Innovation and Antibiotic Use within Antibiotic Classes: Market Incentives and Economic Instruments

We analyze a monopolist’s incentive to innovate a new antibiotic which is connected to the same pool of antibiotic treatment efficacy as is another drug produced by a generic industry. We outline the differences of antibiotic use under market conditions and in the social optimum. A time and state-dependent tax-subsidy mechanism is proposed to induce the monopolist and generic industry to exploit antibiotic efficacy optimally.


Issue Date:
2013-05
Publication Type:
Working or Discussion Paper
DOI and Other Identifiers:
Record Identifier:
https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/149731
PURL Identifier:
http://purl.umn.edu/149731
JEL Codes:
D21; D42; I18; Q38
Series Statement:
CREATE Working Paper
2013-3




 Record created 2017-04-01, last modified 2020-10-28

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