@article{Currarini:151374,
      recid = {151374},
      author = {Currarini, Sergio and Feri, Francesco},
      title = {Information Sharing Networks in Linear Quadratic Games},
      address = {2013-05},
      number = {824-2016-54737},
      series = {CCSD},
      pages = {33},
      year = {2013},
      abstract = {We study the bilateral exchange of information in the  context of linear quadratic games. An information structure  is here represented by a non directed network, whose nodes  are agents and whose links represent sharing agreements. We  first study the equilibrium use of information in any given  sharing network, finding that the extent to which a piece  of information is "public" affects the equilibrium use of  it, in line with previous results in the literature. We  then study the incentives to share information ex-ante,  highlighting the role of the elasticity of payoffs to the  equilibrium volatility of one's own strategy and of one's  opponents' strategies. For the case of uncorrelated signals  we fully characterize pairwise stable networks for the  general linear quadratic game. For the case of correlated  signals, we study pair-wise stable networks for three  specific linear quadratic games - Cournot oligopoly,  Keynes’ beauty contest and Public good provision - in which  strategies are substitute, complement and orthogonal,  respectively. We show that signals’ correlation favors the  transmission of information, but may also prevent all  information from being transmitted.},
      url = {http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/151374},
      doi = {https://doi.org/10.22004/ag.econ.151374},
}