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THE CEREAL SECTOR IN MOROCCO:
FOCUS OF THE 'NEW AGRICULTURAL POLICY'

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INTRODUCTION

The cereal sector in Morocco constitutes an interesting paradox. On one hand, cereals are produced throughout the country, and on the other hand, the domestic production is providing less and less the needs of the population. This culture uses 85% of the land which is seeded each year. This importance in agriculture is not new. It reached two million hectares by 1920, and four million by 1940, the colonials and the Moroccan peasantry, having for different reasons, placed a priority on this culture (Table 1). Currently, cereals occupy five million hectares of land and represent the maximum amount of land that can be put in this culture. Some of this land is becoming useless each year under the influence of erosion and it must then be returned to pasture land. Cereal production has generally been an extensive culture except in the colonial lands situated on the Atlantic coastal plains, on certain lands belonging to wealthy and of interest to the colonial authorities, and in some valleys occupied by peasants since historic times. This extensive characteristic of production was associated with the massive expropriation of the peasant land which, even though it was undertaken in

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a legal system which was designed to protect tribal lands against the appetites of the colonists and their local allies, did not have the least impact on most of the very rich land. A peasant class marginalized by being relegated to the marginal land constitutes the fundamental explanation of the low level of production, (Table 2) a level of production that has achieved only two quintals per hectare in the space of 50 years.

However, today, assigning the cereal deficit to the colonial policies is only a partial explanation of the deficit. It is certain that the structural characteristics that have brought about the stagnation of cereal production are the product of the colonial aggression, but the agricultural policy followed since independence has intensified the cereal deficit in such proportion that they are judged today to be alarming by the public powers. The questioning of this policy, undertaken in 1973 following the world crisis in basic food products throughout the world, is unanimously considered a necessity. The origin of this reconsideration of past choices is not only the increasing cereal deficit and associated foreign exchange deficit, but also the increasing difficulties encountered by agricultural exports of Morocco and by the weak performance of agriculture on the large development projects such as large special irrigation schemes and the special dairy production program. Nevertheless, even if the official strategy is based on the necessity to promote basic food products, the strategy is still constrained by a social-political system which determines the political choices which are made to deal with the problem. Furthermore, the cereal deficit can only be dealt with in relation to the general crisis that characterizes Moroccan agriculture. The elements to

overcome this crisis will be analyzed in the light of the new official strategy.

I. The Moroccan Agriculture Crisis

Agricultural production in Morocco is characterized by a low rate of growth, 1.5% per year between 1960 and 1975 (Table 3). The rate became negative between 1973 and 1977. For the recent five years, the rate was a -1.9%, which was characterized by successive drought years in 1981, 83 and 84. This has placed a heavy burden on future of agriculture production (a reduction in animals for farm work, a massive increase in the debt of the small farmers, and losses in its means of production). As a consequence, agriculture's share of the gross internal product fell from 28% in 1974 to less than 15% between 1980 and 1983. This situation is reflected in the agriculture/commercial balance: the ratio of agricultural exports to agricultural imports has fallen from 2.0 during the period 1960 to 1969, to 1.54 in 1973, and less than .7 currently (Table 4). Cereal imports alone accounted for 15% of the total export receipts for the year 1981 and represented 10% of total imports. The rate of self-sufficiency in the principle basic food crops has fallen in total since the beginning of the 1960's.

Such a situation can be explained by the priority that is accorded to agricultural exports and to the concentration of investments in irrigated agriculture. This double process has reinforced the impact of the world markets on Moroccan agriculture, on both the level of imports and the level of exports. These exports represent around 20% of the

value of total crop production.¹

The production destined for export is found to be concentrated in the irrigated zones which provide, as shown in Table (5), nearly one half of the national agricultural production. But, in spite of the heavy state investment in the large irrigation water projects, the volume of agricultural exports has remained constant between 1960 and the end of the 1980's, while the quantity of food imports has tripled. Furthermore, the enlargement of the European Economic Community has reduced the possibility of export, principally for early season crops of which the foreign sales have fallen to a half between 1973 and 1983². Nevertheless, the impact of the world markets on agricultural production can not explain entirely the crisis in Moroccan agriculture. It is the result also of the lack of interest by the public powers in basic products³. This negligence is not the product of chance, but the result of choice to provide basic foods from the world market which is characterized by excess supply. This strategy is attractive for the proponents of integration into the world market because imported food products cost less than local products and it delays the necessity to reform agrarian structures, above all those of domestic food production. It seems that the priority on export agriculture is less an inheritance

¹ The value was calculated on the basis of data reported in "La Valeur Ajoutée Agricole pour l'Année 1985," of the Moroccan Ministry of Agriculture.

² The European Community is the principal market for early season agricultural products from Morocco.

³ Although the export crops are very important in terms of total agricultural production, they account for a relatively small share of cropland: 14 percent of irrigated lands and 2 percent of all cropland.

of the colonial period (since the beginning of the 1960's the European community has increased or multiplied restrictions on agricultural imports from North Africa) but is a means utilized by the authorities not to deal with the problems of agrarian structure. Thus, the priority given to export agriculture and the neglect of the production of basic food products constitutes the principle elements of the agricultural crisis. It is the purpose here to examine the elements of a policy to deal with this crisis. One question must first, however, be answered. Among the policies or programs that can be followed, to what extent can Morocco assure self-sufficiency in cereals?

II. The Agricultural Potential

Elimination of or reduction of export agriculture will bring only a negligible reduction in the food deficit because of the small area that is devoted to those crops. Consequently self-sufficiency can be attained only with the resources that are now available to domestic food production. Thus, we are left with the question of the potential capacity of agriculture to meet the needs. According to the Ministry of Agriculture study made in 1978, potential food production in 1978 is 26.6 million tons, the current production being about 9 million tons. Table (6) presents the estimates of production potential and those of food demand in the year 2000 for the principle cultures. It shows that Morocco currently produces 12% of potential production for oilseeds and for sugar, 32% for fruits, 33% for pulses and 38% for cereals and garden crops. In the year 2000, by assuming that all resources are mobilized to achieve this end, the deficits could be eliminated with the exception of

cereals, while the principle products destined for export could see a doubling, even a tripling. Nevertheless, as indicated in Table (7), the potential of production is very poorly utilized in the richer zones, both the favorable dry land and irrigated agriculture than it is in the less favorable dry land agriculture. This reflects an incoherent government policy which emphasizes construction of irrigation infrastructure rather than increasing productivity of the irrigated areas. It is also due to the unequal distribution in the better agricultural lands. All of these estimates of potential production were made with the assumption that the structural constraints would be eliminated.

The authors of the cereal plan have tried to estimate for cereals, the potential production with the continuation of the current structural situation. These characteristics are as follows:

35-40,000 agricultural units of production in excess of 20 hectares cultivating 1.2 million hectares;

1,400,000 units of production of less than 20 hectares cultivating 3.4 million hectares.

The potential cereal production is then estimated between 74 and 79 million quintals, and is distributed in the following manner in Table (8). Assuming that this potential is achieved on the current structural base in the year 2000, the cereal deficit will represent then between 25 and 33% of the total demand which indicates a continuation of imports at their current level -- 2-3 million tons per year. Thus, whatever the assumption that is made, mobilization of the entire capacity of production with the re-organization of agricultural structures, or simply intensifying production on the current structure, the cereal deficit will not be entirely eliminated. It is to be noted however that agrarian

reform would permit the achievement of production equivalent to 112 million quintals while simple mobilization of the potential with the current agrarian structure will permit a production only on the order of 74 to 79 million quintals.

For the authors of the cereal plan, the second assumption is financially possible. Thus, in the year 2000 Morocco could stabilize its imports at the present level after having doubled the national production. Such an approach implies that cereal deficit is completely of a structural nature and can be resolved without a radical agrarian reform program. Even accepting the possibility of benefits on production of reform of the agricultural structures, evaluation of the cereal plan leads to the following conclusion: that Morocco can yet afford the luxury of increasing its production simply by a policy of intensification. It is certain that agrarian reform by itself cannot resolve the problem of the cereal deficit, however, the productivists conclusion which eliminates the need for agrarian reform overlooks one important fact. That is, it is not only a question of increasing agricultural production, but also to free the peasantry from the limitations on its ability to improve conditions of life.

III. The General Characteristics of the 'New Agricultural Policy'

This strategy is based on the possibility to improve agricultural production, assuming the current agricultural structure. The means to achieve it are articulated as a reorientation of the policy of intensification with a priority for the dryland agriculture and an increase in prices for basic food products.

Implications of the Potential Cereal Production

Evaluating the potential of cereal production in spite of the efforts made by the technicians of the Ministry of Agriculture furnishes only a very approximative idea of the real possibilities. These potentialities were evaluated in a very narrowly defined system. It assumes on the one hand, the current level of technology, a level which according to the authors of the cereal plan is far from being able to support the improvement of the natural resource base of the localities and, on the other hand, by considering the state of the productive resources to be unchangeable. The implication which can be drawn from this type of evaluation is far from being neutral. It implies that Moroccan agriculture can stabilize the cereal deficit by only mobilizing the productive resources held by the social classes capable of being included in the second wave of the modernization. What can not be drawn from these evaluations is that the policy will not touch many of the peasants who live below poverty level, which according to the terminology of the World Bank is a group which constitutes 40% of the rural population.

It is clear that these calculations of potential carry the mark of the existing social structure and cannot, in any fashion, fix the real limits of the productive capacity of agriculture. It indicates equally that self-sufficiency in food products constitutes a realizable objective even for those who continue to benefit from the integration of the economy into the world market. Are not the terms food self-sufficiency and security used for different ends by all of the social groups?

Strategy of the State and Food Deficits

In regard to food deficits, the evaluation of the agricultural potential is rich in information. It provided a basis for the Moroccan administration to develop a new strategy based on promotion of rain-fed agriculture and basic agriculture. It is stimulated by the problems encountered by the agricultural policies in effect until now, such as the problem of agricultural exports, the increasing problem of food deficits, the amplitude of the rural exodus, etc. The government has become aware that it must terminate the policy of special treatment for the investment in irrigated agriculture, and to support only those activities that are capable of being profitable. It must turn more toward the regions of rain-fed agriculture and enlarge its assistance to peasant groups, much more so than in the past.

However, even if the main features of this new strategy have been fixed, concrete results remain yet rather modest. The major part of this policy, the cereal plan established in June 1982, has not yet been formally adopted. It is the same for the oilseeds plan and the sugar plan⁴. On the other hand, the social phase of the plan has already begun: increases in the prices of basic products and reduction in subsidies to consumers with the objective of truth in pricing.

Thus the new strategy which is oriented toward satisfaction of basic food needs, combines the capitalist way and the peasant way in order to resolve the problems of food deficit. It provides for the possibility to reduce these deficits with the current existing structures with the

⁴ The production plans for sugar have been reduced from those established in 1975.

condition that progress accomplished in production agriculture is supported by the consumers. The agricultural prices must be increased in order to encourage producers and subsidies to consumers must be replaced by subsidization of production. Such is the cost of self-sufficiency, costs which are aggravated by the worsening of the economic and social crisis that has engulfed the country since 1978.

The Limitations of the New Policy

This policy is designed to increase the profitability of basic food products and to stimulate agricultural to give more importance to it's activities. At the same time, the state has installed a program designed for the rain-fed areas of the country in the structure of integrated projects. But, such a policy of development has a double contradiction:

1. The Inherent Limitations of Production Structure in the Cereal Sector.

The agriculture which produces the basic food products includes a vast sector of subsistence agriculture and a very poorly developed commercial sector. In the case of cereals, 30% only of the area is cultivated on farms in excess of 20 hectares, which represent only 5% of the total cereal farms. Although this small agricultural unit dominates the production of basic food products, they have been integrated into the modernization movement that Morocco has been engaged in for 20 years. We estimate in effect that 70% of the cereal areas are plowed by tractors and that half of the national consumption of chemical fertilizer is accounted for by cereals. This modernization however has not permitted raising of the level of production of the small producers of food products because of the poor use of some of the techniques such as deep

plowing, weak or low doses of fertilizer, domination of market channels by merchants, and the large share of the land rents retained by landlords.

This interpretation is partially held by the authors of the cereal plan which imparts the major structural constraints. They do not hesitate to advance the idea that it is the large and medium sized farms which have been, until now, the principle beneficiaries of state aid (subsidies, price policy, agricultural credit). They underline additionally that the small farmers have not been placed in a situation which permits them to exit from traditional agriculture. However, the authors seem to argue that the cereal deficit is primarily the result of insufficiency of state intervention. They argue that producers, whatever the size of the unit, are not, in most cases, motivated to increase production. This absence of motivation comes from the fact that the margins that the farmers obtain, taking account of the prices of cereal in the interior market and the subsidies, does not encourage them to take risks for additional investments to increase their productivity. The solution that they propose is consequently to increase the price of cereals while the subsistence sector requires an intervention of different types, notably the reform of agrarian structures and of the commercial channels.

2. The Necessity to Reduce the Cost of Living for Salaried Workers.

Increasing the price of cereals itself encounters another imperative, that is, to minimize the price for the labor force employed in the capitalistic sector, particularly that involved in the exports.

This necessity requires that the state increase the price of cereals, but not recover this increase by increasing the price of flour. These two limits are the origin of the inconsistency that exists in the official discourse which puts the accent upon the priority of food self-sufficiency, and on the other hand, by effective programs which continue to allocate the agricultural capital to export crops and to profitable agricultural enterprises such as sugar, livestock and dairy.

In addition, analysis of the current situation and development of the propositions for a new agricultural policy must take into account the two following aspects - the necessity to preserve subsistence agriculture which continues in spite of its difficulties to provide the livelihood for a majority of the peasants - the inability of commercial agriculture and its capitalist component to reduce by itself and with reasonable assumptions, the food deficit and, in particular, the cereal deficit.

The redeployment of commercial agriculture is financially very costly. Additionally, it is based essentially on an imported technology which little utilizes the national potential. For example, the priority that is accorded to soft wheat, that covers only 20% of the cereal area, to the detriment of barley which represents 45% of the area re-enforces our technological dependence.

Moreover, left by themselves, the small-production farmer situation will worsen. The disappearance of pulses on small farms notably in regions of intermediate quality land and the practices of increased continuous cropping and crop rotation are reducing the level of production. The weakness of this leads in turn to disaffection of the small peasants to work their land. They will look to other activities to

survive, such as emphasizing extensive livestock production. The stagnation of production is not the result of this forced disintensification, it is only the product. This degradation of resources continues to reduce the possibility for small agriculture to survive.

The Specific Features of the New Agricultural Policy

This new policy is designed to raise productivity without changing the socio-economic environment. The means used to do this are focused in two directions:

- 1) intensify production assistance in the rain fed areas.
- 2) using the incentive of the pricing policy as the main measure for developing crops.

1) The priority given to rain fed areas

This policy is pursued in the framework of so called "To integrated projects." Ten projects currently cover nearly two million hectares and are located mainly in so called "favorable rain fed areas." They seek to increase crops production by the improvement of all conditions of production such as assisting farmers in buying inputs, encouraging farmer cooperatives, trying to solve the problems of marketing, improving the extension services and by providing credit. These projects are also designed to improve the rural way of life: providing roads, education, health care, potable water, electrification...All these measures are expected to slow the rural exodus which leads to uncontrolled urbanization in all Moroccan cities, a characteristic of all cities in the third world.

2) The pricing policy

There are two kinds of agricultural prices:

- fixed prices
- floor prices

Fixed prices are applied to industrial crops such as sugar, cotton, milk and soft wheat. For these products, farmers obtain the fixed price if they sell to factories, to state trading boards or to cooperatives.

Floor prices are used for all cereals except soft wheat. When the price in the free market drops to the floor price, farmers can sell their crops to cooperatives authorized by state agreement to buy at the floor price. Usually, prices in the market are higher than the floor price, so cereals are marketed principally in the free market. But when crops are abundant, farmers prefer to sell to the state marketing boards or to trading cooperatives. However, these organizations lack storage and therefore cannot always protect farmers from falling prices.

Market prices fluctuate seasonally and frequently fall below floor prices fixed by the state, especially during the period of harvest. Small farmers prefer to market their crops in the free market because of its liquidity. State marketing boards pay farmers three months after the receipt of their crops. In these conditions, only larger farmers can hold the crop to benefit from rising prices. Small farmers, to obtain cash for current expenditures, must frequently sell their crop at harvest when prices are low. For these reason, the state pricing policy has little impact on trading cereals except for soft wheat.

The fixed and floor prices of cereals were doubled between 1979 and 1986. In 1986, these prices represented twice the price in the world market. This change was made to bring self sufficiency for cereals. It

appears that many more farmers are more interested in cultivating cereals than before the 1980's. But, as we have noted before, only farmers who produce more than their needs can draw benefit from this policy.

The debate about the potential of increased prices to stimulate the production of cereals has occurred in the context of the so called 'adjustment policy.' Officials are under pressure from the World Bank to cut consumption subsidies in order to reduce the budget deficit. The consumption subsidies had doubled between 1979 and 1985. They represented 3 percent of the GNP, \$15 per capita, and 2 to 3 percent of private consumption. These subsidies were implemented to reduce the inequity in the distribution of income. However, studies have shown the contrary--higher income holders draw more benefit from these subsidies.

The elimination of these subsidies and the increased prices of agricultural products are seen by the IMF and the World Bank as the remedy to rural poverty. The peasantry will receive higher income and be stimulated to increase production. Efficiency and equity can be obtained by this policy, objectives of the IMF and World Bank.

IV. Results of the New Policy

What are the results of this policy? The government has encountered problems from increasing consumption prices of basic foods (riots in 1982). It is still maintaining this policy by raising prices every two or three months with small increases and without announcing them. Although it has failed to reduce consumption subsidies, it has stabilized them and the pressure of IMF is still maintained.

The government introduced in the 1981-1985 agricultural plan, a program of expanding soft wheat production. This cereal before 1980 utilized 600,000 hectares and now it exceeds one million hectares.

Evolution of Cultivated Lands in Cereal, 1980-86 (in million hectares)

Years	Total	Soft Wheat	Hard Wheat	Barley	Maize
1980	4,28	0,45	1,27	2,15	0,41
1983	4,56	0,69	1,29	2,15	0,43
1984	4,37	0,74	1,12	2,13	0,38
1985	4,67	0,77	1,11	2,38	0,40
1986	5,07	1,03	1,19	2,47	0,37
Variation					
1983-86	+0,50	+0,34	-0,10	+0,32	-0,06

The expansion of soft wheat was accomplished in two ways: 1) the reduction of fallow and its substitution for other crops, principally hard wheat and maize. The expansion of soft wheat has not reduced the area cultivated in barley since it has continued to increase. 2) The government has also eliminated some production subsidies (fertilizers) and has replaced them by providing more credit to farmers who expand soft wheat areas.

The impact of these measures on the level of the production, thus far, is modest. The short period since implementation of the policy does not provide a good base by which to judge it. However, the fact that this policy does not deal with the problem of the structural characteristics of production (the bimodal distribution of land...) and the problem of trading crops leads us to be pessimistic about its efficacy. A study of the most important project, Fez Karia Tissa, shows that there is a real and sharp increase in the use of fertilizers,

selected seeds and mechanization. But progress is inequally distributed between small and large farmers. Furthermore, production has not responded to the increase of the input use. This may be due to the lack of agronomic research applied to local conditions. The research and extension services have not resolved technical problems which prevent farmers from improving production. The increased credit given to small farmers is partly used for consumption expenditure or applied to production more profitable than cereals, such as livestock. Although this may achieve one of the main objectives of these integrated projects, to stop the flow of peasants to the cities, it has a weak impact on the level of cereal production.

Table (1) Evolution of Cereal Production 1950-1986

	1950-55		1975-80		1982-85		1986	
	Cropland (ha)	Prod (mil/ton)	Cropland (ha)	Prod (mil/ton)	Cropland (ha)	Prod (mil/ton)	Cropland (ha)	Prod (mil/ton)
Total	4	27.4	4.5	42.3	4.45	42.8	5.07	76.8
Barley	50 %	56 %	47 %	52 %	49 %	44 %	49 %	46 %
Hard Wheat	25 %	21 %	32 %	27 %	26 %	30 %	23 %	26 %
Soft Wheat	12.5%	14 %	11 %	11 %	16 %	20 %	20 %	24 %
Maize	12.5%	9 %	10 %	10 %	9 %	6 %	7 %	4 %

Area: millions ha.

Production: millions quintau

Table (2) Evolution of Cereal's yield 1981-1986 in Quintals per Hectare

	1981/82	1982/83	1983/84	1984/85	1985/86
Barley	11.4	5.7	6.6	10.7	14.4
Hard Wheat	12.7	9.6	10.4	12	16.6
Soft Wheat	13.4	10.6	11.2	13.1	17.7
Maize	6.2	5.9	6.1	8	8.2
Average	11.5	7.6	8.4	11.2	15.1

Table (3). Growth Rates of Value Added Agriculture and Gross National Product, Morocco, 1960-85

	60-64	65-67	68-72	73-77	78-80	81	82	83	84	85
Agriculture										
Value Added	1.0	1.5	6.8	-2.4	8	22.9	19.9	-3.7	-.03	12.1
Gross National										
Product	2.3	2.9	5.6	7.3	6.7	-1.3	6.8	2.3	2.1	4.3

Table (4a) Evolution of Moroccan Food Exports, 1960-1980.

	Year				
	1960-64	1965-69	1970-74	1975-79	1980
Average for Period (1000 tons)	1329	1348	1551	1286	1559
Index (base 100 = 1960-64)	100	101	117	97	117

Table (4b) Evolution of Moroccan Food Imports, 1960-1980.

	Year				
	1960-64	1965-69	1970-74	1975-79	1980
Average for Period (1000 tons)	887	1087	1169	2053	2431
Index (base 100 = 1960-64)	100	122	132	231	274

Table (4c) Evolution of Moroccan Agricultural Trade, 1973-1985.

	Year								
	1973	1975	1977	1978	1979	1982	1983	1984	1985
Exports (1000 tons)	2244	1805	1956	2253	2533	3340	4120	4810	6069
Imports (1000 tons)	1664	3725	3203	3109	3604	5955	6082	8419	8408
Exports ÷ Imports %	135%	48%	61%	73%	68%	56%	68%	57%	72%
Exports ÷ Food Imports %	154%	52%	77%	87%	87%	73%	84%	62%	83%

Table (4d) Moroccan Trade Deficits, 1981-85.

	Year				
	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
	(Bil. dirhams)				
Total Trade Deficit	10.5	13.6	10.9	15.3	17
Agricultural Trade Deficit	3	2.6	2	3.6	2.4
Percent	29	19	18	23	14

Table (5) Distribution of National Agricultural Production by Zone, Morocco

	Area (1000 ha)	%	Production (1000 tons)	%
Irrigated areas	740	12	4200	46
Dryland, favorable	2160	43	2600	29
Dryland, unfavorable	2270	45	2200	25
TOTAL	5170	100	9000	100

Source: Les Potentialites Agricoles, MARA 1978.

Table (6) Current Production, Potential Production, and Production as Share of Domestic Demand, Morocco, Year 2000

Crop	Current Production (1000 tons)	Potential Production (1000 tons)	Current Production ÷ Potential Production(%)	Domestic Demand in Year 2000 (1000 tons)	Production Demand in Year 2000 Percent(%)
Cereals	4280.0	11230.0	38	13000.0	86
Pulses	483.3	1450.0	33	1150.0	126
Oil Crops	54.6	464.4	12	353.0	131
Sugar	281.8	2282.5	12	1410.0	162
Garden Crops	2380.0	6280.0	38	5800.0	108
Fruits	1535.0	4840.0	32	3800.0	127
TOTAL	9014.7	26546.9	34	25519.0	

Source: Les Potentialites Agricoles, MARA 1978.

Table (7) Distribution of Agricultural Production by Zones, Morocco - Comparison between Actual Production in 1975 and Potential

Zone	1976 Situation				Potential Situation				Actual 1976 ÷ Potential
	Area (1000 ha)	%	Production (tons)	%	Area (1000 ha)	%	Production (tons)	%	
Irrigated	741.9	12.2	4170.3	46.3	1436.5	19.5	13890.4	52.1	30
Dryland - Favorable	2610.0	43.0	2606.1	29.0	3327.3	42.2	8633.1	32.5	30
Dryland Unfavorable	2690.5	44.8	2238.0	24.8	2625.0	35.7	4083.4	15.4	55
TOTAL	6042.4	100.0	9014.7	100.0	7361.8	100.0	26606.9	100.0	

Source: Les Potentialites Agricoles, MARA 1978.

Table (8) Distribution of Production by Size of Farm

	Current Situation	Potential Situation
Share of production from farms larger than 20 hectares (percent)	26	31
Share of production from farms of less than 20 hectares (percent)	74	69

Source: le plan cerealier, MARA, 1982

Appendix I

Structure of Moroccan Exports (1973-1985)

	Year							
	1973	1975	1977	1979	1982	1983	1984	1985
Agricultural Products	59	28	35	36	27	28	25	28
Phosphates	21	55	36	29	28	23	24	22.2
Semi-processed Products	6	4	9.5	13	21	26	27	24.3
Finished Goods	9	9	12	13	15	15	15.5	17

Structure of Moroccan Imports (1973-1985)

	Year							
	1973	1975	1977	1979	1982	1983	1984	1985
Agricultural Products	36	35	22	26	24	25	27	23.4
Petroleum	5	9	9	17	25	24.6	24.4	25.7
Equipment	18	24	34	22	21	18	19	16.9
Agricultural Equipment	1	1.1	1.2	1.1	1.4	1.1	0.6	1