000144662 001__ 144662
000144662 005__ 20180122224257.0
000144662 037__ $$a1693-2016-137479
000144662 041__ $$aen_US
000144662 245__ $$aOn the existence and optimality of equilibria in lobbying economies
000144662 260__ $$c1989-07
000144662 269__ $$a1989-07
000144662 270__ $$mjcoggins@umn.edu$$pCoggins,   Jay Steven
000144662 300__ $$a155
000144662 336__ $$aThesis/ Dissertation
000144662 520__ $$aSuppose that members of a society are accorded status as both economic and political agents.  If the polity responds to the same actors for whom economic policy matters, a simultaneity of political and economic determination is introduced.  The first goal of the research presented here concerns the microeconomic question, How does an agent choose economic and political behavior simultaneously when his or her political activity has an explicit effect on the economic environment?  The second is to determine conditions under which an equilibrium will exist in a generic strategic lobbying situation.  The third is to discover the effect of lobbying behavior on society's welfare position.  The model of the thesis begins with an exchange economy in which agents are asked to make economic and political decisions simultaneously.  A government mechanism sets relative prices by law in response to donations by political interests whose stakes in the price level are diametrically opposed, trading with a larger world economy to clear the distorted domestic markets.  The first result is the demonstration that under certain conditions on the economy, the model possesses a lobbying equilibrium.  The welfare properties of this equilibrium are evaluated by comparing agents' utility levels at the lobbying outcome with those which would obtain in corresponding competitive economies.  Both agents may be worse off with lobbying than without it, but one agent is sometimes better off with the lobbying program.  Using cooperative game theoretic techniques, the potential for agents to gain by forming a coalititon and overturning the intervention policy is studied.  The potential for the government to achieve an analagous improvement by implementing a tax/transfer scheme is also evaluated.  It is shown that cases in which agents could help themselves by cooperating coincide precisely with cases in which the government could help them by replacing the price policy of the model with a tax/transfer policy.  In order to investigate these welfare properties, and to draw conclusions about the relationships between agents' characteristics and the pricing rule, numerical experiments are carried out in which equilibrium outcomes are calculated for example economies.
000144662 542__ $$fLicense granted by Linda Eells (lle@umn.edu) on 2013-02-18T22:05:15Z (GMT):

<center>  <h2> Deposit Agreement </h2> </center>
I represent that I am the creator of the digital material identified herein (&ldquo;Work&rdquo;).
I represent that the work is original and that I either own all rights of copyright 
or have the right to deposit the copy in a digital archive such as AgEcon Search. 
I represent that in regard to any non-original material included in the Work I have
secured written permission of the copyright owner (s) for this use or believe this 
use is allowed by law. I further represent that I have included all appropriate 
credits and attributions. I hereby grant the Regents of the University of Minnesota
(&ldquo;University&rdquo;), through AgEcon Search, a non-exclusive right to access, reproduce, 
and distribute the Work, in whole or in part, for the purposes of security, preservation,
and perpetual access. I grant the University a limited, non-exclusive right to make
derivative works for the purpose of migrating the Work to other media or formats in
order to preserve access to the Work. I do not transfer or intend to transfer any 
right of copyright or other intellectual property to the University. If the Deposit 
Agreement is executed by the Author�s Representative, the Representative shall separately
execute the following representation: I represent that I am authorized by the Author
to execute this Deposit Agreement on behalf of the Author.

000144662 650__ $$aPolitical Economy
000144662 650__ $$aResearch Methods/ Statistical Methods
000144662 700__ $$aCoggins, Jay S.
000144662 8564_ $$s1550922$$uhttps://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/144662/files/CogginsPhD1989.pdf
000144662 887__ $$ahttp://purl.umn.edu/144662
000144662 909CO $$ooai:ageconsearch.umn.edu:144662$$pGLOBAL_SET
000144662 912__ $$nSubmitted by Linda Eells (lle@umn.edu) on 2013-02-18T22:18:39Z
No. of bitstreams: 1
CogginsPhD1989.pdf: 1550922 bytes, checksum: 19ce833635a8dc14c7722f868044cd68 (MD5)
000144662 912__ $$nMade available in DSpace on 2013-02-18T22:18:41Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1
CogginsPhD1989.pdf: 1550922 bytes, checksum: 19ce833635a8dc14c7722f868044cd68 (MD5)
  Previous issue date: 1989-07
000144662 982__ $$gUniversity of Minnesota>Department of Applied Economics>Faculty and Alumni Theses and Dissertations
000144662 980__ $$a1693