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Abstract
Tax and expenditure limitations (TEL) on state
and local governments have been passed with the presumption
they will limit the growth of government,
raise government efficiency, and increase direct democracy
by requiring voter approval of tax increases.
Both the popular press and the academic literature
focus on the impacts of TEL on state budgets. Yet at a
time when decentralization and devolution are increasing
demands on local government, TEL provisions
are in some cases causing rigidity in local budgets
and subsequent fiscal stress. The smaller the
budget, the more significant the potential adverse effects
of TEL, and small governments tend to be rural
governments. While there is some evidence that governments
under TEL become more efficient, governments
typically look for ways to circumvent the restrictions
as they become more severe, increasing inefficiencies
and reducing both representative and direct
democracy, the opposite of the intended effects of TEL
laws. States would be wise to avoid TEL and instead
utilize stricter reporting and auditing requirements.
The latter are a more direct means of monitoring public
sector management while allowing local governments
the flexibility to adjust to local fiscal circumstances