@article{Brennan:161973,
      recid = {161973},
      author = {Brennan, Geoffrey},
      title = {Climate change: A rational choice politics view},
      journal = {Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics},
      address = {2009},
      number = {428-2016-27914},
      pages = {18},
      year = {2009},
      abstract = {Reduction in carbon dioxide emissions constitutes a global  public good; and hence
there will be strong incentives for  countries to free ride in the provision of CO2  emission
reductions. In the absence of more or less binding  international agreements, we would
expect carbon emissions  to be seriously excessive, and climate change problems to  be
unsolvable. Against this obvious general point, we  observe many countries acting unilaterally
to introduce  carbon emission policies. That is itself an explanatory  puzzle, and
a source of possible hope. Both aspects are  matters of ‘how politics works’ – i.e. ‘public
choice’  problems are central. The object of this paper is to  explain the phenomenon of
unilateral policy action and to  evaluate the grounds for ‘hope’. One aspect of the  explanation
lies in the construction of policy instruments  that redistribute strategically in
favour of relevant  interests. Another is the ‘expressive’ nature of voting and  the expressive
value of environmental concerns. Both  elements – elite interests and popular
(expressive) opinion  – are quasi-constraints on politically viable policy.  However, the
nature of expressive concerns is such that  significant reductions in real GDP are probably
not  sustainable in the long term – which suggests that much of  the CO2 reduction
action will be limited to modest  reductions of a largely token character. In that sense,
the  grounds for hope are, although not non-existent, decidedly  thin.},
      url = {http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/161973},
      doi = {https://doi.org/10.22004/ag.econ.161973},
}