@article{Cardwell:142376,
      recid = {142376},
      author = {Cardwell, Ryan T. and Ghazalian, Pascal L.},
      title = {The TRIPS Agreement as a Coercive Threat: Estimating the  Effects of Trade Ties on IPR Enforcement},
      address = {2012-10},
      number = {1619-2016-134670},
      series = {CATPRN Working Paper},
      pages = {25},
      year = {2012},
      abstract = {Negotiators from developed countries pushed hard for the  inclusion of the TRIPS Agreement in the WTO set of  agreements because it was viewed as a potentially effective  method of coercing developing countries to strengthen their  protection of intellectual property rights (IPR). We  investigate whether the threat of cross-agreement  retaliation, which could be authorized in disputes  regarding the TRIPS Agreement, is effective in changing  countries’ IPR protection regimes. The results from a panel  empirical model suggest that both the TRIPS Agreement and  the strength of trade ties with developed countries are  important determinants of IPR protection, but that the  vulnerability to potential trade losses through  cross-agreement retaliation is not a uniformly significant  determinant across geo-economic regions. We conclude that  the threat of trade retaliation is just one important  determinant of countries’ institutional protection of IPR.},
      url = {http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/142376},
      doi = {https://doi.org/10.22004/ag.econ.142376},
}