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Estimating Land Use Patterns: A Separable Programing Approach

By Wen-yuan Huang and Howard C. Hogg

A model is described that projects land use patterns under both competitive and profit maximizing conditions. Separable programing is utilized to internalize price effects resulting from project production, and to allow extension of the basic model to include cross-elasticities. An empirical example, as used to illustrate the model, includes a detailed description of model formulation for solution on the IBM-MPS System.

Keywords: Separable programing, Project evaluation, Competitive-equilibrium land use, Profit-maximizing land use.

INTRODUCTION

The model described in this article can be used to predict land use patterns on newly developed projects when project production is expected to affect product price. Market demand and supply curves summarizing preproject conditions are included in the model for each market available to producers and each commodity that can be grown on the project. A linear programing analysis is used to predict land use patterns for the project. Project supplies are added to those of existing producers to assess demand and price implications. The project can be modeled as if it were a profit-maximizing monopoly, or, if appropriate, as if there were competitive equilibrium for each commodity, site, and market. A unique feature involves a method for approximating the competitive solution using ordinary linear programing. The model incorporates a constraint defining the marginal cost of commodities produced in the project, and it modifies the criterion function to compare average revenue with marginal cost. The model, as formulated, can be solved with the IBM-MPS (Mathematical Programing System).

There are a number of possible applications of the model. Land use patterns under competitive conditions, and, consequently, the direct effects of newly developed projects can be estimated. When production control is to be exercised by the developing entity, profit-maximizing land use patterns can also be estimated. This class of project exists when a private investor, producer cooperative, or Government agency desires to maximize project returns. The model presents an alternative to the point demand-minimum cost models widely used in interregional planning. In an application of this type, the model is formulated with demand curves for each crop and market but no explicit supply curves. The solution indicates the least-cost production pattern, by region and land class, to meet the specified demands. The main difference between the two approaches is that in the model

discussed here, equilibrium product prices and quantities demanded are determined by both supply and demand.

MATHEMATICAL MODEL

The basic structure of the land use model can be expressed as follows:

Maximize:

$$Z = \sum_{i} \sum_{j} \sum_{k} (P_{ik} \Theta_{ij} X_{ijk} - C_{ijk} X_{ijk})$$
(1)

Subject to:

i

$$\sum_{i} \sum_{k} X_{ijk} \leq L_j \text{ for } j=1,\ldots,J$$
(2)

$$Q_{ik} = A_{ik} + B_{ik}P_{ik} \text{ for } i=1, \dots, I$$

$$k=1, \dots, K$$
(3)

(4)

$$Q_{ik} = \Theta_{ij}X_{ijk},$$

$$P_{ik} \ge 0, \text{ and}$$

$$X_{ijk} \ge 0 \text{ for } i=1, \dots, I$$

$$j=1, \dots, J$$

k=1...,K

Where:

- = Market price per unit of the *i*th crop in the P_{ik} kth market
- Yield/acre of the *i*th crop on the *j*th land Θ_{ii} class
- Xiik Acreage of the *i*th crop planted on the *j*th land class and subsequently sold in the kth market
- Cost of production per acre of the *i*th crop $C_{iik} =$ on the *j*th land class and of transportation of the per acre product to the kth market

Total available acreage of the *j*th land class

Net market demand for the *i*th crop in the kth market to be supplied by the new project; that is:

$$P_{ik} = a_{ik} + b_{ik} q_{ik}^d \tag{5}$$

and the current supply curve of the *i*th crop at the *k*th market is:

$$P_{ik} = c_{ik} + d_{ik} q_{ik}^s \tag{6}$$

Then:

$$Q_{ik} = q_{ik}^d - q_{ik}^s \text{ or } Q_{ik} = A_{ik} + B_{ik} P_{ik}$$
(7)

Where:

 A_{ik} = The constant of the net demand curve

$$A_{ik} = \left[\frac{-a_{ik}}{b_{ik}} + \frac{c_{ik}}{d_{ik}} \right]$$
(8)


 B_{ik} = The price coefficient of the net demand curve


$$B_{ik} = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & -1 \\ \hline b_{ik} & d_{ik} \end{bmatrix}$$
(9)

The model consists of sets of linear constraints and a quadratic objective function. That is, Z is a function of P_{ik} and X_{ijk} . For maximizing or minimizing a quadratic objective function subject to linear constraints, various solution procedures have been developed by Kuhn and Tucker (7), Beale (1, 2), Wolfe (12), Houthakker (6), and Hadley (3). A review of interregional quadratic formulations using some of these solution procedures is available from Heady and Hall (4).

A land use pattern under "monopoly" conditions can be estimated by maximizing the objective function (1)(assuming a concave function) subject to the constraint sets (2), (3), and (4). When land is limited, the solution will fall on the line OA shown in figure 1. When land is relatively abundant, the solution is point A. At this point, aggregate marginal revenue is equal to aggregate marginal cost.

By setting price constraints, the model can be used to estimate the land use pattern under competitive equilibrium conditions. Such a condition is reached when the last piece of land entering production will give the same marginal rent for any crop planted. Under the assumption of a concave objective function, additional constraints are required to solve the model under two different land availabilities. In the first case, quantities of each crop demanded by each market can always be provided





Note: Point A is where aggregated marginal revenue (AMR) equals aggregated marginal cost (AMC).

Figure 1

because land is not a limiting factor. The last piece of land entering production earns no rent for any crop planted. The constraints to be added are:

$$P_{ik} = U_{ik}^{(1)}, W_{ik}^{(1)} + U_{ik}^{(2)}, W_{ik}^{(L)} + \dots + U_{ik}^{(L)}, W_{ik}^{(L)}$$

$$= \sum_{j=1}^{L} U_{ik}^{(j)}, W_{ik}^{(j)} \text{ for } i=1, \dots, I$$

$$k=1, \dots, K$$
(10)

Where:

$$U_{ik}^{(j)} = \frac{C_{ijk}}{\Theta_{ij}} , \text{ the marginal cost with } U_{ik}^{(j)} < U_{ik}^{(j+1)}$$

for $j=1, \ldots, L$ -1, and
 $W_{ik}^{(j)}$ for $j=1, \ldots, L$ constituting logical variables.

Each logical variable will take a value of 0 to 1 and

$$\sum_{i=1}^{L} W_{ik}^{(j)} = 1$$

Figure 2 shows the prices P_{ik} (in the solution) will (1) (m)

be between U_{ik} and U_{ik} , depending on the position of the demand curve Q_{ik} . The solution is obtained at the point where the demand curve intersects the marginal cost curve MC_{ik} . This marginal cost is the cost of producing a unit of the *i*th crop on the last unit of land entering production and of selling it in the *k*th market.

In the second case, land is limited and all of it is brought into production. The last piece of land entering production will earn the same marginal rent for any crop planted. Figure 3 shows that price P_{ik} will be greater

than or equal $U_{ik}^{(m)}$. The constraints needed are:

$$P_{ik} - \sum_{L=1}^{m} U_{ik}^{(L)} W_{ik}^{(L)} = R \text{ for } i=1, \dots, I$$

$$k=1, \dots, K$$
(11)

Where:

R = Marginal net price, an internally determined constant

Note that by setting R = 0 in constraint (11), the constraint (10) becomes a special case of (11). An equilibrium solution is reached only when the minimum marginal rent is obtained, but all land is brought into production. Given the form of the objective function (1), it is likely that many values of R will satisfy relationship (11). However, only one value of R is a minimum for all possible R's and provides an equilibrium solution.¹ Here, R must be added to the objective function:

$$Z = \sum_{i} \sum_{j} \sum_{k} P_{ik} \Theta_{jk} \cdot X_{ijk} - C_{ijk} X_{ijk} - \alpha R$$
(12)

Where:

 ${}^{\alpha}$ = is an arbitrarily large nonnegative value, and $R \geqslant 0$

A solution under competitive conditions can thus be obtained by maximizing the objective function (12) subject to the constraint sets (2), (3), (4), and (11). This solution represents an equilibrium in the crop sector and in allocating products from new production areas to various markets. The solution is not the equivalent of Samuelson's equilibrium trade solution, which provides a longrun trade equilibrium (10). The competitive solution of our land use model can be interrupted as a longrun equilibrium because R is the opportunity cost of retaining land in a particular use. When a trade equilibrium is desired, the model can be extended to provide it.²

SEPARABLE PROGRAMING FORMULATION

In this article, the solution procedure of separable programing, described by Hadley, is used (3). Separable programing is a technique for handling a nonlinear objective function or nonlinear constraints that can be written as:

¹As a simple example of the equilibrium solution, assume one market for two crops. If at an arbitrary production level, marginal rent R_{11} from crop 1 is greater than marginal rent R_{21} from crop 2, the land used by crop 2 will be reallocated to crop 1. Consequently, R_{11} will decrease, while R_{21} will increase because of the downward-sloping net demand curves for the two crops. Land reallocation will continue until an equilibrium condition, R_{11} equals R_{21} , is reached. In other words, marginal rent from planting either crop 1 or crop 2 is the same.

The term $-\alpha R$, wherein α is a positive constant and R is rent, is to be maximized. The smallest value of R which makes R_{11} equal R_{21} equal R will be found. Thus, by employing the constraints (equation (11)) and the objective function (equation (12)), equilibrium in the crop sector can be obtained.


² In his net social payoff model, Samuelson assumes that the markets are interdependent; trade between two markets is allowed. (The model presented here assumes no trade between markets.) The equilibrium solution is obtained when the price difference of a commodity between any two markets is less than the transportation cost of moving a unit of commodity from one market to the other. When this condition is reached, net social payoff is maximized. Takayama and Judge (1) and Plessner and Heady (9) formulated constraints for an equilibrium in trade as:

$$P_{ik} - P_{ih} \leq T_{kh}$$
 for all *i*, *k*, and *h*


Where

T_{kh} is the transportation cost between k and h markets

This set of constraints can be added to our model so that an equilibrium solution in both the crop sector and trade can be achieved.



Equilibrium Solution ($P_{ik} = MC_{ik}$ = constant) with Limited Land



$$f(X_1, X_2, \dots, X_n) = f_1(X_1) + \dots + f_n(X_n).$$

In each nonlinear function $f_i(X_i)$, $i=1, \ldots, n$ is a function of only one variable and it is approximated by a piecewise linear function. The nonlinear problem thus becomes a linear programing problem. One reason for using separable programing is because the procedure has been incorporated into the IBM-MPS (8). MPS, one of the most flexible computer packages available, provides great efficiency in computation. Another reason for using separable programing is because of the nature of the model. The quadratic terms in the objective function can be expressed as a linear combination of a function of only one variable. Thus, the function Z equals $f(P_{ik}, X_{ijk})$ can be expressed as Z equals $f_1(P_{ik})$ plus $f_2(X_{ijk})$ as follows:

1. Rearrange the nonlinear terms in the objective function:

$$\sum_{i} \sum_{j} \sum_{k} P_{ik} \Theta_{ij} X_{ijk}$$

as
$$\sum_{i} \sum_{k} P_{ik} (\sum_{j} \Theta_{ij} X_{ijk})$$

2. Since $\sum_{j} \Theta_{ij} X_{ijk}$ is equal to Q_{ik} , it is valid to sub-

stitute $(A_{ik} + B_{ik}P_{ik})$ for $\sum_{j} \Theta_{ij}X_{ijk}$ in the objec-

tive function. The objective function (12) becomes:

$$Z = \sum_{i} \sum_{k} P_{ik} \cdot A_{ik} + \sum_{i} \sum_{k} B_{ik} P_{ik}^{2} - \sum_{i} \sum_{j} \sum_{k} C_{ijk} \cdot (13)$$
$$X_{ijk} - \alpha R$$

Because the original objective function (1) is a separable function and can be expressed as function (13), separable programing can be employed to search for the optimum solution. Furthermore, with objective function (13), the quadratic term $\sum \sum B_{ik}P^{2}_{ik}$ can be expressed in the $i \ k$ matrix form *P'BP* as:

$$\begin{bmatrix} P_{11}P_{12}\cdots P_{ik}\cdots P_{IK} \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} B_{11} & & \\ B_{12} & & \\ & \ddots & \\ & & B_{ik} \\ & & \ddots & \\ & & & B_{IK} \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} P_{11} \\ P_{12} \\ \vdots \\ P_{ik} \\ \vdots \\ P_{IK} \end{bmatrix}$$

The matrix B is a diagonal one. If all values of B_{ik} for $i=1, \ldots, I, K=1, \ldots, K$ are negative, the matrix B is

negative definite and function (13) is concave. In this case, a unique solution exists for maximization.

To test to determine if a solution is possible, three steps must be taken before preparing the computer input data. These are: (1) linearization of the nonlinear term; (2) approximation of the logical constraint (11); and (3) construction of an MPS data matrix. The second step is needed only for a competitive equilibrium problem.

LINEARIZATION OF NONLINEAR TERMS

Before constructing the constraint matrix, the nonlinear term $\sum \sum B_{ik} P_{ik}^2$ must be linearized. Procedures i k

for linearization are given in (8). However, an example of linearization, for the term $B_{11}P_{11}^2$ (*i*=1, *k*=1) appears below. Two equations are needed for each nonlinear term: the grid equation, and the functional equation.

The grid equation is:

$$P_{11} = X_{11}^{(0)} + D_{11}^{(1)} X_{11}^{(1)} + D_{11}^{(2)} X_{11}^{(2)} + \dots$$
(14)
$$+ D_{11}^{(n_{11})} X_{11}^{(n_{11})}$$

Where:

$$X_{11}^{(0)}$$
 = The value of P_{11} at the beginning of the first

$$X_{11}$$
 for $r=1, \ldots n$ are special variables for separable variable P_{11}

$$(r)$$
 (1) (r)
 $0 \le X_{11} \le 1$, and if $X_{11} \ldots X_{11}$ are used to com-
pute the P_{11} value, then

$$X_{11}^{(1)} = X_{11}^{(2)} = \dots = X_{11}^{(r-1)} = 1 \text{ and } X_{11}^{(r+1)} = X_{11}^{(r+2)}$$
$$= X_{11}^{(n_{11})} = 0$$
$$D_{11}^{(r)} = \text{ length of the } r\text{th interval}, r = 1, \dots, n_{11}$$

The values of $D_{11}^{(r)}$ have to be determined by the user and are used for linearization.³

 ${}^{3}D_{11}^{(L)}$ is an arbitrarily small increment of the price P_{11} . The magnitude of $D_{11}^{(r)}$ should be small if the value of the nonlinear term $B_{11}P_{11}^{2}$ is to be sensitive to the change in price P_{11} .

The functional equation is:

$$B_{11}P_{11}^{2} = Y_{11}^{(0)} + E_{11}^{(1)} X_{11}^{(1)} + \ldots + E_{11}^{(n_{11})} X_{11}^{(n_{11})}$$
(15)

Where:

$$Y_{11}^{(0)} = \text{ is the value of } B_{11}P_{11}^2 \text{ at the beginning of the}$$

(r) first interval
$$E_{11}^{(r)} = \text{ is the change in the value of } B_{11}P_{11}^2 \text{ in the } r\text{th}$$

interval for r=1, ..., n₁₁

Figure 4 illustrates the linearization process and the relationship between the two functions. For example, the value

of $B_{11}P_{11}^2$ at the point (X, Y) is $\begin{pmatrix} (1) & (2) \\ B_{11}E_{11}^{(1)} + B_{11}E_{11}^{(1)} \end{pmatrix}$, and the corresponding value for P_{11} is $\begin{pmatrix} (1) & (2) \\ D_{11}^{(1)} + D_{11}^{(2)} \end{pmatrix}$. To obtain these values from equations (14) and (15), the special variables $X_{11}^{(1)}$ and $X_{11}^{(2)}$ are set equal to 1 and the other values of $X_{11}^{(r)}$ are set equal to 0.

Similar procedures can be employed for linearizing each of the other terms, $B_{ik} P_{ik}^2$ for all *i* not equal to 1 and *k* not equal to 1. Once the linearization procedures are completed, the constraint matrix can be constructed.

APPROXIMATION OF THE LOGICAL CONSTRAINT FOR THE COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM CONDITION

Employing the special variables described earlier, the constraint (11) can be reformulated as:

$$P_{ik} - M_{ik}^{(1)} X_{ik}^{(1)} - M_{ik}^{(2)} X_{ik}^{(2)} - \dots - M_{ik}^{(n)} X_{ik}^{(n)} = R$$

for *i*=1,..., I
k=1,..., K (16)

Where:

$$M_{ik}^{(1)} = U_{ik}^{(1)}$$

$$M_{ik}^{(2)} = U_{ik}^{(2)} - U_{ik}^{(1)}$$

$$\vdots$$

$$\vdots$$

$$M_{ik}^{(n)} = U_{ik}^{(n)} - U_{ik}^{(n-1)}$$

$$X_{ik}^{(r)}$$
 = The special variables defined in equation (14),
r=1, n. Constraint (16) is an approximation of
constraint (11). The approximation error will

be small if the magnitudes of $M_{ik}^{(2)}, M_{ik}^{(3)}, \dots$ $M_{ik}^{(n)}$ are small.

CONSTRAINT MATRIX

The objective function (13) and the constraint sets (2), (3), (4) and (16) for three crops (I=3), two land classes (J=3) and two markets (J=2) are constructed in matrix form in table 1. Each row is a constraint and each column, a structural variable. The matrix, which represents the basic structure of the model, can be extended for a relatively large number of crops, land classes, and markets. Additional constraints may be added for other types of resources. Because P_{ik} and X_{ijk} are shown as structural variables, cross-elasticities between crops can be built into the model by restating the relationship between P_{ik} and X_{ijk} (see appendix).

USE OF THE MODEL


In 1968, a paper published in this journal described an iterative model similar to the one developed here (5). The illustrative example comes from that article. Tables 3 and 4 contain all of the basic data which, except for the net demand curves in table 3, are identical to the data required in the earlier formulation. Both models are project oriented but ours is more general because crosselasticities and constraints other than land and commodity demand can be accommodated. Table 2 illustrates how the input data is entered into the matrix shown in general form in table 1. In table 2, the coefficients A_{ik} and B_{ik} are from table 3, and C_{ijk} and Θ_{ij} are from table 4 (the value for α is 1,000,000). The coefficients Δ 's and M's are computed by using equation 15 and these are as follows:

Δ_1	= 843325	$\Delta_{17} = 50150$	M ₁	= 140
Δ_2^1	= 371063	$\Delta_{18} = 150450$	M_2	= 4.444
Δ_3^2	= 438529	$\Delta_{19} = 250750$	M_3	= 5.556
Δ_4^0	= 505995	$\Delta_{20}^{10} = 351050$	M ₄	= 88.888
Δ_5	= 573461	$\Delta_{21}^{20} = 33025$	M ₅	= 1.112
Δ_6	= 640927	$\Delta_{22} = 99075$	M ₆	= .909
Δ_7	= 708393	$\Delta_{23} = 165125$		= 175
Δ_8	= 775859	$\Delta_{24} = 231175$	M ₈	= 41.666
Δ_9	= 843325	$\Delta_{25}^{-1} = 83825$	M ₉	= 83.34
Δ_{10}	= 910791	$\Delta_{26} = 251475$	M10	= 100
Δ_{11}	= 978257	$\Delta_{27} = 422875$	M ₁₁	= 5.55
	= 1045723	$\Delta_{28} = 592025$		= 6.945
	= 1113189	$\Delta_{29} = 85825$		= 110.53
	= 1180655	$\Delta_{30} = 257475$	M ₁₄	= .5850
	= 1248121	$\Delta_{31} = 499125$		= .6530
	= 1315587	$\Delta_{32} = 600775$	10	

The formulations represent two alternatives: (1) the land use pattern expected on a newly developed project under competitive conditions, and (2) the profitmaximizing land use pattern when production control, as opposed to free choice, is exercised. Tables 5 and 6 compare the original solution with that of the present model. The example uses five crops, three land classes, and one market.

All lands in the project enter production under competitive conditions in the example. In the "monopoly" solution, only land class 2 is utilized in its entirety, resulting in a zero opportunity rent for land. The "monopoly" prices are, of course, higher than those indicated for the competitive solution. The material presented in tables 5 and 6 is available directly from model output. In addition, certain other impacts of the project can be quantified from the model. For example, the quantities grown by project producers can be obtained by solving the original supply curves with the computed equilibrium prices. Performing the same operation on the demand curves results in an estimate of total market supply. The difference between solution values for the iterative and separable procedures results from the linearization of equation (7) and the approximation of equation (11) by (16). Objective function values for the competitive solution were \$307,481 (separable) and \$310,183 (iterative). A value of \$1,052,032 was obtained for the monopoly solution.

Some users may be concerned that the budgeted production costs are based on factor use under a price level different from the final equilibrium prices. This inconsistency can be resolved by rebudgeting at the new prices. If optimum input combinations change, the model can be rerun with the newly budgeted costs. Several attempts at this iterative process will isolate a price range that brackets the equilibrium position. An acceptable range depends on the linearization precision, data accuracy, and the relative magnitude of the range of prices. In most applications, it should not be necessary to undertake this step as the difference between the budget price and final equilibrium price will be small.






Table 1. Data matrix for land use model

Table 2. Data matrix for land use model ACTIVITY LEVEL SPECIAL VARIABLES RHS p² p p 31 41 51 ROW N co Z L1 550 12 100 L 100 L3 45 -B 11 50 40 E A11 D11 45 E A21 D21 -B 55 50 40 A31 30 20 A41 D41 100 90 80 -B 41 A51 D51 95 90 85 N11 0 E 0 N21 Ε 17 18 19 20 N31 0 1 21 22 23 24 E N41 25 26 27 28 E 0 N51 ¹/₂₉ ³/₃₀ ¹/₃₁ ¹/₃₂ 0 0 G21 50 50 50 50 E 0 G31 50 50 50 50 E O G41 50 50 50 50 E 0 G51 E 0 50 50 50 50 M1 M2 M3 P11 E O M₄ M₅ M₆ M₇ M₈ M₉ E O P21 E O P31 1 M M M 10 11 12 P41 E O P51 M M M E O Upper Bou Lower Bour

Note: A₁₁=78833, A₂₁=4039, A₃₁=4184, A₄₁=7583, A₅₁=7500/ B₁₁=-337,33, B₂₁=-20.06, B₃₁=-13.21, B₄₁=-33.83, B₅₁=-34.33 / ce = 10⁵

 $\begin{array}{l} c_{111}=7000, c_{211}=6000, c_{311}=7000, c_{411}=10000, c_{511}=10500, c_{121}=6500, c_{221}=4500, c_{321}=6500, c_{421}=9500, c_{521}=10000, c_{131}=6000, c_{231}=4000, c_{331}=6000, c_{431}=9000, c_{531}=9500 \end{array}$

30

	Demand functions		Supply functions		Net demand curves	
Crop	Price intercept	Slope	Cost intercept	Slope	Quantity intercept	Slope
	a _{ik}	b _{ik}	c _{ik}	d _{ik}	A _{ik}	B _{ik}
1	250	-0.003	-1,125	0.25	78,833	-337.33
2	300	05	-33,330	17.0	4,039	-20.06
3	400	08	-1,143	1.4	4,184	-13.21
4	250	03	-1,500	2.0	7,583	-33.83
5	300	03	-2,500	1.0	7,500	-34.33

^aPrices are estimated in dollars per 1,000 pounds and quantities are in 1,000 pound units. In this example the demand and supply curves are linear.

	Production costs per acre C _{ijk}			Per acre yield Θ_{ij}		
Crop	Land class 1	Land class 2	Land class 3	Land class 1	Land class 2	Land class 3
		Dollars			1,000 lbs.	
1	7,000	6,500	6,000	50	45	40
2	5,000	4,500	4,000	55	50	45
3	7,000	6,500	6,000	40	30	20
4	10,000	9,500	9,000	100	90	80
5	10,500	10,000	9,500	95	90	85

^aIn this example, land classes 1, 2, and 3 show progressively lower yields for all crops, but this progression is not a requirement of the program.

	Original iterative solution			Separable competitive solution			Separable monopoly solution		
Crop	Land class 1	Land class 2	Land class 3	Land class 1	Land class 2	Land class 3	Land class 1	Land class 2	Land class 3
					Acres				
1	467.2	100.0	6.9	473.3	100.0	2.6	295.3		····
2			50.0			49.3			22.9
3	42.5			38.5			38.5		
4	40.3			38.1			25.6		
5			43.0			43.0	24.7		
Total	550.0	100.0	100.0	550.0	100.0	94.9	384.1		22.9

Table 6. Equilibrium product prices and opportunity rents from alternative solutions

Crop	Equilibrium product prices				Opportunity rents		
	Iterative solution	Competitive solution	Monopoly solution	Land class	Iterative solution	Competitive solution	Monopoly solution
		Dollars				Dollars	
1	150.28	150.00	190.00	1	514.15	493.67	0
2	89.14	90.91	150.00	2	262.73	254.43	0
3	187.85	200.00	200.00	3	11.32	0	0
4	105.14	112.50	150.00				
5	111.90	111.77	150.00				

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APPENDIX

A simple single-market example appears below. Assuming that the cross elasticity between the demand for crop 1, q_{11} and the price, P_{21} , of crop 2 in market 1 is constant, the cross elasticity can be expressed as:

$$e_{12} = \frac{dq_{11}}{q_{11}} / \frac{dP_{21}}{P_{21}}$$

Rewrite as:

$$e_{12} \cdot \frac{dP_{21}}{P_{21}} = \frac{dq_{11}}{q_{11}}$$

The solution for this differential equation is:

$$q_{11} = \frac{q_{11}^{o}}{P_{21}^{o}} P_{21}^{e_{12}}$$
(a)

Where q_{11}^O and P_{21}^O are the equilibrium (intersection of demand and supply) quantity and price on the market before the new project starts.

Since
$$Q_{11} = q_{11} - q_{11}^{O}$$
 (b)

equation (a) can be expressed as:

$$Q_{11} + q_{11}^{o} = \frac{q_{11}^{o}}{P_{11}^{o}} \cdot P_{21}^{e_{12}}$$

Substituting
$$\sum_{j} \Theta_{1j} X_{1j1}$$
 for Q_{11} ,

equation (b) becomes

$$\Sigma \Theta_{1j} X_{1j1} + q_{11} = \frac{q_{11}^{O}}{P_{21}^{O}} P_{21}^{e_{12}}$$
(c)

Incorporating the cross-elasticity in the model means adding constraint (c). Since $P_{21}^{e_{12}}$ is a nonlinear term,

linearization of $P_{21}^{e_{12}}$ is required. The procedures for linearization are those described in the text. To add a cross-elasticity constraint to figure 5 requires the addition of 1 column (Structural Variable) for $P_{21}^{e_{12}}$ and 2 rows—1 row for the cross-elasticity constraint and 1 for the functional equation. Additional grid equations and special variables employed in the linearization of P_{21}^2 can be used for the linearization of $P_{21}^{e_{12}}$