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Testing Market Power with Profit Functions: a Dual Approach with Normalized Quadratic
Functions

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#### Abstract

The dual relationship between parameters of normalized quadratic cost and profit functions is determined when firms can implement market power on the output market. An approach is developed to test the market power by comparing the profits of a firm with and without market power. Simulations demonstrate the efficiency of this approach.

Key words: Normalized quadratic cost function, Normalized quadratic profit functions, Duality, Market power

\section*{Introduction}

The price-cost margin (Lerner Index) is usually used to measure the degree of market power that a firm can implement. Because marginal costs are not directly observable, empirical tests of market power normally use the price elasticity of demand to measure market power: a low elasticity implies substantial market power and a high elasticity implies little or no market power. However, these tests do not incorporate the profit information that a firm can obtain by implementing the market power. The profits of a firm are determined by both revenue and costs, which not only depend on the prices and marginal costs, but also rely on the output quantities. In addition, most previous research focus on a single product firm while firms that produce multi-products are popular in many industries. One of the few papers that estimates the market power in a multiproduct setting is by Schroeter and Azzam (1990), where a two-output model is presented. Using the dual relationship between profit and cost functions, this article presents an approach to test the market power by comparing the profits under the condition with and without market power. This test incorporates both the input side information (marginal


cost) and the output side information (price and output quantity). In addition, this approach naturally incorporates the multi-product characteristics of most modern firms.

## Method

## Unrestricted Profit Function with Market Power

A cost function with flexible functional form, normalized quadratic cost function with $n$ inputs and $m$ outputs is defined as

$$
C(W, Y)=b_{0}+\underset{1 * n}{B} * \underset{n * 1}{W}+\underset{1 * m}{A} * \underset{m * 1}{Y}+0.5 * \underset{1 * n}{W^{\prime}} * \underset{n * n}{B B} * \underset{n * 1}{W}+0.5 * \underset{1 * m}{Y}{ }^{\prime} * \underset{m * m}{C C} * \underset{m * 1}{Y}+\underset{1 * n}{W^{\prime}} * \underset{n * m}{A A} * \underset{m * 1}{Y}(1),
$$

where $W$ is a vector of input prices, $Y$ is a vector of output quantities, and others are parameters in the cost function.

Under the assumption that a firm has market power on the output sides and assuming that the price of a product can only be affected by its own quantity, the price quantity relationship of a product can be defined as $p_{i}=f\left(y_{i}\right)$. Firms will maximize the profit and the unrestricted profit function can be obtained as a result of following maximization problem:
$\Pi=\max P(Y) * Y-C(W, Y)(2)$,
where $P$ is a vector of endogenous output prices, $P=\left[\begin{array}{lll}p_{1} & \ldots & p_{m}\end{array}\right]$.

The first order conditions of equation (2) is
$\frac{\partial \Pi}{\partial Y}=P^{\prime}+D D * Y-\frac{\partial C(W, Y)}{\partial Y}=0$ (3),
where $=\left[\begin{array}{ccccc}\frac{\partial p_{1}}{\partial y_{1}} & 0 & \ldots \ldots & 0 \\ 0 & \frac{\partial p_{2}}{\partial y_{2}} & \ldots \ldots & 0 \\ \cdot & \cdot & \cdot \\ \cdot & \cdot & \cdot & \cdot \\ 0 & 0 & \ldots & \cdot & \frac{\partial p_{m}}{\partial y_{m}}\end{array}\right]$

This is a general condition which states that with market power, a firm's the marginal revenue of producing a product equals its marginal cost. The term $D D * Y$ is the monopoly overcharge, which is the difference between monopoly price and competitive price. With a normalized quadratic cost function, the first order conditions are:
$P^{\prime}=A^{\prime}+C C * Y+A A^{\prime} * W-D D * Y(4)$

It is not possible to solve the optimal outputs $\mathrm{Y}^{*}$ explicitly because DD is a function of Y. However, without losing generality, we can apply the first-order Taylor series expansion of $p_{i}=f\left(y_{i}\right)$ around a fixed quantity (i.e. $\overline{\mathrm{y}}_{0}$ ), which gives:
$p_{i}=f\left(\bar{y}_{i}\right)+f^{\prime}\left(\bar{y}_{i}\right)\left(y_{i}-\bar{y}_{i}\right)(5)$.

As a result, $D D$ can by simplified to
$D D=\left[\begin{array}{cccc}f^{\prime}\left(\bar{y}_{1}\right) & 0 & \ldots \ldots & 0 \\ 0 & f^{\prime}\left(\bar{y}_{2}\right) & \ldots \ldots & 0 \\ \cdot & \cdot & \cdot & \cdot \\ \cdot & \cdot & \cdot & \cdot \\ \cdot & \cdot & \cdot & f^{\prime}\left(\bar{y}_{m}\right)\end{array}\right]$ (6).
Plug (6) into the equation (4), and the optimal output qualities can be solved as:
$Y^{*}=(C C-D D)^{-1} *\left(P^{\prime}-A^{\prime}-A A^{\prime} * W\right)(7)$.

The cost at the optimal output levels can be determined by plugging (7) into the equation (1), and the unrestricted profit function can be determined by plugging (7) into the equation (2).

The cost at the optimal output levels is:
$C\left(W, Y^{*}\right)=\beta_{0}+\beta_{1} * W+\beta_{2} * P^{\prime}+0.5 * W^{\prime} * \beta_{3} * W+0.5 * P * \beta_{4} * P^{\prime}+P * \beta_{5} * W$ (8)

Where
$\beta_{0}=\left[b_{0}-A *(C C-D D)^{-1} * A^{\prime}+0.5 * A *(C C-D D)^{-1} * C C *(C C-D D)^{-1} * A^{\prime}\right]$
$\beta_{1}=\left[B-2 * A *(C C-D D)^{-1} * A A^{\prime}+A *(C C-D D)^{-1} * C C *(C C-D D)^{-1} * A A^{\prime}\right]$
$\beta_{2}=\left[A *(C C-D D)^{-1}-A *(C C-D D)^{-1} * C C *(C C-D D)^{-1}\right]$
$\beta_{3}=\left[B B-A A *(C C-D D)^{-1} * C C *(C C-D D)^{-1} * A A^{\prime}\right]$
$\beta_{4}=(C C-D D)^{-1} * C C *(C C-D D)^{-1}$
$\beta_{5}=\left[(C C-D D)^{-1} * A A^{\prime}-(C C-D D)^{-1} * C C *(C C-D D)^{-1} * A A^{\prime} * W\right]$

The unrestricted profit function is
$\Pi=\alpha_{0}+\alpha_{1} * W+\alpha_{2} * P^{\prime}+0.5 * W^{\prime} * \alpha_{3} * W+P * \alpha_{4} * P^{\prime}+P * \alpha_{5} * W$ (9)
where

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \alpha_{0}=\left[-b_{0}+A *(C C-D D)^{-1} * A^{\prime}-0.5 * A *(C C-D D)^{-1} * C C *(C C-D D)^{-1} * A^{\prime}\right] \\
& \alpha_{1}=\left[2 * A *(C C-D D)^{-1} * A A^{\prime}-A *(C C-D D)^{-1} * C C *(C C-D D)^{-1} * A A^{\prime}-B\right] \\
& \alpha_{2}=\left[A *(C C-D D)^{-1} * C C *(C C-D D)^{-1}-2 * A *(C C-D D)^{-1}\right] \\
& \alpha_{3}=\left[A A *(C C-D D)^{-1} * C C *(C C-D D)^{-1} * A A^{\prime}-B B\right] \\
& \alpha_{4}=\left[(C C-D D)^{-1}-0.5 *(C C-D D)^{-1} * C C *(C C-D D)^{-1}\right]
\end{aligned}
$$

$\alpha_{5}=\left[(C C-D D)^{-1} * C C *(C C-D D)^{-1} * A A^{\prime}-2 *(C C-D D)^{-1} * A A^{\prime}\right]$

Equation (9) indicates that if the market power exists and the price-demand function can be approximated by first-order Taylor series expansion, the unrestricted profit function is also a normalized quadratic function. Equation (9) is a generalization of the results of Gao and Featherstone (2008) who demonstrate the explicit relationship between the parameters in a normalized quadratic cost and a profit function in the case of perfect competition. If there is no market power, the parameters in the unrestricted profit function change to:
$\alpha_{0}^{*}=-b_{0}+0.5 * A * C C^{-1} * A^{\prime}, \alpha_{1}^{*}=A * C C^{-1} * A A^{\prime}-B, \alpha_{2}^{*}=-A * C C^{-1}$,
$\alpha_{3}^{*}=\left[A A * C C^{-1} * A A^{\prime}-B B\right], \alpha_{4}^{*}=0.5 * C C^{-1}, \quad \alpha_{5}^{*}=C C^{-1} * A A^{\prime}$

## Test Market Power with Cost and Profit Functions

The cost function defined in equation (1) is the same no matter a firm has market power or not in the output market. If there is no market power, the unrestricted profit function can be recovered by equation (9) where the parameters are defined by $\alpha_{i}^{*}$. The profit ( $\pi^{p}$ ) of a firm without market power can be estimated with the recovered unrestricted profit function.

With the same normalized quadratic cost function, the unrestricted profit function of a firm that may have market power is also a normalized quadratic function. This indicates that a normalized quadratic profit function can be directly estimated with input and output price data without any assumption of the market power that a firm may have. The profit $\left(\pi^{m}\right)$ of the firm can be estimated using the unrestricted profit function. If the firm does not have market power, the differences in the profits estimated under the conditions with and without market power should be close to zero such that $\left|\pi^{m}-\pi^{p}\right|<\delta$, where
$\delta$ is a small number close to zero. The significance of the market power can be determined by testing whether the difference between $\pi^{m}$ and $\pi^{p}$ is significantly different from zero or not.

## A Simulation Study: A Case of Six Outputs and Three Inputs

Simulations are conducted in three cases: (1) no market power; (2) output price has a linear relationship with output quantity $\left(p_{i}=\mathrm{I}_{i}+D_{i} * y_{i}\right)$; and (3) output price has a quadratic relationship with output quantity $\left(p_{i}=\mathrm{I}_{i}+D_{i} * y_{i}+E_{i} y_{i}^{2}\right)$. In all three cases, two hundred prices are simulated and 1,000 simulations are conducted. In case one, input and output prices are generated as exogenous variables; in case two and, input prices are generated as exogenous variable, and output quantity and prices are generated using the equation (7) and $p_{i}=f\left(y_{i}\right)$. The costs and profits are calculated using equation (1) and $P(Y) * Y-C(W, Y)$, respectively. The curvature conditions of the cost function are imposed using Cholesky decomposition methods. The parameters in the cost function and the inverse demand function are reported in table 1.

With the parameters in the in the cost function, the parameters in the unrestricted profit function under perfect competition are calculated and reported in table 2 . With parameters in table 2, the profits under perfect competition $\left(\pi^{p}\right)$ are calculated with equation (9) where the parameters are defined by $\alpha_{i}^{*}$. Then the simulation is conducted with the following steps: (1) The profit $\left(\pi^{m}\right)$ under perfect competition, linear pricedemand function, and quadratic price-demand function are generated by $P(Y) * Y-$ $C(W, Y)$ and random errors following normal distribution are added to $\pi^{m}$ such that $\pi^{m *}=\pi^{m}+\varepsilon$, to simulate the observed profits; (2) $\pi^{m *}$ are used to estimate the unrestricted profit function with the normalized quadratic form; (3) The null hypothesis
that the predicted $\pi^{m *}$ are not statistically significantly different from $\pi^{p}$ is tested. The steps 1 to 3 are repeated 1,000 times and the statistics of the p-values for the hypothesis tests are reported in table 3. The results in table 3 indicate that when market power exists (case 2 and case 3), the null hypothesis that there is no market power is rejected for all the 1,000 simulations. However, the test fails to reject the null hypothesis in some cases when there is no market power. Further investigation shows that in about 12 cases ( $1.2 \%$ ), the null hypothesis of no market power are failed to be rejected at the $10 \%$ significance level.

## Conclusion

This article presents an approach to test the market power using the dual relationship between the normalized cost and profit function. We first extend the results of Gao and Featherstone (2008) by demonstrating that the unrestricted profit function corresponding to the normalized quadratic cost function is also a quadratic function. We then present the a simple approach to test the market power by comparing the profit under the condition of market power and perfect competition. Our simulation results show that the approach successfully rejects the null hypothesis that there is no market power when market power exist. In addition, although the approach rejects the null hypothesis of no market power in the case of perfect competition, the number of rejections only accounts for $1.2 \%$ of the total simulation cases.

## References:

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Table 1. Parameters of the Cost and Price-demand Function used in Simulation

| Parameter | Value | Parameter | Value | Parameter | Value | Parameter | Value |
| :--- | :---: | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :---: |
| b0 | 35.00 | CC | AA |  |  |  |  |
| B |  | C11 | 59.25 | A11 | -43.59 | I1 | 2978.90 |
| B1 | 0.20 | C12 | 23.74 | A12 | 30.00 | I2 | 4379.09 |
| B2 | 0.30 | C13 | 27.72 | A13 | 551.61 | I3 | 7066.66 |
| B3 | 0.40 | C14 | 49.96 | A14 | 100.00 | I4 | 12631.43 |
| A |  | C15 | 35.69 | A15 | 30.00 | I5 | 11287.63 |
| A1 | 30.00 | C16 | 12.09 | A16 | 104.87 | I6 | 6466.87 |
| A2 | 298.71 | C22 | 27.87 | A21 | -66.54 | D1 | -3.48 |
| A3 | 60.00 | C23 | 31.34 | A22 | 188.18 | D2 | -3.96 |
| A4 | 3.00 | C24 | 65.48 | A23 | 103.26 | D3 | -6.93 |
| A5 | 70.00 | C25 | 51.91 | A24 | 20.00 | D4 | -0.60 |
| A6 | 10.00 | C26 | 14.88 | A25 | 299.37 | D5 | -5.09 |
| BB |  | C33 | 84.24 | A26 | 31.74 | D6 | -4.48 |
| B11 | -13.42 | C34 | 102.82 | A31 | -1.72 | E1 | -3.48 |
| B12 | -21.20 | C35 | 83.30 | A32 | 120.48 | E2 | -3.96 |
| B13 | -6.50 | C36 | 61.38 | A33 | -21.53 | E3 | -6.93 |
| B22 | -53.00 | C44 | 231.03 | A34 | 134.56 | E4 | -0.60 |
| B23 | -17.50 | C45 | 185.52 | A35 | 30.00 | E5 | -5.09 |
| B33 | -6.25 | C46 | 97.65 | A36 | 49.98 | E6 | -4.48 |
|  |  | C55 | 171.53 |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | C56 | 81.84 |  |  |  |  |

Table 2. Parameters of the Unrestricted Profit Function Corresponding to the Cost Function under Perfect Competition

| Parameter | Value | Parameter | Value | Parameter | Value |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $\alpha_{0}^{*}$ | 11833.489 | $\alpha_{4}^{*}$ |  |  |  |
| $\alpha_{1}^{*}$ |  | PC11 | 0.027 | $\alpha_{5}^{*}$ |  |
| PB1 | -5064.677 | PC12 | -0.034 | PA11 | -2.283 |
| PB2 | 14959.625 | PC13 | 0.000 | PA12 | -20.017 |
| PB3 | 8103.616 | PC14 | 0.002 | PA14 | 20.629 |
| $\alpha_{2}^{*}$ |  | PC15 | 0.005 | PA15 | -2.003 |
| PA1 | 8.914 | PC16 | -0.005 | PA16 | -12.759 |
| PA2 | -82.686 | PC22 | 0.292 | PA21 | -6.723 |
| PA3 | 14.828 | PC23 | -0.058 | PA22 | 49.326 |
| PA4 | 26.572 | PC24 | -0.083 | PA23 | -6.564 |
| PA5 | 0.031 | PC25 | -0.011 | PA24 | -24.374 |
| PA6 | -27.690 | PC26 | 0.100 | PA25 | 10.646 |
| $\alpha_{3}^{*}$ |  | PC33 | 0.045 | PA26 | 14.925 |
| PB11 | 9935.567 | PC34 | 0.009 | PA31 | -3.960 |
| PB12 | -2379.759 | PC35 | 0.002 | PA32 | 30.005 |
| PB13 | -2948.385 | PC36 | -0.035 | PA33 | -8.412 |
| PB22 | 12277.938 | PC44 | 0.064 | PA34 | -4.232 |
| PB23 | 3898.707 | PC45 | -0.033 | PA35 | -4.784 |
| PB33 | 3658.165 | PC46 | -0.034 | PA36 | 11.244 |
|  |  | PC55 | 0.046 |  |  |
|  |  | PC56 | -0.006 |  |  |
|  |  | PC66 | 0.064 |  |  |

Table 3. Statistic of P-Values of the Hypothesis Test there There is No Market Power

| Case | N | Mean | Std | Min | Max |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| No Market Power | 1000 | 0.62 | 0.24 | 0.02 | 1.00 |
| Market Power (Linear Price-Demand Function) | 1000 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Market Power (Quadratic Price-Demand | 1000 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Function) |  |  |  |  |  |

