TY - RPRT AB - This paper extends the standard model of self-enforcing dynamc international environmental agreements by allowing the length of the period of commitment of such agreements to vary as a parameter. It analyzes the pattern of behavior of the size of stable coalitions, the stock of pollution, and the emission rate as a function of the length of the period of commitment. It is shown that the length of the period of commitment can have very significant effects on the equilibrium. We show numerically that at the initial date, as the length of commitment is increased, the potential gain from cooperation tends to diminish, increasing the disincentive to ratify the agreements. This suggests that considerable attention should be given to the determination of the length of such international agreements. AU - Nkuiya, Bruno DA - 2012-08 DA - 2012-08 DO - 10.22004/ag.econ.132419 DO - doi ID - 132419 KW - Environmental Economics and Policy KW - International environmental agreements KW - global pollution KW - stock pollution KW - dynamc games L1 - https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/132419/files/CREATE2012-7.pdf L2 - https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/132419/files/CREATE2012-7.pdf L4 - https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/132419/files/CREATE2012-7.pdf LA - eng LK - https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/132419/files/CREATE2012-7.pdf N2 - This paper extends the standard model of self-enforcing dynamc international environmental agreements by allowing the length of the period of commitment of such agreements to vary as a parameter. It analyzes the pattern of behavior of the size of stable coalitions, the stock of pollution, and the emission rate as a function of the length of the period of commitment. It is shown that the length of the period of commitment can have very significant effects on the equilibrium. We show numerically that at the initial date, as the length of commitment is increased, the potential gain from cooperation tends to diminish, increasing the disincentive to ratify the agreements. This suggests that considerable attention should be given to the determination of the length of such international agreements. PY - 2012-08 PY - 2012-08 T1 - The Effects of the Length of the Period of Commitment on the Size of Stable International Environmental Agreements TI - The Effects of the Length of the Period of Commitment on the Size of Stable International Environmental Agreements UR - https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/132419/files/CREATE2012-7.pdf Y1 - 2012-08 T2 - CREATE Working Papers T2 - 2012-7 ER -