@article{Richter:158733,
      recid = {158733},
      author = {Richter, Andries and Grasman, Johan},
      title = {The Transmission of Sustainable Harvesting Norms When  Agents Are Conditionally Cooperative},
      address = {2013-09},
      number = {829-2016-55233},
      series = {ES},
      pages = {33},
      year = {2013},
      abstract = {Experimental and observational studies have highlighted  the importance of agents being conditionally cooperative  when facing a social dilemma. We formalize this mechanism  in a theoretical model that portrays a small community  having joint access to a common pool resource. The  diffusion of norms of cooperation takes place via  interpersonal relations, while individual agents face the  temptation of higher profits by overexploiting the  resource. Agents remain conditionally cooperative, unless  other individuals are misbehaving already. We can observe a  bubble of conditional cooperators slowly building up  followed by a sudden burst, which means that a transition  from a cooperative social norm to non-cooperation occurs.  Interestingly, in some parameter regions alternative stable  states and limit cycles arise. The latter implies that the  same community goes through such a transition repeatedly  over long time spans – history thus repeats itself in the  form of the creation and erosion of social capital.},
      url = {http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/158733},
      doi = {https://doi.org/10.22004/ag.econ.158733},
}