000015642 001__ 15642
000015642 005__ 20180122195857.0
000015642 037__ $$a1605-2016-134445
000015642 041__ $$aen
000015642 084__ $$aH23
000015642 084__ $$aQ17
000015642 084__ $$aQ58
000015642 245__ $$aInvasive Species Management Through Tariffs: Are Prevention and Protection Synonymous?
000015642 260__ $$c2004
000015642 269__ $$a2004
000015642 270__ $$mrranjan@ifas.ufl.edu$$pRanjan,  Ram
000015642 300__ $$a43
000015642 336__ $$aWorking or Discussion Paper
000015642 446__ $$aEnglish
000015642 490__ $$aWorking Paper 04-10
000015642 520__ $$aThis Paper designs a political economy model of invasive species management in order to explore the effectiveness of tariffs in mitigating the risk of invasion. The revenue interests of the government together with the interests of the lobby group competing with the imported agricultural commodity, that is believed to be the vector of invasive species, are incorporated in a Nash Bargaining game. The government, however, also considers the impact of tariffs on long run risks of invasion and decides optimal tariffs based upon its welfare in the pre and post-invasion scenarios. Along with the size of the lobby group, which is a function of the slope of the demand and supply curves, the weights assigned to the various components in the government welfare function too play a key role in influencing the extent to which tariffs could be an effective policy tool for invasive species management.
000015642 650__ $$aPolitical Economy
000015642 650__ $$aResource /Energy Economics and Policy
000015642 6531_ $$ainvasive species
000015642 6531_ $$apolitical economy
000015642 6531_ $$atariffs
000015642 6531_ $$abargaining
000015642 6531_ $$ainterest groups
000015642 700__ $$aRanjan, Ram
000015642 8564_ $$s1275071$$uhttps://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/15642/files/wp040010.pdf
000015642 887__ $$ahttp://purl.umn.edu/15642
000015642 909CO $$ooai:ageconsearch.umn.edu:15642$$pGLOBAL_SET
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  Previous issue date: 2004
000015642 982__ $$gUniversity of Florida>International Agricultural Trade and Policy Center>Working Papers
000015642 980__ $$a1605