



*The World's Largest Open Access Agricultural & Applied Economics Digital Library*

**This document is discoverable and free to researchers across the globe due to the work of AgEcon Search.**

**Help ensure our sustainability.**

Give to AgEcon Search

AgEcon Search

<http://ageconsearch.umn.edu>

[aesearch@umn.edu](mailto:aesearch@umn.edu)

*Papers downloaded from **AgEcon Search** may be used for non-commercial purposes and personal study only. No other use, including posting to another Internet site, is permitted without permission from the copyright owner (not AgEcon Search), or as allowed under the provisions of Fair Use, U.S. Copyright Act, Title 17 U.S.C.*

*No endorsement of AgEcon Search or its fundraising activities by the author(s) of the following work or their employer(s) is intended or implied.*

# Is the New Deal Dead? Government, Economics, and the Rural South

**Patricia A. Duffy**

## **Personal Introduction**

A year ago, apprehensive about writing this address, I spoke with former president Joe Broder. He advised me to pick something I cared about deeply. That advice, although well meant, left me rather stymied. I care about teaching, but Joe Broder's own presidential address had handled that topic better than I thought I could. So I floundered for a while, without gaining a focus. Then came August and the signing into law of the new welfare bill. A few months earlier, farm programs had also been vastly modified. My topic finally came together. The combination of the 1996 Farm Bill and the new welfare legislation clearly signaled major changes for the rural South, and I wondered what these changes would entail.

I don't pretend to have predictions about what will happen in the wake of the 1996 policies. Rather, I hope in this address to stimulate thought about these changes and to point out some areas where economists could apply their skills.

## **A More Formal Introduction**

CCC, TVA, FDIC, FHA, SEC. These acronyms are surely familiar to anyone with even a passing interest in U.S. economic policy.

---

Patricia A. Duffy is a professor of agricultural economics in the Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociology, Auburn University.

The comments of David Dawson, Jennie Raymond, Conner Bailey, Jim Novak, and John Adrian on an earlier draft of this manuscript are appreciated.

These institutions have endured for decades. Like the philosophy that spawned them, they originated in the 1930s as part of a domestic, peacetime program designed to counteract the Great Depression. Then-President Franklin Delano Roosevelt called his program the New Deal. It was prefaced on the belief that the federal government should take an active role in the nation's economic affairs, regulating commerce and industry and providing a social safety net.

The New Deal marked a dramatic break with past policy. Before 1933, federal involvement in promoting the "general welfare" was quite modest. Private charities, backed by some local government efforts, ran a hodgepodge of relief programs, a system that proved largely inadequate to deal with the widespread misery of the Depression. The New Deal built a "safety net" for citizens. Farm programs were designed to alleviate problems of low incomes and high risk in the agricultural sector. Social insurance programs were developed to provide relief for unemployment and poverty. In the words of Sidney Lens, in his famous study, *Poverty: America's Enduring Paradox*, the New Deal "turned America from laissez-faire to controlled capitalism, a legacy that has proved to be irreversible" (p. 257).

Lens published those words in 1969, when the philosophical orientation of the New Deal did indeed seem a permanent structure erected on the American political landscape. Now, not quite three decades later, in the wake of the radical overhaul of two major New Deal programs, many are proclaiming the New Deal dead. Some do so with joy, believing in the

curative powers of unfettered markets to revitalize our nation's economy. Others do so with sorrow, concerned about the consequences of the diminished safety net for the economically disadvantaged. But almost everyone agrees we have entered a new era.

### The New Deal Through the Decades

If the New Deal embodied the mindset that the central government could shape effective and equitable policy, the current political climate could be said to be one of deep disillusionment with Washington. Low election turnouts, Congressional "gridlock," and widespread anti-government rhetoric—even from politicians themselves—are some of the more visible signs of that discontent. Thirty years ago, nearly 80% of voters were confident government would do the right thing most of the time. Now fewer than 20% have that confidence (Penny).

Why did attitudes change? When I was a child in the early 60s, I remember an atmosphere of general pride in the process of government, a belief that, despite some minor problems, the system worked. New Deal programs brought Social Security to our grandparents, unemployment compensation to our parents and neighbors, and economic relief to the widow down the street. Social Security and unemployment taxes were relatively low, while the benefits of these programs greatly eased the stress on families who would otherwise need to support aging parents or disabled siblings. Widowed or abandoned women with small children were viewed with sympathy and largely believed to be morally entitled to welfare.

The early to mid-60s actually saw a revitalization and expansion of the New Deal philosophy, brought about by an increasing awareness that the social safety net had let many fall through its strands. Galbraith's *The Affluent Society* pointed to the problem of poverty amid plenty. Then, in 1962, Michael Harrington published *The Other America*. Lens credits Harrington with providing a major impetus for the "Great Society" programs of the Johnson Administration, which included Med-

icare and Medicaid, federal aid to education, voting rights laws, and an omnibus anti-poverty program called the "War on Poverty."<sup>1</sup>

Although poverty rates fell sharply in the 60s, welfare expenditures continued to rise, despite an expanding economy. Civil rights policies, mandated by the federal government, sparked deep controversies, particularly in the South. Erosion of support for federal programs was further influenced by a new social phenomenon: an explosive rise of single-parent families. Divorce rates were increasing, but the major issue of concern to voters was the dramatic growth of births outside of marriage. From a fairly constant 4–5% of all births in the 1940s through the early 1960s, they rose to roughly 10% of all births by the end of the decade, and represent over 30% of all births today (Moynihan). Welfare for widows and abandoned spouses was one thing; support for unwed mothers was quite another. George Wallace made political mileage in the late 60s by speaking against bureaucrats, regulation, and social planning. His audience was largely composed of low- to middle-income working people from the South and Midwest, the same types of people who had decades earlier supported Franklin D. Roosevelt.

George Wallace didn't win that election, however. The winner, Richard Milhous Nixon, didn't share Mr. Wallace's anti-federal leanings. He implemented wage and price controls in an effort to stop inflation—a solution clearly at odds with the free-market bent of later Republican presidents. Nixon collaborated with Daniel Patrick Moynihan in a failed at-

---

<sup>1</sup> Although the "Great Society" programs represented an ideological expansion of the federal government's responsibility, the fiscal commitment to anti-poverty was not as extensive as some at the time thought it should be, or as many now think it had been. Lens viewed the expenditures as "modest to a fault." The first year, \$800 million was appropriated, and about twice that much in each of the next two. In reference to Johnson's Economic Opportunity Act, Lens wrote: "Even if one includes the seven billion dollar authorization of public housing over a four-year period, the public works programs for the depressed eleven-state Appalachia area, and the model 'cities' projects passed in ensuing years for redeveloping the inner cities, the 'war' was as Martin Luther King pointed out, more nearly a 'skirmish'" (p. 315).

tempt to develop a guaranteed annual income for the poor, which would have brought benefits in the lowest-paying states to the national average. Further, it has been said that the Nixon Administration did the most for the anti-hunger crusade by expanding the use of food stamps (Phillips). Through the Nixon years, the New Deal philosophy remained alive and well.

The Carter Presidency is more difficult to evaluate. Carter was not militantly anti-government, nor did he lobby to cut social programs severely, but by the end of his Presidency, the anti-government sentiment was far more widespread than it had been during Mr. Wallace's 1968 campaign. Vietnam, Watergate, the oil crisis, years of "stagflation," and finally the Iran-hostage situation had combined to bring about a kind of national malaise. In particular, people were unhappy with the increased number of federal regulations. They were tired, as Michael Kinsley of *The New Republic* put it, of the government behaving as the "National Nanny" (quoted in Phillips, p. 94).

Carter stated that one of his goals was to "free the American people from the burden of over-regulation" (Phillips, p. 93). Carter, not Reagan, initiated deregulation of airlines, trucking, railroads, and interest rates. At the same time, however, the Carter Administration pushed for increased regulation of the environment, occupational safety, energy, and equal employment. Under the Carter Administration, a major national jobs program (CETA) was developed in an effort to deal with the rising unemployment of the period. Carter's New Deal record is thus somewhat mixed.

The late 1970s and early 1980s saw the emergence of a kind of "pop" economics with a radically free-market bent. With the publication of such books as Gilder's *Wealth and Poverty* and Friedman's *Free to Choose*, the view that the government created problems rather than solutions found an ever-wider audience. The arguments in these books were selected, simplified, and sometimes actually in-

accurate,<sup>2</sup> but the message was intuitively appealing: cut taxes, reduce the role of government, and our problems will cure themselves. By 1980, this message had won enough adherents to determine the outcome of the presidential election.

The election of the pro-market, anti-state Ronald Reagan in 1980 was seen by some as the watershed year—the end of the New Deal. One of President Reagan's major goals was to reduce the role of the federal government in domestic affairs. In its objective of sharply reducing federal involvement in social programs, the Reagan Administration was often stymied by Congress or circumstances, but the ideology of the Reagan era marked a notable departure from the past.<sup>3</sup>

Despite the change in political attitude, no major New Deal program was dismantled during the eight years of the Reagan Administration or during the four years of the Bush Administration. Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) remained an entitlement. Reagan's welfare reform, the Family Support Act of 1988, was in fact a rather cautious and balanced program. The act expanded AFDC coverage to two-parent families in all states, but required that at least one of the parents work. Young parents were required to finish high school. Other parents were offered a wide range of education and training designed to lead to work. The President believed his reform would lead, in his words, to "lasting emancipation from welfare dependency," but no time limits were included in this bill.

By the end of Reagan's second term, the push for increased deregulation of industry lost much of its energy as the public received news of the scandals in the savings and loan industry and reports of poor airline maintenance. The ideological tone of George Bush's Presidency was more moderate, more "old line" conservative, than Reagan's had been. With the election of Democrat William Clin-

<sup>2</sup> In *Not So Free to Choose*, Rayack provides a point-by-point examination of Friedman's *Free to Choose*.

<sup>3</sup> In a book published in 1989, Fraser and Gerstle proclaimed the New Deal died upon Ronald Reagan's election to office.

ton in 1992, it seemed that the New Deal might still be a live political ideology. Then came 1996.

### *Breaching the Fortress: 1996*

On April 4, 1996, President Clinton signed the Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform (FAIR) Act of 1996. This farm bill represents a substantial departure from the past, eliminating counter-cyclical provisions in favor of predetermined payments. While the bill will cost over \$36 billion, the expenditures will be less than the estimated \$56.6 billion needed to continue the 1990 Farm Bill for another seven years. Benefits under FAIR will decrease each year, presumably to move agriculture to a completely independent situation over time.

On August 22, 1996, President Clinton signed the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act. This welfare bill eliminated the federal entitlement program (Title IV-A of Social Security) in favor of a block grant program which gives the states broad latitude and increased flexibility. In all states, adult-headed families on welfare will face a maximum of a five-year lifetime limit on receiving federal money, or less if the state desires.<sup>4</sup>

Why should we in the South be particularly concerned about these policy changes? As agricultural economists, we are well aware that many of our counties are agriculturally dependent. Many crops grown in the South—cotton, peanuts, corn, tobacco, rice—have been traditionally covered by farm programs. Change in the farm programs, for better or worse, will be heavily felt in these areas.

The welfare bill also has the potential to have a larger-than-typical effect on the South. Most southern states have higher rates of poverty than the rest of the nation (table 1). Of 14 southern states, only three (Georgia, North Carolina, and Virginia) had poverty rates below the national average in 1995. Some southern states have poverty rates considerably

**Table 1.** Percentages of People in Poverty, Various Southern States and U.S., 1994 and 1995

State	1995	1994
Alabama	20.1	16.4
Arkansas	14.9	15.3
Florida	16.2	14.9
Georgia	12.1	14.0
Kentucky	14.7	18.5
Louisiana	19.7	25.7
Mississippi	23.5	19.9
North Carolina	12.6	14.2
Oklahoma	17.1	16.7
Tennessee	15.5	14.6
Texas	17.4	19.1
Virginia	10.2	10.7
West Virginia	16.7	18.6
South Carolina	19.9	13.8
U.S.	13.8	14.5

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census.

higher than the national average. In 1995, the U.S. poverty rate was 13.8%, while Mississippi had 23.5% of its population living below the poverty line. For Alabama, the figure was 20.1%. Some southern rural counties have poverty rates above 40%. Programs that affect the poor disproportionately affect the South.

To understand how FAIR and the new welfare bill might affect the country in general and the South in particular, it's worth taking some time to look at these programs in more depth.

### **The Farm Bills in Context**

The question sometimes comes up, often from people outside agriculture, as to why the United States enacted farm programs in the first place. The rationale for these programs, generally understood if not always supported by people in our profession, can be rather murky to many outside it, particularly young people, to whom the Great Depression is distant history.

From 1929 to 1932, net farm income fell 70% (Paarlberg). Conditions were already bad in 1929—so bad that legislation passed in 1929 (under the fiscally conservative Hoover Administration) created the Federal Farm

<sup>4</sup> Whether a state can use its "Maintenance of Effort" funds to support people beyond the five-year limit is being debated at the time I write this paper.

Board, which was authorized to spend \$500,000 to buy up surplus commodities with the hope of reselling them during times of shortages. The Board soon ran out of money, and the amount authorized proved inadequate to provide significant financial relief. The Depression, combined with more bad weather, turned a poor situation into a disaster.

The widespread and often dramatic plight of farm families during the Great Depression, coupled with protest movements in the rural areas, evoked a national demand for relief. In a 1983 retrospective on the New Deal, Harold Breimyer, who lived through the Depression, remarked: "Despondency in the country was endemic. Farmers by the thousands were being forced off their lands. Foreclosure sales of farmland were being stopped by violence. The account in James Michener's *Centennial* is realistic" (p. 1155).<sup>5</sup>

The Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 was the first "real" farm bill. It set up many of the programs which remained in place for decades, including the CCC and provisions for crop insurance. The primary objective of agricultural legislation during the 30s was to raise farm income. The chosen tools were price supports and supply controls.<sup>6</sup> The programs were meant as emergency measures, but the problems and the programs endured far beyond the Depression years. Given that each new farm bill has been voted upon by a freely elected Congress and signed into law by the also-elected President, one can only conclude that the farm bills, for many decades, continued to have widespread support. Rasmussen believes they endured because they brought a certain stability both to farming and to the consumer costs of food.

Over and above a lingering agrarian sentimentalism, farm programs should have a ra-

tional appeal to nonfarmers. Because of uncontrollable conditions such as weather and pests, agricultural supply is uncertain. Food is a necessity. We cannot do without it. Ensuring an adequate supply of food, at reasonable prices, was and is of general national interest.

As time passed, the provisions of the program were modified to fit changing circumstances. Farm programs, through the mid-60s, continued to rely on support prices and capacity reduction—strategies that were not always popular with urban consumers. By the end of the decade, after a lengthy political battle, the programs tilted heavily toward a reliance on income supports, which cost more in direct outlays but which benefitted consumers through lower prices and kept the U.S. competitive in the world market.

The 1970s were a time of expanding exports and increased market orientation in agriculture. High market prices dominated much of this decade. Had the government wanted to "get out of agriculture" at that time, the rising farm prosperity might have provided a justification. Instead, new programs, such as the Farmer-Owned Reserve, were devised to deal with the increased price volatility, which was seen as a major problem for both producers and consumers (Knutson). Food stamps, a program important to urban legislators, were administered under the farm program umbrella, bringing wider support for the bills.

In a 1979 paper, Luther Tweeten expressed the view that the principle purpose of commodity programs was to eliminate excessive fluctuations in prices and maintain the vitality of adequate-sized, well-run farms. He warned against using farm programs to enhance long-run returns to agricultural production, efforts he believed were doomed to failure because prices above equilibrium would generate excess production, and ultimately benefits would be largely capitalized into land values.

Striking a similar note in making his recommendations for the 1985 Farm Bill, Willard Cochrane advocated a farm program that stabilized prices through a "legitimate" grain reserve program, which he viewed as "necessary to protect both producers and consumers in the domestic market" (p. 140). He also ad-

<sup>5</sup> I recommend this article to anyone interested in reading a vivid first-person account of the genesis of farm programs.

<sup>6</sup> During the 1930s, Breimyer tells us, farmers themselves rejected voluntary controls in favor of mandatory participation, because they did not want "free riders." He also notes that the programs were not authoritarian. They were forms of collective, cooperative action, voted upon and approved by the farmers.

vocated other provisions, including continuation of federal crop insurance.

The farm bill actually passed in 1985 was almost the polar opposite of the Tweeten-Cochrane ideals. Although the 1985 Farm Bill did not entirely eliminate government storage programs, it greatly reduced the government's role. The marketing loan for rice and cotton essentially eliminated government purchase of those commodities, and the Findley loan for grains provided the option of a reduced loan rate, at which level less stocks would be accumulated. With low market prices unchecked by a loan rate, subsidy expenditures reached new highs under the 1985 Farm Bill, making it the most expensive farm bill in history.

Why did that farm bill move so far from the suggestions of Tweeten and Cochrane? Part of the answer involves the free-market orientation of the Reagan Administration. By the time the 1985 Farm Bill was debated, getting the government entirely "out of agriculture" was becoming an increasingly popular policy choice, widely discussed in academic and policy-making circles (see Gardner, for example). The Reagan Administration's initial proposal for the 1985 Farm Bill involved a phase-out of subsidies as well as a decreased role for the federal government in commodity storage. The deep farm financial crisis of the mid-80s and the flood of farm bankruptcies, however, made both Congress and the administration unwilling to drastically reduce farm support (Knutson, Penn, and Boehm). In the free-market ideology, outright government ownership of commodities would be counted as more troublesome than a direct subsidy, which would not interfere so noticeably in market operations.

The history of the farm programs themselves provides another reason why the 1985 Farm Bill turned out the way it did. Problems with excess stocks plagued the farm programs from their inception, all the way through the 80s. Excess production, not shortages, had been the most consistent problem of previous decades. Given this track record—and the recent experience with PIK—the legislature would likely cast a jaundiced eye at the idea of a reserve program.

The 1990 Farm Bill contained some reductions in subsidies as a budget-cutting measure and a modest degree of decoupling through the "flex" acreage provisions, but it kept most of the major provisions of the 1985 Farm Bill. In any event, through much of the bill's life, high market prices dominated the agricultural sector.

### *What's FAIR?*

The Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform (FAIR) Act of 1996 represents a substantial departure from past policies. This farm bill provides full planting flexibility, with the exception of fruits and vegetables, and decoupling of benefits from production decisions and market prices. A landowner has the option of taking a seven-year market transition contract, if he or she had certified base acreage in cotton, feed grains, wheat, or rice during any one of the last five years. Because decoupled payments don't depend on production, some provisions to protect tenant farmers are included in the bill. Adherence to wetland and conservation provisions is required to get transition payments. Total payments are predetermined, so that per unit payment is a function of sign-ups. Contract payments totaled \$5.57 billion in 1996, and will decrease to around \$4 billion by 2002.

The nonrecourse loan provision is included in FAIR, but it could be replaced by broad-based marketing loans previously used only for cotton and rice. The Farmer-Owned Reserve program is suspended. Elimination of that program, coupled with expansion of the marketing loan, could essentially eliminate the government's role in commodity storage.

Under FAIR, farmers are no longer required to obtain CAT crop insurance risk protection, but must sign a waiver if they do not, giving up eligibility for disaster payments. The USDA is required to provide risk management classes for farmers.

With the 1996 Farm Bill, we have moved almost completely away from any attempts at income or price stabilization or of supply management. Subsidies, tied only to previous patterns of production, are given regardless of

current plantings. Save for these subsidies, which are no longer counter-cyclical in design, the government is effectively “out of agriculture.”

What happens to farm policy after 2002 will depend on the outcome of FAIR. Knutson et al., assessing this farm bill, see two different types of extreme problems that could develop. If crop disasters occur, some form of consumer rationing might be implemented. If instead we experience a number of years of very low prices, a wave of farm bankruptcies (like the one in the mid-80s) could follow. If either of these things do happen, we may very well see a return to a more active government role in agriculture in the future. Even in the absence of drastic outcomes, Knutson et al. believe price instability will likely increase. Further, they believe more pressure on moderate-sized farms should lead to a faster rate of consolidation.

A final question about FAIR is how it might affect rural communities, particularly during the out-years, when payments are reduced. A primary question, of course, is to what extent farm program benefits spill over into rural communities. Farming accounts for only a small percentage of total national income, but it can be a fairly large source of income in rural counties. As Otto points out, although farm policy was not intended to be the “salvation of rural communities,” agriculture with “linkages” is an important part of the economic base in many rural areas. Decreases in farm output during PIK had severe effects on many agricultural input industries. Further, rural tax revenues are tied to rural land values. If land values fall, so do taxes and support for schools.

### Ending Welfare as We Know It<sup>7</sup>

Under the old AFDC programs, families with minor children were entitled to cash relief if they met a means test. Now, as a step toward what is being called the “New Federalism,”

the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act ends that entitlement. Instead, it provides \$16.38 billion annually in the form of block grants for states in fiscal years 1997 to 2002. Unlike under the old program, where federal expenditures varied directly with the number of cases, the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) block grant is fixed each year, based on previous federal expenditures. Because most states have seen a recent decrease in their welfare caseload, the program will provide a short-run increase in federal dollars, but by 2000–2002, the block grants are projected to fall below funding under the old program.

A state may not use any part of the TANF grant to provide assistance to a family that includes an adult who has received assistance for a lifetime total of 60 months. Up to 20% of the state’s average monthly number of families receiving assistance may be exempted from this five-year cap because of hardship. A state may reduce the lifetime limit to as little as 24 months if it wishes. There is a 15% cap on administrative services.

To receive their full block grant allocation, states must meet an 80% “maintenance of effort,” meaning the state must continue to spend at least 80% of its total FY 1994 expenditures for AFDC, JOBS, AFDC-related child care, and Emergency Assistance.<sup>8</sup> State expenditure requirements will be reduced to 75% for states that meet the work-participation rate requirement. Various bonus funds are available for states meeting certain objectives.

States have complete flexibility to determine eligibility and benefit levels, but block grant funds are contingent on the states meeting a number of work-related provisions. After receiving assistance for 24 months, adults

<sup>7</sup> More details on the welfare program can be found on the worldwide web at <http://libertynet.org/~edcivic/welfcdf.html>.

<sup>8</sup> The bill provides a total of \$2 billion in federal matching funds for states experiencing an economic downturn. To be eligible for that assistance, however, a state must maintain 100% of its FY 1994 expenditures, rather than 80%. To access the fund, a state must have an unemployment rate of at least 6.5% and the average rate must be at least 10% higher than in the same quarter in either of the two preceding years, or the state must experience a 10% increase in food stamp recipients.



must engage in work activities (subject to good-cause exemptions). Further, recipients must participate in community service within two months of receiving benefits if they are not already working, unless states expressly opt out of this requirement.

States must meet aggregate work targets for all families that include an adult or minor child head of household. In FY 1997, the work target is 25% of household heads in a work activity. The target increases by 5% a year to reach 50% by 2002. To be counted toward the state's work quota, a single parent must work a minimum of 20 hours a week in 1997–98, 25 hours in 1999, and 30 hours in 2000 and beyond. (Two-parent families must meet more stringent work requirements.) States that reduce their overall caseload will have their required work participation rate reduced to reflect this decrease.

As part of the welfare changes, food stamp eligibility was also reduced. Able-bodied recipients age 18–50 without dependents are ineligible for food stamps unless they meet a work requirement. They may receive food stamps only three months in every three years unless they are engaged in work or work programs. If the recipient finds work and then loses the job, an additional three months are granted. Work requires 20 hours or more a week, averaged monthly. States may exempt up to 10% of those covered by these requirements for hardship, and residents of counties with unemployment higher than 10% need not be held to work requirements if the state so chooses.

Current and future legal immigrants are barred from receiving SSI and food stamps until they become citizens. States have the option of determining the eligibility of current legal immigrants for TANF, Medicaid, and services under the Social Services Block Grant (SSBG). Newly arrived legal immigrants are barred from all means-tested federally funded programs for the first five years they reside in the country.

### *The Welfare Population*

The welfare caseload is overwhelmingly composed of women and their dependent children.

**Table 2.** Selected Characteristics of AFDC Recipients, Various Southern States and U.S., 1994

State	Avg. Yrs. on AFDC	Avg. No. of Recipi- ents/Case	Youngest Child Under Age 6 (%)
Alabama	3.0	3.8	60.6
Arkansas	2.7	4.2	58.7
Florida	1.8	3.8	64.5
Georgia	2.7	3.8	62.1
Kentucky	3.9	3.7	50.9
Louisiana	3.5	4.4	59.4
Mississippi	4.2	4.4	60.2
North Carolina	2.8	3.8	59.6
Oklahoma	2.3	3.6	58.7
South Carolina	2.8	4.1	61.2
Tennessee	2.4	3.7	57.1
Texas	1.9	3.8	63.7
Virginia	2.8	3.9	62.3
West Virginia	3.3	3.5	55.6
U.S.	3.0	3.8	64.1

Source: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Family Assistance.

Nationally, 70% of welfare recipients are minor children, roughly the same percentage as found in the South. Depending on the state, anywhere from one-half to two-thirds of welfare cases include a youngest child under the age of six (table 2).

For the most part, southern states have had very low AFDC benefit levels. Seven of 14 southern states have benefits set at less than half the national average (table 3). No southern state exceeds the national average. Almost all AFDC recipients also get food stamps, but the total benefit package still keeps many southern families on welfare far below the poverty level. For Mississippi, the state with the lowest AFDC payments, food stamps plus AFDC benefits for a family of three totaled \$415 per month in 1994, compared to the \$1,013 per month needed to raise a family of this size to the poverty level.

Southern states—which typically have had low benefit levels—receive smaller block grants, on a per-poor-person basis, than the historically more generous northern states. Be-

**Table 3.** AFDC Benefits and Administrative Expenses, Various Southern States and U.S., 1994

State	No. of Cases <sup>a</sup>	Avg. Monthly Payment (\$)	Administrative Costs (\$)
Alabama	51,559	152.20	39.00
Arkansas	26,565	183.76	41.47
Florida	254,006	271.91	54.73
Georgia	141,279	252.11	35.59
Kentucky	82,799	206.98	34.42
Louisiana	90,019	161.42	19.69
Mississippi	60,079	119.97	20.76
North Carolina	130,736	223.86	40.26
Oklahoma	48,483	293.01	69.11
South Carolina	53,314	184.72	27.62
Tennessee	107,865	161.80	24.56
Texas	278,657	159.86	37.84
Virginia	73,650	281.83	44.32
West Virginia	41,383	257.53	13.34
U.S.	26,032,086	376.47	53.42

Source: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Family Assistance.

<sup>a</sup> Most state caseloads have fallen since 1994.

cause of those low benefit levels, some southern states—Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, and Texas—may have trouble meeting the 15% mandated cap on administrative costs, despite lower than average administrative costs per case (table 3).

### *Always with Us?*

In a large sense, the effects of the changes in welfare will depend on the causes of welfare dependency. Various theories about poverty have been advanced, some that blame the individual and others that blame society (Weber). In arguments that echo those advanced to support the English Poor Laws of 1834, the social programs themselves have been blamed for causing poverty (Piven).<sup>9</sup> Supporters of the

welfare bill speak of freeing people from dependency, of encouraging families to care for their own children, and of restoring the work ethic to free children from the culture of poverty.

The message of personal responsibility and an emphasis on employment are positive attributes of the new agenda. Beyond rhetoric, however, the actual outcome of this legislation hinges critically on two things. The first is the ability of current recipients to find jobs. The second is the more long-term efficacy of the stringent work requirements and time limits in changing behavior in such a way that fewer people need assistance in the future.

The first issue, finding employment for current recipients, poses a significant challenge. I have not seen one serious analysis of this legislation that does not point to major obstacles for large portions of current welfare recipients finding work. While previous welfare-to-work programs, such as San Diego's SWIM, Riverside's GAIN, and Wisconsin Works, have been successful in reducing the welfare caseload, not one of these programs has met the work-participation targets of the new welfare law, despite the advantages of strong local economies (Mead).

There are about 130 million people in the national labor force and 4–5 million adult AFDC recipients. Although the numbers may not seem that daunting, a recent analysis by Haveman maintains that up to 25% of adult recipients have insurmountable barriers to employment, including chronic mental or physical problems, lack of basic skills, and language deficiencies. Holzer projects that AFDC recipients will encounter high nonemployment and low wages as they enter the labor market. He estimates that as many as 30% of recipients will have trouble finding any job, while the

---

shows that 15.1% of workers were unemployed at least part of the year, while the census of 1900, a "bad" year, shows a rate of 22.3% (Hunter). It bears noting that these unemployment levels occurred during a period with no minimum wage law and nearly nonexistent regulation of the workplace. Beyond the historical view, one need only look to the developing world to be assured that poverty is widespread in many nations without social programs.

<sup>9</sup> Long before there were comprehensive social programs, there was poverty. Robert Hunter, Jacob Riis, and other American writers from the turn of the century laid out the dimensions of pre-New Deal era poverty in detail. The census of 1890, a "good" year,

rest will have trouble finding and keeping jobs, so that the end result will be a nonemployment rate of 50% for current recipients at any point in time, with effects varying over time and across different labor markets.

Nationally, the average recipient has reading/math skills of about the typical eighth grader. Two-thirds of those who spend five years or more on AFDC lack a high school diploma or GED (Holzer). Thus, these recipients will be competing for jobs primarily with the 18 million high school dropouts currently in the labor force. They will be at a disadvantage in terms of poor work histories, child care problems, location, and lack of transportation.

Most new jobs require a high school diploma (or GED), specific work experience, previous vocational training, certification, or references. Further, most job growth has been in the suburbs, while disproportionate numbers of AFDC recipients are concentrated in rural areas or inner cities, where jobs are less available.

Some areas of the South may fare even worse than the national average. Alabama ranks 46th nationally in adults who have finished high school, and over 456,000 Alabama adults are currently classified as functionally illiterate, twice the current enrollment in Alabama schools ("Odds Long for Dropouts"). Welfare recipients in Alabama, and perhaps several other southern states, will thus have to compete with a disproportionately large population of poorly educated workers for low-skill, entry-level jobs. Further, low AFDC benefits in many southern states have already made welfare unattractive to most adults who could find work. A smaller percentage of the population in the South receives AFDC than the national average. It is likely that a good portion of this population will have significant problems finding work. On the positive side, southern states do have fewer recipients, relative to the population, who must be moved into the work force.

If a welfare-to-work program is run effectively, short-run costs for job training, child care, and support services for employment can cost considerably more per recipient than the current AFDC benefit paid in most southern

states. Average child care expenses for one child under the age of six are higher than Alabama's entire family AFDC benefit for a family of three.

If welfare recipients are turned off the rolls with no source of income, many of the children will be pushed into an already overloaded foster care system. In many southern states, foster care is considerably more expensive than AFDC. In Alabama, for example, monthly AFDC benefits for a mother and two children were \$164 in 1996. Putting those two children in foster care would have cost approximately \$432 per month. Thus, any savings from reduced welfare rolls may well be partially eroded by an increased bill for foster care.

The question of whether the welfare bill will modify behavior and reduce future dependency is unanswerable at this time. We can hope that awareness of the work requirements and welfare time limits will discourage out-of-wedlock births and lower school dropout rates, but we have no assurance that this will happen. The troubling rise in out-of-wedlock births cuts across all races and social classes; it is not a phenomenon limited to the welfare population. Such births have increased despite a 41% average national decrease in real welfare benefits over the period 1970 to 1991, and they have increased at similar rates in the welfare and nonwelfare populations, and in low and high welfare-benefit states (Moynihan). If welfare is a factor in this change in family structure, it is clearly not the only cause.

### *Challenges for the Rural South*

In the South, about 30% of the population lives in rural areas, a much higher percentage than in any other area of the country save the Midwest. Arkansas, Kentucky, Mississippi, and West Virginia have half or more of their populations living in nonmetro areas, placing them among the nation's most rural states.

A 1992 report from the Children's Defense Fund summarizes some of the special problems facing the poor in rural areas (Sherman). Rural children are somewhat more likely to be poor than American children overall, and pov-

erty rates for rural children (as for all children) have trended upward in the last two decades. Compared to metro-area schools, rural schools generally have lower expenditures per student, less experienced teachers, and higher teacher turnover, as well as a more limited range of class offerings. For adults, rural pay is lower in every field, averaging about 75% of non-rural pay, and rural people are disproportionately represented in very low-income jobs. Displaced rural workers suffer longer periods of joblessness than nonrural workers, and new jobs (if found) tend to yield a steeper pay cut than nonrural workers accept. Child care tends to be difficult to find in rural areas. Choices are limited, quality may be low, and the care may be inconveniently located. Transportation in general can be a problem in rural areas. A reliable automobile is usually an essential for employment.

Many southern rural counties have unemployment rates much higher than state or national averages. Greene County, in west central Alabama, for example, had an August 1996 unemployment rate of 18.4%, compared with a state average of only 4.5%. By contrast, Lee County, home of Auburn University, had a 2.8% unemployment rate at that time. A downturn in the agricultural economy, unmitigated by counter-cyclical farm programs, will disproportionately hurt poor, rural counties, where agricultural industries often provide significant sources of employment, especially to low-skill workers. If the year 2002, when the welfare time limits will first be reached, is a bad year for agriculture, we may witness rural distress of a scale unknown for decades.

An Alabama state representative recently offered the suggestion that the unemployed should move where the jobs are. But it takes money to move—deposits for rent and utilities, the cost of providing for transportation of belongings—several hundred to a thousand dollars at a minimum. The relocated individuals, many of whom are far less educated than the suburban population, will also need help finding jobs in their new location, where they have no private social network. Moving away from family and friends, who can help in times of special adversity, represents a significant

risk for low-income people. Housing costs are normally higher in affluent suburban areas, too. To make this option viable for welfare recipients, states would have to help.

State-sponsored relocation, as proposed in Alabama, could be one solution to rural unemployment, but the solution would do little to revitalize rural areas. Rural development might offer a better answer. Historically, job creation in rural areas has been hampered by a number of factors, including transportation, education, and politics. A recent survey ranked an educated work force the top concern of Alabama manufacturers (Loomis and Hemphill).

In a 1988 study, Rosenfeld, commenting on rural economic progress, noted, "If the new criteria for economic capacity—good schools, cultural amenities, a skilled work force—are necessary for growth, and if the federal and state governments do not help out, the prospects of the rural South are dim indeed" (p. 53). This message bears repeating.

## Comments and Conclusions

Although two New Deal edifices are crumbling, many others remain intact: old age pensions under Social Security, the SEC, counter-cyclical monetary policy, and unemployment insurance, among others. These New Deal institutions, however, are increasingly under siege.

It is easy, and perhaps currently popular, to point to failings in the New Deal programs. One can find such critiques in publications ranging from serious scholarly journals to popular magazines. I am aware of these arguments and agree with many of the points raised. Some reform is clearly needed. In overhauling policy, however, it is wise to remember the successes as well as the failures of these programs. For 60 years, we have been relatively secure in our economy. The periodic depressions that once pockmarked the economic landscape vanished. Despite a wave of inflation in the 1970s and a sweep of bank failures in the 1980s, our money remains sound. Safety in the work place is now largely an expectation, not a prayer. We enjoy a cheap,

abundant, and safe food supply, the envy of much of the world. Poverty among the elderly has been all but eliminated. From 1935 to 1973, the period when the country was most committed to the New Deal philosophy, not only did average income rise, but the income distribution (as measured by the Gini ratio) became more equitable. More recently, gains in income have been increasingly accruing to the top earners (table 4).

Only time will tell if the 1996 policy changes are but the first two of many steps toward a return to *laissez-faire*. Whether the New Deal is really dead thus remains an open question in my mind. I do know that I am far less enthusiastic than some economists about a return to the economic system of the last century. Years before I studied neoclassical economics, I read Dickens.

Whether or not the two pieces of legislation discussed in this address prove on balance to be wise or misguided, the potential for transition problems is large. In 2002, when the teeth of the welfare legislation really begin to bite, payments under FAIR also will have fallen. If agricultural market conditions are poor at that time and the general economy also experiences a downturn, the rural South could face financial problems the like of which many of us have never seen.

"All I learned for certain during the 1930s," Breimyer said, "is that despondency is dangerous to a society; and further, that those members of society who remain financially secure are for the most part insensitive. The well-off must see the guillotine before they fear it" (pp. 1155–56).

If we are lucky, commodity prices will remain high through the next seven years and yields abundant, and the general economy will remain strong. Even in that optimistic case, serious negative consequences of the new welfare laws seem all but inevitable for some individuals. By the year 2005, Senator Moynihan tells us, time limits are projected to force nearly 5 million children nationwide off welfare. Popular columnist Molly Ivins, addressing the new welfare bill and child poverty, tried to shake the complacency of the middle class. "Stop thinking about poor, hungry chil-

dren with big sad eyes, like those kids in Keene paintings," she wrote. "Think of millions of feral teenagers loose on the streets, getting into gangs, killing innocent bystanders, dealing drugs, robbing—and then think of the cost of incarcerating them for years at a time" (p. A4).

As economists, we, more than most people, understand opportunity costs. Each undereducated child represents a future of lost wages, lost taxes, and lost prosperity for our states. Each incarcerated adult, the vast majority of whom are low-skilled and poorly educated, eats up resources that could otherwise go toward improving roads, schools, and parks.

In the South, we are fortunate in having an excellent and experienced cadre of rural development experts. I fear, however, that demands on their time may be excessive in the future as states try to cope with these recent policy changes. Some of the rest of us may be able to help. Lyle Shertz, at a conference in the mid-80s, advocated new roles for social scientists in the USDA and the land grants. If we are really concerned about rural development, our job, he said, is to combat functional illiteracy. Skill training for adults could supplement more traditional extension programs. Researchers trained in analyzing supply and demand for commodities could use their expertise to analyze potential job markets for rural residents.

At the same time, land grants cannot abandon their traditional farm clientele. Along with the new policy environment, rapid technological change and expanding international markets are providing southern farmers with challenges and opportunities. Extension programs offer means by which farmers can be taught methods of risk management, to lessen the financial pain that could follow a downturn in the market. Efforts are already underway in this regard. Those of us with research appointments could work with our extension colleagues to discover the most effective strategies of risk management for real-world producers in the new policy environment.

Six years from now, when it is time to consider a new farm bill, agricultural economists must have objective and thorough evaluations

**Table 4.** Income Inequality Over Time

Year	Number (thous.)	Percent Distribution of Aggregate Income						Gini Ratio
		Lowest Fifth	Second Fifth	Third Fifth	Fourth Fifth	Highest Fifth	Top 5%	
1994	69,313	4.2	10.0	15.7	23.3	46.9	20.1	0.426
1993	68,506	4.1	9.9	15.7	23.3	47.0	20.3	0.429
1993	68,506	4.2	10.1	15.9	23.6	46.2	19.1	0.420
1992	68,216	4.3	10.5	16.5	24.0	44.7	17.6	0.404
1992	68,144	4.4	10.5	16.5	24.0	44.6	17.6	0.403
1991	67,173	4.5	10.7	16.6	24.1	44.2	17.1	0.397
1990	66,322	4.6	10.8	16.6	23.8	44.3	17.4	0.396
1989	66,090	4.6	10.6	16.5	23.7	44.6	17.9	0.401
1988	65,837	4.6	10.7	16.7	24.0	44.0	17.2	0.395
1987	65,204	4.6	10.7	16.8	24.0	43.8	17.2	0.393
1986	64,491	4.6	10.8	16.8	24.0	43.7	17.0	0.392
1985	63,558	4.6	10.9	16.9	24.2	43.5	16.7	0.389
1984	62,706	4.7	11.0	17.0	24.4	42.9	16.0	0.383
1983	62,015	4.7	11.1	17.1	24.3	42.8	15.9	0.382
1982	61,393	4.7	11.2	17.1	24.3	42.7	16.0	0.380
1981	61,019	5.0	11.3	17.4	24.4	41.9	15.4	0.369
1980	60,309	5.1	11.6	17.5	24.3	41.6	15.3	0.365
1979	59,550	5.2	11.6	17.5	24.1	41.7	15.8	0.365
1978	57,804	5.2	11.6	17.5	24.1	41.5	15.6	0.363
1977	57,215	5.2	11.6	17.5	24.2	41.5	15.7	0.363
1976	56,710	5.4	11.8	17.6	24.1	41.1	15.6	0.358
1975	56,245	5.4	11.8	17.6	24.1	41.1	15.5	0.357
1974	55,698	5.5	12.0	17.5	24.0	41.0	15.5	0.355
1973	55,053	5.5	11.9	17.5	24.0	41.1	15.5	0.356
1972	54,373	5.4	11.9	17.5	23.9	41.4	15.9	0.359
1971	53,296	5.5	12.0	17.6	23.8	41.1	15.7	0.355
1970	52,227	5.4	12.2	17.6	23.8	40.9	15.6	0.353
1969	51,586	5.6	12.4	17.7	23.7	40.6	15.6	0.349
1968	50,823	5.6	12.4	17.7	23.7	40.5	15.6	0.348
1967	49,834	5.4	12.2	17.5	23.5	41.4	16.4	0.358
1966	49,214	5.6	12.4	17.8	23.8	40.5	15.6	0.349
1965	48,509	5.2	12.2	17.8	23.9	40.9	15.5	0.356
1964	47,956	5.1	12.0	17.7	24.0	41.2	15.9	0.361
1963	47,540	5.0	12.1	17.7	24.0	41.2	15.8	0.362
1962	47,059	5.0	12.1	17.6	24.0	41.3	15.7	0.362
1961	46,418	4.7	11.9	17.5	23.8	42.2	16.6	0.374
1960	45,539	4.8	12.2	17.8	24.0	41.3	15.9	0.364
1959	45,111	4.9	12.3	17.9	23.8	41.1	15.9	0.361
1958	44,232	5.0	12.5	18.0	23.9	40.6	15.4	0.354
1957	43,696	5.1	12.7	18.1	23.8	40.4	15.6	0.351
1956	43,497	5.0	12.5	17.9	23.7	41.0	16.1	0.358
1955	42,889	4.8	12.3	17.8	23.7	41.3	16.4	0.363

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census.

of the effects of this one. Before five years have passed, and the eligibility of many current welfare recipients used up, social scientists and social workers must know the most

effective ways of bringing this population into the work force. The New Federalism allows experimentation and flexibility, providing real opportunities to find out what works in dealing

with poverty. Objective evaluations of these state experiments are critical to long-run success. We must find out what works.

Most of our universities will not get many new resources in the near future, but new technology—e-mail, the worldwide web—makes it possible for us to work together more efficiently. In preparing this paper, I downloaded from the web several very recent papers on welfare and the new farm bill. The Texas A&M University policy center, to pick an example, has made available on the web a series of papers about current farm policy. On the web page for the University of Wisconsin's Institute for Research on Poverty, I obtained scholarly articles on the new welfare bill, months before they could have been published by traditional presses. It has never before been so easy to keep abreast of current research. E-mail allows easy and inexpensive communication and collaboration across universities. Working smarter, and working together, we may be able to keep the guillotine from the gate.

## References

- Breimyer, H.F. "Conceptualization and Climate for New Deal Farm Laws of the 1930s." *Amer. J. Agr. Econ.* 65,5(1983):1153–57.
- Cochrane, W.W. "A 10-Point Policy Agenda for the Food and Agricultural Sector of the United States." In *Alternative Agricultural and Food Policies and the 1985 Farm Bill*, eds., G.C. Rausser and K.R. Farrell. Giannini Foundation, University of California, Berkeley, 1985.
- Fraser, S., and G. Gerstle, eds. *The Rise and Fall of the New Deal Order, 1930–1980*. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989.
- Friedman, M. *Free to Choose*. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1980.
- Galbraith, J.K. *The Affluent Society*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1958.
- Gardner, B. "Policy Options for Grains." In *Alternative Agricultural and Food Policies and the 1985 Farm Bill*, eds., G.C. Rausser and K.R. Farrell. Giannini Foundation, University of California, Berkeley, 1985.
- Gilder, G. *Wealth and Poverty*. New York: Basic Books, 1981.
- Harrington, M. *The Other America*. New York: The MacMillan Co., 1962.
- Haveman, R. "From Welfare to Work: Problems and Pitfalls." *Focus* 18,1(Special Issue, 1996): 21–24.
- Holzer, H.J. "Employer Demand, AFDC Recipients, and Labor Market Policy." Discus. Pap. No. 1115-96, Institute for Research on Poverty, University of Wisconsin, November 1996.
- Hunter, R. *Poverty*. New York: Harper and Row Publishers, Inc., Torchbook edition, 1965.
- Ivins, M. "One Way or Another." *Opelika-Auburn [Alabama] News*, 22 December 1996, p. A4. Reprinted from the *Fort Worth [Texas] Star-Telegram*.
- Knutson, R.D. "Summit Review." In *Consensus and Conflict in U.S. Agriculture*, eds., J.W. Richardson and B.L. Gardner. College Station TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1979.
- Knutson, R.D., J.B. Penn, and W.T. Boehm. *Agricultural and Food Policy*, 2nd ed. Englewood Cliffs NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1990.
- Knutson, R.D., E.G. Smith, A.W. Gray, M.E. Salassi, M. Waller, S.M. Fletcher, A. Schmitz, C.G. Anderson, J. Musick, J.R.C. Robinson, and W.D. Shurley. "Impacts of the 1996 Farm Bill on Southern Commodities." Work. Pap., Texas A&M Agr. Exp. Sta., College Station, 1996. Online. Available <http://afpc1.tamu.edu/pubs/fb96/crops/text.htm>.
- Lens, S. *Poverty: America's Enduring Paradox; A History of the Richest Nation's Unwon War*. New York: Crowell, 1971. (Originally published in 1969.)
- Loomis, J., and M. Hemphill. "Poorly Educated Work Force Dilemma for Industry, Challenge for Leaders." *Opelika-Auburn [Alabama] News*, 3 January 1997, p. A3. Reprinted from the *Decatur [Alabama] Daily*.
- Mead, L.M. "Are Welfare Employment Programs Effective?" Discus. Pap. No. 1096-96, Institute for Research on Poverty, University of Wisconsin, July 1996.
- Moynihan, D.P. *Miles to Go: A Personal History of Social Policy*. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1996.
- "Odds Long for Dropouts Trying to Enter Alabama Work Force." *Opelika-Auburn [Alabama] News [Associated Press]*, 3 January 1997, p. A3.
- Otto, D.M. "Economic Linkages Between Agriculture and Other Sectors Within Rural America." *Amer. J. Agr. Econ.* 68,5(1986):1175–80.
- Paarlberg, D. "Effects of New Deal Farm Programs on the Agricultural Agenda Half a Century Later and Prospects for the Future." *Amer. J. Agr. Econ.* 65,5(1983):1162–67.
- Penny, T. "Changing Federalism." In *Public Prob-*

- lems and Policies: Executive Summary* (National Public Policy Conference, Providence RI, 15–18 September 1996). Oakbrook IL: Farm Foundation, 1996.
- Phillips, K. *The Politics of Rich and Poor*. New York: Harper Collins, 1989.
- Piven, F.F. "From Workhouse to Poorhouse." *New York Times* [undated]. Reprinted, in part, on the worldwide web. Online. Available <http://libertynet.org/~edcivic/welfoppo.html>.
- Rasmussen, W.D. "The New Deal Farm Programs: What They Were and Why They Survived." *Amer J. Agr. Econ.* 65,5(1983):1158–62.
- Rayack, E. *Not So Free to Choose*. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1987.
- Riis, J.A. *How the Other Half Lives: Studies Among the Tenements of New York*. New York: C. Scribner's Sons, 1903.
- Rosenfeld, S.A. "The Tale of Two Souths." In *The Rural South in Crisis*, ed., L.J. Beaulieu. Rural Studies Series. Boulder CO: Westview Press, 1988.
- Schertz, L.P. "Improvements in the Rural South: They Won't Come Easy." In *The Rural South in Crisis*, ed., L.J. Beaulieu. Rural Studies Series. Boulder CO: Westview Press, 1988.
- Sherman, A. *Falling by the Wayside: Children in Rural America*. Washington DC: Children's Defense Fund, 1992.
- Tweeten, L. "Farm Commodity Prices and Income." In *Consensus and Conflict in U.S. Agriculture*, eds., J.W. Richardson and B.L. Gardner. College Station TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1979.
- U.S. Bureau of the Census. Webpage. Online. Available <http://www.census.gov.80/hhes/income/income/incineq/p60tb1.html>.
- U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Family Assistance (OFA). OFA web documents, "reports" section. Online. Available <http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/ofa/reports.htm>.
- Webber, A. "A Systems Approach to the Isolation of Factors Related to Levels and Patterns of Living in Low Income Areas of the Rural South." In *Dimensions of Poverty in the Rural South*, eds., J.S. Dhillon and M.R. Howie, Chap. 1. Tallahassee FL: Florida Agricultural and Mechanical University, 1986.



