@article{Fontini:151530,
      recid = {151530},
      author = {Fontini, Fulvio and Millock, Katrin and Moretto, Michele},
      title = {Investments in Quality, Collective Reputation and  Information Acquisition},
      address = {2013-05},
      number = {829-2016-55235},
      series = {ES},
      pages = {43},
      year = {2013},
      abstract = {In many cases consumers cannot observe firms’ investment  in quality or safety, but have only beliefs on the average  quality of the industry. In addition, the outcome of the  collective investment game of the firms may be stochastic  since firms cannot control perfectly the technology or  external factors that may affect production. In such  situations, when only consumers’ subjective perceptions of  the industry level of quality matter, the regulator may  make information available to firms or subsidize their  information acquisition. Under what conditions is it  desirable to make information available? We show how firms’  overall level of investment in quality depends upon the  parameters of the quality accumulation process, the cost of  investment and the number of firms in the industry. We also  show the potentially negative effects on the total level of  quality from providing information on consumers’ actual  valuation.},
      url = {http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/151530},
      doi = {https://doi.org/10.22004/ag.econ.151530},
}