@article{Liu:148293,
      recid = {148293},
      author = {Liu, Pengfei and Swallow, Stephen and Anderson,  Christopher M.},
      title = {Assessing a Provision Game for Two Units of a Public Good,  With Different Group Arrangements, Marginal Benefits, and  Rebate Rules: Experimental Evidence},
      address = {2011-12},
      number = {1584-2016-134088},
      series = {Working Papers},
      pages = {39},
      year = {2011},
      abstract = {The problem of public good provision remains an active  area of economic research and one of the
several areas that  massively apply experimental methods in deriving analytical  data. In such problems,
aggregated individual utility  maximization behaviors would not necessarily coincide with  a socially best
outcome. Thus, a possible solution shall  reconcile this individual and social divergence, which  encourages
us to search for a set of mechanisms that enable  individuals to act according to their own best  interests
while simultaneously maximize the total welfare  of society. When providing public good through  private
fund, people tend to rest on the contributions of  others to cover some cost of the goods, which is  often
referred a “free riding” problem. The efficient  allocation of a public good happens when the sum  of
marginal benefits across people (or the sum of the  heights of people’s demand curves) equals the marginal
cost  of public good provision. If individual each pays his/her  marginal benefit, these individualized price
levels would  constitute the necessary condition for Lindahl equilibrium.  This Lindahl pricing system
would establish a Pareto  optimal provision of the public good, however this system  is rather unattainable
even in carefully controlled  experimental settings (R. Mark Isaac and James M. Walker,  1988, R. Mark
Isaac et al., 1985): people quickly decrease  their contribution in a voluntary environment as  experience
grows. This paper compare several elements  (including alternative rebate rules) that are often seen in  the
public good game, in hope of finding a better way to  raise individual contribution substantially compared
to  traditional volunteer contribution.},
      url = {http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/148293},
      doi = {https://doi.org/10.22004/ag.econ.148293},
}