@article{Pezzey:162005,
      recid = {162005},
      author = {Pezzey, John C.V. and Mazouz, Salim and Jotzo, Frank},
      title = {The logic of collective action and Australia’s climate  policy},
      journal = {Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics},
      address = {2010},
      number = {428-2016-27966},
      pages = {18},
      year = {2010},
      abstract = {We analyse the long-term efficiency of the emissions  target and of the provisions to
reduce carbon leakage in  the Australian Government’s Carbon Pollution  Reduction
Scheme, as proposed in March 2009, and the nature  and likely cause of changes to
these features in the  previous year. The target range of 5–15 per cent cuts in  national
emission entitlements during 2000–2020 was weak,  in that on balance it is too low to
minimise Australia’s  long-term mitigation costs. The free allocation of  output-linked,
tradable emissions permits to  emissions-intensive, trade-exposed (EITE) sectors was
much  higher than proposed earlier, or shown to be needed to deal  with carbon leakage.
It plausibly means that EITE emissions  can rise by 13 per cent during 2010–2020,
while non-EITE  sectors must cut emissions by 34–51 per cent (or make  equivalent permit
imports) to meet the national targets  proposed, far from a cost-effective outcome.
The weak  targets and excessive EITE assistance illustrate the  efficiency-damaging
power of collective action by the  ‘carbon lobby’. Resisting this requires new national
or  international institutions to assess lobby claims  impartially, and more government
publicity about the true  economic importance of carbon-intensive sectors.},
      url = {http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/162005},
      doi = {https://doi.org/10.22004/ag.econ.162005},
}