). The leakage rate (or inclusion error) is the percentage of beneficiary localities that should not be receiving any

⁹ The ENIGH is also carried out by INEGI and covers 13,208 urban and rural households.

benefits, and is calculated by dividing the error of inclusion by the number of localities covered by the program. Leakage occurs if localities under the principal components method are classified as more marginal compared to the probit method. Conversely, undercoverage occurs if localities under the principal components method are classified as less marginal compared to the consumption-based method. The matrix can be found in Table 1.

Table 1—PROGRESA’s selection versus consumption-based selection of localities

		Classification by consumption-based methods					Total	Percent
		Very low	Low	Medium	High	Very high		
Classification by PROGRESA’s methods	Very low	613	3,473	3			4,089	5
	Low		5,361	250			5,611	7
	Medium		5,390	7,088	3		12,481	17
	High		83	15,819	682		16,584	22
	Very High			6,104	27,770	2,357	36,231	48
	Total		613	14,307	29,264	28,455	2,357	74,996
Percent		1	19	39	38	3	100	

Localities that fall on the diagonal indicate that both methods coincide in the allocation of localities to a particular category. We consider localities off the diagonal, but with just one level of difference, as an acceptable boundary of misclassification. From Table 1 it is evident that the consumption-based probit model results in a stricter classification than the principal components method. In general, one can observe a shift downward and to the left in the categorization of localities. For example, while the principal components method allocates almost half of all localities to the very high

category, the probit method has only 3 percent in this category. The bulk of localities under the principal components method are in the medium, high, and very high (88 percent) categories, while the consumption-based probit model allocates them primarily to the low, medium, and high categories. On the other hand, the probit method is less apt to classify localities in the very low category as well. While the principal components method puts over 4,000 localities in this category, the probit model puts only 613 localities.

Overall the down and leftward shift does not appear too serious. The off-diagonal corner cells remain empty. The majority of localities remain within at least one category distance. However, those who do shift more than one category present a problem. Most significant are those localities that are considered high or very high marginality under principal components, and that are reclassified by the probit as medium (6,104 localities) or low (83). PROGRESA initially incorporated localities in the two highest marginality categories, beginning with the most marginal first. The probit would entail a fairly significant number of these localities from being excluded in the initial stages of PROGRESA. On the other hand, the probit method allocated only approximately 30,812 localities to these categories, while the principal components brought in over 52,000. Assuming a similar budget constraint, the localities classified as medium by the

consumption-based probit would also have been brought in, greatly minimizing the problem of undercoverage.¹⁰

For the most part, PROGRESA's marginality index performs quite well when contrasted to a consumption-based probit model. The probit model results in a more precise categorization of poverty, which implies that geographic targeting based on the marginality index is more likely to result in inclusion errors rather than exclusion errors. The fit between the two methods is particularly tight for the low and very high marginality categories, and is more diffuse in the middle categories. This suggests that the PROGRESA marginality index loses its power of distinction between medium marginality localities precisely at a time when PROGRESA is expanding into less marginal communities. This will introduce a measure of arbitrariness into the selection of these communities. One way to counteract this problem would be to incorporate information from other alternative marginality indices, such as the consumption-based probit method presented here.

¹⁰ As another test of the accuracy of the marginality index in identifying the poor households (rather than just the localities where they may be located) Skoufias, Davis, and Behrman (1999) repeat the exercise conducted above, this time applying the principal components weights to the ENIGH households. The results are similar to those found in Table 1.

4. EVALUATION OF THE SECOND STAGE OF THE PROGRESA TARGETING MECHANISM

A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF PROGRESA'S SELECTION OF BENEFICIARY HOUSEHOLDS

After identifying program localities based on the method described above, PROGRESA proceeds to select beneficiaries. This is done in the following sequence of steps:

1. Carry out a brief census, the Household Socioeconomic Characteristics Survey (ENCASEH), of all the households residing in the marginal localities selected.
2. Construct total household income based on the individual income data contained in the ENCASEH survey.
3. Subtract child income (from children ages 8–18, the age group covered by PROGRESA) from total household income.¹¹
4. Construct per-capita income by dividing the value of income in step 3 by the number of household members.
5. Compare the measure of income obtained from step 4 with the Standard Food Basket (equivalent to an average aggregate income of approximately two minimum wages) of 320 pesos per capita per month in order to create a new binary variable taking the value of 1 for poor households (if income is less

¹¹ The reasoning here is that to identify the poverty status of the household, it is necessary to exclude the income obtained from child labor since this income would be lost if children were to enroll in school.

than the poverty line) and 0 for nonpoor (if income is greater than or equal to the poverty line).

6. Use discriminant analysis, separately for each geographical region, to
 - (a) identify variables that discriminate best between poor and nonpoor households;
 - (b) use the identified variables to develop an equation for computing an index (discriminant score) that represents parsimoniously the differences between the poor and nonpoor households; and
 - (c) use the computed index to develop a rule to classify future observations as poor or nonpoor households.

The steps outlined above indicate that the classification of a household as poor or nonpoor has taken into account a variety of household characteristics that capture the “multidimensional” nature of poverty, meaning that the poverty status of a household is not based solely on reported income. One of the main advantages of the discriminant analysis is that it allows a variety of ways for classifying observations into groups, such as the “cutoff-rate method” and a statistical method based on Bayes rule (Sharma 1996). The method used by PROGRESA is Bayesian since it offers the user the option to incorporate prior probabilities and misclassification costs in the determination of the final cutoff value that is used to classify households as poor or nonpoor.¹²

¹² According to PROGRESA staff, the prior probabilities used by PROGRESA were 58 percent for poor and 42 percent for nonpoor for most of the regions.

It should be noted that the poverty rate estimated by PROGRESA's methods generally varies from region to region, and that the average poverty rate according to PROGRESA's methods in the evaluation sample is 78 percent.¹³

EVALUATION OF PROGRESA'S SELECTION OF FAMILIES

In the initial stages of the selection process, PROGRESA utilizes an individual, or per capita, welfare measure by dividing household income by the number of household members. This measure of welfare requires the following set of assumptions: everyone in the household receives an equal allocation, everyone in the household has the same needs, and the increase in the minimum cost or level of income for an additional member in the household is the same irrespective of family size. The first assumption is defensible due to lack of information on consumption at the individual level. Individual needs, however, usually vary by gender and age, and economies of scale of living together may exist.

These assumptions may have important consequences on the poverty status of large families. For example, the use of a per-capita measure of welfare typically results in larger households having a higher probability of being classified as poor (Lanjouw and

¹³ In Skoufias, Davis, and Behrman (1999), we compare the classification based on discriminant analysis with the classification obtained from a probit method. Although the probit method itself involves a number of questionable assumptions and is not necessarily superior to the method of discriminant analysis, it is the standard econometric method used in targeting studies (for example, see Wodon 1997). In short, we followed steps 1 through 4 as PROGRESA, but in step 5 we run a probit regression instead of discriminant analysis and use the predicted probability from the probit regression to classify households as poor or nonpoor. The very low leakage and undercoverage rates obtained suggest to us that there is no substantial difference between the classifications obtained by the use of the discriminant analysis and alternative statistical methods such as probit.

Ravallion 1995). The dominant role played by family size and dependency ratios in the PROGRESA selection process is discussed in detail in Skoufias, Davis, and Behrman (1999). We experiment with alternative individual-level welfare measures and settle on using an equivalence scale that accounts for different nutritional needs by gender and age. Use of this adult equivalent welfare measure does not lead to major changes in the selection of beneficiary households, as compared to the per-capita measure. Due to its conceptual advantages, however, we utilize the adult equivalent measure throughout the rest of this paper.

Second, Skoufias, Davis, and Behrman (1999) examine the impact of taking into account economies of scale. While the results suggest that economies of scale are present and significant, the point estimates are well outside of acceptable ranges calculated for other countries. For this reason, we ignore economies of scale in the rest of the analysis. Simulation results, however, with typical values of economies of scale parameters result in high leakage rates, suggest that many large families would no longer be selected as beneficiaries if economies of scale were taken into account. Thus the validity of the no-economies-of-scale assumption requires more research.

CONSTRUCTION OF THE STANDARD OF COMPARISON

For reasons that are well established in the poverty literature, our adopted measure of welfare is based on the consumption expenditures of households.¹⁴ Since we

¹⁴ See Deaton (1997) for a discussion of the relative merits of consumption versus income-based welfare measures.

do not have reliable consumption data for the households in our evaluation sample, we use the 1996 ENIGH household survey to estimate the parameters of the relationship between household consumption and household characteristics. We then use these estimated parameters to obtain predicted consumption per adult equivalent for the households in the Encuesta de Características Socioeconómicas de los Hogares (ENCASEH) 1997 survey sample of 24,077 households drawn from an evaluation sample of 506 PROGRESA communities.

Specifically, our method (described in detail in Skoufias, Davis, and Behrman 1999) consists of the following steps. First, we restricted the ENIGH sample to rural localities of less than 2,500 inhabitants that eventually were incorporated into PROGRESA. This yielded a sample of 2,513 households. Second, we constructed a measure of total consumption and an equivalence scale to derive consumption per adult equivalent. Third, we regressed the logarithm of total consumption per adult equivalent on household characteristics (size, composition, assets, etc.) that are also present in the 1997 ENCASEH data set. The estimates of the parameters of the relationship between consumption per capita and household characteristics were obtained using the method of least absolute deviations, which yields estimates that are robust to outliers and the presence of heteroscedasticity in the data. Specifically, we estimated a linear equation for the median (or the .5 conditional quintile) of the logarithm of consumption per adult equivalent ($\ln C$) that may be denoted as

$$Q_{.5}(\ln C \mid X_{ENIGH96}) = \mathbf{b}_{.5} X_{ENIGH96},$$

where β is a vector of coefficients, and X is a vector of explanatory variables, including a set of dummy variables for state of residence so as to account for differences in the cost of living at the state level.¹⁵ Finally, based on the parameters of the median regression in the ENIGH survey and values of the corresponding household characteristics in the 1997 ENCASEH survey, we derived the predicted consumption per adult equivalent ($PlnC$) for households.

COMPARISON OF PROGRESA WITH THE CONSUMPTION-BASED TARGETING

Having constructed the standard against which PROGRESA's selection will be contrasted, we then needed to devise a method by which to classify a household or beneficiary and nonbeneficiary. We adopt a flexible approach and base our analysis on three different cutoff points (or poverty lines).

1. A very strict poverty line based on the 25th percentile of consumption per adult equivalent. This poverty line implies that 25 percent of the households are poor and 75 percent are nonpoor, and reflects an attempt to capture PROGRESA's stated objective of aiming to reach households in *extreme* poverty.

¹⁵ The individual parameters estimates from these regressions are available from the authors upon request.

2. An intermediate poverty line based on the 50th percentile of the consumption per adult equivalent.
3. A poverty line based on the 78th percentile of the consumption per adult equivalent. With this latter poverty line the resulting poverty rate equals the average poverty rate in our sample derived from PROGRESA's classification methods.¹⁶

In Table 2 we present the undercoverage and leakage measures commonly used as a means of measuring the accuracy of a targeting program.¹⁷ The reader is cautioned that with our strict poverty line, the exclusion error is the more (if not the only) relevant measure for evaluation of PROGRESA's targeting, since the inclusion error will be high by construction. Given PROGRESA's objectives, the critical question is whether PROGRESA's classification has left out any of the households that, according to our indicator, are extremely poor. Also, the highest poverty line at the 78th percentile provides PROGRESA's targeting with the best chances of achieving exclusion or inclusion errors that would be approximately zero if its targeting were identical to the consumption-based targeting. For these reasons, this is our preferred poverty line and this cutoff value forms the basis for the simulations in the latter part of the paper.

¹⁶ Note that our poverty line is absolute in the space of welfare, so as to guarantee that the poverty comparisons made are consistent in the sense that two individuals or households with the same level of consumption are treated the same way irrespective of region or state (Ravallion 1998).

¹⁷ For a welfare-based interpretation of the concepts of undercoverage and leakage, see Coady and Skoufias (1999).

Table 2—Undercoverage and leakage rates of PROGRESA with different poverty lines

	Poverty line used:		
	25 th Percentile	50 th Percentile	78 th Percentile
Undercoverage rate	6.63%	10.80%	16.27%
Leakage rate	70.10%	42.87%	16.34%

As revealed in Table 2, the undercoverage rate is 6.6 percent when the extreme poverty line is used. In other words, approximately 7 of 100 households classified as extremely poor by the "perfect" targeting method based on consumption are not classified as poor by PROGRESA. Since PROGRESA is using a poverty line that yields, on average, a poverty rate of 78 percent, that means that these households are assigned a discriminant score that is high enough to disqualify them from PROGRESA benefits. Even with such a high poverty line, 6.6 percent of the extreme poor, as determined by consumption, were still excluded by PROGRESA. These exclusion errors are probably a reflection of the tendency of the discriminant analysis method to classify as beneficiaries households with more children, and to exclude smaller households or older households with no young children.¹⁸

As the poverty line increases, the undercoverage rates increase as well, to 10.8 percent at the 50th percentile and 16.27 percent at the 78th percentile. This suggests that

¹⁸ PROGRESA recently added new beneficiaries in a process called "densification." It was felt that the original selection method was biased against the elderly poor who no longer lived with their children. Skoufias, Davis, and Behrman (1999), without access to the complete data, do not include as beneficiaries the densification households. Comparing our earlier results with those reported in this paper, densification resulted in a drop in undercoverage from 19 to 5 percent.

the targeting accuracy of PROGRESA is lower for moderately poor households, i.e., the group of households between the 25th and 78th percentile of consumption.¹⁹ Put differently, PROGRESA's targeting works better at identifying extremely poor households. This raises some serious concerns regarding the use of PROGRESA's current targeting method during the next phase of the program, as PROGRESA expands into less poor areas.

As mentioned above, when the low poverty line is applied, the leakage rate is high by construction. This explains the 70 percent leakage rate obtained with the low poverty line. This leakage rate decreases to 43 percent and 16 percent as the poverty line increases.

PROGRESA'S LEAKAGE AND UNDERCOVERAGE RATES RELATIVE TO ALTERNATIVE TARGETING METHODS AND TRANSFER SCHEMES

The accuracy of PROGRESA's targeting is not directly comparable to other targeted programs in Mexico. Part of the reason for this is the fact that PROGRESA is the first program to be subjected to a rigorous evaluation of its methods and overall effectiveness. Besides, rural households in extreme poverty have never been the explicit target of any program before PROGRESA. Nevertheless, from the few published estimates of undercoverage and leakage rates for other programs in Mexico, it appears that the targeting errors committed by PROGRESA are miniscule when compared to the

¹⁹ The undercoverage rate with either of the two higher poverty lines can be expressed as a weighted average of the undercoverage rates of the extreme poor and the moderately poor. The higher undercoverage rates obtained with the higher poverty lines imply that the undercoverage rate of the moderately poor is higher than that for the extreme poor.

targeting errors associated with the tortilla subsidy (which targeted mainly urban households), and the undercoverage rates of the urban milk program and other food supplementation programs (see Cornia and Stewart 1995).

Nevertheless, it is still important to know whether the leakage and undercoverage rates estimated above are more or less serious errors. For example, if the majority of the poor households excluded from participation by the PROGRESA targeting method are close to the poverty line, there would be less cause for concern compared to the case if they were far below the poverty line. For this reason we applied a weighting scheme along the lines of the Foster, Greer, and Thorbecke (1984) or FGT family of poverty measures. With these measures, a parameter, α , can be set according to society's sensitivity to the income distribution among the poor. Specifically the FGT poverty measures are summarized by the formula,

$$P(\alpha) = \left(\frac{1}{N} \right) \sum_{i=1}^q \left(\frac{z - c_i}{z} \right)^\alpha,$$

where N is the number of households, c_i is the per-capita consumption (or income) of the i th household, z is the poverty line, q is the number of poor individuals, and α is the weight attached to the severity of household poverty (or the distance from the poverty line). When $\alpha = 0$, the FGT measure collapses to the Headcount Index, or the percentage of the population that is below the poverty line. When $\alpha = 1$, the FGT measure gives the poverty gap $P(1)$, a measure of the average depth of poverty. When $\alpha = 2$, the FGT index

becomes the Severity of Poverty index. The $P(2)$ measure assigns more weight to individuals that are further away from the poverty line.

For our purposes, we calculated undercoverage rates using the formula,

$$U(\mathbf{a}) = \left(\frac{1}{N_{PC}} \right) \sum_{i=1}^q \left(\frac{z - c_i}{z} \right)^{\alpha},$$

where N_{PC} is the total of households categorized as poor according to the consumption-based criterion and q is the total number of households classified as nonpoor by PROGRESA. When $\alpha = 0$, this expression collapses to the undercoverage rate (see, for example, the undercoverage rate calculated in Table 2 above). When $\alpha = 2$, more weight is given to households that are further away from the poverty. Along the same lines, the leakage rate is defined as

$$L(\mathbf{a}) = \left(\frac{1}{N_{PRO}} \right) \sum_{i=1}^q \left(\frac{c_i - z}{z} \right)^{\alpha},$$

where N_{PRO} is the total of households covered by PROGRESA and q is the total number of households classified as nonpoor by the consumption-based targeting scheme.

The undercoverage (or leakage) rates for different values of \mathbf{a} are not comparable within a given transfer or targeting scheme. To get a sense of how high or low the leakage rates of PROGRESA are, we compare them with the undercoverage and leakage rates obtained with two other targeting and transfer schemes.

The first scheme is a *uniform transfer*. The full sample of 24,077 households is treated as poor. In this transfer scheme, every household is covered; as a result, undercoverage is zero. It is the implicit desire to minimize undercoverage that, in many

occasions, has been used as an argument in favor of uniform transfers. However, the major problem with a uniform transfer scheme is leakage.

The second scheme examined is *targeting at the locality level*.²⁰ This is a geographic targeting scheme of the type surveyed by Baker and Grosh (1994). At present, PROGRESA's beneficiary selection method may result in some households within a certain locality being excluded from the program while a significant fraction of the households in that same locality are covered by the program, or vice versa. Within the subset of localities selected by PROGRESA as marginal, it is possible, with the use of the continuous marginality index constructed by PROGRESA, to rank localities as more or less marginal. Beginning with the most marginal locality, we classify as poor (or beneficiaries) all the households residing in that locality and then repeat these steps for the households in the locality with the next value of marginality index until the total number of poor households is equal to 78 percent of all households in the sample. As discussed earlier, it is essential to have a poverty line that yields the same poverty across schemes.

In all of our calculations, consumption-based targeting with the higher poverty line (the 78th percentile) is treated as the "perfect" targeting scheme, meaning that the undercoverage and leakage rates with consumption-based targeting are zero. Also, at this point we abstract from issues related to budgetary constraints or costs of targeting, but

²⁰ An in-depth comparison of this geographic targeting scheme to PROGRESA's targeting at the household level is presented in Appendix G of Skoufias, Davis, and Behrman (1999). All of our simulations here are based on localities from the pool of localities already selected as marginal by the first step of PROGRESA's selection method. In principle, however, the same method could be applied to the full of set of localities in Mexico.

take these into account later. Tables 3 and 4 contain the undercoverage and leakage rates, respectively, estimated for the various targeting schemes.

Table 3 reveals that PROGRESA's undercoverage rate is lower than the undercoverage rate obtained if targeting were at the locality level based on the marginality index. Moreover, PROGRESA's undercoverage rate is even lower if we were to focus on the severity of poverty of those excluded from the program. Put differently, locality-based targeting would have left out of the program more of the extreme poor compared to the PROGRESA targeting method.

Table 3—PROGRESA's undercoverage rates using the FGT^a weighting scheme (percentage change in index relative to transfers with PROGRESA targeting)

	U(0)	U(1)	U(2)
Uniform transfer (i.e., no targeting)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Transfers with PROGRESA targeting	0.1626	0.0487	0.0201
Locality-level targeting (based on marginality index)	0.1896	0.0674	0.0312
	(16.61)	(38.45)	(55.42)

^a Foster, Greer, and Thorbecke (FGT) (1984).

Table 4 also reveals a generally favorable picture of PROGRESA. With PROGRESA's targeting method, the leakage rate is lower than the leakage rate obtained with a uniform transfer, as well as lower than the leakage rate obtained with targeting at the locality level.²¹ The households leaking into the program with PROGRESA's

²¹ Note that the leakage rate and undercoverage rate for locality-level targeting are approximately half the corresponding rates of locality-level targeting for Mexico obtained from the simulations of Baker and Grosh (1994), who use a poverty line at the 30th percentile of consumption per capita.

targeting are much closer to the poverty line (less well-off) compared to the households leaking into the program with uniform targeting or locality based-targeting.

**Table 4—PROGRESA’s leakage rates, using the FGT^a weighting scheme
(percentage change in index relative to uniform transfer)**

	L(0)	L(1)	L(2)
Uniform transfer (i.e., no targeting)	0.2200	0.0769	0.0561
Transfers with PROGRESA targeting	0.1634 –(25.73)	0.0487 –(36.72)	0.0313 –(44.15)
Locality-level targeting (based on marginality index)	0.1896 –(13.82)	0.0595 –(22.63)	0.0413 –(26.34)

^a Foster, Greer, and Thorbecke (FGT) (1984).

5. EVALUATION OF PROGRESA’S IMPACT ON POVERTY ALLEVIATION RELATIVE TO ALTERNATIVE TARGETING METHODS AND TRANSFER SCHEMES

The preceding analysis suggests that PROGRESA’s targeting method performs better than alternative methods. In this section, we provide a more conclusive evaluation by setting the budget of the program at a fixed amount and simulating the impact of the different targeting and transfer schemes, inclusive of targeting costs, on indices of poverty. The budget is by construction equal to the total amount of benefits that would be

distributed to all the poor households under PROGRESA's selection method. It is approximately 45 percent of the total poverty gap in our sample.²²

ALTERNATIVE TRANSFER SCHEMES

We start from the case where there is no cash transfer program and a fixed budget, and examine the decrease in the poverty rate if the cash transfers were uniform in the sense that the full budget available is allocated to all households without distinguishing between poor and nonpoor households. We then investigate how PROGRESA, given its beneficiary selection method, compares to the impact of a cash transfer program that has the same benefit structure (based on gender and age) and distributes the same funds but selects households based on an alternative indicator.

In the simulation assuming a uniform transfer scheme, each household gets the same absolute amount as a cash transfer. The cash transfer received by each household is the ratio of the total budget and the total number of households in the sample. The post-transfer consumption of the household (which equals the pre-transfer level of consumption and the cash transfer received) is then divided by the number of adult equivalent units of the household.

For the case of consumption-based targeting, we first identify poor households based on the comparison of the household-specific consumption per adult equivalent and the 78th percentile poverty line. Households classified as nonpoor by the consumption-

²² We do not provide an evaluation of whether the size of the budget is appropriate. Such issues can only be addressed later when more detailed data become available on the constraints, incentives, and opportunity costs faced by rural families and policy-makers.

based criterion receive no benefits, while households classified as poor are assumed to receive benefits according to the structure of the PROGRESA program, outlined in detail in the Appendix. As with the uniform transfer case, the post-transfer consumption of the household (which equals the pre-transfer level of consumption and the cash transfer received) is transformed into adult equivalent units. However, a rule needs to be adopted regarding how the limited budget is allocated to the households selected as participants into the program. In simple terms, the rule consists of giving benefits first to the neediest households and then moving progressively up the ranking of households until the budget is exhausted. A household is classified as having more need in the sense that its level of consumption per adult equivalent is further away from the poverty line. Since the budget is lower than the total poverty gap, 19.56 percent of poor households do not receive any benefits. These poor households are closer to the poverty line compared to those that do receive benefits. Similar steps are followed in allocating benefits to the households selected as poor by the PROGRESA targeting method.

It is very important to clarify the implications of this budgetary allocation rule. By construction, this rule is likely to result in a very small (or zero) impact on the poverty rate most people are accustomed to, the headcount index $P(0)$. If PROGRESA benefits are given first to those who are far from the poverty line and not to those close to the poverty line, the headcount rate is not likely to change, unless the benefit given to a very poor household is large enough to cover the poverty gap. Note also that if the budgetary allocation rule were to be reversed, i.e., if the limited budget were first allocated to the households closer to the poverty line moving down progressively to households further

away from the poverty line, then the impact on the headcount rate of poverty would be much higher. We are of the opinion that the latter budget allocation rule does not reflect the key objectives of PROGRESA, and for this reason we adopt the rule of giving the money to the neediest first.

The preceding discussion also implies that in comparing the relative targeting success or failure of PROGRESA to alternative methods of selection, it is imperative to focus on the higher order measures of poverty such as $P(1)$ or $P(2)$. Only the higher order measures of poverty can provide an estimate of the relative effectiveness of PROGRESA's methods in identifying the poorest of poor households in comparison to other targeting methods.

TARGETING COSTS

Targeting necessitates the collection of information of a number of variables at the household level that are useful at identifying beneficiaries. Such variables include the income of each household by source or consumption expenditures over a reference period, household assets, etc. In practice it is quite difficult to distinguish between the service-delivery costs of the program and costs associated with targeting. For example, a large component of the information collected by the ENCASEH survey is essential for the administration of the program as well as for targeting. For this reason, we ran three separate simulations using a zero, low, and high estimates for the cost of targeting. The low-cost figure is based on the estimate of PROGRESA officials that the cost of

collecting targeting information is only 60 pesos per household out of the total of 170 pesos per household for the whole ENCASEH survey.

Using these cost estimates, we then adjust the original budget used in our earlier simulation by subtracting the cost of surveying all households in the sample with all costs deflated to June 1994 prices. Given that these survey costs are one-time, in the sense that they are incurred only at the start of the program, and since PROGRESA plans to review the status of all households three years after the initiation of the program, we distribute these costs equally over time by dividing them by 36 (the number of months of the duration of the program). It turned out that the costs of targeting made very little difference in the estimates obtained for the impact of PROGRESA on poverty. Therefore we report the estimates obtained assuming the full cost of the surveys.

For the case of locality-level targeting, we assume there are zero targeting costs. We use an analogous method and simulate the scenario of PROGRESA using its limited budget to provide benefits to all households, starting from the most marginal localities and then moving down to less marginal localities, until the budget is exhausted. In this manner, we can get a sense of the impact of PROGRESA on the various poverty indicators without having to do targeting at the household level and thus without incurring any of the costs associated with targeting. Non-economic costs include the potential conflicts and problems that can arise within small communities, where households that are in many respects similar to households selected as beneficiaries are

excluded from the program.²³ Such conflicts could work against the original objectives of the program, as communities may end up becoming more divided after the initiation of the program than before. In addition, the possible emergence of conflict within communities may give rise to criticisms of the targeting method of the program, which may lead to calls for universal coverage or elimination of inequities. If the impact of PROGRESA's second step on the poverty indices were to be approximately the same as that of locality-based targeting, then we could safely conclude that targeting at the household level is not a worthwhile effort, given the objective of maximizing poverty reduction.

In our simulations we do not consider problems related to program take-up or incentives effects. For example, households selected as potential beneficiaries may not have enough information, nor find it in their interest, to adhere to the program's requirements. Also, targeting programs can have incentive effects that are side effects of their goal of sorting the poor from the nonpoor. These effects arise from the behavioral responses of households or individuals as they attempt to become eligible for the program. For example, the presence of the program may induce some households to reduce their work effort and thus their income so as to become eligible for program benefits (Kanbur, Keen, and Tuomala 1995).

²³ Other non-economic costs to targeting may exist, such as the undermining of traditional community-wide forms of organization.

RESULTS

In Table 5 we present the results of our simulations on the impact on poverty indices. The reader is cautioned that for any given transfer scheme the alternative poverty indices are not comparable. Comparisons are only meaningful for a given poverty index (that is, a given value of α) across transfer and targeting schemes.

Table 5—Poverty indices under various targeting/transfer schemes with a fixed budget and including costs of targeting (percentage change in poverty index from case of no transfer)

	P(0) (Headcount Index)	P(1) (Poverty Gap)	P(2) (Severity Index)
No transfer (no anti-poverty program)	0.7800	0.3142	0.1577
Uniform transfer (i.e., no targeting)	0.6434 –(17.52)	0.2256 –(28.19)	0.1006 –(36.18)
Transfers with consumption-based targeting	0.7691 –(1.40)	0.2158 –(31.30)	0.0797 –(49.42)
Transfers with PROGRESA targeting	0.7029 –(9.88)	0.2203 –(29.88)	0.0874 –(44.58)
Locality-level targeting (based on marginality index)	0.6948 –(10.92)	0.2214 –(29.51)	0.0900 –(42.94)

For the reasons discussed above, both "perfect" targeting based on household consumption and PROGRESA's targeting have little or no impact on poverty as measured by the headcount ratio. These results highlight the point that the social objective assumed is crucial in determining which transfer or targeting scheme is the most efficient. If the

social objective of the government were to decrease the number of poor households as a percentage of the total population (the headcount rate), then according to our simulations, a uniform transfer is the most effective way. Locality targeting comes second, PROGRESA targeting a close third, and perfect targeting last. With uniform transfers, more households close to the poverty line receive benefits that are sufficiently high to make them cross over the poverty line.

The picture changes dramatically if the social objective were to reducing the depth of poverty as measured by the poverty gap index $P(1)$, or the severity of poverty as measured by the severity index $P(2)$. Given either one of these social objectives, PROGRESA's targeting is the second most effective scheme to "perfect" targeting based on consumption, and uniform transfers are the least efficient scheme for reducing the depth or severity of poverty in Mexico. Moreover, since we have accounted for the costs of targeting, the higher impact of PROGRESA's targeting on the depth and severity of poverty than locality-based targeting implies that targeting by PROGRESA is worth the cost, though not by much. Whether these benefits exceed the non-economic costs associated with targeting is impossible to determine within the framework we have adopted in this paper. Qualitative studies conducted as part of the PROGRESA evaluation, however, suggest that non-economic costs may be significant, suggesting that this dimension should be taken into account in order to understand the full cost of household level targeting (Adato et al. 1999).

The exclusion of some of the nonpoor households in marginal localities provides the opportunity to include in the program poor households from less marginal localities

The extent to which targeting within localities is economically and ethically justified depends on the inequality of distribution of the welfare among households within localities and between localities. To obtain more insight on the questions of whether and what proportion of households to select within a locality, we conducted a number of additional simulations.

As we have noted, at the early stages of the program PROGRESA initially used a cutoff point that would allow, on average, 52 percent of the households in our sample to qualify as beneficiaries. After a few months, the formula used to select beneficiaries was revised and the cutoff was moved up to let more households in. This “densification process” resulted in the current cutoff value of 78 percent of households being selected as eligible beneficiaries. The discriminant scores for each household in our sample, before and after the densification process, kindly made available by PROGRESA authorities, provide us with the opportunity to assess whether this expansion in program coverage within has the potential of having a bigger impact on the indices of poverty.

For our simulations, we assumed a fixed budget amounting to 77.87 percent of the poverty gap, using a poverty line at the 52nd percentile of predicted consumption. In reality, the decision to expand the number of households covered was accompanied by a simultaneous increase in the budget. We estimated the impact on the various indices of poverty under three different scenarios. In the first scenario, selection into the program is

made by sorting households based on their discriminant score before the densification.²⁴

In the second scenario, we followed the same steps except that we ranked households by their discriminant score after the densification process. In the third, beginning with localities of the highest index of marginality, all households within a locality are covered by the program until the budget is exhausted.

The results of our new simulations are reported in Table 6. As can be seen, the impact of the transfers on higher poverty indices $P(1)$ and $P(2)$ increases with the selectivity of targeting. A stricter rule of selection into the program, e.g., one that allows 52 percent of the households in the program, decreases the depth and severity of poverty more than the current rule that classifies 78 percent of the households as beneficiaries. This result implies that even within rural communities of extreme poverty, there is considerable variation in the distribution of welfare, making it possible to justify on strictly economic grounds the implementation of targeting rules even within the locality level and in spite of the costs associated with targeting.

IMPACT ON INEQUALITY

As a last test of the targeting methods of PROGRESA, we examined the impact of the different transfer and targeting schemes on inequality. The social objective is now

²⁴ Lower discriminant scores signify poorer households. Since the discriminant scores of PROGRESA were derived separately by region, and some of the households were classified as poor in spite of their discriminant score (from feedback during the third stage of beneficiary selection), we took care to first sort all households classified as poor, then by the marginality index of the locality (higher index values signifying more marginal communities), and finally by the region-specific discriminant score of the household.

Table 6—Comparing the impact on poverty under more or less restrictive targeting rules (percentage change in poverty index from case of no transfer)

	P(0) (Headcount Index)	P(1) (Poverty Gap)	P(2) (Severity Index)
No transfer (no anti-poverty program)	0.5200	0.1583	0.0635
Uniform transfer (i.e., no targeting)	0.4158 –(20.04)	0.1076 –(32.04)	0.0384 –(39.56)
Transfers with consumption-based targeting	0.4512 –(13.23)	0.0721 –(54.48)	0.0172 –(72.90)
Transfers with PROGRESA targeting before densification	0.4085 –(21.44)	0.0858 –(45.82)	0.0264 –(58.44)
Transfers with PROGRESA targeting after densification	0.4110 –(20.97)	0.0892 –(43.63)	0.0283 –(55.39)
Locality-level targeting (based on marginality index)	0.4096 –(21.23)	0.0928 –(41.38)	0.0305 –(52.03)

considered to be the minimization of inequality instead of poverty alleviation. The main shortcoming of the FGT poverty indices is that they assign weights only to poor households. Thus, households just above the poverty line, though for all practical purposes identical to households just below the poverty line, receive no weight. Inequality indices provide an alternative means of evaluating the impact of various targeting and transfer schemes by comparing their impact on inequality in the total population of households. In this manner, the benefits accruing to households just above the poverty line are not necessarily considered leakage and are assigned a weight similar

to that assigned for households receiving benefits just below the poverty line (Deaton 1997).

We calculated the impact of the targeting and transfer schemes for two inequality indices: the generalized entropy index $GE(a)$ and the Atkinson index, $A(e)$. Both inequality indices involve a parameter that allows the index to be sensitive to different parts of the distribution. For example, for the $GE(a)$ index, the more negative a is, the more sensitive $GE(a)$ is to consumption differences at the bottom of the distribution. The more positive is $e > 0$ is, the more sensitive is $A(e)$ to consumption differences at the bottom of the distribution. In Table 7 we report the values of these two indices with the values of the parameters set to $a = -1$ and $e = 2$ so that both indices are sensitive to differences at the bottom of the distribution of consumption.

Table 7—Inequality indices under various targeting/transfer schemes with a fixed budget and including costs of targeting (percentage change in inequality index from the case of no transfer)

	P(0) (Headcount Index)	P(2) (Severity Index)
No transfer (no anti-poverty program)	0.13112	0.20776
Uniform transfer (i.e., no targeting)	0.13313 (1.53)	0.21027 (1.21)
Transfers with consumption-based targeting	0.06549 –(50.05)	0.11581 –(44.26)
Transfers with PROGRESA targeting before densification	0.08463 –(35.46)	0.14475 –(30.33)
Locality-level targeting (based on marginality index)	0.09114 –(30.49)	0.15418 –(25.79)

Table 7 reveals the same general patterns observed for the poverty index $P(2)$ in Table 5. For both inequality indices, uniform transfers have little or no effect on inequality while consumption-based targeting has the highest impact on inequality. PROGRESA's targeting runs second to consumption-based targeting but well ahead of the impact of targeting at the locality level.

6. CONCLUSIONS

The PROGRESA experience and the results of our evaluation of the program's targeting methods provide important policy implications for other Latin American countries considering the adoption of similar schemes.

First, it is necessary to have the right expectations about the potential impact of programs targeted toward the extreme poor on the poverty measure that most people are familiar with. Targeted programs, such as PROGRESA, may be quite successful at reducing the poverty gap or the severity of poverty, but may have a negligible impact on the headcount ratio. A program may meet its social objective, but politically it may be difficult to sustain if expectations are misplaced.

Second, PROGRESA's methodology of selecting beneficiary localities and households is relatively more effective in identifying the extremely poor localities or households, but less so when in distinguishing among localities or households in the middle of the scale. In short, it becomes increasingly difficult to differentiate between the moderately poor and the nonpoor once the program has covered the extreme poor. This

implies that as PROGRESA or other similarly targeted transfer programs expand into less marginal communities, the chances of making selection errors are higher. A similar conclusion is derived from our evaluation of the targeting of households within localities. PROGRESA's targeting is not perfect, but it is relatively more effective at identifying extremely poor households within localities and less so at selecting households that are moderately poor.

Third, the non-economic costs associated with targeting deserve serious consideration in the overall decision to pursue a household level targeting strategy. We find that PROGRESA's method of targeting households outperforms alternative methods in terms of reducing the poverty gap and severity of poverty indices, even after taking into account the economic costs of targeting. However, the reduction in the higher order measures of poverty accomplished by household targeting over and above those accomplished by simply including all the households in the locality are relatively small. Whether these marginal successes of targeting at the household level is a worthwhile effort depends on the size of the non-economic, or political, and social costs of targeting, all of which are very difficult to quantify. Preliminary qualitative surveys from PROGRESA's evaluation show that these costs of targeting in rural, often indigenous, communities may not be negligible.

We close by pointing out that our evaluation of the selection of beneficiaries into PROGRESA is not equivalent to evaluating the program as a whole. It remains to be determined whether the level and structure of benefits in PROGRESA are successful at

having a measurable positive impact on the health, education, and nutrition of the members of the selected households.

APPENDIX: STRUCTURE OF BENEFITS

The PROGRESA program has the following social objectives:

- Improve the conditions of education, health, and nutrition of poor families, particularly children and their mothers, by providing access to education and health services as well as providing monetary assistance and nutrition supplements.
- Integrate these actions so that educational achievement is not affected by poor health or malnutrition in children and young people, or because they carry out work that makes school attendance difficult.
- Ensure that households have sufficient means and resources available so that their children can complete basic education.
- Encourage the responsibility and active participation of parents and all family members in improving the education, health, and nutrition of children and young people.
- Promote community participation and support for the actions of PROGRESA, so that educational and health services benefit all families in the localities where the program operates, as well as unite and promote community efforts and initiatives in actions that are similar or complementary to the program.

Upon selection into the program, benefits provided to households are composed of three components:

- Educational grants for school-age children;
- Free basic health care for all members of the family and provision of preventative health information for the female beneficiary; and
- Monetary transfers and nutrition supplements to improve the food consumption and nutritional status of poor families, particularly of children and women.

In our simulation of the PROGRESA benefit structure, we assume that children of primary school age are all attending full-time and there are no delayed enrollments. Thus, the level of primary school benefits received by each potentially participating household is determined as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}
 & \textit{Primary School benefits at the household level} = \\
 & \quad (\textit{number of boys and girls of 8 years of age}) * 60 \textit{ pesos/month} \\
 & \quad + (\textit{number of boys and girls of 9 years of age}) * 70 \textit{ pesos/month} \\
 & \quad + (\textit{number of boys and girls of 10 years of age}) * 90 \textit{ pesos/month} \\
 & \quad + (\textit{number of boys and girls of 11 years of age}) * 120 \textit{ pesos/month}.
 \end{aligned}$$

PROGRESA provides increasing cash transfers for teenagers enrolled in the first through third grades of secondary school up to age 18. Given that we have to attribute child ages to a particular grade in school, for children between 12 and 18 years of age, we had to make a few stronger assumptions. Given that the enrollment rates of children begin to decrease at the secondary school level, we have assumed that PROGRESA's

program impact will bring back to the first grade of secondary school all boys and girls ages 12, 13, and 14. Thus, households with boys and girls between 12 and 14 years received the corresponding benefits attached to the first grade of secondary school. Along similar lines, boys ages 15 and 16 are assumed to attend the second grade of secondary school, while boys and girls 17 and 18 years of age are enrolled in the third grade of secondary school.

Thus, the level of primary school benefits received by each potentially participating household is determined as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}
 & \textit{Secondary school benefits at the household level} = \\
 & \quad (\textit{number of boys 12–14 years of age}) * 175 \textit{ pesos/month} \\
 & \quad + (\textit{number of girls 12–14 years of age}) * 185 \textit{ pesos/month} \\
 & \quad + (\textit{number of boys 15–16 years of age}) * 185 \textit{ pesos/month} \\
 & \quad + (\textit{number of girls 15–16 years of age}) * 205 \textit{ pesos/month} \\
 & \quad + (\textit{number of boys 17–18 years of age}) * 195 \textit{ pesos/month} \\
 & \quad + (\textit{number of girls 17–18 years of age}) * 225 \textit{ pesos/month}.
 \end{aligned}$$

We then summed the benefits from having all children enrolled either in primary and secondary school grades with the allowance of 115 pesos per month given to PROGRESA beneficiaries, up to the maximum of 695 pesos per month per household.

Finally, we added to the total cash transfer the allowances given to households for school supplies, these being equal to the *number of children in primary school * (135 pesos/12) + number of children enrolled in secondary school * (170/12)*.

The school allowances were divided by 12 since these are provided on an annual basis. In determining the total budget to be used in all of our simulations, we added all the benefits that would be distributed to beneficiaries with PROGRESA's selection method. All of our monetary values are expressed in July 1994 prices.

REFERENCES

- Adato, Michelle, David Coady, Sudhanshu Handa, Rebecca Lee Harris, Raul Perez, and Beatriz Traffon. 1999. The Impact of Mexico's Education, Health, and Nutrition Program (PROGRESA) at the Community Level. Report prepared as part of the PROGRESA Evaluation Project of the International Food Policy Research Institute (August).
- Atkinson, Anthony. 1995. On Targeting Social Security: Theory and Western Experience with Family Benefits. In *Public Spending and the Poor: Theory and Evidence*, ed. Dominique van de Walle and Kimberly Nead. Baltimore, Md., U.S.A.: Johns Hopkins University for the World Bank.
- Baker, Judy, and Margaret Grosh. 1994. Poverty Reduction Through Geographic Targeting: How Well Does It Work? *World Development* 22 (7): 983–995.
- Besley, Timothy, and Ravi Kanbur. 1993. The Principles of Targeting. In *Including the Poor*, ed. Michael Lipton and Jacque van der Gaag. Proceedings of a symposium organized by the World Bank and the International Food Policy Research Institute. Washington, D.C: World Bank.
- Coady, David, and Emmanuel Skoufias. 1999. On the Distributional Gains of Targeted Transfer Programs. International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, D.C. Photocopy.

- Cornia, Giovanni Andrea, and Frances Steward. 1995. Two Errors of Targeting. In *Public Spending and the Poor: Theory and Evidence*, ed. Dominique van de Walle and Kimberly Nead. Baltimore, Md., U.S.A.: Johns Hopkins University for the World Bank.
- CONAPO-PROGRESA. 1998. *Indices de Marginación, 1995*. Mexico City.
- Dalenious, Tore, and Joseph Hodges, Jr. 1959. Minimum Variance Stratification. *American Statistical Association Journal* 88–101.
- Deaton, Angus. 1997. *The Analysis of Household Surveys. A Microeconomic Approach to Development Policy*. Baltimore, Md., U.S.A.: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- de la Vega, Sergio. 1994. *Construcción de un Índice de Marginación*. Masters thesis in statistics and operations research. Mexico City: UNAM.
- Foster, James, J. Greer, and E. Thorbecke. 1984. Class of Decomposable Poverty Measures. *Econometrica* 52: 761–765.
- Grosh, Margaret. 1994. *Administering Targeted Social Programs in Latin America: From Platitudes to Practice*. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
- Hentschel, Jesko, Jean O. Lanjouw, Peter Lanjouw, and Javier Poggi. 1998. *Combining Census and Survey Data to Study Spatial Dimensions of Poverty*. Policy Research Working Paper No. 1928. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
- Kanbur, Ravi, Michael Keen, and Matti Tuomala. 1995. Labor Supply and Targeting in Poverty Alleviation Programs. In *Public Spending and the Poor: Theory and Evidence*, ed. Dominique van de Walle and Kimberly Nead. Baltimore, Md., U.S.A.: Johns Hopkins University Press for the World Bank.

- Lanjouw, Peter, and Martin Ravallion. 1995. Poverty and Household Size. *Economic Journal* 105 (November): 1415–1434.
- Levy, S. 1994. La pobreza en Mexico. In *La pobreza en Mexico: Causas y políticas para combatirla*, ed. Félix Vélez, pp. 15-112. México, DF: ITAM y FCE.
- PROGRESA (Programa Nacional de Educacion, Salud, y Alimentacion). 1998. *Método de selección de las localidades*. México, DF.
- Ravallion, Martin. 1992. *Poverty Comparisons: A Guide to Concepts and Methods*. Living Standards Measurement Study Working Paper No. 88. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
- Ravallion, Martin. 1998. *Poverty Lines in Theory and Practice*. Living Standards Measurement Study Working Paper No. 133. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
- Sharma, Subbash. 1996. *Applied Multivariate Techniques*. New York: J. Wiley Press.
- Skoufias, Emmanuel, Benjamin Davis, and Jere Behrman. 1999. An Evaluation of the Selection of Beneficiary Households in the Education, Health and Nutrition Program (PROGRESA) of Mexico. Research Report prepared as part of the PROGRESA Evaluation Project of the International Food Policy Research Institute (June). International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, D.C.
- Van de Walle, Dominique. 1998. Targeting Revisited. *World Bank Research Observer* 13 (2) (August): 231–48.
- Velez, Carlos Eduardo, Elkin Castano, and Ruthanne Deutsch. 1999. An Economic Interpretation of Targeting Systems for Social Programs: The Case of Colombia's SISBEN. Inter-American Development Bank, Washington, D.C. Photocopy.

Wodon, Quentin. 1997. Targeting the Poor using ROC Curves. *World Development* 25

(12): 2083–2092.

Yaschine, Iliana. 1999. The Changing Anti-Poverty Agenda: What Can the Mexican Case

Tell Us?" *IDS Bulletin* 30 (2): 47–60.

FCND DISCUSSION PAPERS

- 01 *Agricultural Technology and Food Policy to Combat Iron Deficiency in Developing Countries*, Howarth E. Bouis, August 1994
 - 02 *Determinants of Credit Rationing: A Study of Informal Lenders and Formal Credit Groups in Madagascar*, Manfred Zeller, October 1994
 - 03 *The Extended Family and Intrahousehold Allocation: Inheritance and Investments in Children in the Rural Philippines*, Agnes R. Quisumbing, March 1995
 - 04 *Market Development and Food Demand in Rural China*, Jikun Huang and Scott Rozelle, June 1995
 - 05 *Gender Differences in Agricultural Productivity: A Survey of Empirical Evidence*, Agnes R. Quisumbing, July 1995
 - 06 *Gender Differentials in Farm Productivity: Implications for Household Efficiency and Agricultural Policy*, Harold Alderman, John Hoddinott, Lawrence Haddad, and Christopher Udry, August 1995
 - 07 *A Food Demand System Based on Demand for Characteristics: If There Is "Curvature" in the Slutsky Matrix, What Do the Curves Look Like and Why?*, Howarth E. Bouis, December 1995
 - 08 *Measuring Food Insecurity: The Frequency and Severity of "Coping Strategies,"* Daniel G. Maxwell, December 1995
 - 09 *Gender and Poverty: New Evidence from 10 Developing Countries*, Agnes R. Quisumbing, Lawrence Haddad, and Christine Peña, December 1995
 - 10 *Women's Economic Advancement Through Agricultural Change: A Review of Donor Experience*, Christine Peña, Patrick Webb, and Lawrence Haddad, February 1996
 - 11 *Rural Financial Policies for Food Security of the Poor: Methodologies for a Multicountry Research Project*, Manfred Zeller, Akhter Ahmed, Suresh Babu, Sumiter Broca, Aliou Diagne, and Manohar Sharma, April 1996
 - 12 *Child Development: Vulnerability and Resilience*, Patrice L. Engle, Sarah Castle, and Purnima Menon, April 1996
 - 13 *Determinants of Repayment Performance in Credit Groups: The Role of Program Design, Intra-Group Risk Pooling, and Social Cohesion in Madagascar*, Manfred Zeller, May 1996
 - 14 *Demand for High-Value Secondary Crops in Developing Countries: The Case of Potatoes in Bangladesh and Pakistan*, Howarth E. Bouis and Gregory Scott, May 1996
 - 15 *Repayment Performance in Group-Based credit Programs in Bangladesh: An Empirical Analysis*, Manohar Sharma and Manfred Zeller, July 1996
 - 16 *How Can Safety Nets Do More with Less? General Issues with Some Evidence from Southern Africa*, Lawrence Haddad and Manfred Zeller, July 1996
 - 17 *Remittances, Income Distribution, and Rural Asset Accumulation*, Richard H. Adams, Jr., August 1996
 - 18 *Care and Nutrition: Concepts and Measurement*, Patrice L. Engle, Purnima Menon, and Lawrence Haddad, August 1996
 - 19 *Food Security and Nutrition Implications of Intrahousehold Bias: A Review of Literature*, Lawrence Haddad, Christine Peña, Chizuru Nishida, Agnes Quisumbing, and Alison Slack, September 1996
 - 20 *Macroeconomic Crises and Poverty Monitoring: A Case Study for India*, Gaurav Datt and Martin Ravallion, November 1996
-

FCND DISCUSSION PAPERS

- 21 *Livestock Income, Male/Female Animals, and Inequality in Rural Pakistan*, Richard H. Adams, Jr., November 1996
 - 22 *Alternative Approaches to Locating the Food Insecure: Qualitative and Quantitative Evidence from South India*, Kimberly Chung, Lawrence Haddad, Jayashree Ramakrishna, and Frank Riely, January 1997
 - 23 *Better Rich, or Better There? Grandparent Wealth, Coresidence, and Intrahousehold Allocation*, Agnes R. Quisumbing, January 1997
 - 24 *Child Care Practices Associated with Positive and Negative Nutritional Outcomes for Children in Bangladesh: A Descriptive Analysis*, Shubh K. Kumar Range, Ruchira Naved, and Saroj Bhattarai, February 1997
 - 25 *Water, Health, and Income: A Review*, John Hoddinott, February 1997
 - 26 *Why Have Some Indian States Performed Better Than Others at Reducing Rural Poverty?*, Gaurav Datt and Martin Ravallion, March 1997
 - 27 *"Bargaining" and Gender Relations: Within and Beyond the Household*, Bina Agarwal, March 1997
 - 28 *Developing a Research and Action Agenda for Examining Urbanization and Caregiving: Examples from Southern and Eastern Africa*, Patrice L. Engle, Purnima Menon, James L. Garrett, and Alison Slack, April 1997
 - 29 *Gender, Property Rights, and Natural Resources*, Ruth Meinzen-Dick, Lynn R. Brown, Hilary Sims Feldstein, and Agnes R. Quisumbing, May 1997
 - 30 *Plant Breeding: A Long-Term Strategy for the Control of Zinc Deficiency in Vulnerable Populations*, Marie T. Ruel and Howarth E. Bouis, July 1997
 - 31 *Is There an Intrahousehold 'Flypaper Effect'? Evidence from a School Feeding Program*, Hanan Jacoby, August 1997
 - 32 *The Determinants of Demand for Micronutrients: An Analysis of Rural Households in Bangladesh*, Howarth E. Bouis and Mary Jane G. Novenario-Reese, August 1997
 - 33 *Human Milk—An Invisible Food Resource*, Anne Hatløy and Arne Oshaug, August 1997
 - 34 *The Impact of Changes in Common Property Resource Management on Intrahousehold Allocation*, Philip Maggs and John Hoddinott, September 1997
 - 35 *Market Access by Smallholder Farmers in Malawi: Implications for Technology Adoption, Agricultural Productivity, and Crop Income*, Manfred Zeller, Aliou Diagne, and Charles Mataya, September 1997
 - 36 *The GAPVU Cash Transfer Program in Mozambique: An assessment*, Gaurav Datt, Ellen Payongayong, James L. Garrett, and Marie Ruel, October 1997
 - 37 *Why Do Migrants Remit? An Analysis for the Dominican Sierra*, Bénédicte de la Brière, Alain de Janvry, Sylvie Lambert, and Elisabeth Sadoulet, October 1997
 - 38 *Systematic Client Consultation in Development: The Case of Food Policy Research in Ghana, India, Kenya, and Mali*, Suresh Chandra Babu, Lynn R. Brown, and Bonnie McClafferty, November 1997
 - 39 *Whose Education Matters in the Determination of Household Income: Evidence from a Developing Country*, Dean Jolliffe, November 1997
 - 40 *Can Qualitative and Quantitative Methods Serve Complementary Purposes for Policy Research? Evidence from Accra*, Dan Maxwell, January 1998
-

FCND DISCUSSION PAPERS

- 41 *The Political Economy of Urban Food Security in Sub-Saharan Africa*, Dan Maxwell, February 1998
 - 42 *Farm Productivity and Rural Poverty in India*, Gaurav Datt and Martin Ravallion, March 1998
 - 43 *How Reliable Are Group Informant Ratings? A Test of Food Security Rating in Honduras*, Gilles Bergeron, Saul Sutkover Morris, and Juan Manuel Medina Banegas, April 1998
 - 44 *Can FAO's Measure of Chronic Undernourishment Be Strengthened?*, Lisa C. Smith, with a Response by Logan Naiken, May 1998
 - 45 *Does Urban Agriculture Help Prevent Malnutrition? Evidence from Kampala*, Daniel Maxwell, Carol Levin, and Joanne Csete, June 1998
 - 46 *Impact of Access to Credit on Income and Food Security in Malawi*, Aliou Diagne, July 1998
 - 47 *Poverty in India and Indian States: An Update*, Gaurav Datt, July 1998
 - 48 *Human Capital, Productivity, and Labor Allocation in Rural Pakistan*, Marcel Fafchamps and Agnes R. Quisumbing, July 1998
 - 49 *A Profile of Poverty in Egypt: 1997*, Gaurav Datt, Dean Jolliffe, and Manohar Sharma, August 1998.
 - 50 *Computational Tools for Poverty Measurement and Analysis*, Gaurav Datt, October 1998
 - 51 *Urban Challenges to Food and Nutrition Security: A Review of Food Security, Health, and Caregiving in the Cities*, Marie T. Ruel, James L. Garrett, Saul S. Morris, Daniel Maxwell, Arne Oshaug, Patrice Engle, Purnima Menon, Alison Slack, and Lawrence Haddad, October 1998
 - 52 *Testing Nash Bargaining Household Models With Time-Series Data*, John Hoddinott and Christopher Adam, November 1998
 - 53 *Agricultural Wages and Food Prices in Egypt: A Governorate-Level Analysis for 1976-1993*, Gaurav Datt and Jennifer Olmsted, November 1998
 - 54 *Endogeneity of Schooling in the Wage Function: Evidence from the Rural Philippines*, John Maluccio, November 1998
 - 55 *Efficiency in Intrahousehold Resource Allocation*, Marcel Fafchamps, December 1998
 - 56 *How Does the Human Rights Perspective Help to Shape the Food and Nutrition Policy Research Agenda?*, Lawrence Haddad and Arne Oshaug, February 1999
 - 57 *The Structure of Wages During the Economic Transition in Romania*, Emmanuel Skoufias, February 1999
 - 58 *Women's Land Rights in the Transition to Individualized Ownership: Implications for the Management of Tree Resources in Western Ghana*, Agnes Quisumbing, Ellen Payongayong, J. B. Aidoo, and Keijiro Otsuka, February 1999
 - 59 *Placement and Outreach of Group-Based Credit Organizations: The Cases of ASA, BRAC, and PROSHIKA in Bangladesh*, Manohar Sharma and Manfred Zeller, March 1999
 - 60 *Explaining Child Malnutrition in Developing Countries: A Cross-Country Analysis*, Lisa C. Smith and Lawrence Haddad, April 1999
 - 61 *Does Geographic Targeting of Nutrition Interventions Make Sense in Cities? Evidence from Abidjan and Accra*, Saul S. Morris, Carol Levin, Margaret Armar-Klemesu, Daniel Maxwell, and Marie T. Ruel, April 1999
-

FCND DISCUSSION PAPERS

- 62 *Good Care Practices Can Mitigate the Negative Effects of Poverty and Low Maternal Schooling on Children's Nutritional Status: Evidence from Accra*, Marie T. Ruel, Carol E. Levin, Margaret Armar-Klemesu, Daniel Maxwell, and Saul S. Morris, April 1999
- 63 *Are Urban Poverty and Undernutrition Growing? Some Newly Assembled Evidence*, Lawrence Haddad, Marie T. Ruel, and James L. Garrett, April 1999
- 64 *Some Urban Facts of Life: Implications for Research and Policy*, Marie T. Ruel, Lawrence Haddad, and James L. Garrett, April 1999
- 65 *Are Determinants of Rural and Urban Food Security and Nutritional Status Different? Some Insights from Mozambique*, James L. Garrett and Marie T. Ruel, April 1999
- 66 *Working Women in an Urban Setting: Traders, Vendors, and Food Security in Accra*, Carol E. Levin, Daniel G. Maxwell, Margaret Armar-Klemesu, Marie T. Ruel, Saul S. Morris, and Clement Ahiadeke, April 1999
- 67 *Determinants of Household Access to and Participation in Formal and Informal Credit Markets in Malawi*, Aliou Diagne, April 1999
- 68 *Early Childhood Nutrition and Academic Achievement: A Longitudinal Analysis*, Paul Glewwe, Hanan Jacoby, and Elizabeth King, May 1999
- 69 *Supply Response of West African Agricultural Households: Implications of Intrahousehold Preference Heterogeneity*, Lisa C. Smith and Jean-Paul Chavas, July 1999
- 70 *Child Health Care Demand in a Developing Country: Unconditional Estimates from the Philippines*, Kelly Hallman, August 1999
- 71 *Social Capital and Income Generation in South Africa, 1993-98*, John Maluccio, Lawrence Haddad, and Julian May, September 1999
- 72 *Validity of Rapid Estimates of Household Wealth and Income for Health Surveys in Rural Africa*, Saul S. Morris, Calogero Carletto, John Hoddinott, and Luc J. M. Christiaensen, October 1999
- 73 *Social Roles, Human Capital, and the Intrahousehold Division of Labor: Evidence from Pakistan*, Marcel Fafchamps and Agnes R. Quisumbing, October 1999
- 74 *Can Cash Transfer Programs Work in Resource-Poor Countries? The Experience in Mozambique*, Jan W. Low, James L. Garrett, and Vitória Ginja, October 1999
- 75 *Determinants of Poverty in Egypt, 1997*, Gaurav Datt and Dean Jolliffe, October 1999
- 76 *Raising Primary School Enrolment in Developing Countries: The Relative Importance of Supply and Demand*, Sudhanshu Handa, November 1999
- 77 *The Political Economy of Food Subsidy Reform in Egypt*, Tammi Gutner, November 1999.
- 78 *Determinants of Poverty in Mozambique: 1996-97*, Gaurav Datt, Kenneth Simler, Sanjukta Mukherjee, and Gabriel Dava, January 2000
- 79 *Adult Health in the Time of Drought*, John Hoddinott and Bill Kinsey, January 2000
- 80 *Nontraditional Crops and Land Accumulation Among Guatemalan Smallholders: Is the Impact Sustainable?* Calogero Carletto, February 2000
- 81 *The Constraints to Good Child Care Practices in Accra: Implications for Programs*, Margaret Armar-Klemesu, Marie T. Ruel, Daniel G. Maxwell, Carol E. Levin, and Saul S. Morris, February 2000
-

FCND DISCUSSION PAPERS

- 82 *Pathways of Rural Development in Madagascar: An Empirical Investigation of the Critical Triangle of Environmental Sustainability, Economic Growth, and Poverty Alleviation*, Manfred Zeller, Cécile Lapenu, Bart Minten, Eliane Ralison, Désiré Randrianaivo, and Claude Randrianarisoa, March 2000
- 83 *Quality or Quantity? The Supply-Side Determinants of Primary Schooling in Rural Mozambique*, Sudhanshu Handa and Kenneth R. Simler, March 2000
- 84 *Intrahousehold Allocation and Gender Relations: New Empirical Evidence from Four Developing Countries*, Agnes R. Quisumbing and John A. Maluccio, April 2000
- 85 *Intrahousehold Impact of Transfer of Modern Agricultural Technology: A Gender Perspective*, Ruchira Tabassum Naved, April 2000
- 86 *Women's Assets and Intrahousehold Allocation in Rural Bangladesh: Testing Measures of Bargaining Power*, Agnes R. Quisumbing and Bénédicte de la Brière, April 2000
- 87 *Changes in Intrahousehold Labor Allocation to Environmental Goods Collection: A Case Study from Rural Nepal*, Priscilla A. Cooke, May 2000
- 88 *The Determinants of Employment Status in Egypt*, Ragui Assaad, Fatma El-Hamidi, and Akhter U. Ahmed, June 2000
- 89 *The Role of the State in Promoting Microfinance Institutions*, Cécile Lapenu, June 2000
- 90 *Empirical Measurements of Households' Access to Credit and Credit Constraints in Developing Countries: Methodological Issues and Evidence*, Aliou Diagne, Manfred Zeller, and Manohar Sharma, July 2000
- 91 *Comparing Village Characteristics Derived From Rapid Appraisals and Household Surveys: A Tale From Northern Mali*, Luc Christiaensen, John Hoddinott, and Gilles Bergeron, July 2000
- 92 *Assessing the Potential for Food-Based Strategies to Reduce Vitamin A and Iron Deficiencies: A Review of Recent Evidence*, Marie T. Ruel and Carol E. Levin, July 2000
- 93 *Mother-Father Resource Control, Marriage Payments, and Girl-Boy Health in Rural Bangladesh*, Kelly Hallman, September 2000
- 94 *Targeting Urban Malnutrition: A Multicity Analysis of the Spatial Distribution of Childhood Nutritional Status*, Saul Sutkover Morris, September 2000
- 95 *Attrition in the Kwazulu Natal Income Dynamics Study 1993-1998*, John Maluccio, October 2000
- 96 *Attrition in Longitudinal Household Survey Data: Some Tests for Three Developing-Country Samples*, Harold Alderman, Jere R. Behrman, Hans-Peter Kohler, John A. Maluccio, Susan Cotts Watkins, October 2000
- 97 *Socioeconomic Differentials in Child Stunting Are Consistently Larger in Urban Than in Rural Areas*, Purnima Menon, Marie T. Ruel, and Saul S. Morris, December 2000
- 98 *Participation and Poverty Reduction: Issues, Theory, and New Evidence from South Africa*, John Hoddinott, Michelle Adato, Tim Besley, and Lawrence Haddad, January 2001
- 99 *Cash Transfer Programs with Income Multipliers: PROCAMPO in Mexico*, Elisabeth Sadoulet, Alain de Janvry, and Benjamin Davis, January 2001
- 100 *On the Targeting and Redistributive Efficiencies of Alternative Transfer Instruments*, David Coady and Emmanuel Skoufias, March 2001
-

FCND DISCUSSION PAPERS

- 101 *Poverty, Inequality, and Spillover in Mexico's Education, Health, and Nutrition Program*, Sudhanshu Handa, Mari-Carmen Huerta, Raul Perez, and Beatriz Traffon, March 2001
- 102 *School Subsidies for the Poor: Evaluating a Mexican Strategy for Reducing Poverty*, T. Paul Schultz, March 2001
-