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Universities and AID:

A History of Their Partnership in
Technical Assistance for
Developing Countries

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A History of Their Partnership in Technical Assistance for Developing Countries

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The paper has benefitted from a number of people who have given interviews or have reviewed earlier drafts. Chief among these is Dr. Delane Welsch, director of international programs at the University of Minnesota, who has candidly shared insights from the perspective of a participant of the program. Dr. Erven Long and Dr. Ralph Cummings, Jr. of the Agency for International Development generously provided information from their perspective in Washington, D.C. Dr. John Stovall and Dr. Stuart Callison confirmed the analysis of the paper from their perspective within the agency. Susan Schram of the National Association for State Universities and Land Grant Colleges, Alison Hess of the Office of Technology Assessment, and Sylvia Rosen of the University of Minnesota each provided helpful comments and editorial criticisms.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The present time is a watershed period in the history of the AID-University relations. AID is reorganizing and redirecting its foreign assistance efforts, and if preliminary indications predict the final character of AID, the traditional role of the universities in the future plans of the Agency will continue to be dramatically reduced. The need for university technical expertise, particularly in agriculture, has not diminished, nor has the quality of university expertise. Why then does the AID-University program seem to be headed for ruin?

In fact, the diminishing concern within the Agency for technical assistance is not unique. With each reorganization, beginning with the formation of the Foreign Operations Administration under Harold Stassen in 1954, the Agency has lost some of its technical expertise and its concern for technology-based development strategies. The universities possess the expertise to fill this need within the Agency, but without an effective collaboration between AID and the universities, this expertise has not been fully tapped.

OBJECTIVES

The objective of our study is to provide a historical perspective which is needed to understand the forces that have molded the AID-University partnership: those which have aided its success and those which at times have threatened its continuation. It examines the web of relationships that each organization has with their respective constituency groups, with Congress, the administration, and the foreign governments and universities. It studies the motivations of each of these organizations, their systems of accountability, their goals and their values, and it presents the deficiencies and accomplishments of the program.

METHODOLOGY

The paper is structured historically and concludes with an analysis of recurring issues that have plagued the relationship throughout its forty-year history and a look to the future of the Agency-University program. Popular newsprint, scholarly journals, Congressional testimony, government reports, and personal interviews were all used to highlight the significant events in each period. Appendix A employs game theory to interpret the difficulty in establishing a productive relationship between the Agency and the Universities.

CONCLUSIONS

The program by which AID engages the expertise of US universities has great potential. The transformation of US agricultural productivity, led by the application of

research developed in US universities, as well as the universities' continuing contributions to understanding both domestic and international issues testifies to their potential as a resource for foreign assistance. The Agency has developed an extensive system for coordinating technical and non-technical aid and also has great potential to coordinate work with the universities.

The crux of the program's inadequacies lies in the difficulty in establishing a cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship. This difficulty, we conclude, is endemic in the program. It stems from the incongruity of rewards AID and the universities receive from the program, from the vastly different modes of operation under which each organization works, and from the lack of support from Congress and the administration. These three factors are revealed in a number of attributes of the program. They are discussed briefly below.

Because AID is a political organization subject to the will of Congress and heavily lobbied by special interest groups, it has been difficult to build a clear mandate and a solid foundation for its work. It is forced to react to the development fads of any particular period. As a foreign assistance agency, it must continually justify its existence whenever budgetary constraints bring into question appropriations for "non-essential" expenditures. It has been used as a tool for broader, but not necessarily consistent, goals. And it has suffered from high rates of personnel turnover. Consequently, it has not been able to establish a strong organizational identity that could allow it to engage in long-term contracts with other organizations, such as the universities.

The Universities have also contributed to the decline of the program. Because participation in overseas work often limits the ability of their faculty to publish or to achieve tenure, aspiring analysts are given little incentive to participate in AID programs. Universities administrations are more geared to managing long-term projects and have frustrated AID by their poor contract management. Universities have often failed to integrate international work into their institutional mission. Moreover, many universities have secured projects for which they have little expertise. These factors have caused AID to be disappointed in the universities performance.

Both organizations can benefit from the program, but neither will benefit without cooperation from the other. Building a sense of trust, then, is essential to the success of the program. However, the political pressures under which AID operates have not facilitated the stability in the program, and stability is a crucial element in building that trust.

If Congress and the administration could establish a proper foundation for the program so each organization could concentrate on utilizing its comparative advantage, then rewards from the program would be forthcoming and each organization would gain incentives to continue to contribute effective work.

Even though the University-AID program has not lived up to its potential, it has achieved very significant results. In recent years, the program which has been most successful in coordinating university technical assistance has been the Collaborative Research Support Programs (CRSPs).

The CRSPs operate under a grant program which allows for university freedom in project design and management. They receive strong support in Congress because the research benefits both international and domestic agricultural production. As a result, long-term projects are made possible. CRSPs have also benefitted from a unique planning procedure by which non-participating but knowledgeable analysts design and evaluate the policy and implementation of the program. While institution-building programs have fallen out of favor with AID, these collaborative programs are expected to continue.

The most recent meeting of the Board for International Food and Agricultural Development and Economic Cooperation (BIFADEC) confirmed the speculation based on recent Agency reorganization plans that AID is turning away from cooperating with universities in technical assistance. A report from a blue-ribbon committee headed by Dr. G. Edward Schuh which called for a radical reorientation of the Agency toward collaborative agricultural technical assistance received little encouragement.

Signs of hope for the future include the establishment of a Center for University Cooperation and Development within AID which will coordinate university participation. In its present reorganization plan AID has called for the program to extend cooperation with a broader array of colleges and universities, especially business schools.

The future of the AID-University program in technical assistance is very much in question. Based upon the history enumerated in the paper, our analysis would conclude that its success must be predicated upon the emergence of greater trust between AID and the universities. Because the two organizations work very differently, the program should maximize the relative strengths of each without mutual interference. From a historical perspective, it is clear that sustaining and strengthening the AID-University program presents a difficult challenge for today's leaders.

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ACRONYMS USED IN PAPER

Titles of the Agency:

AID	Agency for International Development (1961-present)
AID/M	Agency for International Development: Missions
AID/W	Agency for International Development: Washington Office
FOA	Foreign Operations Administration (1953-1955)
ICA	International Cooperation Administration (1955-1961)
MSA	Mutual Security Administration (1951-1953)
TCA	Technical Cooperation Administration (1950-1952)

University Organizations

CIPA	Committee on Institutional Projects Abroad (A Committee of the American Council of Education)
NASULGC	National Association of State Universities and Land Grant Colleges

General Terms

ADNR	Agriculture, Rural Development and Nutrition Account, the line item for Title XII funds
BARD	Bi-National Agricultural Research and Development fund
BHN	Basic Human Needs
BIFAD	Board for International Food and Agricultural Development (1975-1990)
BIFADEC	Board for International Food and Agricultural Development and Economic Concerns (1990-present)

JRC	Joint Research Committee, a former BIFAD committee
JCAD	Joint Committee on Agricultural Development, a former BIFAD committee
JCARD	Joint Committee on Agricultural Research and Development, a BIFAD committee which combined the JRC and JCAD committees

CRSP	Collaborative Research Support Program
GAO	General Accounting Office
IDCA	International Development Cooperation Agency
LDC	Less Developed Country
NARS	National Agriculture Research Systems
PVO	Private Voluntary Organizations

<u>International Agricultural Research Centers</u>

CGIAR	Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research
IARC	International Agricultural Research Centers (Coordinated by CGIAR)

IRRI	International Rice Research Institute
CIMMYT	International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center
IITA	International Institute on Tropical Agriculture
CIAT	Cantro Internacional de Agricultura Tropical
CIP	Centre International de la Papa
WARDA	West African Rice Development Association
ICRISAT	International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-And Tropics
ILRAD	International Laboratory for Animal Diseases
IBPGR	International Board for Plant Genetic Diseases
ILCA	International Livestock Center for
IFPRI	International Food Policy Research Institute
ICARDA	International Center for Agricultural Research in the Dry Areas
ISNAR	International Service for National Agricultural Research

FOREIGN ASSISTANCE AGENCY
TITLES AND ADMINISTRATORS: 1942 - 1991[1]

ECONOMIC COOPERATION ADMINISTRATION
Paul G. Hoffman, April 1949 to August 1950.
William C. Foster, October 1950 to August 1951.

TECHNICAL COOPERATION ADMINISTRATION
Henry G. Bennett, June 1950 to December 1951.
Stanley Andrews, May 1952 to December 1952.

MUTUAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
W. Averill Harriman, October 1951 to January 1953.
Harold Stassen, January 1953 to July 1953.

FOREIGN OPERATIONS ADMINISTRATION
Harold Stassen, August 1953 to June 1955.

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ADMINISTRATION
James B. Hollister, July 1955 to September 1957.
James H. Smith, October 1957 to January 1959.
James W. Riddleberger, May 1959 to February 1961.
Henry Labouisse, March 1961 to November 1961.

AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
Fowler Hamilton, September 1961 to December 1962.
David E. Bell, December 1962 to July 1966.
William S. Gaud, August 1966 to January 1969.
John A. Hannah, April 1969 to September 1973.
Daniel S. Parker, October 1973 to January 1977.
John J. Gilligan, March 1977 to March 1979.
Douglas Bennet, August 1979 to January 1981.
M. Peter McPherson, February 1981 to August 1987.
Alan Woods, November 1987 to June 1989.
Mark L. Edelman, July 1989 to February 1990.
Ronald Roskens, March 1990 to the present.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

The premise of the AID-University partnership in U.S. foreign assistance programs is that universities are endowed with the technical skills that, if properly coordinated by AID and transferred by the partnership, can free the constraints on increased agricultural productivity in developing countries. This is the ultimate goal of the program. However, during its forty-year history the program has been used for various other purposes which have influenced its development and policies.

Initially, the program was primarily a tool used to win good will for the United States, to develop overseas markets for U.S. investments, and to strengthen the developing countries against the communist ideology. During the 1960s, a stronger emphasis was given to long-term development. Following the world food crisis of the early 1970s, the program emphasized humanitarian assistance to nations that needed to develop the food-producing capacity to feed their hungry populations. In the 1980s, support for the program declined as private initiatives increasingly usurped university technical assistance, and political and strategic goals were emphasized over humanitarian goals. The current support for the program is largely a result of momentum built up in the past.

The history and analysis of the agency-university program leads to the conclusion that the program has suffered from Congressional actions and from the philosophies of different political administrations which together have not allowed the Agency for International Development to become an effective organization and have prohibited the establishment of an effective partnership with the universities.

Agency-University Partnership: The Beginning

University participation in the first agency programs was initiated by a letter to President Truman from John A. Hannah, President of the Association of Land Grant Colleges and Universities, on February 4, 1949. Dr. Hannah wrote in part,

> This is to offer the full cooperation of the members of the Association of Land-Grant Colleges and Universities in carrying out the fourth point of your inaugural address, which gave new inspiration to many of us who have been convinced that such a program is basic to progress toward the stable, democratic, peaceful world which we all want.
>
> One of the greatest contributions America can make to the improvement of living standards, elimination of hunger, and fostering of peace in certain parts of the world is by encouraging education in food production, food handling, food utilization, and better homemaking and family life among rural and urban people. These have been the objectives, the basic philosophy and the outstanding role of the Land-Grant Colleges and Universities in American life since the passage 87 years ago of basic legislation for federal-state cooperation in a national system of "people's colleges" dedicated to the "education of the industrial classes in the several pursuits and professions of life." It is time this basic philosophy and the "know-how" developed in more than fourscore years of operating under it is extended to the rest of the world on a much broader scale than has been the case in the past. Your message will furnish a powerful impetus in that direction....[2]

The Association of Land Grant Colleges and Universities' offer to President Truman and to his goal of extending U.S. technology to the developing countries posed a substantial commitment on the part of the U.S. universities to an undefined program. The offer recognized that the universities had made an outstanding contribution to the development of the United States and its agricultural productivity. It explained the need for technical services in the less developed countries and projected the potential of the universities to satisfy that need.

The Association was well aware of the potential costs the universities could incur by offering their "full cooperation." Their letter states that "the release of staff members on leave for work abroad or consultation in this country would handicap some institutions in carrying out their domestic responsibilities. The training of foreign students and consultation with foreign visitors would involve serious demands on crowded facilities and on time of staff members."[3] Despite these costs, the universities have fulfilled that commitment of full cooperation for much of their forty-year partnership with the U.S. foreign assistance agency.

Oddly enough, in the past few years the universities' lack of commitment has been the subject of complaints by the agency. It is this lack of university commitment, according to the agency, which explains the deteriorating relations between the two organizations. In contrast, some in the university have regarded their involvement in foreign assistance as the fourth pillar of the land-grant educational system, after teaching, research and extension.

By the same token the universities have felt an ever-decreasing support within the agency for technical assistance work. This decrease is reflected in, and is a product of, the paucity of agency personnel with technical backgrounds. Both organizations have much to gain by their partnership. Why then has a potentially promising program become one fraught with continuing difficulties? To understand this we turn to the beginnings of the Point Four program.

The involvement of the United States in foreign assistance is a phenomenon unique to its post-World War II history. For much of its history, the United States was committed to the political ideal of isolationism. However, as it emerged from the war as the leading world power, the United States became more involved in international concerns and began to expand its sphere of influence politically, militarily and economically. The foreign assistance program was an important new development in U.S. foreign policy. It began first with the successful four-year Marshall Plan which aided the reconstruction of western Europe. Having completed that, the United States turned its attention to assist the developing nations of the world.

In his 1948 inaugural address President Truman announced the plan to extend the technical knowledge of the United States to assist the development of Third World nations. A leading purpose of the new program was to strengthen our allies and to discourage other nations from aligning with the Communist bloc. This "Point Four" program was to be an historic new turn in U.S. relations with the developing nations, and the beginning of a

substantial commitment by the United States.[4] One editorial remarked: "a little psychology, a little money, a few devoted experts, and a very good idea -- these were the ingredients of Point Four."[5]

John Hannah, then president of the Association of Land-Grant Colleges, explained the value of university contributions to foreign assistance programs in his letter to President Truman. "The troubled areas of the world are primarily agricultural, and their political problems derive primarily from the need to develop a higher standard of living--more and better food, and better clothing and housing for their people. It is this problem which the United States, for all its deficiencies, has solved better than any other major nation. It is in the solution of this problem for other nations that we offer the services of the land-grant institutions and their nationwide staffs and experience in the fields of research, teaching, and extension work in agriculture, homemaking, and in the technology of improved industrial production."[6]

U.S. universities had long been leaders in technical advances, particularly in agriculture. Since the inception of the land-grant universities under the Morril Acts of 1862 and 1880, they had received strong, continuous support from the government for their research, teaching and extension activities, and had transformed the productivity of American agriculture.

The work of the universities in the Point Four program was to cover many disciplines, but their primary involvement was to assist developing countries to form a modern system of agriculture. Projects varied widely from place to place, but each had as its goal the development of research, teaching and extension for the generation and diffusion of agricultural technology. Though it had originally been somewhat naively thought that agricultural production techniques proven successful in the United States would work in the developing countries as well, it was soon learned that the vastly different agro-climatic conditions and the differences in culture and resources would necessitate the adaption of these techniques to the new environment. Building the capacity to adapt and to develop technology has been the stimulus to create the institution-building programs.

This involvement of U.S. universities in foreign assistance was a unique and innovative program. Universities had previously engaged in work in other countries, but only on a limited basis. The Point Four program institutionalized the involvement of the universities within the agency.

Both the agency and the universities had much to gain from their partnership. The agency gained the technical expertise of the universities to assist in the implementation of its foreign aid programs. This technical expertise would become much broader than what could ever be employed within the agency. The university faculty gained a broader field in which to study, thus creating new challenges to solve and new technical frontiers to explore. By exposing their faculty to international environments, the home university generally

improved the quality of its own instruction. Though both organizations had much to gain in theory, it has been both a highly productive and highly frustrating relationship.

The focus of this paper is to understand the forces which have molded this relationship: those which have aided its success and those which at times have threatened its continuation. It will examine the web of relationships that each organization has with their respective constituency groups, with Congress, the administration, and the foreign governments and universities. It will study their motivations, their systems of accountability, their goals and their values, and it will present the deficiencies and accomplishments of the program. The paper will begin with the history of the program and its evolution over time, followed by an analysis of recurring issues that have plagued the relationship throughout its forty-year history. It concludes with a look to the future of the agency-university program.

Chapter Two analyzes the foundation of the foreign assistance program and the effects of two prominent, but antithetical agency administrators -- Harold Stassen and John Hollister. The period was characterized by the organizational difficulties involved in taking an idea and creating an institutional system to achieve its goals. The competing goals of the program, however, impeded the leaders from establishing both a firm foundation and a clear direction for the program and the agency.

Chapter Three describes the relationship between the agency and the universities as the program became well established and increasingly effective at building institutions in

developing nations. The period began with another major agency reorganization and an emphasis on capital transfers as the primary vehicle of development work. The number of projects increased dramatically during this period and various studies assessed the goals and methods of the program.

Chapter Four examines the disillusionment with previous forms of foreign assistance that led Congressional leaders to direct foreign assistance toward the "poorest of the poor." The institution-building model of foreign assistance was superseded by the collaborative model. In 1975, the Congress put forth a major new commitment to the agency-university partnership by passing the Title XII amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. The amendment provided additional support for universities, a type of research collaboration, and a new voice within AID for university concerns.

Chapter Five examines how AID, after extensive investments in universities, became less inclined to utilize the universities for technical assistance. Foreign assistance funding during the period was often appropriated to serve the strategic and military interests of the United States, while those funds earmarked to development were increasingly channeled through private voluntary organizations(PVOs). As a result of the dwindling budget, lack of strong leadership, and increasing tensions between universities and AID, the number of development projects rapidly decreased.

Chapter Six investigates the institutional arrangements of the agency-university program and their effect on the partnership over the course of its history.

Chapter Seven describes the new developments in the agency-university relationship. The program is presently undergoing dramatic changes that will influence its course of action for the coming decade. To the extent possible, these changes are discussed here. Finally, the paper ends with some speculation on the future of the agency-university program.

CHAPTER TWO



POINT FOUR AND THE EARLY YEARS: 1950-1960

The participation of the U.S. universities in foreign assistance became well established in 1954 during the formation of the Foreign Operations Administration (FOA) under the administration of Harold Stassen. Point Four had been an initiative of the Democrats and was particularly linked to the Truman administration. Although a few university projects were begun before 1954, the majority of agency projects were implemented by the in-house technicians of the Mutual Security Administration (MSA) and the Technical Cooperation Administration (TCA), predecessors to the FOA.[7] The Eisenhower administration wanted to sever the program's identification with the Truman administration, and to encourage private initiatives. The administration tried to change the name of Point Four, but it was already entrenched throughout the world (one official who measured its worldwide impact stated, "it has caught on like coca-cola!").[8] Eventually, the Eisenhower administration would revamp both the organization and mission of the Point Four program.

Universities were drawn into the foreign assistance program during this reorganization to provide the technical assistance once given by agency technicians. The reorganization had its roots in the change in government two years earlier. The 1952 election had brought both a new Republican president and a new Republican Congress to power. Both were less supportive of foreign assistance than their predecessors.[9] The new Congress directed several committees to investigate the foreign assistance program. This committee action produced the Mutual Security Act of 1953 which ordered FOA director Harold Stassen to eliminate 25% of the agency's personnel by January 1, 1954.[10] The number of technical personnel in the agency was dramatically reduced in this reorganization. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles forecast the reduction in agency technical personnel during the Congressional hearings on that bill when he noted that private sector initiatives might implement U.S. technical assistance as well as or better than government assistance.[11] The agency has suffered from the lack of technical personnel ever since this decision. From the university perspective the lack of technical personnel has been the major cause of the agency's failure to understand and value the contribution of the universities to U.S. foreign assistance. It has therefore been a leading cause of disharmony in their relationship.

The Stassen Era

On September 11, 1953, Harold Stassen, the Director of the MSA announced before a meeting of private philanthropic leaders the plan to cut part of the Point Four technical

assistance programs and begin using voluntary agencies and U.S. colleges and universities to carry out technical assistance.[12] On October 6, 1953, he presented the plan to the annual meeting of the National Association of State Universities and Land Grant Colleges, which then included over 300 university presidents. The technical assistance budget, he announced, would be increased by 20 - 30% and it would incorporate more fully the participation of the universities.[13] At a meeting of the leaders of U.S. aid missions in Lima, Peru a few months later, Stassen instructed each aid mission to suggest by June 1, 1954 a university with which they could work to carry out the technical assistance programs in their region.

Under the Stassen administration, 20 new University projects were added. This was due in large part to the power and charisma of its administrator, Harold Stassen. This growth was not achieved by any sort of an evolutionary process but, rather, by mandate. In other words, each mission was directed to choose a university with which to work, not so much because an individual nation or university was asking for this type of assistance, but because Stassen decided these projects were needed, perhaps to carry out Point Four programs with less cost and personnel. His directive was not based on any type of feasibility study, and it seemingly included little consultation with the agency's missions. The agency staff, in response to Stassen's habit of issuing policy directives without prior consultation with them, dubbed his policies "SSS" (Stassen Says So).[14]

Stassen had a vision for expanding university involvement, and he used his power to put that vision into action. He wanted programs that would be both responsive to the needs of foreign countries and flexible enough to pass through the "Washington bottlenecks." By expanding university participation he hoped to garner Congressional support for a long-term commitment to foreign aid and to increase the quality of personnel overseas.[15]

Stassen's power stemmed from the reorganization of the MSA and TCA into the Foreign Operations Agency (FOA), as well as the broad authority granted to him by Congress to remove personnel.[16] Eleven projects were begun during Stassen's 18 month tenure, including some of the major university programs in India, Korea, Thailand and Peru.[17] Because of Stassen's authority to implement programs, his legacy is a period of prolific expansion of institution-building aid. But his administration also put a tremendous strain on the agency.

In truth, the Stassen era was both a bane and a blessing to university involvement in foreign aid. The rapid expansion of university projects helped to institutionalize this important program by creating a "critical mass" of such projects. At the same time, the rapid growth and Stassen's leadership style "created a legacy of hostility in the agency toward university participation and led to a substantial increase in negative incidents following Stassen's departure."[18] Stassen also changed the direction of the foreign aid program.

A presidential advisory board warned Stassen that "lumping our Point Four program with military or economic programs abroad would amount to a 'major mistake.'"[19] The smaller TCA would be engulfed in the larger MSA changing the character of the program and reducing broad popular support for Point Four. Other nations would read into this change new evidence of U.S. imperialistic tendencies. The administration used a speech by European Point Four Director Walter M. Ringer at the Women's National Republican Club to deny the charge that technical assistance was being tied to military assistance. Whether military and technical assistance were tied to one another is a debatable issue. Clearly these two forms of technical assistance were not separable, more and more technical assistance combined with military assistance and targeted to the nations on the outer fringe of the communist bloc. The universities were presented with the dilemma of whether to participate in assistance whose objectives were more strategic and political than humanitarian or educational.

The creation of the FOA caused a significant change in the objectives of the assistance program. It also changed the perception of the program (by people other than policy makers) from one containing a modicum of altruism and goodwill to one concentrated upon strategic interests. From its inception, Point Four was included in U.S. foreign policy primarily as a tool to contain communism. Humanitarianism and economic growth were important, but they were secondary goals. Among policy makers this distinction was clearly understood. However, the anti-communist bias was not well translated to the general public, the agency technicians, or the recipients of U.S. aid. The rhetoric used to garner support

for Point Four highlighted the program's benefit to the poor. Consequently, among the general public and the agency technicians working in the field, Point Four was commonly perceived as the humanitarian response of the U.S. government to the suffering and material deprivation of Third World Nations.

The published position of the National Education Association stated "the clear purpose of the program should be to assist the people of each participating country to improve their condition: to raise their standard of living, to make their lives, individually and collectively, more abundant and secure, to enhance their dignity and sense of worth as human beings."[20] The program was quite successful. It was implemented with enthusiasm approaching a missionary's zeal. Policy makers saw in Point Four a program that would not only be in the self-interest of the United States, but would appeal to the basic American sense of wanting to be a compassionate nation. The humanitarian perception provided a strong motivation for people engaged in the program.

The perception was changed when Stassen merged the two technical assistance agencies (TCA and MSA) into the Foreign Operations Administration. PVOs were brought into the program to provide technical assistance and the FOA concentrated on security assistance. Now, in both substance and perception, the program clearly focused on the primary goal of containing communism.

In 1951, The New York Times had declared the Point Four program to be "in purpose"

> a systematic attack on the vicious circle that keeps two-thirds of the world's population too poor, too enfeebled, and too backward to produce adequately, and too unproductive to overcome without help the poverty, sickness, and ignorance that hold them down. To these people the crude propaganda and drastic techniques of the communists must come with the shock of religious revelation.[21]

Just over two years later, when the TCA had been swallowed up by the FOA, The New York Times declared that Point Four had become "an instrument of America's 'cold war' policy."[22]

The formation of the FOA also marked a significant change in the program's basic philosophy under Eisenhower. In essence two methods of achieving the goal of containing communism with foreign aid were advocated.

The first, espoused by the Democrats, was to use the program to target the basic needs of people and thereby to disarm the tempting communist propaganda that promised improved standards of living for the lower classes. In 1949, Acting Secretary of State James Webb testified before Congress that the U.S. foreign policy goals for Point Four were to establish conditions in the world that permit the U.S. and others "to enjoy security against external aggression, to preserve and strengthen the concept of the dignity and freedom of the individual, and to participate in a prosperous and expanding world economy."[23] The

head of the TCA, Stanley Andrews, succinctly commented that "we are not fighting Communism, we are fighting the conditions which cause communism."[24]

The Eisenhower Administration initiated a philosophy supported by Republicans which used the program to expand the U.S. political influence in the world. Assistance was a way to enlist the loyalty of foreign governments. Republicans who opposed the original concept of Point Four had denounced it as a "world-wide WPA."[25] One particularly colorful condemnation was provided by Dr. Elgin Groseclose.

> Overlooking the phenomenon that the hotbeds of communism in the East are the universities among the relatively well-fed and -clothed students, it proceeds on the hypothesis that communism breeds on hunger and poverty and that the antidote to such are things as DDT, artificial insemination of cattle, steel plow points and bigger jackasses.[26]

Under Eisenhower, technical assistance was given primarily to countries on the fringe of communist countries. It was held out as an enticement to discourage these governments from turning to the Soviet Union.

The Hollister Era

Foreign aid programs were again reorganized in 1955 to become the International Cooperation Administration (ICA) which was headed by John B. Hollister.[27] Hollister had little knowledge of or interest in technical assistance programs. He had been executive director of the Hoover Commission which studied the foreign assistance program and determined "that 'mistakes and waste' had characterized the U.S. foreign aid program and

that 'important savings' could be made through more efficient administration."[28] In contrast to the growth of university projects during the Stassen administration, Hollister's administration intensely challenged any plan to add or continue projects.[29] Whereas Stassen is considered to be a visionary leader actively demanding university involvement, Hollister was a conservative manager who wanted to streamline the entire foreign aid program, including university involvement. His administration eventually terminated five projects (two in Jordan, two in Chile, and one in Ecuador) and began only three (in Indonesia, Japan, and Guatemala).[30]

In Hollister's conception of foreign assistance, expenditures for personnel were overhead rather than programmatic costs. In his concern with efficiency he worked to reduce overhead. He believed that foreign assistance could be made more efficient by supplying the capital to finance development projects rather than by transferring personnel to improve human resources. However, people were the core of the university contract program. University faculty members were the means by which institutions were built and productive capability was improved. The Hollister era clearly was a low point in relations between the agency and the universities. Long-term agency staff members refer to that period as the "Dark Ages."[31]

Hollister's administrative philosophy is reflected in his policy directive which stated that new project goals needed to be quantifiable, that detailed documentation was a prerequisite for the consideration of any proposal, and that a detailed review process was

required before submitting a proposal to the director.[32] Since the achievements of university projects were difficult to measure, Hollister's new administrative policies worked against university contract programs. In contrast to Stassen, Hollister was building Washington bottlenecks.

There is also evidence that Hollister had little direct interest in or knowledge of the university program. In 1955, during the Conference on University Contracts Abroad, Michigan State University President John Hannah noted

> ...[the need to] investigate objectively with Mr. Dulles, Mr. Hollister, and the White House, if necessary, to determine what their feelings are... I don't know Mr. Hollister, but I haven't seen anything he has said or written that indicates he has any awareness at all of this university program.[33]

Tensions between the agency and the universities increased to the point that the American Association of Land-Grant Colleges and Universities pledged to bring its case before President Eisenhower. It warned the agency of the possibility that many universities might withdraw their participation in the program because of "the lack of major concern for and support of institutions at the top ICA administrative levels" [34] Tensions were diffused only when Hollister personally addressed the meeting of the association. Thus, the agency-university partnership avoided further fracturing.

The universities gained some political clout during this period. The Conference on University Contracts Abroad was convened by the American Council of Education's Committee on Institutional Projects Abroad (CIPA), which became a major representative

for the universities. The conference resolution stated, "the principle governing relationship between the government and the universities in this program must be one of cooperative partnership rather than that of employer-employee."[35] Also discussed at the conference were the problem of contracts and the need for a clear public policy statement to enable long-range planning. Perhaps the most significant development of CIPA was the initiation of negotiations that led to the adoption of the first standard university contract. A new Office of Contract Relations was established to centralize contracting; previously a dozen divisions could negotiate, enter into, and administer contracts.[36]

Contracts define the relationship between the agency and the universities at the project level. They had to be written generally enough to sit within the broad foreign policy goals of the United States, and yet specific enough to give direction to the project. They had to be both challenging to encourage new work and realistic enough to fit each situation. Contracts had been a continual sore spot between the two organizations, and, although the standard contracting did not end the disputes, it did signal an improvement in relations. In fact, it is considered the first major agency policy change brought about by university initiative.[37]

Hollister and Stassen were antithetical in their direction of the agency. Stassen was a visionary, action-oriented leader who was highly supportive of the university contract program. He wanted absolute control of the program. As long the program was productive, the process was of little concern to him. Hollister, however, was more concerned with

efficiency and proper management. Because the university program involved high personnel costs, Hollister believed it was not an efficient means of providing foreign aid and therefore he did not actively support the program.

While some outstanding work was being completed in the field, the administration in Washington was not developing a strong foundation which could support future work, primarily because the agency lacked a clear direction. John Richardson in Partners in Development describes this period in the agencies' history as somewhat akin to the adolescent period of human growth.[38] Following a rapid growth spurt, the agency was out of balance and needed organization. It was not until the administration of David Bell that the agency "matured."

CHAPTER THREE

THE GROWTH OF INSTITUTION-BUILDING PROJECTS AND THE AGENCY-UNIVERSITY HARMONY: 1961-1972



> Through time, the technical assistance experiences in the traditional societies led to the conclusion that success in modernization involves one highly important and necessary, if not sufficient, condition. This condition is the creation of change in old institutional infrastructure or the building of new institutions. It was the gradual, somewhat grudging and still incomplete recognition of the fundamental truth that led the United States into the institution-building business in the developing nations.[39]

The early 1960s brought change to the United States' foreign policy and relations with communist nations. Communist Russia had developed nuclear weapons, launched Sputnik, and were extending their sphere of influence throughout Africa and into one of the United States' closest neighbors, Cuba. To counteract the perceived threat, the United

States formalized its response to communism through the foreign aid program. It was at this time that the Peace Corps and the Alliance for Progress were established.[40]

For universities, this period was one of rapid growth in institution-building projects. By the early 1960s it had become widely understood that simply transferring to developing countries the new agricultural techniques developed in America would not be sufficient to sustain long-term agricultural development. Certain techniques developed for American conditions and constraints were unsuitable to the conditions of the less developed countries (LDCs). The best way for the United States to serve the LDCs was to build institutions that could develop indigenous agricultural technology -- transferring not only the suitable U.S. agricultural techniques but also the capacity to develop their own techniques.

The increased emphasis on institution-building and the many years of technical assistance prompted a wide range of studies and reflections on the previous accomplishments and on prospects for the future of AID-university collaboration. These studies focused on the institutional relationships between AID and the universities. This relationship went through a tremendous change with the reorganization of the agency in 1961.

The Agency Reorganization

The agency underwent its fourth major reorganization to become the Agency for International Development (AID) in early 1961. Under the new Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 the Development Loan Fund and the International Cooperation Administration were consolidated as AID, and the Latin America bureau of the ICA was given greater visibility and renamed the Alliance for Progress. The broader goals of the Act were to initiate "greater emphasis on overall long-term development of recipient countries, establishment of standards of self-help, and comprehensive long-term planning."[41] The change created in AID an administration which was more decentralized and much less technically oriented. "The new doctrine held that underdevelopment was caused almost entirely by interactions among poor LDC economic planning, poor macro-economic policy, and shortage of hard currency foreign exchange to pay for capital imports."[42] As opposed to organizing bureaus according to technical expertise, each bureau was given a certain geographical region in which to guide all aspects of foreign aid work. Each bureau was equipped with a small technical staff in addition to administrators. The change greatly reduced the role of technical services within AID, and many technical personnel lost their positions.

The reorganization increased the agency's need for university technical experts to replace in-house agency technicians, but it actually impeded the agency-university relationship. The agency technical personnel who lost their jobs in the reorganization had been the primary contact people for the universities. Moreover, the reduction in agency technical personnel left fewer people who could understand the need for technical services, so agency priorities continued to turn away from technical assistance. Consequently, the

reorganization caused universities to be concerned that their future involvement in AID projects might diminish.[43] John Gardner, president of the Carnegie Corporation of New York, in his book A.I.D. and the Universities[44] noted that if technical assistance was to be effective the agency needed to have personnel who could interact with University personnel on an equal professional level. But with the new organizational structure, this did not exist.

The reorganization also blurred the focus and changed the overall plan of the agency. Previously, the agency had been structured to transfer technology that would assist the development of nations that were needy or that could benefit U.S. security interests. The foreign assistance goals and the means by which these goals were to be accomplished were fairly clear. But the reorganization made the agency more of a comprehensive development agency integrating many diverse vehicles for foreign assistance, especially loans, to help LDCs grow. The agency therefore became less of a technology-transferring agency.[45] It had become evident that U.S. technology was not always directly appropriate or feasible in vastly different environments. Therefore, to facilitate LDC development, a more broad-based approach and a more broadly defined organization was designed.

Newly-elected President John F. Kennedy appointed Fowler Hamilton to administer the new Agency for International Development (AID). Hamilton was primarily concerned with capital transfers from the United States to the LDCs as opposed to educational assistance, so agency-university relations continued on a holding pattern.[46] Hamilton's effect on AID-university relations was minimal during a short fifteen-month administration.

At this point in its history, AID needed to regain some stability and direction. The reorganization and the abundance of short-term administrators caused confusion which limited the effectiveness of the agency.

The Bell Era

The Administration of David Bell (1962-66) was a turn toward a more mutually respectful and fruitful relationship between the agency and the universities. As he began his tenure, the agency was in disarray from its reorganization and public confidence in it was very low. Shortly after Bell's appointment President Kennedy wrote Bell to say with a bit of irony "I'm sure that my troubles with AID are over, and I hope that yours never begin."[47] Given the state of AID when Bell became administrator, his work was amazingly effective. Twenty-six university contracts were established many of which would become long-term projects, while only 5 contracts were terminated.[48] Perhaps his greatest contribution was to provide stability within AID and to create a sense of cooperation between AID and the universities.

Although many factors led to improved relations between AID and the universities, the key was clearly the stability and direction Bell provided for the future. His valuable experience prior to joining AID enabled Bell to be not only an effective administrator but also an empathetic leader. Just before coming to AID he had been Kennedy's Director of the Bureau of the Budget. More important, Bell had been a professor at Harvard and was

the first AID administrator with overseas experience. He had served as a technical adviser in Pakistan with the Ford Foundation.[49] One of the difficulties with any foreign aid program, and specifically with the agency-university program is that the work crosses so many cultures and modes of operation. Bell was uniquely qualified to head the agency, having worked in all three major fields: government, universities and overseas technical assistance.

Bell's leadership style facilitated the development of the agency as an institution. In contrast to the impetuous demands of Stassen, Bell was much more measured; and unlike Hollister he strongly supported technical assistance. Policies were carefully planned and agency workers were well aware of the reasoning behind each decision. This fostered a sense of teamwork in which the agency workers and their partners in the universities were working together for a common goal. In contrast to Hollister, Bell supported growth in aid programs, particularly in the university programs. The agency nearly doubled its contracts during his three-year administration. Under Bell, university participation in AID programs was clearly welcomed and valued.

Agency-university participation in technical assistance had grown through ten years of innovation and change. The stability of Bell's administration enabled the agency and the universities to more formally evaluate the accomplishments and difficulties of their work, and plan for the work ahead. Many of the early successes of the program could be attributed to individual initiative. The need, then, was to design an institutional system that

could support future technical assistance. Just as the focus of technical assistance turned toward institution-building, so the agency and the universities needed to develop new institutional schemes for their work. A number of conferences were convened and reports written to study agency-university collaboration. The first and perhaps the most influential of these was the Gardner Report, published jointly in 1964 by the agency and by Education and World Affairs, a university organization involved in international development issues. The report was written by John Gardner who was highly respected in both governmental and academic circles.

The commissioning of the report provided the agency with some needed direction and was a significant step in improving relations between AID and the universities. Although AID commissioned many studies, few have had the impact of Gardner Report. Richardson attributed its impact to the fact that it was widely read, that Gardner had put much of his own effort into it, and that Bell had highly endorsed it.[50]

Gardner believed that the proper role of the universities was to continue institution-building programs overseas.[51] He believed the universities should be given a "maximum degree of autonomy"[52] to perform their duties and to determine long-term policy and program needs. The short-term political battles should be the work of the agency with little interference from universities. The Gardner Report gave an analysis of most of the points of interaction between the agency and the universities. In essence Gardner argues that each organization should concentrate on its particular strengths and the

functions it has been trained to carry out with minimum interference from the other. His analysis was widely read and discussed and many of his minor reforms were put into place. However, most of the major problems he enumerated continued to persist after his report.

Soon after the Gardner Report was published, AID contacted the International Rural Development Subcommittee of the National Association of Land-Grant Colleges to collaborate in "An Analytical Study of AID University Contract Projects in Agricultural Education and Research."[53] The study was a massive, three-year project that summoned the input of nine universities and the agency to help shape the future of the agency-university effort. Because of the breadth of university involvement in the study and the insights which they uncovered, the ten recommendations will be listed and discussed below.[54]

Recommendations of "An Analytical Study of AID University Contract Projects in Agricultural Education and Research."

1) There should be a stronger commitment on the part of all participating agencies to an expanded and long-term program of building institutions to serve agriculture.

The changing nature of aid, the pressures from Congress and the administration, and the instability of the agency have discouraged both organizations from making long-term

commitments to institution-building. Without long-term commitments, many of the benefits of the program are lost because these benefits are not fully realized until five or ten years into the project. This in turn discourages both the participation of new faculty and the continued commitment of universities. The agency may then concentrate their efforts within the contract toward achieving quick returns rather than meeting the real needs of the host country, and may fail to build a strong foundation within the program for its future work. In large part, this lack of long-term commitment is attributable to Congress' lack of patience and insistence upon quick returns to investments. It is exacerbated by the lack of a domestic constituency for foreign aid.

2) More flexible project agreements and improved liaison between AID and the university community would effect needed improvements in AID-university relations.

The universities have had more difficulties dealing with AID than with other governmental agencies. The report cites the following as circumstances which are each partially responsible for these difficulties: "(a) the service nature of technical assistance, (b) the conduct of operations in a foreign nation thousands of miles from the campus, (c) the failure of the foreign aid program to achieve solid support from the American public, (d) the "buyer-seller" approach by the contracting offices with the consequent implication that monitoring the actions of team members was more important than evaluating project achievement, (e) the feeling among AID personnel that university contracts represented a

threat to their job security, and (f) the unwillingness of some U.S. university team members to coordinate their work with other segments of the overall AID program."[55]

3) Research on the institution building process should be significantly increased and existing knowledge should be utilized more effectively.

The process of institution-building is complicated. At the time of the report relatively little had been written to guide that process. The report itself was a positive first step in that regard, but more study was needed. Furthermore, the knowledge that was available was often not tapped effectively. Administrators in the United States were not actively drawn into the program, and technical experts were not utilized during the orientation programs.

4) The basic ideas that underlie the land-grant type institution are highly relevant in technical assistance projects if properly understood and employed.

Two characteristics of many host institutions in the LDCs have complicated the transfer of the land grant concept of agricultural development based on teaching, research and service. First, unlike the United States, the research and extension work in most LDCs is performed by the government's ministry of agriculture rather than by the universities. Oftentimes U.S. advisers have dogmatically advocated a shift of responsibility from the ministry of agriculture to the universities. This has caused a power struggle between the host institution and the host government in some countries. The report recommends that

the universities should translate the land-grant system philosophy, but not necessarily the U.S. structure, into the host's culture to create a suitable system.[56] Secondly, many LDC universities were begun under a European educational system which stresses basic rather than applied research. Classes tend to be taught using a rote memory system, so the switch to a system which encourages creative thinking and problem-solving has been difficult. The report considers these two characteristics to be challenges that university staff must overcome, rather than grounds for dismissing the land-grant concept.

5) Agreement on goals and commitment to an overall strategy by host and U.S. personnel should be strengthened by wider participation in project planning and review.

The report states that the planning process needs to be improved and that the resulting plan must be more clearly articulated. Broader participation in the process is vital in this regard. The implementation of a project should follow a well determined path beginning with a highly visible opening project implemented by U.S. faculty, to the development of host country participation, and finally to a long-term partnership involving the exchange of faculty and research findings.

6) Those aspects of technical assistance programs which have contributed to the highly negative attitudes of many university staff members and departments heads should be changed.

U.S. universities need to receive benefits commensurate with their costs in order to be committed to the AID contracts for the long-term. The costs to a university can be substantial. Research shows that department heads who must temporarily fill vacated spots for professors overseas show a serious lack of enthusiasm for the program.[57] Although faculty are enriched by these experiences, department heads often see this work as an interruption in the proper flow of program development.[58] As a result, support for university field teams has at times been lacking.

The incentive for faculty members has also been questioned. Their assignment is vague,[59] opportunities for research and publication are limited,[60] and the change in lifestyle can be difficult. In the judgement of Jackson A. Rigney, then Dean of the International Programs at North Carolina State University, "the professional costs of participating in overseas contracts under previous styles of operation resulted in very little if any professional reward to the individual, with a consequent serious penalty as he attempted to re-enter the domestic professional stream."[61] The report calls for the agency to extend funding for faculty members to include more time for orientation before sending faculty overseas, and more time afterward to reap the benefits of the faculty experiences. Universities too are called upon to better utilize these experiences.

7) There should be fundamental changes in orientation programs in order to prepare team members adequately for their overseas assignments.

The cross-cultural nature of technical assistance can create significant challenges to the U.S. faculty. Often they are required to communicate in a new language, adapt to unfamiliar customs, and rely on fewer services than at home. Their work is often quite different, for example a professor may take on greater administrative duties in the LDCs than at home. To be prepared for this change, faculty members require proper orientation prior to their appointments overseas. These orientation programs have been criticized as being too limited. Ideally the orientation should employ the resources of staff members returning from overseas.

8) Programs of participant training should be more carefully planned and more adequately supported so that they conform to the developmental needs of host institutions.

The institution-building projects of the U.S. universities are dependent upon the effectiveness of staff members to gain the ability to teach and lead students and faculty in a foreign land and culture. Learning the language and adapting to the new culture are vital ingredients in this process. It is during the orientation process that these skills must be improved. In addition, the orientation process also gives the individual participants the perspective on how this project fits into the whole picture in the LDCs and into AID's plans. This orientation has been haphazard.

9) The university should exert its leadership in developing a fuller public understanding of international technical assistance.

As noted earlier, one of the goals of developing the university contract system from Harold Stassen to the present time was to engender a domestic constituency for foreign aid. However, universities have not effectively focused public attention on their programs, and thus that constituency has not coalesced.

10) A.I.D and the universities should cooperate in strengthening the international capabilities of U.S. universities.

Universities have special skills to assist the LDCs, however the conditions in these countries are vastly different than in the United States. This provision proposes that the universities need to be strengthened in order to enter into this work.

CHAPTER FOUR



TITLE XII AND THE NEW DIRECTIONS IN U.S. FOREIGN ASSISTANCE: 1973-1982

University involvement in foreign aid reached its peak under the Democratically controlled administrations of Kennedy and Johnson. Large investments had been made in institution-building projects. In 1969, the newly elected Nixon administration quickly activated changes in the foreign aid program. In a message to Congress on May 28, 1969, Nixon expressed support for economic, military and technical assistance programs that served both to aid other nations and to achieve security, market expansion, and goodwill for the United States.[62] Nixon proposed three new initiatives: a) the establishment of a semi-private organization called the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) to expand private enterprise, b) increased support for the international development banks that finance United Nations technical assistance programs, and c) the expansion of U.S. technical assistance.[63]

The United States increased its support for the United Nations programs and began to fund up to 25% of the core costs of the Consultative Group on International Food and Agricultural Research (CGIAR).[64] (U.S. contributions to this fund are discussed in a later section). In order to expand U.S. technical assistance, Nixon proposed the establishment of a Technical Assistance Bureau that would "devise new techniques, evaluate the effectiveness of programs, and seek out the best possible people in universities and other private groups to direct the programs."[65]

The early 1970s were a time for reevaluation within the development assistance community. Widespread hunger and new food shortages in a number of countries tempered the excitement of the Green Revolution and caused many people to question the means by which development was being achieved. Congress too was impatient and dissatisfied with the ability of U.S. foreign aid to quickly improve the welfare LDC peoples. Reformers who were critical of foreign aid, claimed that U.S. aid primarily served the elite of recipient countries or funded broad-based government programs that did not directly affect the poorest citizens.

In 1973, Congress amended the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to include a new emphasis on growth with equity. This new policy was patterned after the Basic Human Needs (BHN) strategy of development which the International Labor Organization and the World Bank had recently adopted. The approach was characterized not by research into specific problems of food production but by large-scale capital transfers that targeted aid

directly to the "poorest of the poor." University projects had been declining dramatically since the beginning of the Nixon Administration, and with the passage of this amendment in 1973 the bias against agricultural research was now reflected in the law.

In response to this bias the agency-university program searched for new forms of cooperation. Daniel Parker, AID's administrator from 1973 to 1977, was a strong advocate for developing research services within AID.[66] His first plan was to use a fraction of loan repayments from LDCs to the U.S. government to fund an institution that could financially support agricultural research. However, to achieve Congressional support for such a plan that would reduce Congressional control of funding was considered impossible. The second plan was to devise an institutional system by which the University would have a vested interest in the program, and thus would lobby for funding. This was to become the Collaborative Research Support Program (CRSP), one of three key components of the Title XII legislation of 1975.

Title XII Legislation

By the early 1970s the universities and AID had a well-established working relationship. Each knew the strengths and weaknesses of their collaboration. The new emphasis on meeting Basic Human Needs through large-scale capital transfers threatened to decrease or eliminate University involvement in AID programs. In 1975 Rep. Paul Findley and Sen. Hubert Humphrey introduced the "Freedom From Hunger and Famine

Prevention Act of 1975," the Title XII Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Bill of 1961. The amendment sought to reinstate the idea that U.S. universities had a unique contribution to make to the agricultural development of LDCs, and that institutional relations between AID and the universities therefore needed to be strengthened.

The proposed amendment consisted of three components. First, it established a Board for International Food and Agricultural Development (BIFAD) comprising members from both universities and the general public to oversee the work of the AID-university partnership. Second, it strengthened the grants program to develop the capability of U.S. universities to carry out international development projects through Title XII. Third, it established the Collaborative Research Support Program (CRSP), a program to research constraints on food production and to develop strategies to overcome these constraints in both the LDCs and the United States. The Title XII amendment was a potential turning point in AID-university relations because it promised strong Congressional support for AID as an institution.

The Board for International Food and Agricultural Development

The heart of the Title XII legislation, according to its co-sponsor, Sen. Hubert Humphrey,[67] was the creation of the Board for International Food and Agricultural Development (BIFAD), a semi-autonomous advisory board of seven members chosen by the President to act as a liaison between AID and the universities. It was designed to empower

and focus attention on U.S. universities to better utilize their expertise in foreign assistance[68] and to bridge the often difficult communications gap between AID and the universities. The BIFAD is responsible for helping to develop and administer the CRSPs and other research programs, to strengthen university involvement in AID, and to evaluate AID-university projects. It was a new administrative structure to help design and implement all Title XII programs.[69] The BIFAD's advisory role was designed to extend beyond Title XII to P.L. 480[70] and other programs related to AID's agriculture, food and nutrition account (section 103), of which Title XII is only a part. Rather than designing BIFAD simply to represent a special interest competing for AID funding, "The agreed broader approach permitted the Board to make its recommendations on the apportionment of funds to Title XII activities in the context of other requirements of the developing countries and to seek optimum complementary relationships between Title XII and other activities."[71] AID responded that it "warmly welcomes and will work energetically to facilitate this."[72]

The source and extent of the BIFAD's authority have been controversial. A legal staff opinion of AID in 1976 determined that the BIFAD was officially an advisory committee.[73] But the first BIFAD chairman, Clifton Wharton, declared that "there is agreement that the Board is not simply an advisory committee, although for AID management purposes, BIFAD is so classified."[74] He went on to say, "The Board is not in a position to operate programs independently. Its influence on policy and programs will be largely dependent on its close ties to universities, its relationship to the Administrator and his immediate deputies, and its independent reporting authority to Congress on Title

XII programs."[75] The strong constraint upon BIFAD's effectiveness is that it can exert influence only when AID is committed to both developing Title XII and to following BIFAD's advice.[76] This has potentially limited its effectiveness, although during the early period of Title XII AID was highly supportive of BIFAD proposals.

The process of integrating BIFAD into Title XII leadership was both complicated and slow. Although the BIFAD was commissioned in October 1976 its full involvement did not begin until Fiscal Year 1979.

Strengthening Grants Program

Congress initiated the strengthening grants program to develop university capacity to eliminate hunger and prevent famine. Funds were provided directly to universities and were spent primarily in the United States. The grants provided through the program were used to initiate or modify courses to give them more of an international perspective, to support graduate students and faculty in research on international issues, and to develop new language classes.[77]

Initially, AID intended these grants to strengthen the universities with which AID had worked, but the Congressional debate changed the focus to include universities not previously involved in AID projects.[78]

Four different grants programs were implemented. Each served the same goal: to strengthen the capacity of universities to engage in international work. The grants programs differed only in the means by which to achieve that goal. The four programs included:

1) Strengthening Grants Program 1979-1985.

2) Memorandums of Understanding 1983-1989.

3) Joint Memorandums of Understanding 1986-1991.

4) Matching Support Grant Program begun in 1986.[79]

Universities were chosen for strengthening grants based on the following criteria: evidence of faculty and administrative interest, demonstrated capabilities in agricultural research, a recommendation, and the willingness to commit the institution to the program by matching all AID funds, covering all overhead expenses or indirect costs, and using the effect of the grants to strengthen the capability for AID work.[80] The program provided each institution with approximately $100,000 yearly for five years.

By the mid-1980s the Strengthening Grants Program had successfully enhanced and expanded the capacity for international work in a number of universities. Because of its cost, however, the program was thought to be too politically unfeasible to continue indefinitely. Thus a new program, the Memorandum of Understanding, was begun in 1983. It was similar in intent but functioned on a much smaller scale than its predecessor. Funds were given to only 5 colleges for a five-year period.[81] Later, Congress established the Joint Memorandum of Understanding that paired colleges previously active in foreign assistance

with Historically Black Colleges and Universities to improve the capacity of each to work on AID projects. This program received strong Congressional and presidential support. Finally in 1986, the universities and AID jointly funded a program, the Matching Support Grant Program, through which grants were allocated on a competitive basis. This competitive program had the advantage of being more politically palatable than its predecessors, and therefore it may be the most likely program to continue long-term.[82]

On the whole, these programs reawakened the interest and commitment of universities to agricultural issues in developing countries. They broadened the experience and the competence of faculty members and students to engage in AID projects. Erven J. Long, former director of university programs for AID, counted 133 new courses on LDC agriculture begun, 232 courses modified to be relevant to LDC agricultural issues, and 3580 persons enrolled in these courses.[83] Hundreds of faculty and graduate students were given Title XII funds to finance research on developing countries.

Although the strengthening grants programs honed universities' skills in international education and research, AID missions did not actively seek out new contracts with universities. Rather, throughout this whole period, support for AID-university collaboration within AID and particularly in the AID Missions was declining rapidly. Consequently, universities were increasingly better prepared to provide foreign assistance, just as AID was becoming disenchanted with their partnership with the universities. This program decline is examined in Chapter Five.

Collaborative Research Support Programs

The Collaborative Research Support Program (CRSP) is considered to be one of the most effective programs to engage university expertise in foreign assistance. An innovative collaborative relationship reactivated the participation of U.S. universities in international research. Institution-building, which created the capacity for LDCs to develop their own indigenous agricultural technology, had been the focus of much of the AID-university partnership. However, the commitment of AID to this program had declined dramatically by the early 1970s. In conjunction with the adoption of the Basic Human Needs approach to development, the feeling among many people in the international development community was that U.S. foreign assistance should finance action, not deliberation, and that research was disconnected from reality.[84] Furthermore, because institution-building programs lacked a strong domestic constituency the support of Congress had always been difficult to generate. Finally, as had been the case with much of their history, the relationship between AID and the universities tended to be frustrating. Over time, each of these reasons caused AID to decrease its commitment to institution-building programs and to look for new institutional arrangements for research.

Within this context, the Collaborative Research Support Program (CRSP) was devised. The program is highly regarded primarily because it seeks to develop agricultural technologies that will serve the self-interests of both LDCs and the United States. Its benefit to U.S. agriculture is twofold. First, it allows U.S. scientists to work with a much

broader genetic range of plants and animals than if research is performed only within U.S. borders. This range of genes is needed to develop new breeds that can be of benefit both domestically and internationally.[85] Second, technology such as pest and disease control methods can be exchanged between countries. For example, the Hessian fly is a problem in both Morocco and Kansas.[86] Much can be learned by studying the problem in both areas. Because the research carried out under the CRSP has benefitted U.S. agriculture, it has engendered some support among U.S. farmers and farm organizations.

The CRSPs signaled a fundamental philosophical shift in U.S. foreign assistance to LDC agriculture. Rather than the U.S. seeking either to inform other nations about proper agricultural techniques, or to build the capacity to engage in teaching, research, and extension patterned after the U.S. model, the program fostered collaborative work. It recognized the benefit to U.S. agriculture from the knowledge of other countries.[87] The relationship between the U.S. and LDCs in the program was perhaps more a partnership than assistance. The program also changed the relationship between AID and the universities. Again, the work was collaborative and more like a partnership than direct-hire. Rather than the contracts required in the institution-building program, universities received grants and, therefore, more autonomy.[88]

Program leadership in the CRSPs was first provided by the Joint Research Committee (JRC), a group under the direction of BIFAD. The JRC was composed of an equal number of members from both AID and the universities along with representatives

from the U.S. Department of Agriculture and other organizations. The JRC and the Joint Committee on Agricultural Development (JCAD) ultimately were combined to form the Joint Committee on Agricultural Research and Development (JCARD). Initially, the criteria for setting priorities for the CRSPs were the following:

1. The relative importance of the problem to the developing countries.
2. The interest and competence of U.S. universities to work on these problems.
3. The extent to which the problem, if solved, would contribute to the well being of the very poor people in the developing countries (reflecting AID's emphasis at that time on solving the problems of the very poor),
4. The likelihood that important progress could be made through research on the subject matter area within a reasonable length of time.[89]

The first programs were:

1. Small Ruminants (Sheep and Goats),
2. Sorghum and Millet,
3. Tropical Soils Management,
4. Food Legumes (Beans and Cowpeas),
5. Human Nutrition (Effects of Marginal Malnutrition), and
6. Fisheries and Aquaculture,
    a. Pond Dynamics, and

b. Stock Assessment.

Once the priorities were set for the type of work to be completed, the organizational structure had to be developed and the people recruited. The JRC established planning entities for each CRSP to formulate policy. The planning entity then chose a management entity to integrate and manage the work and the funding of each part of its CRSP. For example, the Small Ruminants CRSP had 13 U.S. institutions[90] working at 17 different sites researching various aspects of the project, all of which were coordinated by the management entity.

An effective innovation of the CRSPs is the use of external evaluations to guide programs. These external panels are composed of experts who are not directly involved in the program. Evaluations tend to be objective and critical. In general, CRSPs have learned the lessons of the past and have become an effective means of developing appropriate agricultural techniques. CRSPs are able to engender political support which means that long-term planning and commitments are possible. This support is vital to research programs. The design of the CRSPs provides an effective organization, and yet they allow for appropriate individual initiative. By most accounts, the CRSPs have been a refreshing and highly effective initiative in the AID-university relationship.

The Bi-national Agricultural Research and Development Fund (BARD)

An alternative approach in bilateral collaborative research was begun in 1977 when the United States and Israel developed the Bi-national Agricultural Research and Development (BARD) program. Like the CRSPs, this program is collaborative, although it links only the U.S. and Israel. The program is funded by interest earned on an endowment created by the equal contributions of monies from both nations rather than through the political process inherent in CRSP budgeting.[91] The focus of its research is on high-value agricultural production -- including nuts, fruits, fish, dairy, and poultry -- in the arid regions of both countries. In contrast to the CRSP research that often seeks to benefit consumers by improving the productivity of staple crops, BARD research often benefits farmers because of the high elasticities of demand for these goods. Of the 208 BARD projects completed by 1988, 20 had produced a commercial application in the United States, while 23 more had commercial potential.[92]

Review of Title XII Progress

Eighteen months after its inception, Title XII was reviewed by the Senate Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance. Senator Hubert Humphrey and Representative Paul Findley (sponsors of the bill in 1975) were concerned with the lack of progress for Title XII programs. Don Paarlberg[93] -- a leader in the formation of Title XII, former staff member of the U.S. Department of Agriculture, and Professor Emeritus at Purdue University -- enumerated four areas in which the AID-university collaboration had failed to live up to its potential: the program lacked a clear mandate, its sense of mission was unclear, its financial

resources were too limited, and the organizational structure was not sound.[94] Paarlberg also identified three hazards that must be overcome in order to implement the Title XII legislation: AID inertia, University duplicity, and Congressional impatience.[95] Although Dr. Paarlberg's comments were made specifically in regard to the Title XII program in 1977, his testimony is perhaps one of the better analyses of the structural problems faced by AID and the universities in their collaboration.

1) As a result of 25 years of annual battles with Congress over funding and support for the organization and its programs, some AID officials "have grown battle-scarred and gun-shy. Many bright prospects have flashed across the horizon and disappeared. Visions and promises have failed. There is a tendency to treat Title XII as another one of these bright hopes, probably headed for disappointment."[96] Paarlberg noted further, "the wisest thing, some think, is to avoid going overboard on it, to fold it in with ongoing programs, and to give it less visibility, a kind of fail-safe attitude."[97] This type of attitude does not allow the program to grow and prosper. The focus of one's commitment becomes the agenda or status quo rather than the goal to be achieved.

2) Universities have not always used Title XII funds properly. A few programs that were essentially domestic in nature were funded under the guise of an international title. Moreover, "promising overseas projects might be staffed with persons whose chief qualifications were that they fit poorly into the domestic operations."[98]

3) Congress must become more patient with the program. They must realize that it took perhaps 80 years[99] for U.S. agriculture to benefit from the tremendous agricultural advances developed at land-grant universities. The development of the LDCs may not take 80 years, but Congress must understand that international agricultural research also takes many years to mature. It would be unrealistic to expect quick returns on these type of foreign assistance investments.[100]

Essentially, Paarlberg said that AID and universities need each other. When each institution focuses on the mission at hand, its relative strengths are utilized and disagreements are minimized. Paarlberg's analysis echoes the same issues identified in 1964 by John Gardner AID and the Universities.[101] AID participation is needed for its international focus and coordination efforts, and for its diplomatic, budgetary, and political skills. University participation is needed for project staffing and technical skills. Both will benefit, though in different ways, from a successful Title XII program, and yet each is dependent upon the work of the other. The crucial issue to the success of the program is the ability to coordinate their goals and commitments.

Significant changes occurred in 1980 in the Title XII program. First, AID became part of the International Development Cooperation Agency (IDCA), a dream of the late Sen. Hubert Humphrey. This new organization served as an umbrella for all U.S. foreign assistance programs. It was hoped that this structure would improve coordination between assistance agencies. Second, Title XII activities were to be placed under the newly

established Institute for Scientific and Technical Cooperation. Although the institute was authorized, it received no funding.[102]

The 1980 Report to Congress described the AID-university relationship as follows:

> Mutual understanding between AID and the universities continues to improve. AID is making several modifications in approach and procedure which improve university performance in carrying out AID technical assistance programs. Universities increasingly recognize that many problems are inherent in the task itself. They are taking several measures to strengthen their capabilities to deal with these problems and to do even more effective technical assistance work in the future.[103]

The Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR): An Alternative to the University Model

During the New Directions Period, AID began to support a significant parallel development in agricultural research on the problems in developing countries. It committed itself to funding 25% of the annual budget of the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) that directs the work of the International Agricultural Research Centers (IARC). The IARCs presently number 13, and in one year (1984) their annual budget was $177.9 million.

The IARCs were begun as a collaboration of the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations. Each had a history of support for international development projects. The Rockefeller Foundation had put together a strong cadre of scientists during its sponsorship of educational and research-oriented programs in Mexico. Following some excellent advances

in plant breeding, the Rockefeller Foundation planned to tackle the problem of improving the food supply problem in Asia. It was unable to raise local support for the project, so it turned for additional funding to the financially strong Ford Foundation which had also established a track record of work in international development.

Their first joint project was the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) in the Philippines, established in 1960.[104] The combination of the Rockefeller Foundation's research experience and cadre of scientists and the Ford Foundation's financial backing created a strong institute that contributed to significant increases in agricultural productivity in India that has popularly been called the Green Revolution.[105] Between 1960 and 1966 the two foundations also created the International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center (CIMMYT) in Mexico, the International Institute of Tropical Agriculture (IITA) in Nigeria, and the International Center for Tropical Agriculture (CIAT) in Colombia.[106] In 1967, each foundation agreed to limit contributions to the four centers to $3 million annually, an amount that was inadequate for further growth but would encourage cost-effective research. More important, the funding cap encouraged the research centers to seek funding from other public sources.[107] One of these sources was AID.

AID became committed to funding the International Agricultural Research Centers in 1969 at the Bellagio Conference. AID had earlier provided one-time grants of $350,000 (in 1965) and $400,000 (in 1968) to IRRI to develop machinery and to cover disastrous harvests in India and Pakistan. The Bellagio Conference was a meeting of representatives

of the World Bank, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations, and the government aid organizations of the United States, Canada, Sweden, and Great Britain. Forrest F. Hill of the Ford Foundation expressed the need for international cooperation on technical development. In response, the president of the World Bank, Robert S. McNamara, suggested the concept of a consultative group to coordinate fundraising efforts. This was to become the CGIAR. The AID administrator, John Hannah, pledged to produce a U.S. commitment to pay up to 25% of the CGIAR's operating budget.[108]

Since the Bellagio Conference, the United States through AID has faithfully supported the IARCs, and from the early 1970s through the mid 1980s has continued to cover nearly 25% of CGIAR's budget. The IARCs have grown to include institutes or programs that research plant genetics, livestock production, plant and animal diseases, food policies, farming systems research, and national agriculture research systems in addition to the original research on a variety of specific commodities. The sum total of the IARC's work has greatly reduced the constraints that limit agricultural productivity.

The success of the IARCs can be attributed to three areas in which they are differ from bilateral technical assistance agencies. The IARCs are not subject to direct political interventions and can determine their research goals on the basis of need and opportunity rather than political priorities. They have been able to draw from a broad international scientific community in building their staffs. And finally, they have developed an effective

management system to guide their programs.[109] With the effectiveness of the IARCs, some observers have questioned the need for the AID-university programs that build agricultural educational, research and extension centers in developing countries.

These national agriculture research systems (NARS) are needed for a variety of reasons, but two are especially pertinent to this discussion. First, a majority of the IARCs research is strategic in nature.[110] To be useful to a farmer, the research must be adapted to the local agro-climatic region by scientists working in the region. Second, the IARCs do not possess an effective extension capacity. The centers rely on the NARS to transmit the new technologies to local farmers. The skill to transmit technology requires a sophisticated system and technically trained faculty. "It has been widely accepted that the ability to screen, borrow, and adapt scientific knowledge and technology requires essentially the same capacity as is required to invent new technology."[111]

An effective international agricultural research system requires the services of both international and national research systems. The IARCs are able to capitalize upon intercountry economies of scale to perform broad commodity-based research and to assist in the coordination of technology transfer and adoption. The role of the university is to carry out research, teaching and extension that is location-specific and applied. The university meets the needs of its local constituents by developing its own strategic research and modifying and adopting appropriate technology developed by IARC research. As a

result of this complementary interaction, there exists a synergistic relationship between the IARCs and the National Agricultural Research Systems.

In an effort to improve the application of strategic research findings at the IARCs, CGIAR established the International Service for National Agricultural Research (ISNAR) in 1979 to identify problems in and encourage the development of national agricultural systems.

CHAPTER FIVE



THE DECLINE OF UNIVERSITY PARTICIPATION IN U.S. FOREIGN ASSISTANCE: 1983-1991

The change from the Carter administration to the Reagan administration was accompanied by a decrease in policy-level support for Title XII. One of the hallmarks of the Carter administration was the president's commitment to human rights. Support for foreign assistance was part of this policy. In fact, Carter pledged to double the percentage of U.S. support for foreign assistance from one-quarter of one percent of GNP to one-half of one percent (matching the level under the Kennedy Administration). Although fiscal constraints and inflation impeded the achievement of this goal, the policy commitment to assist the long-term economic growth of developing countries was still evident.

The focus of foreign assistance clearly changed under the Reagan administration[112] Foreign assistance was intended less to support long-term growth and more to secure short-

term political and strategic goals and to provide emergency famine relief. One of the distinguishing characteristics of the Reagan administration was the emphasis on the privatization of public services and encouragement of free enterprise. The foreign assistance programs reflected this ideology by increasing the use of private consulting firms for research and Private Voluntary Organizations (PVO's) for technical and relief services.[113]

It was this new policy direction during the eight years of the Reagan Administration, coupled with an increasing dissatisfaction of AID personnel with the Title XII program that led to the decline of University involvement in foreign assistance and which now threatens its very existence.

During Reagan's presidency, the involvement of universities in AID projects declined rapidly. Title XII projects declined from 42 in 1982 to just 8 in 1988.[114] During the same period, the percentage of funds within AID's Agriculture, Rural Development, and Nutrition account (ARDN), which were designated for Title XII projects also diminished. The decline has caused considerable concern in the university community.

From 1981 to 1986 the agency had an administrator, M. Peter McPherson, who actively supported the goals of Title XII. McPherson had previously served as a member of the BIFAD. A few months after taking office McPherson and the BIFAD chairman Clifton Wharton signed a Joint Resolution of AID and the BIFAD regarding Title XII. It expressed a mutual support at the highest levels for the AID-university collaboration.

However, this resolution was insufficient to bolster support for Title XII throughout the agency, particularly among AID missions (AID/M).

In 1986 McPherson conducted a survey of officials at AID/Washington (AID/W), AID/M, and university representatives regarding the Title XII program. AID/M criticized universities for showing little commitment to the program, for supplying to AID projects long-term personnel who were of poor quality, and for ineffective contract management.

In response to this survey universities expressed their concern that their capabilities in agriculture were not fully appreciated by AID; that AID relied too heavily on procedures for project implementation which in turn interfered with addressing substantive issues; that bidding procedures were skewed toward private firms; and that universities should be more involved in planning processes.[115]

According to the 1989 GAO review of Title XII programs, the reasons for the decline in the program include: a decrease in the overall funding for the Agriculture, Rural Development and Nutrition that finances Title XII; Congressional earmarks to PVOs that compete with Title XII; and the trend toward developing private sector initiatives.[116]

E.T. York, Jr., Chancellor Emeritus of the State University system of Florida in a paper prepared for the Office of Technology Assessment, described the circumstances limiting the achievements of the Title XII program:

1. Decline in support for Title XII Assistance.
2. Decentralization of AID decision-making.
3. Lack of continuity of AID and university personnel.
4. Shortage of Technical Personnel in AID.
5. Lack of support for Title XII by AID professionals.
6. Competition with private sector firms.
7. Procurement and contracting procedures.
8. Failure of universities to involve their best personnel.[117]

In December 1990, the agency published its position papers outlining a plan to reorganize the agency. The new initiatives for the agency include 1) promoting democracy and democratic institutions 2) creating a partnership for business and development 3) encouraging family development 4) promoting environmental security. The final paper discussed AID's new strategic management system by which the agency plans to improve quality and efficiency as it streamlines operations: "AID is working on its ship of state in two ways: one will repair and remove the barnacles from the hull and tighten the rigging, revitalize the crew and polish the brass, while the other will adjust the navigational instruments and set the course for the right place on the horizon."[118]

The reports seem to indicate that the university program is one of those "barnacles" that is to be repaired or removed from AID. According to the position papers, the limited

role of universities in the new AID plan is to assist in the business and development initiative. The report uses strong language to indicate that the AID-university relationship will be changing. "No longer can AID afford exclusive, entitlement-style relations with U.S. universities. We need to create processes that are inclusive and competitive, able to adapt to changing times and requirements, and to grow with the dynamic change occurring in the developing countries."[119] Two new programs were initiated: 1) The Creation of the Center for University Cooperation in Development and 2) the linkage of U.S. and LDC business schools.

The Center for University Cooperation in Development combines BIFAD's support staff and AID's Office of Research and University Relations under the authority of the Bureau for Science and Technology. The Center will administer all Title XII programs which increasingly will be limited to linking U.S. universities with LDC institutions, and it will serve the newly named Board for International Food and Agricultural Development and Economic Cooperation (BIFADEC).

The new BIFADEC is designed to broaden the pool of university resources available to AID beyond the resources of the land-grant colleges. Perhaps more significant, BIFADEC has lost its authority to report directly to the AID administrator and has been placed instead under the Bureau of Science and Technology. This new designation has changed the original conception of the BIFAD as a semi-autonomous committee that could comment on and influence agency policies from a position outside AID control.

The creation of the Center for University Cooperation and the BIFADEC signal that AID is reducing the traditional use of universities and their agricultural expertise. Appendix D documents the rapid decline of the number of University projects since 1982. New institution-building projects will continue to be few if any.[120] The program support grants will be ended in 1992, and will be replaced by the Linkages Program. Under this program a variety of colleges in addition to the major research institutions in LDCs and in the United States will form partnerships for joint research and teaching. It remains to be seen how these new initiatives will affect the CRSP program. An ambitious BIFADEC budget proposal calls for an additional $8.3 million for CRSPs and a 10 percent increase above 1990 levels for activities in agriculture production.[121] However, there is little written in the new AID initiatives or other current analyses to suggest that agricultural university projects will not continue to decline.

Ultimately these new initiatives will dilute the work of the universities. First, as the universities are asked to expand the type of projects in which they engage, the role of agricultural development will be significantly reduced. This is also reflected in the change from BIFAD to BIFADEC. Second, more institutions will be employed to implement technical assistance projects (from 70 land-grant and Historically Black Colleges to over 400 institutions, including community colleges). Finally, as the focus of university programs changes, the resources available dwindles. Fewer dollars are being spent over more universities to meet a broader project agenda.

CHAPTER SIX

RECURRING ISSUES IN AGENCY-UNIVERSITY RELATIONS

> We academicians cannot excuse our shortcomings by pointing a finger at the federal government and claiming that we need more freedom and longer-term commitment of funds. As true as that may be, the federal administrators of the funds in turn need only reply that contracts may well grow longer-term when universities can demonstrate a viable planning process and an overseas record equal to the inherent political risks. For this chicken and egg situation, we need a cooperative effort by government and university to enhance the effectiveness of the universities, participation overseas.[122] (Emphasis added)

In this chapter we turn from tracing the historical trends of the U.S. technical assistance programs to a more explicit assessment of the factors which have contributed to the successes and failures of the agency-university partnership. As indicated earlier, the program is losing support within the agency because of poor performance in recent years. Both the universities and the agency have contributed to this poor performance, but we contend here that the U.S. technical assistance enterprise, in general, has been strongly guided to failure by both the Congress and the presidential administrations. Indeed, analyses of the 40 years of technical assistance to the needy has led to agreement on the role and the mechanisms for AID, the universities, Congress, administrations, and host country governments to be effectively engaged in technical assistance.

Idealized Modes of Participation in the Program

The Agency for International Development

The agency is the lead institution in this partnership. It has both the financial resources and the contacts within LDCs to implement the programs.

For a partnership with the universities to be effective, the agency must first commit to long-term support for a program. University projects are often slow to mature yet they can bring lasting results. The Morocco project initially produced very negative evaluations, for example, but the continuing support of the agency has allowed the Hassan II University to become a leading institution in the region. It now has the capability to educate all Moroccan B.S. and M.S. agriculture students. AID itself concluded that longer university development projects are more successful. "Project experience indicates that it takes 10 to 15 years to train a critical mass of host-country faculty, and then another decade to build a sufficient base of experience for conducting an effective research program."[123]

In addition, the agency must facilitate a mutually beneficial relationship with the universities. Commitments must be rewarded. The incremental nature under which the Moroccan project was managed, for example, rewarded good work and thus kept standards high for both organizations. As a sense of trust developed, the interaction grew and became more profitable for both AID and the University.

The Universities

In their role of supplying technical assistance, the universities must also be committed to the program. To be effective, their international work must not become an appendage to customary activities but rather an integral facet of their institutional mission.[124] They must provide competent faculty members for work assignments and ensure that assignments overseas do not impede the ability of faculty to achieve tenure.[125] Universities should concentrate on work in the areas in which they have a comparative advantage: institution-building[126] and collaborative research.[127] Finally, universities must commit themselves to proper backstopping of the program by being efficient and timely in the administration of AID-university agreements and accommodating to reasonable agency procedures. This will build a sense of cooperation with the agency.

The Congress and the State Department

The Congress and the State Department must be committed to long-term funding that will build a sense of trust between all organizations. They are responsible for consistency in funding the program.

Broad Issues in the Agency-University Partnership

Undergirding collaborative technical assistance work must be a strong sense of the mission to be accomplished and a cooperative working relationship. This is a partnership project to achieve a common goal. The ultimate success of each organization is inextricably linked with the other organizations. Institutional arrangements have inhibited this sense of mission and cooperation, and have ultimately undermined the commitment of each of the organizations to the program. An analysis of these institutional relationships follows.

AID-university technical assistance programs were formed by the agency's constituents -- Congress and the administration. Although the program received authorization and funding, it was never given a strong foundation. Factors which have precluded the establishment of this foundation include agency reorganizations, changes in program goals, and the necessity to justify its existence. Thus the program often lacked stability. As a result, agency personnel were limited both in their freedom to design projects that responded to the needs of its beneficiaries and in their ability to establish strong institutional commitments.

Foreign assistance programs in general are characterized by a high degree of uncertainty. In order for these programs to be implemented successfully the various participants must undertake a great deal of planning to coordinate their actions. Coordination between two parties may be achieved by various means. For example, under a hierarchical system, the requests of the people in authority coordinate actions; and in a marketplace actions are coordinated by the pricing mechanism. Given that neither a

hierarchy nor the pricing mechanism is sufficiently developed to act on the AID-university partnership, coordination must be achieved through negotiation or bargaining. Of the three coordinating systems -- hierarchical authority, market, and bargaining -- the latter is the most costly in terms of time and uncertainty. This is especially true when neither organization has the initial power to exert authority over the other. In the agency-university partnership, AID controls both the funds and policy direction of the program, but because it must enter into agreements or contracts with the universities, it has no inherent authority over the universities and their decisions. In the same manner, although universities can influence the agency by lobbying Congress, they have little authority over the agency.

Bargaining can take place on a number of different levels. In the AID-university program, some bargaining is done on a programmatic level between the leaders of AID/W and the leaders of the universities (universities are usually represented by the NASULGC or since 1975 by the BIFAD). Bargaining also occurs on a project level between AID/M and a particular university. Where it is feasible, efficiencies are gained by bargaining on the programmatic as opposed to the project level. In addition to its use for a specific program or project, negotiation is also used to establish norms of coordination. These norms of coordination are patterns of interaction with other organizations that guide that interaction. They constrain the variety of potential directions of an organization by limiting it to certain patterns of behavior. This allows each organization to form expectations regarding the future of their program.

Establishing coordination norms in turn reduces the cost of future bargaining and can improve the implementation of the programs. Coordination norms are necessary for two organizations to achieve any goal that involves the work of both. The norms reduce uncertainty and build a sense of trust between the organizations. It is the responsibility of the leaders of the program to create these coordination norms.

Leaders use their resources -- their powers of persuasion or the authority granted to them by their positions -- to create a culture within an organization and coordination norms between organizations. This culture is a set of norms and expectations that guide individual and group goals and objectives. For example, a strong culture was developed during the Bell Administration and it clearly facilitated a mutually productive relationship between AID and the universities, but this culture was missing during the Stassen and Hollister administrations. The university program was used by Stassen for intermediate goals: to satisfy personnel reduction requirements as mandated by Congress and to establish a domestic constituency for the entire foreign aid program. Under Hollister the program was beset by the agency's cost-cutting measures and its growing adherence to the goal of maintaining proper procedures over and above the goal of obtaining successful outcomes from foreign assistance. In its 40 year history, the agency has had great difficulty in establishing coordination norms and a sense of direction. Part of the difficulty in establishing coordination norms results from the multitude of AID's goals. A proper system to facilitate work cannot be developed when the ultimate goal of that work is ambiguous.

The multiplicity of goals is evident in the foreign assistance legislation. Embedded in the legislation are 33 objectives. One AID document listed 75 priorities for foreign assistance.[128] Given AID's limited budget and the broad scope of the Congressional objectives, it was impossible for AID to meet each one. Leaders of AID must not only decide how a program will fulfill its objectives, but also must delineate which objectives of the stated goals to pursue.

Moreover, these objectives change over time. A 1989 study completed for the House Committee on Foreign Affairs noted "the program began with an emphasis on large resource transfers during the Marshall Plan, shifted toward technical assistance during Point Four, to infrastructure during the 1960s, to basic human needs during the 1970s, and finally to the role of markets and policy reform during the 1980s."[129] A bureaucracy as fragmented as AID, with offices world-wide cannot respond quickly to changes in its mission which require reorganizing operating systems, hiring personnel with skills in new areas of assistance, and transferring personnel whose jobs are no longer needed to other areas. Mission changes can be particularly cumbersome for long-term programs such as the AID-university program that by design do not respond quickly to new policy initiatives.

Defining the objectives for the program or an individual project is made even more difficult because foreign assistance programs often are used to achieve a goal that is an intermediate step toward an ultimate goal. For example, much of foreign aid has been used to ultimately contain communism. For many policy makers, the goal of development is an

intermediate goal in that process. However, the means to achieve the goal of containing communism may interfere with the intermediate goal of agricultural development, and vice versa. The conflict between intermediate and ultimate goals adds to the confusion within the program, and has caused disagreements between AID and the universities.

Under conditions of uncertainty in implementation and uncertainty in program direction, strong leadership is needed. However, the leadership in AID is severely constrained by Congress. In order for leadership to be effective, leaders need freedom to mobilize resources to achieve goals. With limitations on either freedom or resources, the potential for leadership is constrained. The resources of AID leaders include the authority of their position, the ability to direct subordinates, the analysis policy, and the control over the budget. However, Congress has increasingly been limiting their freedom to use these resources. For example, for fiscal year 1989, "92% of military aid, 98% of ESF [the Economic Support Fund], and 49% of development assistance" was earmarked often to a specific country.[130] Congress has not made a full commitment to the sustainability or the autonomy of the program. Without this commitment, AID cannot exert effective leadership and the program suffers.

The lack of full Congressional commitment to the program often becomes clear during hearings on foreign assistance. One year, in a preliminary vote on foreign assistance, the Senate literally voted the agency out of existence.[131] More common are the annual speeches that declare that U.S. taxpayer's money must be a spent at home to be beneficial

to Americans. Even among those congressmen attending the hearings who are better acquainted with the program, there is bitter conflict over the support for and direction of the program. To be sure, certain congressmen have been strongly supportive of foreign assistance and of Title XII, and they have been very helpful to the universities. But many congressmen are uncomfortable supporting any foreign assistance program when there is little support from their constituency. Lacking this support, their desire for a secure return on their commitment of funds is increased.

A more subtle sign of the lack of Congressional commitment to foreign assistance in general is the numerous reporting requirements that Congress demands from AID. The foreign assistance legislation calls for 288 of these reporting requirements and over 700 notifications of project changes each year.[132] Congressman Lee Hamilton explained that "a principal cause of the numerous congressionally mandated earmarks, conditions, restrictions, reporting requirements, is that the Congress has serious doubts about the manner in which the executive branch administers the program."[133] Accounting for the AID program which has been called "extensive but ineffective,"[134] tends to focus on the changes needed in the program rather than on analyzing how effective the total program is in meeting its ultimate objectives. Most AID evaluations focus on the project rather than on the programmatic level,[135] and therefore the focus of change pertains almost exclusively to the procedures and processes of foreign assistance rather than to the ideals and goals.

Congressional micro-management of AID has strongly influenced the agency. Some of the more negative effects of this intervention include the weakening of AID leadership, the lack of investment in long-term projects, the lack of investment in the long-term viability of the agency itself, the inability to establish norms of coordination with universities and host country governments, and ultimately the defection of AID from the university program and the failure of their partnership. (In a subsequent section we show that these conditions are exacerbated by the needs and the responses of the university community).

The effects of Congressional controls on AID may be summarized as follows:

1) Leaders tend to become managers. Congress has tied the hands of AID personnel by earmarking funds, micro-managing the direction of the program, and demanding excessive reporting requirements. With little freedom of initiative and few resources with which to guide the program, rules and procedures, not people, become the guiding authority on policy formation and project implementation.

2) The agency resists long-term commitments. The administration and the Congress have frequently changed the mission of the agency either as a result of a new situation or a new political party in power. With such great uncertainties, three years may be considered a long-term commitment by the agency.[136] Short-term results are necessary for AID to justify its existence before Congress. Like many other bureaucracies, survival goals (the means) often supplant the ultimate goals (the ends).[137] For example, "the present system

of accountability saps this asset [AID personnel] as employees sit at word processors rather than work in the field. The process may keep AID honest; it also keeps them from the development process."[138]

3) The agency is not able to invest in itself to ensure its own long-term viability. It does not become strengthened as an institution and is not able to establish proper institutional relations with other organizations. The agency is burdened by a multitude of clients each seeking to influence the agency in their favor. The agency is given little support to deal with these competing demands. Since AID can never succeed in satisfying the many valid requests, it often becomes mired in inertia.[139]

The consequence of these effects has been the defection of the organization. It seeks its narrow self-interests without proper respect for the interests and needs of its partner organizations including the universities. This then is the organizational situation to which the universities must face in their partnership with AID.

U.S. universities have certain institutional characteristics and values that are remarkably different from those of AID. The description of these differences illuminates the source of some of the conflicts between AID and the universities and explains why their work together has continually failed to achieve an effective collaboration.

1) Universities and their faculty members function best under long-term commitments. Returns to research and institution-building are slow but substantial. For example, the land-grant colleges significantly contributed to a five-fold increase in agricultural productivity in the United States over the last 100 years.[140] However, most of those gains occurred in the latter part of that time period. Universities use a methodical mode of operation to achieve long-term results. An impermanent "quick fix" solution to a problem is abhorrent to university faculty. In his discussion of intellectual leadership, James MacGregor Burns characterized an intellectual as, "in the first sense, a devotee of ideas, knowledge, values ... a person concerned critically with values, purposes, ends that transcend immediate practical needs."[141]

Because of the institutional situation within AID, universities are pressured to achieve quick, tangible results, in part to justify further funding. Universities would prefer to establish long-term commitments to the program, but foreign assistance goals change too rapidly for AID to commit to long-term funding.

2) University faculty members value and are accustomed to freedom of inquiry and freedom to publish the results of their research. They value research sponsors that can provide them with stable funding and a certain degree of freedom of investigation. Universities have this type of relationship with the USDA and the state experiment stations, but not with AID. Unlike other government programs, such as the National Science Foundation, AID has failed to understand the needs of the universities.[142]

The Incentive Structure in the Agency-University Partnership

The challenge of the agency-university partnership in technical assistance is to mobilize and coordinate the various people, institutions, and resources for the purpose of transferring or developing technology that is helpful to a host country. In a contract for technical assistance program leaders draw upon the resources of two or more universities in different cultures that are under the guidance of vastly different governments. Each government and university has certain resources and resource needs, and each has varying objectives and expectations for the contract. The diversity of objectives is due in part to the vastly different backgrounds of the organizations, and in part to the diverse leadership in the program. This leadership comes from AID Washington, the U.S. and host University leadership, the AID mission, and the U.S. and host country governments. Each faculty member, politician, AID-employee, host country official, and host university faculty member has certain incentives and certain needs in carrying out their particular responsibilities in the program.

By design, the AID-university technical assistance is carried out as a partnership. Projects are collaborative rather than competitive. Institutionally the partnerships are agency-university, government-government, and university-university. No single institution in any of these partnerships is the sole leader. Programmatically, technical assistance seeks to benefit both organizations, so mutual goals are more prominent than exclusive goals.

A partnership mode of operation is driven by the hope of achieving mutual gain at each point of interaction. That hope, however, can only be engendered by visionary leadership. Leaders must build a certain culture that will encourage performance. A host country, unlike a buyer, does not have the right to demand better work (or work more applicable to their situation) when all assistance is perceived to be free. If the assisting agency realizes this condition, then the self-interested agency employee has little incentive to do work for the benefit of the aid recipient. That employee is motivated to satisfy the boss -- AID leadership and ultimately Congress and the Administration -- and not to achieve results for the LDCs.

For university faculty members, the incentive is to provide assistance and to produce publishable research. By publishing, a faculty member earns a higher status, improves the potential for achieving tenure and a higher income, and contributes to the knowledge in their field. The faculty member also wants to do well in order to continue to receive grants from AID and other agencies. However, if the motivation is exclusively self-interest, the faculty member also has little incentive to meet the needs of the host people or the project.

The incentives of U.S. agency personnel is to provide foreign assistance and to carry out the objectives defined by Congress and the administration. AID/W is in a directive mode: it receives general objectives from Congress and the Administration and relays specific instructions around the world to AID mission personnel. Because Congress and the Administration may vacillate widely about the objectives of the program within the span of

a few years, AID/W is often unable to make definite, long-term plans. AID/W is bound by the will of Congress because it must appear annually before Congressional hearings to renew agency funding. Consequently, AID/W's policies are built on shifting foundations, so its directives to the AID missions may have little continuity.

The task of AID missions is to receive the funding and direction from AID/W and to design programs and projects that match these directives and fit within budgets. Primarily, their task is to coordinate this program with the host country governments and institutions. In a sense AID missions serve two masters: one being the host country in which they live and work, and the other being the country from which they came and which provides them with funding and resources. Perhaps because of their proximity to their hosts and the vacillating directives from AID/W, the AID missions as an institution have become stronger in recent years than AID/W.[143] In fact, AID mission directors are routinely moved every four years because of a tendency for AID mission directors to become too closely tied with the host country.[144] This regular rotation adds to the discontinuity in the programs. It creates an incentive structure that rewards new Mission Directors to discredit previous work, to begin new programs with a great deal of enthusiasm, and then to leave before the programs come to fruition and the problems begin.[145] Thus, mission directors gain approval for beginning programs rather than for completing old programs.

The incentive structure has been a leading cause of difficulties between the agency and universities, and it is an important factor in understanding the history of their relationship.

Although the relationship has achieved some success, that success has been hampered by the institutional relationship between the agency and the universities. Essentially, each has different interests in the program and different constituents to which they are accountable. This has formed within the two organizations a very different set of values and norms of behavior. Although both are engaged in the same program to achieve a common goal of LDC development, their methods of achieving this goal or modes of operation are quite different. This creates an endemic problem. Potentially both organizations can benefit through the implementation of a favorable program, however coordinating their cooperation is difficult task.

It is the contention of this paper that Congress in its impatience to achieve quick, tangible results from the program has created an agency too concerned with procedure and unable to build a strong, long-term foundation for the program. Similarly, the demands on faculty members to publish, to be tenured (which is difficult to achieve during an overseas project), and to raise grant money have caused the universities to, at times, put forth technical assistance that is of a rather poor quality. In essence, the constituents of the program have so constrained the agency and the universities that building an effective, long-term partnership has been exceedingly difficult.

A game theory analysis is presented in Appendix A to more fully explain the endemic nature of the difficulty of AID and the universities to establish an effective, long-term partnership. It builds upon the present chapter but uses a model to enrich the discussion. Game theory displays the interdependence of AID and the universities. To achieve the desired results in the LDCs both organizations must cooperate. However, the analysis also explains the incongruity of the interests AID and the universities have for participating in the program. Similarly, their methods of achieving a desired outcome are different and often conflict with each other. For example, the universities value long-term contracts to achieve long-term solutions. AID values short-term solutions. These are necessary to demonstrate results to Congress that can justify continued appropriations for the agency. A game theoretic analysis is useful for modeling these complex relationships in order to explain them more clearly.

The conclusion of the game theory is that neither AID nor the universities have the interests of the LDCs foremost in their priorities. Both organizations can gain the most from the program by cooperating to serve the LDCs. However, if each organization acts purely within its own rational but narrow self-interest, they will defect from the program and will ultimately precipitate the demise of the program. This is in essence what is now happening to the program.

CHAPTER SEVEN

PROGRAM PROSPECTS:

REBUILDING THE AGENCY-UNIVERSITY RELATIONSHIP

Much has been accomplished during the forty-year collaboration between the agency and universities. Difficulties have impaired the success of certain projects, and lessons have been learned about the process of providing technical assistance. The capability of U.S. universities to contribute to growth in agricultural productivity and in turn to the general economic growth of LDCs remains strong. One need only look at the involvement of universities in the IARCs to be convinced that the impact of the universities can be impressive, given appropriate institutional arrangements and programmatic goals. The need of the program then is to establish the proper institutional arrangements.

1) A proper foundation must be established. This requires an investment by all parties to the long-term viability of the program. Stability is needed to make long-term plans, a stability both in funding and in organizational structure. Commitments must be garnered from each organization and a spirit of collaboration must be engendered. In 1975 Congress sought to establish this foundation with the Title XII amendment. This legislation gave new power to the universities through BIFAD, provided institutional support for the universities, and added a new and effective mode of operation. However, the program was

not well insulated from short-term political and economic demands. Less than two years after signing Title XII, Congress berated the agency for its ineffective work while the foreign assistance budget failed to grow at its expected rate. At the same time, the agency was not given a proper foundation. Congress voted to accept the proposed Institute for Science and Technology but chose not to fund it.

2) Once a proper foundation is in place, the program must offer some reward to encourage effective work and to make participation in the program a worthwhile venture for all organizations. Under the present system rewards are based on broader interests, so the effectiveness of the work may have little to do with funding. It is the leaders who must demand quality work. The need for this type of leadership exists not only in the agency but also in the universities as well. University administrators must not send only their expendable staff members, but must provide rewards to attract the highly competent members to foreign work. International work must be integrated into the campus life and mission, and tenure must not be denied faculty members who are involved in the program. In short, if the partnership is to continue, the effort must be made to continue to value and reward U.S. university-AID technical assistance work.

3) The AID-university program requires a proper goal and a vision for action. The famines of the early 1970s, the need for a domestic constituency in the early 1950s, and the spread of communism in the 1960s each provided an impetus for the program. Such an

impetus is now lacking, and the continuity of the program is dependent upon past momentum.

4) The program needs to be subject to proper accountability. These evaluations must be thoughtful and occasional. They must appraise not only the implementation of the projects but, also, the ideals and values of the program. The success of the Gardner Report was due to its careful analysis and the support of agency leaders.

The integrity of the institutional arrangements must match the ultimate goals of the program. The agency cannot establish proper arrangements for long-term technical assistance nor can Congress consistently fund them. Each organization is too unstable. Similarly, the universities are not equipped to staff short-term, politically motivated projects. They are not flexible enough and do not value the quick-fix solutions that may be appropriate for certain circumstances.

If long-term university technical assistance is to continue, then Congress must set up a foundation system to support technical assistance. This foundation would free the support for technical assistance programs from short-term political and economic pressures. Such a foundation was recommended by the BIFADEC Task Force on foreign assistance.

BIFADEC Task Force

In 1989 the BIFAD designated a blue-ribbon task force to analyze the present AID-university partnership and prepare recommendations for the BIFAD and AID as they plan the future of University involvement with AID in foreign assistance. Much had changed in recent years both among the universities and AID and in the new geo-political setting for foreign assistance. A prime motivation for technical assistance -- the threat of communism -- was crumbling from within. At the same time relations between AID and the universities were becoming increasing strained. Evidence for this can be clearly seen in the decrease in University projects as shown in Appendix D.

On April 19, 1991 the task force headed by Dr. G. Edward Schuh presented its findings before the BIFADEC, AID representatives, and a distinguished array of experts in the field of technical assistance. Also on hand was AID administrator Ronald Roskens.

The task force sought to explain the need for AID to utilize U.S. universities for foreign assistance. First, it described the new world system and the benefits U.S. universities could bring to LDCs including education, rural agricultural development, and a slowdown in rural to urban migration. Though these were not new plans, the task force felt they were still very relevant goals that could fit well into the democratization and privatization priorities within the agency.

Second, the task force noted that U.S. universities possessed a strong comparative advantage in providing technical assistance. At the same time, AID's in-house cadre of technical personnel had significantly diminished over time.

The response of AID personnel revealed their indifference to the report. AID administrator Roskens had no comment on the report, and many believe he had little knowledge of its background. AID personnel more in touch with the program subtly expressed the notion that the reorganized AID would have little room for university involvement. Based upon past performance they could not be convinced that the U.S. universities ability to supply technical assistance gave the U.S. a comparative advantage in foreign aid over other countries. Their response to a radical plan by the task force to reform AID and retain its agricultural expertise was congenial rather than substantive, causing many to suspect that the bulk of the AID-university program would simply "wither on the vine" rather than be "pruned."

A Look to the Future

The continuing decline of Title XII projects seems to forecast a bleak future for university/AID relations. It is questionable whether institution-building projects will continue in their traditional form with the emergence of private sector initiatives, the hesitancy of mission directors to use universities, and the difficulty in attracting quality university faculty for extended stays overseas. As the difference in economic strength

between developed countries and the developing countries becomes less distinct, AID will continue to change from its origins as a granting organization to an organization that seeks mutual cooperation for the benefit of both the United States and the recipient nations.[146]

The emerging chapter of the AID/university partnership will likely be the concentration on collaborative projects. Institution-building projects may involve faculty members in numerous short-term assignments on specific projects over an extended period of time.[147] This arrangement seems to be much more efficient than massive institution-building programs, and has produced relationships that surprisingly continue over a longer period of time than those developed during two-year stays.

The CRSPs are likely to continue to be the dominant mode of partnership between AID and the universities. A 1986 survey of mission directors and university participants indicated that both groups held CRSPs in high regard.[148] CRSPs are well-conceived methods of engaging university expertise and strengthening linkages among scientists of different nations, and they have proven to be effective in solving problems relating to specific commodities. Moreover, they attract strong political support in Congress.

One of the ironies of the period of institution-building overseas, is the relative neglect of U.S. institutions.[149] The strengthening grants programs have begun to address this problem and will continue to do so in one form or another. G. Edward Schuh argued that

the United States will continue to face increased economic competition from other countries and will need the strength of U.S. universities to maintain their technological edge and to develop human capital.[150]

The agency will continue to use the private consulting groups to perform technical assistance and evaluation, since these organizations are more flexible in responding to the needs of AID than are universities. If Republican administrations continue in power, private sector initiatives are also likely to continue.

Budgetary difficulties will continue to plague the institution-building projects. The national budget deficit and the emergence of new assistance priorities in Eastern Europe and perhaps the Middle East will constrain the funding available for the university programs.

More serious is the lack of a political vision to justify technical assistance programs. With the new power of the United States in the international community and the crumbling of the communist system, a major impetus for foreign assistance has been removed.[151]

The present agency leadership will try to refocus foreign assistance toward capital transfers and the development of infrastructure. This may continue to seriously limit the future of university projects in human capital development.

Most important, the sense of trust in and the mutual commitment to the Title XII university projects has diminished to the point that even with the adoption of new policy initiatives, the agency-university partnership may be unable ever to be restored to the effective program it once was.

APPENDIX A

GAME THEORETIC PERSPECTIVE OF THE AID-UNIVERSITY PARTNERSHIP

The AID-university partnership in foreign assistance is designed to meet the needs of its beneficiaries -- the foreign and domestic agricultural systems, universities, and governments. An evaluation of the effectiveness of the program would study its impact on these institutions. Our purpose here is to study the policy formation process. If policy is determined by the ability of the program to meet the needs of the beneficiary, then this study should examine the evolution of the effectiveness of the program in order to understand why certain policies have been advocated. However, in the AID-university program it is the ability of AID and the universities to meet the needs and wishes of the constituents that ultimately influences the formation of policy. For example, to ensure the continuation of its programs, history would show that AID must concentrate their efforts on satisfying Congressional demands more than satisfying the interests of a LDC government. A further discussion of the beneficiaries and constituents of the program is presented below.

The Beneficiaries of the AID-University Partnership

Beneficiaries are defined as those people or institutions that receive benefit from the program but have little authority to influence policy. AID and the universities have the

same beneficiaries. The LDCs receive agricultural technology to increase agricultural productivity. Agricultural institutions have been created and strengthened in the LDCs that can develop or adapt agricultural technology appropriate to each region. U.S. farmers have also benefitted by the research advances of the CRSP program such as the work done on the Hessian Fly.

The Constituents of the AID-University Partnership

Conversely, AID and the universities have diverse constituents. Constituents are defined here as those people and institutions which both benefit from the program and have authority to influence policies. The constituents for AID include Congress, which controls its funding and authorizes its actions, and the State Department and President to which AID must report. The universities constituents include its administration and the university community.

AID and University Interests in the Program

University interests

Universities value autonomy, the interchange of knowledge, and long-term commitments.[152] They have at least six reasons for participation in the program.[153]

1. Professors who have participated provide students with better teaching. Examples can be gleaned from a world-wide experience and perspective which enrich the interest and breadth of their knowledge.

2. The diversity of graduate students is broadened. The enrollment of foreign graduate students would have been fewer had not the universities been involved overseas.

3. Participation increases money for research.

4. The improved international background of the faculty benefits both U.S. students who are interested in international work and international students who find empathetic advisers who have lived overseas.

5. Faculty members have opportunities to publish in foreign journals on the basis of their international experience.

6. Universities can help alleviate the problems of hunger and famine among the needy people in the LDCs.[154]

AID interests

Mapping out the specific institutional interests of AID is difficult. The mission of AID tends to change rapidly from one era to another. AID has been characterized as having no institutional memory. Its institutional values, its goals and its organizational structure have changed frequently. This change is due in part to changes in its beneficiaries -- the countries it seeks to assist. More often, change is initiated by its constituents, especially when a new administration comes to power. The influence of AID's constituents

is so strong that Congress and the Administration explicitly define the agency's short-term interests. This creates a situation in which the long-term interest of the agency center on satisfying the will of Congress and the administration.

The interests of Congress and the Administration in the AID-university program vacillate, primarily because foreign assistance has a weak domestic constituency. In general, they seek a program which can be a flexible, dependable instrument of foreign policy and are concerned about finding evidence showing a favorable return to their investments in the program. Thus, the agency is pushed to demand quick, tangible results from AID-university projects.

The Decision Rules: Cooperation and Defection

Given these constituents and beneficiaries and their own interests and goals, the universities and AID are required to make numerous policy decisions. Often, individual policy choices are determined by broad policy decision rules. Two policy rules -- cooperation and defection -- and the dynamics of the interaction between AID and the universities are defined below.

In cooperation, a player's decision rule considers that one can best achieve one's objectives by working in concert with the other organization. The goals or utility sets of the

two organizations are unified. Actions are taken to maximize the utility of both organizations.

In defection, an organization works to achieve its own goals, irrespective of the goals or needs of the other organization. This does not imply that an organization terminates interaction with the other organization. Rather, it means that one organization works to satisfy its own short-term self-interest and cooperates with the other organizations only to the extent that the cooperation permits the achievement of one's own goals.

The choice of cooperation does not identify the game as a zero-sum. Gains by one organization are not considered losses to the other. Rather, an action that benefits the universities also implicitly benefits AID because it further adds to the universities capacity to achieve their mutual goals. This decision rule is similar to the justification for U.S. foreign assistance which is based on "enlightened self-interest": gains to the beneficiary are also gains to the United States.

In defection, an outcome is beneficial only if it contributes to one's narrowly defined self-interest. For example, if AID is defecting, then a research gain by a university which, for example, did not immediately contribute to AID's interests, (e.g. the ability to obtain funding from Congress), would not be viewed as a gain to AID, but as a loss: the universities could have spent their time more effectively on more pertinent matters. The

next section defines specifically the character of cooperation and defection for AID and the universities.

AID cooperation

1) AID makes long-term commitment to projects which allow universities to have certainty of funding and the ability to plan.[155]

2) AID allows for more University autonomy, including the ability for faculty research and publishing.

3) AID commits itself to employ quality, technically competent staff who can communicate and plan with University faculty.

4) AID commits funds to the strengthening grants programs which improves the ability of the university to perform their services for AID.[156]

AID defection

If AID defects, its support for university programs extends only as far as the university technical projects clearly contribute to AID's ability to prove its effectiveness to Congress. Congressional demands cause AID to seek tangible evidence of successes and quick returns to investments. These demands lead AID to engage in project rather than program evaluation, and to short-term funding. AID also tries to control research so more tangible results can be achieved. Institutional support for the program is limited.

University cooperation

The characterization of university cooperation is taken from a memorandum sent by AID/W to AID missions. The memorandum encouraged the use of the universities in foreign assistance, and enumerated four guidelines to measure university commitment. The guidelines were chosen by an AID/BIFAD committee and were based upon the document, "Basic Principles for College and University Involvement in International Development Activities," adopted by NASULGC in 1979.

i. The universities must be committed to employing high quality faculty in foreign assistance. To do so they must increase the incentives for faculty to work with AID by:

a. providing security to the faculty that grant money will be available after they return.

b. Promotions must recognize the benefit of international work. Taking an AID assignment should not limit possibilities for tenure. (NASULGC Principle 4)

ii. Commitment to quality and timely administrative support by the university and departmental administration which should include committing faculty to learn AID's financial management and procurement policies. (NASULGC Principles 3,5)

iii. Commitment by departments to effectively monitor and evaluate university personnel overseas. (NASULGC Principle 9)

iv. Commitment to give priority for international development activities and to integrate these activities into the universities mission and offerings. (NASULGC Principles 2,7)

University defection

University defection is characterized by the lack of commitment to fulfilling the above objectives. For example, sending low-quality faculty members on AID projects, or failing to integrate international work into the educational offerings on campus.

Outcomes of the Partnership

The stated purpose of the program is to achieve the development of agricultural productivity in LDCs by building institutions of education, research, and extension that can generate the human capital and technology necessary for increased agriculture production. This is not the only relevant outcome. Other outcomes include, for example, the development of goodwill for the United States, new markets for U.S.-produced goods, knowledge regarding institution-building, and improved or deteriorated relations between AID and the universities.

In this "Game" four outcomes are possible:

AID and the Universities cooperate	C,C
AID cooperates and the Universities defect	C,D
AID defects and the Universities cooperate	D,C
AID and the Universities defect	D,D

The following chart shows the interaction between the agency and universities in terms of cooperation and defection. It characterizes their relationship throughout their forty-year history. Movements toward a more harmonious and productive relationship resulted from the creation of the program, the administrative stability and cooperativeness of the agency beginning with the Bell Era, and the revision of the program to form Title XII. Movements toward retrenchment and unproductiveness resulted from the administrative restrictiveness of the Hollister Era, the search for new forms of technical assistance following the disappointments of the decade of development in the 1960s, and the inability of the agency and the universities to form a productive relationship following the passage of Title XII.

GAME THEORY CHART

		THE UNIVERSITIES	
		Cooperation	Defection
AID	Cooperation	- The Early Years: 1950-5. - Growth of IB projects: 1962-1968. - Early Title XII: 1975-80.	- Late Title XII to Early Decline: 1980-85.
	Defection	- Hollister Era through Formation of AID: 1956-61. - Growth of Multilateral Aid and New Directions: 1969-1974.	- Late Decline in Agency-Univ. Relations: 1986-present.

The Payoffs of the Partnership

1) AID and the Universities cooperate:

If cooperation occurs on both sides, then assistance is carried out properly and positive results will be facilitated. Extra commitment is required on both sides and therefore is costly. The demands of constituents are not always fulfilled; for instance, Congress may not receive quick, tangible results, and university faculty may have fewer opportunities to publish their results. However, the beneficiaries of the program are better served. Moreover, this cooperation positively influences future outcomes by creating a momentum of commitment to the program. Ostensibly, as the program becomes more successful, then each participant is benefitted. This was the situation during the Bell administration.

2) AID cooperates and the Universities defect:

Many people would claim that this outcome occurred in the early 1980s. AID had incurred expenditures for the program over and above the results it was receiving from the universities. AID's position was inequitable. Either it convinced the universities to cooperate or it defected. In terms of narrowly defined self-interest, the universities gained from the outcome. They received monies from the strengthening grants programs but only committed lower quality staff members to the projects. However, this result was unstable. During the early 1980s AID has shown a steady decrease in support for the program.

3) AID defects and the Universities cooperate:

This situation was characteristic of the Hollister era. AID achieved more from the program without much expending effort expended. Based on narrowly defined self-interest, AID was "winning." The universities moved into the inequitable position and again the position is unstable. In this scenario the universities seek either to convince AID to cooperate or they will defect.

4) AID and the Universities defect:

This may be the best description for AID-university relations during the latter part of the 1980s. Neither organization contributed effectively to the program. The advantages of the program to beneficiaries declined.

This may not be a bad outcome for the constituents, depending upon their goals for the program. If the goal is to achieve the stated purpose of the program, then AID and university defection is an unfavorable outcome. If, however, the constituent has ultimate goals for the program other than the stated purpose, then this outcome may not be unfavorable. For example, Stassen was more concerned with developing the domestic constituency than with the output of the program.

If the outcome for both the constituents and beneficiaries is unfavorable, then two options are left: to improve the system whereby AID and the universities can cooperate, or to withdraw support from the program.

Beneficiary Interests

LDCs want expanded research on their agricultural production as well as training for their people. They need research that is well suited to their people's needs. Often, the direction of the AID-university program is driven primarily by political forces in both the host country and the United States, rather than by people's needs. Only when AID and the universities see development of the LDC as their primary goal can the LDCs -- the beneficiaries -- influence government policy. Ultimately, interests of the beneficiary have no authority and little influence in AID decision-making.

Constituent Demands

The decision rule by which each organization plays is strongly affected by its constituency. The extent of that effect depends on the power of both the organization and the constituency. AID in particular is strongly affected by its constituents: the Congress and the Administration.

Congress wields the power to determine the agency's budget and to authorize its priorities. Initially they were reviewed annually, but since 1973 have been reviewed bi-annually. Because the foreign assistance program does not affect domestic interests, each

Congressional debate is a difficult struggle. Congress generally signals to AID that it seeks short-term, tangible returns to its foreign assistance investments.

University faculty members are often under pressure to publish their findings. They want to do research that will lead to publishable results. This often necessitates long-term work.

The constituents of the program who tend to focus more upon the fulfillment of their interests than on achieving the stated purposes of the program often cause universities and AID to defect.

The question is how to achieve a cooperative relationship between AID and the universities. This problem is solved when the program is able to engender commitment from both organizations. This commitment is made stable by the establishment of coordination norms.

For the program to be effective it must be seen as a cooperative effort that maximizes the relative skills and experiences of each organization in pursuit of a common and mutually beneficial goal.

APPENDIX B

Accomplishments of the Program in the Early Years

A Case Study of The Jimma Secondary School and the

Alemaya University in Ethiopia

The Point Four program accomplished much in its first decade of existence. It had undergone tremendous changes in its goals and its administration. One of the more successful programs will be detailed below.

Prior to 1952 and the technical assistance of Oklahoma State University, Ethiopia had produced no Bachelor of Science graduates. The personal relationship of Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie with an early agency administrator Henry G. Bennett facilitated the development of a partnership to establish a land-grant type of agriculture college.[157] With technical assistance from the agency and Oklahoma State University, The Jimma Secondary School and the Alemaya University in Ethiopia established educational facilities for high school and college-age youth and began doing major research on grains such as teff, a staple food in the country. Their formal partnership lasted from 1952 to 1968.

A 1989 study commissioned by AID explained the accomplishments of the university over the past 37 years. Its graduates have held positions in government and in a variety of international organizations throughout the world.[158] A survey was taken of the first 80 students at the Jimma School which reported that 50 students graduated from Alemaya with a B.S. degree. Of these students, 26 went on to receive master's degrees and 16 of these to receive doctorates from institutions in the United States![159]

Oklahoma State University guided the growth of Alemaya. Over 16 years, 185 faculty and staff "assumed the entire responsibility for the development and operation of a college of agriculture. They served as instructors, advisers, and work supervisors."[160] The first four presidents of the College of Agriculture were officers from Oklahoma State University. This University was free to design their own unique program to meet the needs of Ethiopians, and they enjoyed a great deal of autonomy from the leaders in the agency.[161] The result was a major agriculture university and significant productivity increases among those farms adopting the universities' new technologies.

APPENDIX C

Accomplishments of the New Directions and Title XII Period

A Case Study of the development of the Hassan II Institute of Agriculture and Veterinary Medicine in Morocco

One of the most successful AID-university collaborations is the contract between the University of Minnesota and the Hassan II Institute of Agriculture and Veterinary Medicine in Morocco, begun in 1969.

A 1987 AID evaluation reported that "the Institute has evolved in the space of two decades from 12 students taking their basic science training from non-Moroccan faculty in temporary facilities at Mohammed V University to its present status with approximately 2,300 Moroccan students and 346 faculty members (of which 85 percent are Moroccans) on its own campuses in Rabat and Agadir."[162]

The institute has become a major research center for agricultural education and research. Its research on dryland agriculture has produced cereals that are resistant to the Hessian fly and is now achieving some success in producing date palms that are resistent to a local virus which infected 10 million trees. Students from the institute are leaders in

government and hold positions in a number of international research centers. The institute is modeled after the U.S. land-grant university concept but has formed a unique identity, particularly in requiring students to learn both crop practices and veterinary medicine.

The major source of funding and staffing for the Institute has been the AID-university of Minnesota collaboration. Additional contributions were made by Germany, France, Belgium, Great Britain and Canada. The institute adopted educational systems from each of these countries as it developed a unique University. "This process of investigation, evaluation, and adoption/rejection of outside elements has given the Institute a feeling of uniqueness and a high esprit de corps among faculty, administrators, and students."[163]

Several factors were key to the success of AID-university contributions to the Hassan II Institute. Of primary importance is the strong, consistent, long-term commitment of both AID and the University of Minnesota. The AID evaluation reported, "It is remarkable that substantial assistance continued to flow through three successive projects with the Institute over 15 years, despite a very negative first project evaluation and several major differences of opinion on how the Institute should evolve."[164] The University of Minnesota and its leaders also exhibited a strong commitment to the program. Faculty members were able to establish lasting and productive terms of service to the Institute because "the University of Minnesota went to considerable effort to ensure that the terms and length of service of

their faculty in Morocco would add rather than detract from their tenure prospects at the University of Minnesota."[165]

The report noted three factors under agency control that contributed to the success of the program.[166] First, the agency gave a long-term commitment to the Institute. Second, the agency provided this funding in an incremental nature, giving a modest initial contract followed by more lucrative contracts as trust was built into the mutual commitments of the institute, the agency and the University. Finally, the agency managed the contract with the University to encourage long-term and flexible commitments by all three organizations.

APPENDIX D[167]



The graph depicts U.S. University projects in AID Bilateral Technical Assistance programs (all development sectors).

APPENDIX E[168]



APPENDIX F

CHANGES IN U.S. FOREIGN AID ADMINISTRATIONS



ENDNOTES

1. Erven J. Long and Frank Campbell, Reflections on the Role of AID and the U.S. Universities in International Agricultural Development, (Rockville, MD: Statistica, Inc., 1989), Appendix A.

2. Richard O. Niehoff, John A. Hannah: Versatile Administrator and Distinguished Public Servant, (Lanham, MD: Univ. Press of America, 1989), p. 216.

3. Ibid, p. 218.

4. Other independent projects had existed prior to this. Taken together these projects would have roughly matched the basic goals of the Point Four program. The Export-Import Bank secured private lending to LDC's, the World Bank financed public lending, and the Smith-Mundt Act had as its goal the exchange of technical knowledge. With such work already in progress, some Congressmen attending the hearings on Point Four questioned the need for a new program and a new bureaucracy. However, none of these earlier programs caught the spirit of the Point Four program.

5. Editorial (January 12, 1953). The New York Times, p. 26.

6. Richard O. Niehoff, John A. Hannah: Versatile Administrator and Distinguished Public Servant, pp. 216-7.

7. In 1951 the Mutual Security Administration (MSA) was formed, taking over and expanding upon the responsibilities of the Economic Cooperation Administration, which had guided the Marshall Plan. It would oversee the technical and military assistance to nations the United States hoped to strengthen in order to keep them from turning to communism. This agency grew and became responsible for all aid to Southeast Asia and the Pacific regions while the Technical Cooperation Administration (TCA) coordinated aid to the Middle East, South Asia, the American Republics and Africa. (The New York Times, January 12, 1953, p. 10). The MSA and TCA essentially were doing the same work but in different geographical regions. The MSA differed from the TCA in its clear goal of countering the threat of infiltration from nearby communist nations, thus its work included military assistance. There was some controversy over the need for two separate bureaus, and ultimately the two organizations were merged to form the Foreign Operations Administration (FOA).

8. Paul P. Kennedy, "Concept and scope of Point 4 viewed as undergoing shift" The New York Times, September 24, 1953, p. 12.

9. John M. Richardson, Jr., Partners in Development, An Analysis of AID-University Relations 1950-1966. (East Lansing: Michigan Univ. Press, 1969), p. 37.

10. Ibid, p. 37.

11. Paul P. Kennedy, "Concept and Scope of Point 4 Viewed as Undergoing Shift," The New York Times, September 24, 1953, p. 12.

12. "Private Aid Stressed in Stassen Cutback," The New York Times, September 11, 1953, p. 5.

13. "U.S. Technical Aid Enlists Colleges," The New York Times, October 7, 1953, p. 18.

14. John M. Richardson, Jr., Partners in Development, An Analysis of AID-University Relations 1950-1966, (East Lansing: Michigan Univ. Press, 1969), p. 41.

15. Ibid., p. 35.

16. Ibid., p. 41.

17. AID Evaluation Highlights No. 5, August 1988, p. 6.

18. John M. Richardson, Jr., Partners in Development, An Analysis of AID-University Relations 1950-1966. (East Lansing: Michigan Univ. Press, 1969), p. 41.

19. Paul P. Kennedy, "Separate Point 4 Urged on Stassen," The New York Times, December 17, 1953, p. 30.

20. "Point Four and Education," NEA Journal, September 1950, p. 418. This article is a condensation of a new statement published in June 1950 by the Educational Policies Commission of the NEA and the American Association of School Administrators.

21. Robert Bendiner. "Point Four -- Still the Great Basic Hope," The New York Times, April 1, 1951, section VI, p. 13.

22. Paul P. Kennedy, " Concept and Scope of Point 4 Viewed as Undergoing Shift," The New York Times, September 24, 1953, p. 1.

23. James Webb testimony, U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, International Technical Cooperation Act of 1949 ("Point Four" Program): Hearings on H.R. 5615. 81st Cong., 1st sess., 1949, p. 4.

24. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs,24. Mutual Security Act Extension: Hearings on H.R. 5710. 83rd Cong., 1st sess., 1953, p. 794.

25. Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1950, p. 396.

26. Elgin Groseclose, "Should U.S. Continue Point Four?" Foreign Policy Bulletin, November 15, 1953, p. 5.

27. Erven J. Long and Frank Campbell, Reflections on the Role of AID and the U.S. Universities in International Agricultural Development, (Rockville, MD: Statistica, Inc., 1989), section I, page 19.

28. John M. Richardson, Jr., Partners in Development, An Analysis of AID-University Relations 1950-1966. (East Lansing: Michigan Univ. Press, 1969), p. 53.

29. Erven J. Long and Frank Campbell, Reflections on the Role of AID and the U.S. Universities in International Agricultural Development, (Rockville, MD: Statistica, Inc., 1989), section I, p. 20.

30. John M. Richardson, Jr., Partners in Development, An Analysis of AID-University Relations 1950-1966. (East Lansing: Michigan Univ. Press, 1969), p. 59.

31. Ibid., p. 54.

32. Ibid.

33. Richard Humphrey, ed., Universities...and Development Assistance Abroad, (Washington, D.C.: American Council on Education, 1967), p. 40.

34. Ibid., p. 43.

35. John M. Richardson, Jr., Partners in Development, An Analysis of AID-University Relations 1950-1966. (East Lansing: Michigan Univ. Press, 1969), p. 76.

36. Ibid., p. 55.

37. Ibid., p.

38. Ibid., p. 51.

39. D. Woods Thomas,Institution-building Implications of the CIC-AID Rural Development Project, in Proceedings of the Regional Conference on Institution Building, held under the auspices of the Utah International Education Consortium and the U.S. Agency for International Development, August 17-21, 1970, Utah State University, Logan, Utah. p. 86.

40. The Alliance for Progress channeled major outlays of funds to the Latin America branch of the Agency in order to strengthen countries in Latin America and discourage their the spread of the communist ideology which had just gained a foothold in Cuba. The Peace Corps was a new foreign assistance program which brought technical assistance to developing countries in a broader geographical area.

41. U.S. Congress, House, "Foreign Assistance Act of 1962: Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, pt. 1, 87th Cong., 2nd sess., (Washington, D.C.:Government Printing Office, 1962), p. 3.

42. Erven J. Long and Frank Campbell, Reflections on the Role of AID and the U.S. Universities in International Agricultural Development, (Rockville, MD: Statistica, Inc., 1989), section III, p. 10.

43. Ibid., p. 1.

44. John W. Gardner, A.I.D. and the Universities, Report to the Administrator of the Agency for International Development, (Washington, D.C.: AID, 1964), p. 2.

45. U.S. Agency for International Development, AID Experience in Agricultural Research: A Review of Project Evaluations, A.I.D. Program Evaluation Discussion Paper No. 13, (Washington, D.C.: A.I.D., May 1982). PN-AAJ-613, p. 24.

46. John M. Richardson, Jr., Partners in Development, An Analysis of AID-University Relations 1950-1966. (East Lansing: Michigan Univ. Press, 1969), p. 109.

47. "The Anchor Man for Foreign Aid." Business Week, 11 May 1963, p. 50.

48. Projects were begun in Jordan, Argentina(2), Bolivia, Brazil(4), Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Jamaica, Paraguay, Uruguay, Nigeria(5), Malawi, Zambia, Sierre Leone, Somali Republic, Uganda, and India. Projects were terminated in Cambodia, China, Iran, Guetamala, and Paraguay. John M. Richardson, Jr., Partners in Development, An Analysis of AID-University Relations 1950-1966. (East Lansing: Michigan Univ. Press, 1969), p. 124-5.

49. David E. Bell, Interview by Brian D. Jordahl, Minneapolis, Minnesota, 19 June 1990.

50. John M. Richardson, Jr., Partners in Development, An Analysis of AID-University Relations 1950-1966. (East Lansing: Michigan Univ. Press, 1969), p. 141.

51. John W. Gardner, A.I.D. and the Universities, Report to the Administrator of the Agency for International Development, (Washington, D.C.: AID, 1964), p. 7.

52. Ibid., p. 8.

53. Committee on Institutional Cooperation-US/AID Rural Development Research Project, Building Institutions to Serve Agriculture, (LaFayette, Indiana: Purdue Univ. Press, 1968), p. ix.

54. Committee on Institutional Cooperation-US/AID Rural Development Research Project, Building Institutions to Serve Agriculture, (LaFayette, Indiana: Purdue Univ. Press, 1968), pp. 4-26.

55. Ibid., p. 7.

56. Ibid., p. 11.

57. Committee on Institutional Cooperation-US/AID Rural Development Research Project, AID-University Rural Development Contracts and U.S. Universities, (Urbana, Illinois: Univ. of Illinois, June 1968), p. 74.

58. Ibid., p. 15.

59. Ibid.

60. Ibid., p. 16.

61. Lyman F. Smart, Proceedings of the Regional Conference on Institution Building, held under the auspices of the Utah International Education Consortium and the US/AID, (Logan, Utah: Utah State Univ., August 17-21, 1970, p. 143.

62. Richard O. Niehoff, John A. Hannah: Versatile Administrator and Distinguished Public Servant, (London: Univ. Press of America, 1989), pp. 141-2.

63. Ibid., p. 142.

64. Erven J. Long and Frank Campbell, Reflections on the Role of AID and the U.S. Universities in International Agricultural Development, (Rockville, MD: Statistica, Inc., 1989), section IV, p. 2.

65. Richard O. Niehoff, John A. Hannah: Versatile Administrator and Distinguished Public Servant, (New York: Univ. Press of America, 1989) p. 142.

66. Erven J. Long and Frank Campbell, Reflections on the Role of AID and the U.S. Universities in International Agricultural Development, (Rockville, MD: Statistica, Inc., 1989), section IV, p. 2.

67. Sen. Hubert Humphrey testimony, U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations and Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance, Foreign Assistance Authorization: Examination of U.S. Foreign Aid Programs and Policies: Hearings on S. 1816 and H.R. 9005, 94th Cong., 1st sess., 1975, p. 640.

68. U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations and Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance, Foreign Assistance Authorization: Examination of U.S. Foreign Aid Programs and Policies: Hearings on S. 1816 and H.R. 9005, 94th Cong., 1st sess., 1975, p. 640.

69. U.S. General Accounting Office, Aid and the Universities Have Yet to Forge an Effective Partnership to Combat World Food Problems, (Gaithersburg, MD: GAO, 1981). ID82-3, p. 7.

70. Public Law 480 (P.L. 480) is the primary legislation authorizing U.S. food assistance to Less Developed Countries.

71. United States Agency for International Development, "Report To The Congress on Title XII -- Famine Prevention and Freedom From Hunger," 1977, p. 6.

72. Ibid.

73. U.S. General Accounting Office, Aid and the Universities Have Yet to Forge an Effective Partnership to Combat World Food Problems, (Gaithersburg, MD: GAO, 1981). ID82-3, p. 7.

74. Olga Starakis and Sally Nelson, eds., Proceedings of the Conference on the University and Title XII held in Minneapolis, Minnesota, May 5-7, 1977, (Saint Paul: Institute of Agriculture, Forestry, and Home Economics, July 1977), p. 37.

75. Ibid., p. 37-8.

76. U.S. General Accounting Office, Aid and the Universities Have Yet to Forge an Effective Partnership to Combat World Food Problems, (Gaithersburg, MD: GAO, 1981). ID82-3, p. 7.

77. Erven J. Long and Frank Campbell, Reflections on the Role of AID and the U.S. Universities in International Agricultural Development, (Rockville, MD: Statistica, Inc., 1989), section V, p. 8.

78. Ibid., p. 6.

79. Five Universities participated in the Memorandums of Understanding (Colorado State University, the University of Florida, Purdue University, Utah State University, and Washington State University. Twenty-nine universities received Joint Memorandums of Understanding, and nine universities had received the competitive matching support grants by 1989. Erven J. Long and Frank Campbell, Reflections on the Role of AID and the U.S. Universities in International Agricultural Development, (Rockville, MD: Statistica, Inc., 1989), section V, pp. 4-15.

80. Erven J. Long and Frank Campbell, Reflections on the Role of AID and the U.S. Universities in International Agricultural Development, (Rockville, MD: Statistica, Inc., 1989), section V, p. 6.

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82. Ibid., p. 15.

83. Erven J. Long and Frank Campbell, Reflections on the Role of AID and the U.S. Universities in International Agricultural Development, (Rockville, MD: Statistica, Inc., 1989), section V, p. 8.

84. David E. Bell, Interview by Brian D. Jordahl, Minneapolis, Minnesota, 19 June 1990.

85. Erven J. Long and Frank Campbell, Reflections on the Role of AID and the U.S. Universities in International Agricultural Development, (Rockville, MD: Statistica, Inc., 1989), section IV, pp. 4,5.

86. Delane Welsch, Interview by Brian D. Jordahl, Saint Paul, Minnesota, 23 July 1990.

87. David E. Bell, Interview by Brian D. Jordahl, Minneapolis, Minnesota, 19 June 1990.

88. Erven J. Long and Frank Campbell, Reflections on the Role of AID and the U.S. Universities in International Agricultural Development, (Rockville, MD: Statistica, Inc., 1989), section IV, p. 7.

89. Ibid., p. 12.

90. R.D. Blond, Partners In Research, (Berkeley, CA: UC Printing Dept., 1983), p. 2.

91.Richard E. Just, David Zilberman, Douglas Parker, and Mark Phillips, The Economic Impacts of Bard Research on the U.S., June 1, 1988, p. 1.

92. Ibid.

93. Sen. Hubert Humphrey called Dr. Don Paarlberg "the midwife of title XII. He was the man who brought disparate elements together time and again, who pointed to the direction in which Congress had to go and to the direction in which USDA had to go at several critical points." Sen. Hubert Humphrey testimony, U.S. Congress, Senate, "Implementation of Title XII of the Foreign Assistance Act" Hearings before the Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance of the Committee on Foreign Relations, 95th cong., 1st sess., (Washington, D.C.,: GPO, 1977).

94. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations and Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance, Implementation of Title XII of the Foreign Assistance Act, 95th Cong., 1st sess., 1977, p. 16.

95. Ibid.

96. Ibid.

97. Ibid.

98. Ibid.

99. Committee on Institutional Cooperation-US/AID Rural Development Research Project, Building Institutions to Serve Agriculture, (LaFayette, Indiana: Purdue Univ. Press, 1968), p. 207.

100. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations and Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance, Implementation of Title XII of the Foreign Assistance Act, 95th Cong., 1st sess., 1977, p. 16.

101. John W. Gardner, A.I.D. and the Universities, Report to the Administrator of the Agency for International Development, (Washington, D.C.: AID, 1964).

102. U.S. Agency for International Development, Report to Congress On Title XII -- The Famine Prevention and Freedom From Hunger Amendment of 1975, (Washington, D.C.: A.I.D., April 1980), p. ii.

103. U.S. Agency for International Development, Report to Congress On Title XII -- The Famine Prevention and Freedom From Hunger Amendment of 1975, (Washington, D.C.: A.I.D., April 1980), p. ii.

104. Warren C. Baum, Partners Against Hunger: The Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research, (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1986), p. 16.

105. In the Punjab area of India productivity increased two and a half times from 1965 to 1975. See Sterling Wortman and Ralph Cummings, Jr., To Feed This World, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1978, p. 391.

106. Warren C. Baum, Partners Against Hunger: The Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research, (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1986), p. 18-22.

107. Ibid., p. 24.

108. Ibid., p. 30.

109. Vernon W. Ruttan, "Toward a Global Agricultural Research System: A Personal View," in Research Policy, (Elsevier Science Publishers B.V. (North-Holland), 1986), p. 316.

110. Strategic research is designed to solve the major problems that exist in various regions. It requires adaptation and adoption to be useful to individual farmers. For a further discussion on classifications of research, see Sterling Wortman and Ralph Cummings, Jr., To Feed this World the Challenge and the Strategy, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1978), pp. 299-301.

111. Vernon W. Ruttan, "Toward a Global Agricultural Research System: A Personal View," in Research Policy, (Elsevier Science Publishers B.V. (North-Holland), 1986), p. 316.

112. Mark F. McGuire and Vernon W. Ruttan, "Lost Directions: U.S. Foreign Assistance Policy since New Directions," in The Journal of Developing Areas, (January 1990), pp. 127-180.

113. Each new Republican administration has instituted changes to move control over technical assistance out of the Agency's responsibility -- to "privatize" foreign assistance. Under the Eisenhower Administration, the Agency (MSA, TCA) was changed to the Foreign Operations Administration (FOA) and the universities became the primary "private" contributor to technical assistance. The Nixon Administration supported the use of the multilateral institutions including the United Nations and the International Agriculture Research Centers (IARC). The Reagan Administration continued the funding of multilateral institutions and increased the use of the Private Voluntary Organizations (PVO) for technical assistance.

114. U.S. General Accounting Office, Foreign Aid: Issues Concerning U.S. University Participation, (Gaithersburg, MD: GAO, 1989). NSID-89-38, p. 2.

115. John G. Stovall, The Role of U.S. Universities in Development Assistance: What Have We Learned from Experience? Paper prepared for the Office of Technology, U.S. Congress. August 1989, p. 21.

116. U.S. General Accounting Office, Foreign Aid: Issues Concerning U.S. University Participation, (Gaithersburg, MD: GAO,1989). NSID-89-38, pp. 2,14-16.

117. E.T. York, Jr. An Assessment of Title XII of the Foreign Assistance Act, "Famine Prevention and Freedom From Hunger." Paper prepared for the Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress, December 1988, pp. 10ff.

118. U.S. Agency for International Development, Toward Strategic Management, One of a series of initiatives of USAID, December 1990, p. 3.

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120. Bruce Koppel noted that institution-building projects will not be appropriate in the future because (1) IB projects are expensive, long-term, inflexible to AID programming changes, and are generally managed by host country governments, (2) The problem-specific CRSP program is becoming the dominant research program (3) State legislatures are less willing to fund international agricultural programs, and (4) Considerable attention must be given to maintaining the relationship between institutions after the program is finished. Bruce Koppel, U.S. Universities and Development Assistance: Technical Support for Agriculture, Natural Resources and Environment, Paper prepared for the Office of Technology Assessment.

121. "BIFADEC Submits Report on AID Budget for Fiscal Year 1992" in BIFAD BRIEFS, Vol. XIV, No. 6, Nov./Dec. 1990, p. 3.

122. Daniel G. Aldrich, Jr. "Ways in Which U.S. Universities Need to Be Strengthened To Effectively Respond to Title XII," in Proceedings of the Conference: The U.S. University and Title XII, (St. Paul, MN: Institute of Agriculture, Forestry, and Home Economics, July 1977), p. 64.

123. U.S. Agency for International Development, The Impact of Investments in Agricultural Higher Education, A.I.D. Evaluation Highlights No. 5, (Washington, D.C., A.I.D., August 1989), p. 6.

124. For further reading on the internationalization of Universities of Agriculture see James Henson and Jan C. Noel, The Internationalization of U.S. Universities and Participation in Development Assistance: Implications for the Developing Countries and the U.S., International Program Development Office, Washington, D.C., Occasional Paper #5, December 1989.

125. J. Lawrence Apple, Hugh Poppenoe, and James Meiman, The USAID/University Partnership: Issues Identified by USAID Mission Directors that Reflect Upon University Performance and that Universities Must Address," A report developed under the auspices of the Universities Concerned with International Development (UCID), May 8, 1987, p. 3.

126. Delane Welsch, Interview by Brian D. Jordahl, Saint Paul, Minnesota, 26 February 1990.

127. Lynn Pesson, "Thoughts from the Executive Director: What is the Future of Title XII," in BIFAD BRIEFS, Vol. XIV, No. 1, Jan./Feb. 1990, p. 2. The author describes the CRSPs as the "crown jewel of Title XII."

128. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Report of the Task Force on Foreign Assistance to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives. 101st Cong., 1st sess., 1989, p. 27.

129. Ibid., p. 26.

130. Ibid., p. 27.

131. Erven J. Long and Frank Campbell, Reflections on the Role of AID and the U.S. Universities in International Agricultural Development, (Rockville, MD: Statistica, Inc., 1989), section III, p. 25.

132. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Report of the Task Force on Foreign Assistance to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives. 101st Cong., 1st sess., 1989, p. 27.

133. Congressman Lee Hamilton, "The U.S. Political and Economic Development Environment for Foreign Assistance in the 1990's." Address at a BIFAD symposium September 14, 1988. BIFAD, Development Partnership in World Agriculture for the 1990's: A Symposium, BIFAD Occasional Paper No. 13, (Washington, D.C.: AID, November 1988), p. 21.

134. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Report of the Task Force on Foreign Assistance to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives. 101st Cong., 1st sess., 1989, p. 27.

135. John G. Stovall, The Role of U.S. Universities in Development Assistance: What Have We Learned from Experience? Paper prepared for the Office of Technology, U.S. Congress. August 1989), p. 64-72.

136. John W. Gardner, A.I.D. and the Universities, Report to the Administrator of the Agency for International Development, (Washington, D.C.: AID, 1964), p. 3.

137. James MacGregor Burns, Leadership, (New York: Harper Colophon Books, 1978), p. 298.

138. Congressman Lee Hamilton, "The U.S. Political and Economic Development Environment for Foreign Assistance in the 1990's" speaking at a BIFAD symposium September 14, 1988. Recorded in BIFAD, Development Partnership in World Agriculture for the 1990's: A Symposium, BIFAD Occasional Paper No. 13, (Washington, D.C.: AID, November 1988), p. 20.

139. Don Paarlberg testimony, U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relation and Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance, Implementation of Title XII of the Foreign Assistance Act 95th Cong., 1st sess., 1977, p. 16.

140. Yujiro Hayami and Vernon W. Ruttan, Agricultural Development: An International Perspective, 2nd ed., (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1985), p. 447.

141. James MacGregor Burns, Leadership, (New York: Harper Colophon Books, 1978).

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143. Delane Welsch, Interview by Brian D. Jordahl, Saint Paul, Minnesota, 23 July 1990.

144. Terry Roe, Interview by Brian D. Jordahl, Saint Paul, Minnesota, December 1990.

145. Ibid.

146. G. Edward Schuh, Interview by Brian Jordahl, Minneapolis, Minnesota, May 1990.

147. Delane Welsch, Interview by Brian D. Jordahl, Saint Paul, 23 July 1990.

148. John G. Stovall, The Role of U.S. Universities in Development Assistance: What Have We Learned from Experience? Paper prepared for the Office of Technology, U.S. Congress. August 1989, p. 21.

149. G. Edward Schuh, Interview by Brian D. Jordahl, Minneapolis, Minnesota, May 1990.

150. Ibid.

151. For more on the changing global circumstances which may limit or alter U.S. foreign assistance see Vernon W. Ruttan, "Solving the Foreign Aid Vision Thing," in Challenge, May-June 1991, pp. 41-46.

152. John W. Gardner, A.I.D. and the Universities, Report to the Administrator of the Agency for International Development, (Washington, D.C.: AID, 1964), p. 8.

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156. Ibid., p. 14.

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158. U.S. Agency for International Development, Ethiopia: Alemaya University of Agriculture, A.I.D. Project Impact Evaluation Report No. 71, (Washington, D.C.: A.I.D., June 1989), pp. 6-7.

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160. U.S. Agency for International Development, Ethiopia: Alemaya University of Agriculture, A.I.D. Project Impact Evaluation Report No. 71, (Washington, D.C.: A.I.D., June 1989), pp. 4-5.

161. John M. Richardson, Jr., Partners in Development, An Analysis of AID-University Relations 1950-1966. (East Lansing: Michigan Univ. Press, 1969), p. 21.

162. U.S. Agency for International Development, The Hassan II Institute of Agriculture and Veterinary Medicine in Morocco: Institutional Development and International Partnership A.I.D. Project Impact Evaluation Report No. 65, (Washington, D.C.: A.I.D., July 1987), p. 3.

163. Ibid., p. 18.

164. Ibid., p. 22.

165. Ibid., p. 3.

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167. Data compiled from: Erven J. Long and Frank Campbell, Reflections on the Role of AID and the U.S. Universities in International Agricultural Development, (Rockville, MD: Statistica, Inc., 1989), Appendix B.

168. Congressional Quarterly Almanacs, 1949-1990.