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MEASURING POWER

Elizabeth Frankenberg and Duncan Thomas

Food Consumption and Nutrition Division

International Food Policy Research Institute
2033 K Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006 U.S.A.
(202) 862–5600
Fax: (202) 467–4439

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ABSTRACT

There is a longstanding interest in how decisions about resource allocations are made within households and how those decisions affect the welfare of household members. Much empirical work has approached the problem from the perspective that if preferences differ, welfare outcomes will depend on the power of individuals within the household to exert their own preferences. Measures of power are therefore a central component of quantitative empirical approaches to understanding how differences in preferences translate into different welfare outcomes. Following most of the empirical studies in this genre, this paper focuses on dynamics within couples, although we recognize that dynamics among extended family members and across generations are of substantial interest.

A number of different measures of power have been used in the literature. Because control over economic resources is seen as an important source of power, individual labor income, which one earns and so presumably controls to some degree, is one potential measure of power. However, whether and how much one works is a choice that is not likely to be independent of one's power in the household. Non-labor income has also been used as a measure of power, but even if non-labor income does not reflect contemporaneous choices, it likely does reflect past choices, particularly labor supply choices, and so is also a function of power. Levels of resources brought to the marriage by each spouse, over which they may individually retain control, are even less proximate to the current choices of household members, but nevertheless reflect one's taste in

partners and therefore may not be exogenous to power. (In some instances, resources brought to the marriage may reflect decisionmaking by the couple's parents, depending on the role that parents play in arranging marriages or transferring resources at the time of marriage.)

A possible source of insight into the issue is to examine the impact of changes that affect the distribution of power within the household but that are plausibly exogenous to that power, such as changes in laws related to divorce or changes in benefit programs that provide resources to one member of the couple but not the other. Economic crises and the dislocations that accompany them may be another source of (exogenous) change that provides an opportunity to examine whether changes in the distribution of power within households is associated with changes in the welfare of individuals within the household.

Another way to gain insight into intrahousehold decisionmaking is to develop additional, more plausibly exogenous, measures of power. In the absence of conducting natural experiments, it may be profitable to study variation in community norms or ethnic traditions that give rise to different levels of power for different household members. This approach has particular appeal for societies with heterogeneous cultures and those undergoing dramatic social change. This approach would require combining insights from the ethnographic and sociological literatures and from theoretical economic models of behavior, as well as knowledge of survey design and field practice. This paper describes an attempt to move in the direction of this ambitious agenda.

Additionally, beyond the development of alternative or additional measures of power, it may also be useful to include in household surveys explicit questions to multiple household members about decisionmaking within the household. This provides insights into differences in perceptions among household members. Additionally, patterns of decisionmaking may be outcomes (and thus indicators) of relative power within households. Thus, indicators of decisionmaking shed light on how power manifests itself in everyday life.

A goal of this project was to develop and field a decisionmaking module as part of a large-scale, multipurpose household survey, the second Indonesia Family Life Survey (IFLS2). The IFLS2 was fielded in 13 provinces in Indonesia between August, 1997, and February, 1998. From the point of view of working in heterogeneous and dynamic societies, Indonesia is an ideal laboratory. The IFLS is an ongoing panel survey, with the potential to provide a picture of the dynamics of power relationships over time and across the life course, an issue about which little is known.

This paper describes the approach we took to developing the household decisionmaking module and presents preliminary results from the IFLS2. We use the IFLS2 data to address the following questions:

1) To what extent are day-to-day patterns of managing resources and making decisions consistent with the notion that, within households, members either share common preferences or the preferences of one member dominate?

2) Within households, who has the power over the purse strings? What characteristics predict power over the purse strings?

3) How do husbands and wives make decisions about expenditures and about use of time? Are there particular spheres where the man assumes control, and others where the woman dominates? Are certain spheres of decisionmaking more typically joint?

4) Can we identify indicators of relative power that can be collected in a field setting and that can enrich our tests of models of household behavior? Can measures of relative power used in other empirical studies be correlated with these indicators?

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Elizabeth Frankenberg
RAND
Santa Monica, California

Duncan Thomas
RAND
Santa Monica, California
and
University of California at Los Angeles

1. INTRODUCTION

The specific context of our research is Indonesia, where we have conducted three rounds of the Indonesia Family Life Survey (IFLS). The IFLS is a multipurpose panel survey of over 7,000 households in Indonesia. The first round was conducted in 1993/94. The second round was conducted in 1997/98. In the second round, we successfully reinterviewed 94 percent of the 7,224 households contacted in IFLS1 (excluding households where all members died), along with 800 split-off households. A 25 percent subset of the enumeration areas was interviewed again in late 1998. A fourth round of the survey was planned for 2000.

The household survey collected data at the household level (consumption, income from household enterprises) and at the individual level on a variety of topics, including labor force participation and earnings, non-labor income and assets, migration, education, marriage, health status and health care use, and histories of pregnancy and contraceptive use. In IFLS2, we conducted physical assessments of health status. In addition to the household survey, there was an extensive community and facility survey that included interviews with the community leader, the head of the community women's group, and (in 1997/98) an authority in local laws and traditions.

The overall structure of the IFLS provided the framework within which the household decisionmaking module was implemented. The International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) provided support for the development of the module. The development proceeded in stages, including a review of ethnographic literature, focus

groups with men and women in Jakarta and in nearby rural areas, and pilot-tests and pretests of versions of the module.

REVIEW OF THE ETHNOGRAPHIC LITERATURE

Indonesia is extremely diverse ethnically, which means there are a variety of traditions with respect to the organization of family and community life. By reviewing the anthropological literature we developed a better understanding of differences among ethnic groups. However, the extent to which the groups have been studied and which aspects of their social organization have been studied, vary considerably. For example, there was much less information available about Kalimantan and the Eastern Islands than about Sumatra, Java, and Bali. Because ethnic variation has potentially important implications for patterns of intrahousehold decisionmaking in Indonesia, we briefly describe some of the main dimensions of diversity among ethnic groups.

In Indonesia, the term for local traditions is *adat*, which can be translated as customary law, or as the body of tradition that sets out how individuals relate to each other with respect to matters of marriage, divorce, inheritance, land, and property rights. The fact that in Indonesia the colonial system recognized 17 different "*adat* law areas" is testimony to the diversity of systems that exist within the archipelago (Hooker 1978). The structure of any *adat* system is determined by the nature of an individual's ties to his kin and the nature of his ties to a particular area (Ter Haar 1948; Booker 1978). We describe some of the principal organizing features of several of the major ethnic groups in Indonesia.

Java

Javanese society is renowned for being loosely structured. Large-scale kin groups are absent, there are cross-cutting religious, economic, and social groups, marriage ties are relatively weak, and mobility is high so that enduring bonds between neighbors are not forged (Schweizer 1988). On Java, descent is bilateral and nuclear families are the primary unit of social organization. Household members share resources and work together to support themselves. Women play a central role in the organization of the household economy. There is a common Javanese saying, "women are the minister of the interior," which means that women take the lead in household matters.

Bali

On Bali, descent is patrilineal and men are viewed as superior to women. A household is only committed economically to the maintenance of one ancestral temple, that of the man. Nevertheless, after marriage, women continue to retain strong ties to their natal homes and to participate in ceremonies there, sometimes accompanied by their husbands or children. But at death a woman is cremated by her husband's family and conceptualized as an ancestor by that family. On Bali, only sons can inherit their father's estate. If a man has no son, he can either adopt one or raise the position of one of his daughters to that of a son. In this case, when the girl marries, her husband must join her family, rather than the reverse.

The Bugis of South Sulawesi

Kinship ties are reckoned bilaterally among the Buginese, and at the time of marriage, neither bride nor groom loses ties to the natal family. Bride wealth, an integral component of a Bugis wedding, measures the social status of the bride and indicates much about the status of the groom as well, since marriages tend to be between equals. Bride wealth consists of two components: rank-price and spending money. A woman may not receive a lower rank-price than her mother, but if her father is higher status than her mother, she may receive a higher rank-price than her mother. The amount of rank-price is determined by *adat*. The other portion of the bride wealth, called spending money, reflects the standing of the bride's parents. The amounts are often substantial. The spending money received by the bride's family is used for the reception. Spending money functions as an aggressive and ostentatious display of status. Rank-price is a passive, fixed indicator of the bride's descent-rank. In South Sulawesi, the children are not considered part of the father's kinship line until the bride price has been paid in full.

The Batak of North Sumatra

The Batak are patrilineal. Among the Toba Batak, the bride generally moves in with the husband's parents after marriage, but she does not join her husband's clan. Rather, she remains a member of the clan of her birth all her life and merely passes under the "jural control" of the lineage of her husband (including his brothers, father, and father's brothers). Both the Toba Batak and the Karo Batak prefer that sons marry the daughters of their maternal uncles. Marriages that reverse the family's marital status

relative to another family are avoided. Kinship ties are extremely hierarchical and extremely important, and virtually all social interaction occurs within the framework of kinship (Kipp 1984).

The Minangkabau of West Sumatra

The Minangkabau are matrilineal. There is no bride price in Minang culture. Although there is an exchange of gifts, the woman is not part of the exchange and gift-giving is secondary. The husband remains part of his own clan, and children from the marriage belong to the clan of the mother. If the mother dies, her children stay with her family. Kin group property is very important. Traditionally, it cannot pass to an individual, although there is some evidence that this is changing (Kato 1982; Quisumbing and Otsuka 2001). Property accrues to the nuclear family only if both the husband and the wife participated in acquiring the property.

The groups described above differ considerably in the traditions that form their *adat*. In our empirical work, we will explore whether ethnicity is associated with patterns of managing money and control over decisionmaking, as the ethnographic review suggests it should be.

FOCUS GROUPS OF MEN AND WOMEN

The topic of intrahousehold decisionmaking and the relative power of husbands and wives is potentially sensitive. Until recently, relatively few household surveys have

included questions along these lines, so there is relatively little research to refer to with respect to designing a module. Moreover, questions that are interesting and appropriate in one setting may have little relevance in another setting. Thus, an important first step in designing the decisionmaking module was to listen to Indonesians discuss the topics that we were interested in including in the module. We wanted to gauge the sensitivity of the topic and listen to the language used in discussions. To meet these goals, we arranged for four focus groups to be conducted at two sites: in urban Jakarta and in a rural area outside of Jakarta.[1] In each site, one focus-group discussion was conducted with men and one with women. Each focus group lasted between one-and-one-half and two hours. The topics for discussion were

- In which areas are disagreements between husbands and wives common with respect to how money should be spent, and how are difficulties resolved? Is it appropriate for husbands and wives to retain separate pots of money?
- Are certain aspects of day-to-day life particularly the concern of women, while others are the concern of men, or do men and women share responsibility for decisions?
- How important are arranged versus unarranged marriages, and what is the role of dowry and bride price?

[1] Limited funding prevented conducting focus groups in other areas of the country. While the focus groups that were conducted cannot capture the ethnic diversity of Indonesia, we felt that they were an important first step in establishing the feasibility of the undertaking and in hearing the language used to discuss decisionmaking within the household.

- What are some scenarios in which a husband and wife might disagree on expenditures, and how should such disagreements be resolved?

The focus groups yielded a number of insights, not least of which was that they established the feasibility of asking questions to both men and women about the processes of decisionmaking and the respective roles of husbands and wives. Group members were willing to talk about these topics and did not appear to feel that they were too personal.

It was also readily apparent that even among focus group participants, there was heterogeneity in the workings of the household economy, particularly by age and socioeconomic status. Among the urban women, for example, some reported that they were equals with their husbands in all decisions, some reported that they typically deferred to their husbands, and some said that they made the decisions. The most outspoken of the latter group volunteered that she brought home more money than her husband.

Another confirmation from the focus groups was that, consistent with the anthropological literature about Javanese families, women play a key role in managing the household budget. In a number of households, both men and women expected that the man would turn over most or all of his earnings to the wife for her to manage. Interestingly, the wife was responsible both for covering current expenses, and for putting aside money for emergencies. In these groups it was commonly acknowledged that

husbands and wives each had some “private” savings, although this practice seemed to be associated with the level of socioeconomic status. For the poorest members of the groups in rural areas, private savings appeared less feasible. The results suggested considerable variation across couples in patterns of behavior with respect to control over expenditures.

Among topics that husbands and wives were most likely to disagree about were gifts and transfers to family members. With respect to decisions about children’s health and education, most respondents seemed to feel that both spouses should play a role and that if there were disagreements, it was important to work out compromises. Male respondents, particularly in the rural group, mentioned that pressure to earn more so that their families could “keep up with the neighbors” was a source of tension in their marriage.

Focus group participants were asked whether the quality of the marriage would be affected if one spouse were from a significantly wealthier background than the other. A number of participants stated that different levels of socioeconomic status could cause problems because one spouse would look down on or try to dominate the other, and that it was generally better if husband and wife were from similar backgrounds. Respondents reported that very few marriages were arranged by parents. This topic was not fruitful in terms of encouraging discussion.

An observation that was common to all focus groups is that group dynamics appeared to play a role in respondents’ answers. Heterogeneity in views was a declining function of the time spent in the group.

IN-DEPTH INTERVIEWS, PILOTS, AND PRETESTS OF MODULES

The focus groups provided the basis for designing a structured questionnaire module to be administered as part of a pilot test. The module was informed by the focus group in a number of ways. First, we included questions about management of the household budget in response to the observation that husbands often turn over most of their earnings to their wives. Second, we did not include many questions regarding whether parents had arranged couples' marriages. Third, we included a range of different behaviors and choices in the questions about decisionmaking. Fourth, we include questions on the relative social status of the husband and the wife at the time of marriage. All of the questions were asked both to husbands and to wives.

For the pilot, we tested a longer module than we anticipated fielding. Levels of respondent cooperation in the pilot tests was extremely high and provided further evidence of the feasibility of administering a structured questionnaire on decisionmaking as part of a household survey.

Many of the questions tested in the pilot were retained in the module that was ultimately fielded, and are discussed below. One result from the pilot test of the decisionmaking module, and from pilot tests of other modules, was that after about 20 minutes of questioning on a particular topic, the attention span of respondents had wandered far away.

Another finding that emerged from the pilot test was the importance of designing questions so that they are either relevant across a range of life-cycle stages, or so that skip patterns filter out respondents for whom questions are not relevant.

The point is perhaps best illustrated with an example. We were interested in husbands' and wives' aspirations for their male and female children, and so a section of the module asked about expectations for children's education, occupation, and age of marriage. The questions worked adequately well for respondents with two or three children between the ages of five and ten. But they were tedious for anyone with more than three children, seemed silly to respondents whose children were very young, and were irrelevant for respondents with adult children or no children. We dropped these questions from the final version of the module.

Other questions that were tested but ultimately dropped included questions on ownership of "private" assets that one spouse could liquidate, whether a decision to liquidate would be discussed with the spouse who did not own the asset, and whom respondents talked to about spousal problems.

The pilot test results taught us the importance of simplicity and specificity. When questions required respondents to imagine hypothetical situations that seemed implausible or to think at a very abstract level, interviewers spent a lot of time explaining the questions or cajoling respondents into answering, frustrating both interviewers and respondents. On the other hand, overly specific questions reduced the group of respondents for whom the question was relevant to an unacceptably narrow range.

We confronted this problem by coming up with a list of topics for which we wanted to know who in the household made decisions. For example, as respondents found the concept of "expensive items" vague, we provided an example that was appropriate to the household, which for some households was a cassette player, and for

others, a car. In the end, we included the item "large expensive purchases such as a refrigerator or TV."

A final trade-off that emerged from the pilot test concerned the costs and benefits of posing questions symmetrically when day-to-day patterns may be asymmetric. In the module that we fielded, respondents are asked identical questions, regardless of their gender. This approach guarantees that different patterns of responses by gender are not a function of differences in the questions asked. Additionally, respondents were asked both about themselves and their spouses. This structure restricted our ability to explore phenomenon that are much more common for one gender than the other.

2. SURVEY INSTRUMENT

The module that we fielded is provided in the Appendix. While it was administered to individuals, its focus is particularly on the dynamics within married couples. Because many of the questions concern the relationship between husband and wife, the module was only administered to respondents who are currently married and whose spouse has lived in the household in the past six months.

The module comprises three components. The first battery of questions focuses specifically on how couples deal with money. Respondents who have a regular source of income were queried about their autonomy in spending that money for household expenses and about whether they saved a portion over which they retained control.

Respondents were asked the same set of questions about their spouse, if their spouse had a regular source of income.

One of the drawbacks of these questions is that they are only relevant when at least one member of the couple has a source of income. Although most men reported a source of income, less than half of the female respondents did. An additional set of questions were asked to all respondents about whether their arrangements with their spouse were such that if the respondent needed money when the spouse was absent, he or she could comfortably use money from the spouse's wallet or purse. The converse of these questions were asked as well. That is, if the respondent was away and his or her spouse needed money, was it acceptable for the spouse to use money from the respondent's wallet or purse. The point of these questions was to discuss whether couples pool resources to the extent that there is complete transparency in terms of who has resources at a given time.

In combination, these questions provided insights into the notion of income pooling. Specifically, they touch on the degree of autonomy of each member of the couple with respect to expenditures and savings, and on the degree of privacy that characterizes attitudes toward cash in the home.

The second battery of questions concerns how families make decisions about expenditures and use of time. Each respondent was asked who in the household makes decisions about expenditures or use of time for each of 17 items, including food eaten at home, clothing (respondent's, spouse's, and children's), resources allocated to child education and health, gifts to family members, savings, expenditures on durables, time

spent socializing (respondent and spouse), and use of contraception. Respondents are allowed to name multiple decisionmakers. Recognizing that household and family structures are varied, we allowed respondents to report that decisions were made by coresident, non-coresident family, and nonfamily members. As shown among our respondents below, the vast majority of decisions are made by the husband and wife.

These questions were designed to explore whether, within the household, husbands and wives make decisions jointly (either as a couple or in conjunction with other family members), or whether certain members dominate decisionmaking in particular arenas.[2]

The last battery of questions in the module attempts to provide insight into the relative status of husbands and wives within the household. These questions focus on the family backgrounds of husbands and wives at the time of marriage. Each respondent was asked to evaluate the relative position of his or her parents in relation to his or her spouse's parents at the time that the respondent married the spouse. There are eight categories on which the comparisons are made, including the father's job and education, the mother's education, the family's position in the community and quality of housing, and levels of earnings and assets. We collected this information because parts of Indonesia, e.g., Java, are extremely hierarchical; thus, beyond whatever effect the

[2] The questions themselves do not ask respondents whether decisions are made jointly with their spouse. Rather, the questions allow husbands and wives to identify all the participants in a decision. If a respondent identifies both him or herself and his or her spouse as participants in a decision, then we infer that from the respondent's perspective, the decision is made jointly with the spouse. This interpretation is also suggested by the focus groups, during which husbands and wives alike stated repeatedly the importance of deciding things together and compromising in the event of conflict.

absolute socioeconomic level of the respondent's family, the relative position of the

and wife's families may well influence their respective levels of power within the marriage. Another reason we collected these measures is that in the focus groups, respondents stressed that marriage between people from different socioeconomic backgrounds were likely to result in serious discordance.

Because the questions were asked not just of the respondent, but also about the respondent's spouse, it was possible to consider the answers from multiple perspectives: how individuals perceived their own situation, how they perceive their spouse's situation, and whether the perceptions of each member of the couple corresponded to those of the spouse.

Finally, the question of how to interview husbands and wives separately needs to be addressed. All interviews were conducted individually and interviewers were trained to try to interview each spouse alone. That was not always possible and the interviewers were told to not risk an interview being disrupted or stopped if the spouse wanted to be present. For about a third of the couples, neither spouse was at either interview; for another third, interviews were conducted with the spouse present at both interviews. In many of the latter cases, the interviews were conducted simultaneously in different parts of the room with the male interviewer interviewing the male respondent and the female interviewer interviewing the female respondent. It would be naï ve to think that the interviews with each member of the couple are independent and getting independent responses is not practical in a field setting. (Even if the interviews are conducted without the spouse present, they would have to be conducted simultaneously. That is very hard to

accomplish among respondents who work. Imposing that restriction would have seriously reduced the interview completion rates in the IFLS.)

3. RESULTS

Results presented here are primarily from the household decisionmaking module. This module was administered to household residents who were married at the time of the interview, and whose spouse had lived in the household within the past six months. There were 5,186 couples that received the module. We investigated the correlates of two types of behavior: income sharing/pooling and decisionmaking within the household. Both of these types of behavior are potentially associated with measures of the husband's and wife's relative power in the household.

INCOME SHARING AND INCOME POOLING

One purpose of the module was to collect data on the extent to which individual household members pool their resources and treat resources as part of a common pot. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics on responses to questions related to this topic. About 20 percent of females who earned income reported that they set aside a portion of that income, which they could spend without consulting their spouse. The corresponding proportion for males was lower, at 16.3 percent.[3] Much higher proportions of both women and men reported that they felt free to spend their income on household expenses:

[3] These questions are asked only of respondents who have a source of income. There were 2,310 female respondents who reported earning income and 4,855 male respondents who reported earning income.

53.3 and 43.3 percent, respectively. These results certainly suggest that there are households in which husbands and wives do not pool all their income. An additional question was asked of all respondents, regardless of whether they had income, about whether, if they needed money and their spouse was not at home, they would feel comfortable using money from their spouse's wallet or purse. This question also addresses the issue of whether couples perceive that there is a "common pot" from which they may both draw. Less than 20 percent of respondents reported that they would feel comfortable using money from their spouse's purse if he or she was absent.

Besides the simple distributions reported above, there were patterns that characterized couples rather than individuals. The joint distributions of the questions are also presented in Table 1. Most couples live in households where neither kept money to him/herself (66.9 percent). Females were a little more likely than males to keep part of their income. In only about 8 percent of couples did both keep some of their income. The pattern is quite similar with respect to whether respondents felt comfortable using their spouse's money. A different pattern emerged with respect to couples' arrangements about expenditures. With respect to freedom to spend, there were almost as many couples in which only the female reported that she was free to spend as there were in which both couples were free to spend. It was rare that only the husband felt free to spend his income on household goods.

Table 1 shows evidence that there were couples who do not pool their incomes, or more generally, who treat money as though it was all part of a common pot. What factors

predicted men's and women's behaviors with respect to managing money? Table 2 provides coefficients from probit regressions of the behaviors discussed above.

There are several classes of covariates that are included in the models. We include measures of the ethnicity of the respondent. Respondents were assigned to six groups. The groups are the Javanese, the Minangkabau, the Balinese, other Sumatran (those who speak Sumatran languages other than Minang), and "outer islands" (including ethnic groups in Kalimantan, West Nusa Tengarra, and South Sulawesi). We also create a residual category for speakers of Chinese and residents of Jakarta and West Java who speak Indonesian or who speak languages other than Javanese, Balinese, Minang, or a Sumatran language.

We also include an indicator for whether the respondent lives in an urban area.

Several variables are conceptualized as measures of power. These include age of both the husband and wife, years of education for both the husband and wife, and whether the head of the household is male. We also include the husband's perception of whether his family was of higher status that his wife's, based on the families' relative positions in the community at the time of marriage. An indicator of the wife's perception of whether her husband's family had higher status that hers (at the time of marriage) is included as well.

Finally, four variables capture the dynamics of the interview: whether the husband was interviewed alone and whether his wife was present, and whether the wife was interviewed alone and whether her husband was present.

The first two columns of Table 2 show results for whether females and males set aside money from their income, over which they retain control.

As described above, the reference group for ethnicity is one we called "other/urban," which consists of Chinese speakers and speakers of Indonesian or other languages who reside in Jakarta or West Java. These respondents tended to be from urban areas and were, on average, more "modern" than other respondents. Javanese, Sumatran, and (particularly) Minangkabau women were significantly less likely to report keeping money than the reference group. Balinese women and women from the outer islands (West Nusa Tenggara, Sulawesi, and Kalimantan) were indistinguishable from the reference group. The results for men were not very different, although the coefficients were somewhat smaller in magnitude. Urban residence increased the chance that women and that men retained part of their income. These results are consistent with the focus groups, which suggested that retaining private savings was more common among better-off urban residents.

Increasing levels of education for both the woman and her husband increased the chance that she reported keeping part of her income, but only the man's education affected the chance that he kept some of his income. As the age of her husband rose, a woman was less likely to keep part of her income, while her age was positively related to the chance that she retained some of her income. Older men were less likely than younger men to reserve some of their income.

The perceptions of the husband with respect to his family's economic status were not associated with whether his wife kept part of her income, but when she perceived that

his family was of higher status than hers, she was less likely to report retaining some of her income. Her perceptions were also a significant predictor of whether he kept income.

The third and fourth columns of Table 2 report the results for whether men and women felt free to spend their income on household items. Both Javanese and Balinese women were much less likely than women in the "other/urban" category to report that they felt free to spend their income on household goods, while Sumatran women and women on other outer islands were more likely to report feeling free. The relationship between ethnicity and freedom to spend money differed for men. Except for the Balinese, all other ethnic groups of men were more likely than their "other/urban" counterparts to feel free to spend their money.

Neither the wife's nor her husband's education affected either's feelings of freedom with respect to expenditures. Rising age of the wife, however, had a deterrent effect on men feeling free to spend money.

As with whether women keep money, when women perceived their husbands as from higher status backgrounds, they felt less freedom to spend money.

The fifth and sixth columns of Table 2 report whether women and men felt comfortable taking money from their spouse's wallet or purse if they need money and their spouse is absent.

There were no differences between the reference category and Javanese and Sumatran men and women. Minangkabau women and men, however, were much less likely to feel comfortable using their spouse's money. Balinese women and "outer island" men, however, were much more likely to feel comfortable using their spouse's money.

Years of education (either own or spouse's) were not related to whether respondents felt comfortable taking money, but women were less likely to feel comfortable when their husbands were older, and when they perceived that their husbands were from higher status backgrounds.

All of the dependent variables in this table measured perceptions related to income-sharing and income-pooling. It is clear from the results that perceptions varied significantly by ethnicity, as the ethnographic literature suggested it would, and by characteristics of husbands and wives that were related to their status in the household.

None of the interview dynamic variables affected whether men or women reported retaining income, but several of the interview dynamic variables do affect reports about freedom to spend money and about degree of comfort in using money. It is important to point out that the interview variables were not necessary distributed randomly across households. It is possible that interview dynamics are correlated with power in the household. Moreover, the relationship between the reported behaviors and characteristics of the interviews may reflect more than simply an effect of interview dynamics on the propensity to report certain things. Note that whether a woman's spouse is present at her interview is related not only to her report that she feels free to spend money, but also to her husband's report. If the presence of a spouse is related only to reporting propensity, then there should be no effect of dynamics of the woman's interview on the male's reports of behavior.

SPHERES OF INFLUENCE AND POWER

The literature has discussed in detail the different roles that men and women play in the household as well as in the broader economy. The implications of these "spheres of interest" for models of household behavior have been drawn out in, for example, Lundberg and Pollak (1993). In an effort to pry open the "black box" of the household, each respondent was asked to describe who he or she perceived was the primary decisionmaker for a series of different household activities. For example, say it has been argued (in a particular context) that women who have more control over resources allocate more to food expenditures and that a reduced form regression shows that food shares are higher as women have more "power." It should be the case that women have more say in budget allocations (to food) in those households in which they have more power. Our goal is to assess whether this is true.

Table 3 provides the joint distribution of decisionmaking regarding expenditures on food at home as reported by husbands and their wives.

Comparing the marginal distributions, one is immediately struck by the similarity of the distributions, which might lead one to conclude that there is a very high degree of concordance in the reports of husbands and their wives. Inspection of the joint distribution demonstrates that this conclusion would be premature. In fact, fully 25 percent of the couples did not report the same decisionmaker(s). While we do not analyze

them here, these discrepancies may provide insights into the extent of conflict in power-relations within the households.[4]

These results are presented again in the first line of Table 4. The first panel displays the male's report; female reports are in the second panel. The percentage of couples that report the same decisionmaker(s) is the third panel and the diagonal elements of Table 3 (the distribution of the "consistent" cases) is reported in the final panel. For example, both husband and wife reported that the wife makes decisions about food in 65 percent of cases.

The most striking result in Table 4 is the heterogeneity in decisionmaking among respondents. While managing household expenses (on food and routine items) is largely the wife's domain, in around 20 percent of households, the husband either takes charge or plays a role in the decision. At the other extreme, the decision to use contraceptives is largely a joint decision—over three-quarters of respondents report making the decision in collaboration with their spouse. And, if the decision is not joint, it is usually a woman's choice. Between these extremes, there is a spectrum of distribution of decisionmakers. For example, whereas the man plays little role in decisions about his wife's or children's clothing, the reverse is not true when it comes to his own clothes: his wife is a decisionmaker in about one-third of households. Time spent working is primarily a joint decision, but time spent socializing is an individual's choice in almost half the households. While routine expenditures, gifts, and spending on *arisan* are all a woman's

[4] It should be noted, however, that discordance does not necessarily indicate conflict—it may be that two individuals simply have different perceptions as to who makes decisions about certain topics.

domain, larger expenditure and savings decisions are less so. Males play a particularly key role in decisions about expenditures on durables.

Family structures in Indonesia are very complex: there are a substantial number of multigenerational households as well as many extended households. Yet, very few couples report that they do not play a primary role in decisions in the domains that we asked about. The exceptions are investments in children (particularly clothing) as well as durable expenditures (which are likely to involve investments by other family members, some of whom may not be co-resident).

Table 4 shows that many households do appear to behave as if there are spheres of influence that differ for men and women. That tells us nothing about whether the unitary model of the household is appropriate, for it may be efficient for couples to invest in different spheres. If, however, measures of power do affect the choice of decisionmaker, then we would need to turn to more complex models of the household to understand behavior.

We address this question in Tables 5a-5e, which present regressions of the determinants of who is reported to be the prime decisionmaker for five spheres of interest: expenditures on food, expenditures on child education, provision of health care for children, durable purchases, and the decision to use contraceptives.

In each case, multinomial logit regression estimates are displayed for the male's reports (in the first panel) and the female's reports (in the second panel). In each panel, the first two columns record the impact of the covariate on the probability that the decision is individualistic relative to the decision being joint. The difference between the

two columns, that is, the impact on the probability on the wife making the decision, relative to the husband, is in the third column. We leave for future work analysis of the differences between male and female reports and focus here on the main results in the tables.

The first set of covariates is a set of ethnicity indicator variables. These controls are not only of interest by themselves, but they also provide some cross-validation of the survey responses with anthropological evidence. For all decisions except use of contraceptives, the excluded group (modern or nontraditional groups) was the most likely to be individualistic in their decisionmaking.

Among the Balinese, it is common to make decisions jointly. Relative to women of other ethnicities, however, Balinese women stand out as being particularly unlikely to report that they make decisions on their own, regardless of what the decision is. Balinese men, on the other hand, do not stand out as being particularly unlikely to report that they make decisions on their own. Thus, among the Balinese, the pattern of reporting differs by gender. For couples that are Sumatran but not Minang, husbands and wives tend to agree that women do not decide on their own about expenditures on food and durables. Thus, for the two groups that are patrilineal, it is particularly unlikely to observe that women report themselves as making decisions on their own.

The matrilineal Minang are a group for whom both males and females report that joint decisionmaking is common. But males are more likely than females to report that females do not make decisions on their own, particularly with respect to expenditures on food and education. The one behavior for which Minang men and women agree that

decisionmaking is not joint (and is in the hands of women) is contraceptive use. Additionally, Minangkabau women (and women from other parts of Sumatra) are no different from “nontraditional women” in the probability of reporting that they make these decisions alone. With respect to contraceptive decisionmaking among other groups, if the decision is not made jointly, then it is more likely to be in the woman’s domain among the Balinese and Javanese.

The Javanese are more likely to make decisions jointly than is the reference category, but they are not as likely to make decisions jointly as the Balinese and Minangkabau. Among the Javanese, both men and women report that decisions are made jointly. Large differences in reporting patterns by gender do not emerge.

The age and education of both husband and wife are included in the second set of covariates. Controlling for husband education, the wife's education can be interpreted as relative education (or a measure of relative power). Most men are better educated than their wives: holding his education constant, an increase in his education implies a reduction in the gap. For example, in Table 5a according to the wives' reports, an increase in her own education reduces the probability her husband will make decisions about food expenditures, relative to the decision being joint (first column of second panel), and will increase the probability she makes the decisions relative to him making them (third column of second panel). This pattern holds for all decisions—expenditures on child education, child health, durables, and perhaps, for contraceptive use—but for one anomalous result: as the wife's education increases, she is more likely to make decisions about child health jointly with her husband.

A key strength of the IFLS is the array of indicators of power that are collected. These include income, individual non-labor income, and assets as well as assets at marriage, all of which were collected in IFLS1 and were repeated in IFLS2. These have been (and will be) exploited elsewhere (see, for example, Thomas, Contreras, and Frankenberg 1996; Beegle, Frankenberg, and Thomas 1998). We focus here on a set of indicators that are new in IFLS2.

A legitimate concern with collecting retrospective information on assets brought to marriage is measurement error. The error may take several forms. Apart from random error, there may be a tendency for a respondent to either hide resources or inflate their status. Moreover, there is likely to be recall bias in both values and the date of marriage. Finally, it is difficult for respondents to report the real value of the assets in current rupiah but, as time since marriage increases, there may be a tendency to inflate the value because it seems low now. This seriously complicates use of the measure. Furthermore, one's relative position in a marriage may not only be a function of the physical assets brought to the marriage but also the support one may rely on from outside the marriage.

With these issues in mind, each respondent was asked to rate his or her background at the time of marriage relative to his or her spouse on a five point scale (1 = much higher, 2 = somewhat higher, 3 = about the same, 4 = somewhat lower, 5 = much lower). Status was defined over several different domains (father's job, father's education, mother's education, family assets, etc.); we use the most general: the status of the family relative to that of the spouse. The regressions include an indicator for those men who reported their families were of higher status and an indicator for those women

who reported their husbands were from a higher status family. Both indicators should, therefore, identify more powerful men in the household.

Men from higher status families were more likely to make decisions about the health of their children, expenditures on the education of their children, on durable expenditures, and on the couples' decision to use contraceptives. This evidence is suggestive that these measures of power are capturing something important in households and that they do affect decisionmaking.

There are, however, two anomalous results. Women who reported themselves as being married to higher status men were more likely to also report that they made decisions about child health. Recall that a counter-intuitive pattern also emerged for education: better educated women were less likely to be making decisions about child health alone. This suggests that better educated women and those married to higher status husbands are inclined to make child health care decisions jointly with their husbands. Women married to higher status men are more likely to make contraception decisions alone.

On balance, the results for this first set of measures of power within the household are not conclusive. At the very least, they do indicate that there are subtleties across households in how decisions are made, and they do provide some suggestions of how to model these differences.

The final set of covariates refers to the conditions of the interview and, in particular, whether the interview was conducted with the spouse present or alone (the excluded category being interviews with other people present). There is some evidence

that these controls do affect the answers given by respondents. At a superficial level, the controls should have no effect on behavior within the household and thus only reflect reporting error. That, however, presumes the allocation of respondents to each interview type is random—which is not the case, since it is a choice of the respondent—and that there is no communication about the survey among the respondents after the interviewer has gone—which is unlikely to be true. Moreover, if the controls capture only interview conditions, the presence of the respondent at the spouse's interview should have no effect on one's own answer. That hypothesis is clearly rejected with these data. These results suggest that collecting information about couples in household surveys on an individual basis may prove to be quite difficult in practice.

In addition to the tests of significance reported in the tables, we have tested for the joint significance of variables included in our various categories of predictors (Table 6). Taking covariates in groups, ethnicity is a powerful predictor of decisionmaking. It is significant in all the regressions. Social status indicators of the husband and wife are jointly significant in the domains of food, durables, and contraception; education of the respondents is significant in the child education, child health, and durables domains. In view of the importance of ethnic differences, we have also explored interactions between ethnicity and the relative status of the husband and wife; no clear patterns emerge, with few of the interactions being significant.

It is possible that whether a respondent was interviewed alone is a function of their own social status relative to that of their spouse. This would potentially contaminate

our tests. We have, therefore, tested this hypothesis and find that the interview conditions are unrelated to the social status indicators.

4. CONCLUSIONS

This paper has demonstrated that a combination of qualitative and quantitative approaches to studying the dynamics of power in the household can enrich our understanding of intrahousehold decisionmaking. Moreover, the paper demonstrates the feasibility of including in household surveys explicit questions on the management of household finances and on patterns of decisionmaking. Administering these questions both to husbands and wives provides a richer set of information than asking them of only one partner, although, in practice, it is difficult to completely isolate the spouses from one another during the interviews.

In this paper, we have focused on a nonfinancial measure of power: the relative status of families of husbands and wives at the time of marriage. This measure does affect couples' financial arrangements and patterns of decisionmaking, which suggests the potential value of developing additional, non-economic measures of power within the household.

The topic of power in the household, how to measure it, and how to capture its effects on decisionmaking, resource allocation, and outcomes, is complex. If the models of household behavior that theorists put forth are to be tested empirically, it is imperative

that surveys make increasingly sophisticated efforts to collect data that will be up to the task.

TABLES

Table 1—Perceptions of income sharing and income-pooling

		Percent that answer yes to questions		
		Females		Males
			Joint distribution	
1. Apart from money you use for household expenses, is there any part of your income that you set aside that you can spend without consulting your spouse?				
All respondents		21.2		16.3
		(0.8)		(0.5)
Couples (both spouses asked)		21.7		19.2
of whom	Both		7.8	
	Female only		13.9	
	Male only		11.4	
	Neither		66.9	
2. Are you free to spend the money you earn on household expenses?				
All respondents		53.3		43.3
		(1.0)		(0.7)
Couples (both spouses asked)		53.1		43.0
of whom	Both		27.5	
	Female only		25.6	
	Male only		15.5	
	Neither		31.4	
3. If you needed money and your spouse was not at home, would you feel comfortable taking money from your spouse's wallet/purse?				
Couples		17.6		18.6
		(0.5)		(0.5)
of whom	Both		6.8	
	Female only		10.8	
	Male only		11.8	
	Neither		70.6	

Notes: The first two questions are asked only of respondents who earn income. The third question is asked of all respondents. Standard errors are in parentheses.

Table 2—Perceptions of income-sharing and income-pooling Probit regression estimates

Covariates	Keeps own money		Free to spend money		Comfortable taking money	
	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Ethnicity: (1) if Javanese	-0.293*	-0.202*	-0.224*	0.158*	0.017	-0.074
	(2.60)	(2.75)	(2.10)	(2.36)	(0.23)	(1.05)
Sumatran	-0.357*	-0.344*	0.257+	0.498*	-0.003	-0.015
	(2.33)	(3.31)	(1.80)	(5.64)	(0.04)	(0.17)
Minangkabau	-0.654*	-0.533*	-0.002	0.286*	-0.419*	-0.850*
	(3.63)	(3.82)	(0.02)	(2.67)	(2.98)	(5.28)
Balinese	-0.056	0.160	-0.413*	-0.094	0.213+	-0.111
	(0.38)	(1.44)	(2.97)	(0.93)	(1.93)	(0.99)
Outer Isl	-0.205	0.031	0.285*	0.274*	0.105	0.150+
	(1.54)	(0.35)	(2.26)	(3.49)	(1.20)	(1.80)
(1) urban household	0.167*	0.219*	-0.048	-0.163*	-0.116*	-0.063
	(2.53)	(4.48)	(0.84)	(4.02)	(2.51)	(1.38)
Years of education						
Male	0.025*	0.044*	0.008	0.000	0.008	0.004
	(2.46)	(5.76)	(0.85)	(0.06)	(1.06)	(0.54)
Female	0.030*	-0.002	-0.008	-0.010	-0.009	0.000
	(2.68)	(0.41)	(0.94)	(1.63)	(1.34)	(0.03)
Age						
Male	-0.012*	-0.007+	0.000	0.001	0.007+	0.004
	(2.25)	(1.95)	(0.02)	(0.17)	(1.90)	(1.03)
Female	0.014*	0.002	0.001	-0.009*	-0.004	-0.002
	(2.24)	(0.50)	(0.14)	(2.75)	(1.31)	(0.87)
(1) male is head	0.048	0.023	-0.055	0.168*	0.137+	0.020
	(0.44)	(0.33)	(0.58)	(2.71)	(1.91)	(0.30)
(1) if male's family higher social status						
According to male	0.068	0.075	-0.113	-0.046	0.018	0.100+
	(0.79)	(1.23)	(1.46)	(0.89)	(0.29)	(1.73)
According to female	-0.227*	-0.168*	-0.163*	-0.037	-0.112+	0.015
	(2.61)	(2.55)	(1.99)	(0.66)	(1.72)	(0.23)
Interview characteristics						
(1) spouse at male interview	0.102	0.033	0.008	0.110*	0.021	0.076
	(1.25)	(0.56)	(0.12)	(2.27)	(0.38)	(1.40)
(1) male interview alone	-0.002	-0.059	0.090	0.026	0.044	0.008
	(0.03)	(0.86)	(1.12)	(0.45)	(0.67)	(0.12)
(1) spouse at female interview	-0.096	-0.029	0.152*	0.137*	0.139*	0.057
	(1.30)	(0.58)	(2.34)	(3.15)	(2.79)	(1.18)
(1) female interviewed alonel	0.056	-0.066	0.137+	0.108*	0.102+	-0.015
	(0.67)	(1.05)	(1.84)	(2.05)	(1.69)	(0.27)
Intercept	-0.844*	-0.825*	0.265	-0.130	-1.140*	-0.983*
	(3.84)	(5.65)	(1.34)	(1.04)	(7.92)	(7.08)
Likelihood	-1,127.768	-2,052.686	-1,556.902	-3,250.464	-2,350.710	-2,439.508
Chi square	139.710	210.610	79.550	141.970	66.440	76.290

Notes: Asymptotic t-statistics in parentheses. 5,186 couples are included in sample. 2,310 female and 4,855 male respondents who report having their own income are included in columns 1-4; all respondents are included in columns 5 and 6.

Table 3—Spheres of control: Distribution of reported decisionmaker regarding expenditures on food at home, by couples

Comparing consistency of male and female reports of expenditures on food at home

		Female reports decisionmaker is				
		Male	**Female**	**Joint**	**Other**	**Marginal**
Male reports decisionmaker is	**Male**	**1.2** *20.4* 20.2	**4.1** *67.4* 5.3	**0.7** *11.3* 5.0	**0.1** *0.9* 1.7	**6.1**
	Female	**4.3** *5.6* 70.4	**65.3** *84.8* 84.8	**6.4** *8.2* 46.4	**1.1** *1.4* 33.1	**77.0**
	Joint	**0.6** *3.8* 9.0	**7.3** *50.0* 9.5	**6.6** *45.1* 48.1	**0.2** *1.1* 5.0	**14.6**
	Other	**0.0** *1.1* 0.4	**0.3** *14.4* 0.4	**0.1** *3.3* 0.6	**1.9** *81.1* 60.3	**2.4**
	Marginal	6.1	77.0	13.7	3.2	100.0

Notes: 3,798 couples. First element of each panel is joint density (bold), second is row marginal (italics), third is column marginal.

Table 4—Spheres of control: Distribution of reported decisionmaker within couples

	Male's report				Female's report					Both report		
Decisionmaker is	**Male**	**Female**	**Joint**	**Other**	**Male**	**Female**	**Joint**	**Other**	**Consistent**	**Male**	**Female**	**Joint**
Food at home	6.1	77.0	14.6	2.4	6.1	77.0	13.7	3.2	75.0	1.2	65.3	6.6
	(0.4)	(0.7)	(0.6)	(0.2)	(0.4)	(0.7)	(0.6)	(0.3)	(0.7)	(0.2)	(0.8)	(0.4)
Routine household purchases	5.8	77.2	14.4	2.6	6.2	74.7	15.4	3.8	73.2	1.1	63.4	6.9
	(0.4)	(0.7)	(0.6)	(0.3)	(0.4)	(0.7)	(0.6)	(0.3)	(0.7)	(0.2)	(0.8)	(0.4)
Male's clothes	30.8	29.2	36.5	3.6	26.8	30.6	38.8	3.8	52.9	13.7	14.5	22.7
	(0.7)	(0.7)	(0.8)	(0.3)	(0.7)	(0.7)	(0.8)	(0.3)	(0.8)	(0.6)	(0.6)	(0.7)
Female's clothes	9.5	53.5	34.2	2.8	10.8	53.1	32.3	3.8	57.9	2.0	35.2	19.0
	(0.5)	(0.8)	(0.8)	(0.3)	(0.5)	(0.8)	(0.8)	(0.3)	(0.8)	(0.2)	(0.8)	(0.6)
Children's clothes	7.6	34.5	45.7	12.2	7.3	33.0	46.0	13.7	60.6	2.1	19.2	30.2
	(0.4)	(0.8)	(0.8)	(0.5)	(0.4)	(0.8)	(0.8)	(0.6)	(0.8)	(0.2)	(0.7)	(0.8)
Child education	14.0	12.9	67.3	5.7	10.8	14.1	68.4	6.7	67.5	4.5	5.2	53.2
	(0.6)	(0.6)	(0.8)	(0.4)	(0.5)	(0.6)	(0.8)	(0.4)	(0.8)	(0.3)	(0.4)	(0.8)
Child health	10.4	15.1	69.9	4.5	7.1	17.3	70.4	5.2	69.7	2.8	6.5	56.8
	(0.5)	(0.6)	(0.8)	(0.3)	(0.4)	(0.6)	(0.8)	(0.4)	(0.8)	(0.3)	(0.4)	(0.8)
Expenditure on durables	18.8	6.8	65.3	9.1	18.0	7.2	64.5	10.2	66.6	7.9	2.0	50.2
	(0.6)	(0.4)	(0.8)	(0.5)	(0.6)	(0.4)	(0.8)	(0.5)	(0.8)	(0.4)	(0.2)	(0.8)
Money to male's parents	12.6	8.0	78.8	0.6	9.3	9.6	80.5	0.5	71.8	2.7	2.5	60.5
	(0.6)	(0.5)	(0.8)	(0.1)	(0.5)	(0.6)	(0.7)	(0.1)	(0.8)	(0.3)	(0.3)	(0.9)
Money to female's parents	7.9	12.6	79.2	0.3	7.4	13.6	78.6	0.5	71.4	2.0	3.9	60.5
	(0.5)	(0.6)	(0.7)	(0.1)	(0.5)	(0.6)	(0.8)	(0.1)	(0.8)	(0.3)	(0.4)	(0.9)
Gifts (e.g., weddings)	8.2	22.4	67.9	1.5	6.2	25.3	66.7	1.8	65.4	1.7	11.0	51.9
	(0.4)	(0.7)	(0.8)	(0.2)	(0.4)	(0.7)	(0.8)	(0.2)	(0.8)	(0.2)	(0.5)	(0.8)
Arisan (savings club)	10.1	36.4	51.8	1.7	7.0	43.9	47.2	1.9	73.8	1.9	21.4	30.9
	(0.7)	(1.1)	(1.1)	(0.3)	(0.6)	(1.1)	(1.1)	(0.3)	(0.7)	(0.3)	(0.9)	(1.0)
Savings	17.7	17.8	61.0	3.5	12.2	24.8	59.4	3.6	77.8	4.8	6.4	34.6
	(1.0)	(1.0)	(1.3)	(0.5)	(0.9)	(1.1)	(1.3)	(0.5)	(0.7)	(0.6)	(0.6)	(1.3)
Male time->social	49.1	4.6	46.1	0.2	44.6	9.1	45.9	0.4	61.9	29.7	0.8	31.2
	(0.8)	(0.3)	(0.8)	(0.1)	(0.8)	(0.5)	(0.8)	(0.1)	(0.8)	(0.7)	(0.1)	(0.8)
Female time->social	8.2	42.7	48.8	0.3	9.2	41.6	48.7	0.4	61.4	1.5	25.7	34.0
	(0.4)	(0.8)	(0.8)	(0.1)	(0.5)	(0.8)	(0.8)	(0.1)	(0.8)	(0.2)	(0.7)	(0.8)
Time spent working	26.8	3.9	68.2	1.1	22.9	8.2	68.0	0.8	69.6	12.8	1.2	55.1
	(0.7)	(0.3)	(0.8)	(0.2)	(0.7)	(0.4)	(0.8)	(0.1)	(0.7)	(0.5)	(0.2)	(0.8)
Use contraception	5.8	17.9	76.0	0.3	5.5	18.2	75.8	0.5	78.6	1.0	7.4	58.8
	(0.5)	(0.8)	(0.9)	(0.1)	(0.5)	(0.8)	(0.9)	(0.1)	(0.7)	(0.2)	(0.5)	(1.0)

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.

Table 5a—Determinants of reported decisionmakers regarding expenditures on food at home

Decisionmaker is / Covariates	Male's report: Male	Male's report: Female relative to joint	Male's report: Female relative to male	Female's report: Male	Female's report: Female relative to joint	Female's report: Female relative to male
Ethnicity: (1) if						
Javanese	-0.622*	-0.316+	0.306	-0.064	-0.357+	-0.292
	(2.20)	(1.66)	(1.33)	(0.21)	(1.87)	(1.12)
Sumatran	-0.517	-1.016*	-0.499+	-0.344	-0.950*	-0.605+
	(1.57)	(4.62)	(1.81)	(0.93)	(4.29)	(1.89)
Minangkabau	-0.701+	-1.721*	-1.019*	-1.374*	-1.717*	-0.343
	(1.90)	(6.96)	(3.12)	(2.76)	(7.07)	(0.74)
Balinese	-2.399*	-1.031*	1.368*	-1.717*	-1.211*	0.505
	(4.09)	(4.31)	(2.47)	(3.27)	(5.11)	(1.03)
Outer islands	-0.448	-0.073	0.376	0.420	-0.016	-0.436
	(1.26)	(0.32)	(1.27)	(1.15)	(0.07)	(1.44)
(1) urban household	0.209	0.137	-0.071	0.364*	0.062	-0.302+
	(1.19)	(1.34)	(0.46)	(2.06)	(0.60)	(1.94)
Years of education						
Male	0.022	0.003	-0.018	0.004	-0.002	-0.006
	(0.80)	(0.18)	(0.78)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.25)
Female	-0.034	-0.014	0.020	-0.067*	-0.000	0.067*
	(1.16)	(0.82)	(0.76)	(2.18)	(0.05)	(2.41)
Age						
Male	0.010	-0.010	-0.020+	-0.011	-0.015*	-0.003
	(0.80)	(1.39)	(1.86)	(0.92)	(2.10)	(0.33)
Female	-0.023+	0.003	0.027*	-0.011	0.001	0.012
	(1.71)	(0.38)	(2.18)	(0.79)	(0.11)	(0.96)
(1) male is head	1.107*	0.824*	-0.282	1.146*	1.021*	-0.125
	(2.83)	(4.86)	(0.75)	(3.08)	(6.10)	(0.35)
(1) if male's family higher social status						
According to male	0.028	-0.241+	-0.269	0.083	-0.014	-0.096
	(0.13)	(1.81)	(1.38)	(0.35)	(0.10)	(0.47)
According to female	-0.338	0.301+	0.639*	-0.091	0.103	0.195
	(1.07)	(1.85)	(2.23)	(0.32)	(0.66)	(0.76)
Interview characteristics						
(1) spouse at male interview	0.167	0.226+	0.059	0.149	0.421*	0.272
	(0.82)	(1.93)	(0.32)	(0.75)	(3.65)	(1.54)
(1) spouse at female interview	-0.101	0.102	0.203	-0.056	0.066	0.123
	(0.55)	(0.92)	(1.26)	(0.30)	(0.59)	(0.74)
(1) male interview alone	0.274	0.117	-0.156	-0.028	0.344*	0.373+
	(1.14)	(0.85)	(0.73)	(0.12)	(2.53)	(1.69)
(1) female interview alone	-0.357	0.160	0.517*	-0.069	-0.030	0.039
	(1.48)	(1.22)	(2.38)	(0.30)	(0.24)	(0.19)
Intercept	-0.949	1.408*	2.358*	-0.686	1.502*	2.189*
	(1.59)	(4.28)	(4.35)	(1.15)	(4.58)	(4.06)
Likelihood		-2,333.198			-2,323.241	
Chi square		199.600			212.940	

Notes: Mulitinomial logit regression estimates. Asymptotic t statistics in parentheses.

Table 5b—Determinants of reported decisionmakers regarding expenditures on child education

Decisionmaker is / Covariates	Male's report: Male	Male's report: Female relative to joint	Male's report: Female relative to male	Female's report: Male	Female's report: Female relative to joint	Female's report: Female relative to male
Ethnicity: (1) if						
Javanese	-0.661*	-0.644*	0.017	-0.315+	-0.449*	-0.133
	(4.13)	(3.86)	(0.08)	(1.73)	(2.85)	(0.62)
Sumatran	-1.087*	-0.767*	0.320	-0.795*	-0.913*	-0.118
	(4.51)	(3.33)	(1.04)	(3.01)	(3.94)	(0.36)
Minangkabau	-1.242*	-2.444*	-1.202*	-1.942*	-1.334*	0.608
	(3.79)	(4.60)	(1.99)	(3.62)	(3.84)	(0.98)
Balinese	-0.861*	-0.944*	-0.083	-0.317	-2.533*	-2.215*
	(3.44)	(3.45)	(0.25)	(1.21)	(5.29)	(4.21)
Outer islands	-0.458*	-0.514*	-0.056	-0.582*	-0.464*	0.118
	(2.29)	(2.41)	(0.22)	(2.42)	(2.33)	(0.42)
(1) urban household	0.069	0.083	0.015	0.092	0.182	0.091
	(0.60)	(0.69)	(0.10)	(0.72)	(1.59)	(0.57)
Years of education						
Male	0.030+	-0.071*	-0.101*	0.024	-0.031+	-0.055*
	(1.69)	(3.79)	(4.27)	(1.25)	(1.77)	(2.28)
Female	-0.073*	0.036+	0.110*	-0.061*	-0.018	0.043
	(3.75)	(1.72)	(4.16)	(2.79)	(0.93)	(1.57)
Age						
Male	0.013	0.012	-0.001	-0.002	0.012	0.014
	(1.55)	(1.29)	(0.13)	(0.24)	(1.40)	(1.19)
Female	-0.018*	-0.024*	-0.006	-0.004	-0.025*	-0.020
	(1.98)	(2.49)	(0.52)	(0.43)	(2.72)	(1.58)
(1) male is head	-0.306	0.707*	1.013*	-0.029	0.099	0.128
	(1.48)	(2.27)	(2.90)	(0.12)	(0.42)	(0.41)
(1) if male's family higher social status						
According to male	0.084	-0.069	-0.154	0.043	-0.049	-0.092
	(0.59)	(0.44)	(0.79)	(0.27)	(0.33)	(0.45)
According to female	-0.056	-0.286+	-0.229	-0.282	-0.431*	-0.148
	(0.33)	(1.74)	(1.07)	(1.57)	(2.79)	(0.69)
Interview characteristics						
(1) spouse at male interview	-0.184	0.176	0.360+	0.006	-0.113	-0.119
	(1.39)	(1.19)	(1.97)	(0.04)	(0.85)	(0.64)
(1) spouse at female interview	-0.067	-0.147	-0.080	-0.178	0.118	0.296+
	(0.55)	(1.15)	(0.50)	(1.31)	(0.96)	(1.75)
(1) male interview alone	0.182	0.334+	0.152	-0.032	-0.072	-0.039
	(1.20)	(1.96)	(0.73)	(0.19)	(0.45)	(0.18)
(1) female interview alone	0.007	0.147	0.141	-0.033	0.168	0.201
	(0.04)	(0.99)	(0.74)	(0.21)	(1.12)	(1.00)
Intercept	-0.333	-0.994*	-0.660	-0.775+	-0.164	0.611
	(0.88)	(2.20)	(1.22)	(1.81)	(0.43)	(1.16)
Likelihood		-2,483.389			-2,375.682	
Chi square		147.420			137.520	

Notes: Sample contains 3,357 couples. Mulitinomial logit regression estimates. Asymptotic t statistics in parentheses.

Table 5c—Determinants of reported decisionmakers regarding use of health care for children

Decisionmaker is / Covariates	Male's report: Male	Male's report: Female relative to joint	Male's report: Female relative to male	Female's report: Male	Female's report: Female relative to joint	Female's report: Female relative to male
Ethnicity: (1) if						
Javanese	-0.699*	-0.581*	0.118	-0.380+	-0.576*	-0.195
	(4.09)	(3.78)	(0.58)	(1.80)	(4.11)	(0.85)
Sumatran	-1.226*	-0.901*	0.325	-1.122*	-1.213*	-0.090
	(4.55)	(4.11)	(1.01)	(3.42)	(5.61)	(0.25)
Minangkabau	-1.510*	-1.890*	-0.379	-2.001*	-2.015*	-0.014
	(3.80)	(4.83)	(0.71)	(3.24)	(5.21)	(0.02)
Balinese	-1.410*	-0.952*	0.459	-1.262*	-2.664*	-1.402*
	(4.34)	(3.79)	(1.20)	(3.26)	(6.51)	(2.58)
Outer islands	-0.511*	-0.538*	-0.026	-0.549*	-0.628*	-0.078
	(2.40)	(2.74)	(0.10)	(2.01)	(3.49)	(0.26)
(1) Urban household	0.263*	0.238*	-0.025	0.066	0.387*	0.321+
	(2.06)	(2.17)	(0.16)	(0.43)	(3.70)	(1.86)
Years of education						
Male	-0.000	-0.046*	-0.046+	-0.000	-0.015	-0.015
	(0.01)	(2.71)	(1.93)	(0.00)	(0.98)	(0.60)
Female	-0.041+	0.015	0.057*	-0.024	-0.045*	-0.021
	(1.91)	(0.79)	(2.13)	(0.92)	(2.51)	(0.73)
Age						
Male	0.012	0.009	-0.002	-0.002	0.015*	0.018
	(1.25)	(1.12)	(0.21)	(0.20)	(2.01)	(1.37)
Female	-0.018+	-0.026*	-0.007	-0.002	-0.029*	-0.026+
	(1.79)	(2.87)	(0.62)	(0.20)	(3.47)	(1.89)
(1) male is head	-0.109	0.241	0.350	-0.010	0.096	0.106
	(0.45)	(1.04)	(1.13)	(0.04)	(0.45)	(0.32)
(1) if male's family higher social status						
According to male	0.308*	-0.103	-0.412*	0.172	0.005	-0.166
	(2.03)	(0.70)	(2.14)	(0.92)	(0.04)	(0.78)
According to female	0.144	0.130	-0.014	0.287	0.412*	0.125
	(0.79)	(0.83)	(0.07)	(1.36)	(2.86)	(0.53)
Interview characteristics						
(1) spouse at male interview	-0.140	0.049	0.189	0.222	0.062	-0.159
	(0.94)	(0.37)	(1.03)	(1.19)	(0.50)	(0.76)
(1) spouse at female interview	0.030	-0.097	-0.127	-0.027	0.048	0.075
	(0.22)	(0.83)	(0.77)	(0.17)	(0.43)	(0.41)
(1) male interview alone	0.173	0.206	0.033	0.261	0.005	-0.255
	(1.00)	(1.36)	(0.16)	(1.21)	(0.03)	(1.05)
(1) female interview alone	-0.077	0.140	0.217	0.005	0.200	0.194
	(0.47)	(1.03)	(1.10)	(0.03)	(1.48)	(0.88)
Intercept	-0.894*	-0.539	0.355	-1.750*	-0.399	1.351*
	(2.27)	(1.51)	(0.73)	(3.69)	(1.22)	(2.53)
Likelihood		-2,474.230			-2,325.791	
Chi square		140.180			201.510	

Notes: Sample contains 3,443 couples. Mulitinomial logit regression estimates. Asymptotic t statistics in parentheses.

Table 5d—Determinants of reported decisionmakers regarding expenditures on durables

Decisionmaker is / Covariates	Male's report: Male	Male's report: Female relative to joint	Male's report: Female relative to male	Female's report: Male	Female's report: Female relative to joint	Female's report: Female relative to male
Ethnicity: (1) if						
Javanese	-0.706*	-0.727*	-0.020	-0.763*	-0.888*	-0.125
	(5.01)	(3.57)	(0.09)	(5.30)	(4.74)	(0.60)
Sumatran	-0.335+	-1.121*	-0.786*	-0.473*	-1.671*	-1.197*
	(1.86)	(3.40)	(2.23)	(2.53)	(4.91)	(3.28)
Minangkabau	-1.010*	-1.489*	-0.478	-1.631*	-2.015*	-0.383
	(3.81)	(3.25)	(0.95)	(4.96)	(4.13)	(0.68)
Balinese	-0.458*	-1.098*	-0.640+	-0.190	-3.871*	-3.680*
	(2.20)	(3.05)	(1.65)	(0.94)	(3.79)	(3.57)
Outer islands	-0.908*	-0.434+	0.475	-0.771*	-1.282*	-0.511+
	(4.81)	(1.71)	(1.64)	(4.17)	(4.67)	(1.67)
(1) Urban household	-0.009	0.322*	0.331+	0.081	0.084	0.004
	(0.10)	(2.10)	(1.94)	(0.80)	(0.55)	(0.02)
Years of education						
Male	0.011	-0.018	-0.029	0.011	0.006	-0.005
	(0.73)	(0.77)	(1.11)	(0.71)	(0.24)	(0.20)
Female	-0.050*	0.001	0.052+	-0.057*	-0.027	0.029
	(2.99)	(0.05)	(1.77)	(3.30)	(1.08)	(1.01)
Age						
Male	-0.004	0.005	0.009	-0.007	0.001	0.008
	(0.57)	(0.41)	(0.70)	(0.96)	(0.07)	(0.65)
Female	-0.008	0.005	0.013	-0.007	0.013	0.020
	(1.05)	(0.40)	(0.98)	(0.87)	(1.14)	(1.53)
(1) Male is head	-0.009	0.309	0.318	-0.135	-0.321	-0.186
	(0.05)	(0.91)	(0.87)	(0.71)	(1.18)	(0.60)
(1) If male's family higher social status						
According to male	0.359*	-0.025	-0.383+	0.213+	-0.224	-0.437+
	(2.96)	(0.12)	(1.72)	(1.70)	(1.06)	(1.90)
According to female	-0.127	-0.118	0.010	-0.050	-0.509*	-0.459*
	(0.90)	(0.54)	(0.04)	(0.34)	(2.63)	(2.04)
Interview characteris tics						
(1) Spouse at male interview	-0.060	-0.261	-0.200	-0.000	0.058	0.058
	(0.53)	(1.45)	(1.00)	(0.01)	(0.31)	(0.29)
(1) Spouse at female interview	-0.112	-0.081	0.031	0.037	0.108	0.071
	(1.07)	(0.49)	(0.17)	(0.34)	(0.66)	(0.39)
(1) Male interview alone	-0.024	0.218	0.243	0.086	0.288	0.202
	(0.18)	(1.11)	(1.09)	(0.63)	(1.37)	(0.86)
(1) Female interview alone	0.037	0.169	0.132	-0.007	0.160	0.168
	(0.30)	(0.90)	(0.63)	(0.06)	(0.83)	(0.77)
Intercept	0.132	-2.327*	-2.459*	0.155	-1.344*	-1.499*
	(0.40)	(4.29)	(4.14)	(0.46)	(2.79)	(2.77)
Likelihood		-2,478.854			-2,429.908	
Chi square		119.190			178.710	

Notes: Sample contains 3,520 couples. Mulitinomial logit regression estimates. Asymptotic t statistics in parentheses.

Table 5e—Determinants of reported decisionmakers regarding use of contraceptives

Decisionmaker is / Covariates	Male's report: Male	Male's report: Female relative to joint	Male's report: Female relative to male	Female's report: Male	Female's report: Female relative to joint	Female's report: Female relative to male
Ethnicity: (1) if						
Javanese	-1.212*	-0.503*	0.709*	-0.518+	-0.391*	0.127
	[4.44]	[2.77]	[2.35]	[1.84]	[2.24]	[0.41]
Sumatran	-0.319	-0.037	0.282	-0.036	-0.380	-0.344
	[0.95]	[0.16]	[0.75]	[0.10]	[1.55]	[0.85]
Minangkabau	-1.258*	0.086	1.345*	-2.173*	0.141	2.314*
	[2.20]	[0.30]	[2.22]	[2.09]	[0.52]	[2.19]
Balinese	-2.461*	-0.681*	1.781*	-3.124*	-1.243*	1.881+
	[3.83]	[2.48]	[2.63]	[3.00]	[4.08]	[1.76]
Outer islands	-0.818*	-1.077*	-0.259	-0.006	-0.813*	-0.807*
	[2.35]	[3.93]	[0.63]	[0.02]	[3.12]	[2.01]
(1) Urban household	-0.312	0.102	0.414+	0.309	0.109	-0.199
	[1.46]	[0.81]	[1.76]	[1.43]	[0.87]	[0.85]
Years of education						
Male	-0.035	-0.019	0.016	0.004	-0.016	-0.020
	[1.14]	[1.05]	[0.46]	[0.13]	[0.85]	[0.58]
Female	-0.021	-0.020	0.001	-0.067+	-0.056*	0.011
	[0.61]	[0.97]	[0.02]	[1.86]	[2.66]	[0.27]
Age						
Male	0.013	0.013	0.000	-0.017	0.012	0.029
	[0.79]	[1.27]	[0.02]	[0.91]	[1.22]	[1.45]
Female	-0.009	-0.021+	-0.012	-0.009	-0.029*	-0.020
	[0.50]	[1.82]	[0.60]	[0.46]	[2.55]	[0.88]
(1) Male is head	-0.592+	0.191	0.784*	0.432	0.130	-0.302
	[1.86]	[0.75]	[2.07]	[0.96]	[0.54]	[0.62]
(1) if male's family higher social status						
According to male	0.543*	0.197	-0.345	0.369	0.294+	-0.074
	[2.33]	[1.27]	[1.33]	[1.52]	[1.94]	[0.28]
According to female	-0.215	0.298+	0.513	0.421	0.595*	0.174
	[0.67]	[1.80]	[1.49]	[1.50]	[3.67]	[0.58]
Interview characteristics						
(1) spouse at male interview	-0.365	0.243	0.609*	-0.369	0.175	0.544*
	[1.62]	[1.56]	[2.36]	[1.51]	[1.17]	[2.02]
(1) spouse at female interview	-0.410+	-0.033	0.377	-0.216	-0.226+	-0.009
	[1.87]	[0.25]	[1.55]	[0.94]	[1.68]	[0.04]
(1) male interview alone	-0.274	0.287	0.561+	-0.009	0.041	0.050
	[0.98]	[1.60]	[1.79]	[0.03]	[0.23]	[0.16]
(1) female interview alone	-0.371	-0.138	0.233	0.070	0.009	-0.061
	[1.39]	[0.87]	[0.79]	[0.27]	[0.06]	[0.22]
Intercept	-0.399	-0.984*	-0.585	-1.125+	-0.298	0.828
	[0.69]	[2.41]	[0.88]	[1.66]	[0.76]	[1.12]
Likelihood		-1,458.496			-1,435.542	
Chi square		96.490			117.130	

Notes: Sample contains 2,211 couples. Mulitinomial logit regression estimates. Asymptotic t statistics in parentheses.

Table 6—Joint tests of significance: F test statistics (p values in parentheses)

	Food	Education	Health	Durable	Contraception
Social status of husband and wife	12.50	4.50	5.95	10.43	9.83
	(0.01)	(0.34)	(0.20)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Education of husband and wife	1.77	31.54	14.63	13.94	8.16
	(0.77)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.86)
Ethnicity of couple	128.40	54.84	66.15	56.91	55.92
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)

APPENDIX

SECTION PK (HOUSEHOLD DECISIONMAKING)

(Source: Rand Corporation 1998)

PK00a.	Are you currently married?	Yes ..... 1 No 3	—> **NEXT SECTION**
PK00b.	Does your spouse live in this household now/in the past 6 months?	Yes ..... 1 No 3	—> **NEXT SECTION**
PK01.	Do you yourself receive money from working inside or outside the household, or from some other regular source? (Do not include money from your spouse.)	Yes ..... 1 No 3	—> **PK07**
PK02.	Are you free to spend this money for household expenses?	Yes, all HH expenses ..... 1 Yes, some HH expenses ..... 2 Yes, daily expenses ..... 3 No 5	
PK03.	Apart from money you spend for household expenses, is there any part of your income that you set aside which you can spend without consulting your spouse?	Yes ..... 1 No 3	—> **PK07**
PK04.	From this money, how much did you keep for personal use in the last month?	Rp.~~,~~~,~~~ ..... 1 DON'T KNOW 8	—> **PK07**
PK05.	About what percent did you keep?	~~~ ..... 1 DON'T KNOW 8	—> **PK07**
PK06.	Try to estimate the percentage that you kept.	Only a little (less than 10%) ..... 1 Some (approximately 25%) ..... 2 About half ..... 3 More than half 4	
PK07.	Does your spouse receive money from working inside or outside the household or from some other regular source? (Do not include money you give to your spouse.)	Yes ..... 1 No 3	—> **PK14**
PK07a.	Is your spouse free to spend some of that money for household expenses?	Yes, all HH expenses ..... 1 Yes, some HH expenses ..... 2 Yes, daily expenses ..... 3 No 5	
PK07b.	Apart from the money your spouse spends for household expenses, is there any part of your spouse's income that your spouse sets aside and can spend without consulting you?	No ..... 3 Yes 1	—> **PK12**
PK08.	From this money, how much did your spouse keep for personal use in the last month?	Rp.~~,~~~,~~~ ..... 1 DON'T KNOW 8	—> **PK12**

PK09.	About what percent did your spouse keep?	~~~ % ..... 1 DON'T KNOW 8	—>**PK11**
PK10.	Try to estimate the percentage that your spouse kept.	Only (less than 10%) ..... 1 Some (approximately 25%) ..... 2 Approximately half ..... 3 More than half 4	
PK12.	**INTERVIEWER CHECK: PK01, PK07 DO THE RESPONDENT AND SPOUSE BOTH RECEIVE MONEY?**	Yes ..... 1 No 3	—>**PK14**
PK13.	How regular is the money you receive in comparison to the money y our spouse receives?	Much less regular ..... 1 A little less regular ..... 2 About the same ..... 3 A little more regular ..... 4 Much more regular 5	
PK14.	If you needed money and your spouse was not at home, would you feel comfortable taking money from your spouse's wallet/purse?	Yes ..... 1 No ..... 3 Spouse never has money ..... 6 Refuse to answer 7	
PK15.	If you need money and your spouse is not at home, do you ever take money from your spouse's wallet/purse?	Often ..... 1 Sometimes ..... 2 Rarely ..... 3 Never 4	
PK15a.	If you needed money and your spouse were not at home, would he/she feel upset if you took money from his/her wallet?	Yes ..... 1 No 3	
PK16.	If your spouse needed money and you were not at home, would you feel comfortable if your spouse took money from your purse/wallet?	Yes ..... 1 No 3	
PK17.	If your spouse needs money and you are not at home, has your spouse ever taken money from your wallet/purse?	Often ..... 1 Sometimes ..... 2 Rarely ..... 3 Never 4	
PK17a.	If your spouse needed money and you were not at home, would you feel upset if your spouse took money from your wallet/purse?	Yes ..... 1 No 3	

SECTION PK (HOUSEHOLD DECISIONMAKING)

We would like to know how your family makes decisions about expenditures and use of time.

PK18 TYPE: EXPENDITURES AND USE OF TIME	PK18 In your household, who makes decisions about: (CIRCLE ALL THAT APPLY ON EACH LINE)																	
	Respondent	Spouse	Male Child	Female Child	Mother	Father	Mother In law	Father In law	Brother	Sister	Brother In law	Sister In law	Grandparent	Other, specify_____	Son/Daughter In law	Grandchild	X/W/Y/V	Can't Answer
A. Food eaten at home	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P		Z
B. Routine Purchases for the household of items such as cleaning supplies	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P		Z
C. Your clothes	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P		Z
D. Your spouse's clothes	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P		Z
E. Your children's clothes	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	W	Z
F. Your children's education	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	W	Z
G. Your children's health	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	W	Z
H. Large expensive purchases for the household (i.e., refrigerator or TV)	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P		Z
I. Giving money to your parents/family	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	X	Z
J. Giving money to your spouse's parents/family	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	X	Z
K. Gifts for parties/weddings	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P		Z
L. Money for monthly arisan (savings lottery)	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	X	Z
M. Money for monthly savings	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	X	Z
N. Time the husband spends socializing	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P		Z
O. Time the wife spends socializing	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P		Z
P. Whether you/your spouse works?	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	V	Z
Q. Whether you and your spouse use contraception?	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Y	Z

Code PK18:
V. Don't work
W. No children
X. Never used money for this purpose
Y. Never used contraception

SECTION PK (HOUSEHOLD DECISIONMAKING)

	PK20				PK21TYPE	PK21
	At that time that you were married, was [...] alive?				**ANSWER PK21 IF 1 IS**	At the time that you were married, how did the status of your parents compare to the status of your parents-in-law?
	PK20a.	**PK20b.**	**PK20c.**	**PK20d.**	**CIRCLED IN BOTH COLUMNS**	
	Father 1. Yes 3. No	Mother 1. Yes 3. No	Father-in-law 1. Yes 3. No	Mother-in-law 1. Yes 3. No		
	INTERVIEWER CHECK: (CIRCLE 1 (YES), 3 (NO) IN EACH COLUMN FOR LINES A-H. BASED ON THE INFORMATION IN PK20a-PK20d.					
	PK20ax.	**PK20bx.**	**PK20cx.**	**PK20dx.**		
	1 3		1 3		A. Father's job	Higher 1 2 3 4 Lower 5 NA 6 UA 7 DK 8
	1 3		1 3		B. Father's education	Higher 1 2 3 4 Lower 5 NA 6 UA 7 DK 8
		1 3		1 3	C. Mother's education	Higher 1 2 3 4 Lower 5 NA 6 UA 7 DK 8
	CIRCLE 1 IF EITHER MOTHER OR FATHER WAS ALIVE		**CIRCLE 1 IF EITHER MOTHER-IN-LAW OR FATHER-IN-LAW WAS ALIVE**			
	1 3		1 3		D. Position in community	Higher 1 2 3 4 Lower 5 NA 6 UA 7 DK 8
	1 3		1 3		E. Quality of house/ neighborhood	Higher 1 2 3 4 Lower 5 NA 6 UA 7 DK 8
	1 3		1 3		F. Earnings	Higher 1 2 3 4 Lower 5 NA 6 UA 7 DK 8
	1 3		1 3		G. Land	Higher 1 2 3 4 Lower 5 NA 6 UA 7 DK 8
	1 3		1 3		H. Other assets	Higher 1 2 3 4 Lower 5 NA 6 UA 7 DK 8

CODES FOR PK21

1. Much higher
2. Somewhat higher
3. About the same
4. Somewhat lower
5. Much lower
6. Parent(s) not alive at time of marriage
7. Unwilling to answer
8. DON'T KNOW

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