@article{Capogrossi:149701,
      recid = {149701},
      author = {Capogrossi,   Kristen and You,   Wen},
      title = {National School Lunch Program Menus:  A Moral Hazard  Problem},
      address = {2013},
      pages = {24},
      year = {2013},
      abstract = {Decisions are made daily concerning many facets of the  National School Lunch Program at the federal, state and  local levels, but how are decisions made with regard to the  actual choice of foods on school lunch menus? No study that  we are aware of examines the incentives and barriers among  the SFAs decision-making process with regard to the  provision of healthier lunch menus.  The issue faced by  SFAs is a classic moral hazard problem:  a SFA’s effort for  the provision of healthy menu options is unknown (i.e.,  hidden actions).  SFAs can accept federal funds and  agricultural commodities to provide healthy lunches while  districts create school wellness policies “requiring”  minimum nutritional quality of school-provided foods, but  the overall quality of implementation and compliance are  not observable.  This paper utilizes the Principal-Agent  (PA) theory to model this moral hazard problem and unveil  the barriers and incentive targets and channels behind the  observed inefficient school nutrition policy  implementation.},
      url = {http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/149701},
      doi = {https://doi.org/10.22004/ag.econ.149701},
}