TY  - RPRT
AB  - This paper extends the standard model of self-enforcing dynamc international environmental agreements by allowing the length of the period of commitment of such agreements to vary as a parameter. It analyzes the pattern of behavior of the size of stable coalitions, the stock of pollution, and the emission rate as a function of the length of the period of commitment. It is shown that the length of the period of commitment can have very significant effects on the equilibrium. We show numerically that at the initial date, as the length of commitment is increased, the potential gain from cooperation tends to diminish, increasing the disincentive to ratify the agreements. This suggests that considerable attention should be given to the determination of the length of such international agreements.
AU  - Nkuiya, Bruno
DA  - 2012-08
DA  - 2012-08
DO  - 10.22004/ag.econ.132419
DO  - doi
ID  - 132419
KW  - Environmental Economics and Policy
KW  - International environmental agreements
KW  - global pollution
KW  - stock pollution
KW  - dynamc games
L1  - https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/132419/files/CREATE2012-7.pdf
L2  - https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/132419/files/CREATE2012-7.pdf
L4  - https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/132419/files/CREATE2012-7.pdf
LA  - eng
LK  - https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/132419/files/CREATE2012-7.pdf
N2  - This paper extends the standard model of self-enforcing dynamc international environmental agreements by allowing the length of the period of commitment of such agreements to vary as a parameter. It analyzes the pattern of behavior of the size of stable coalitions, the stock of pollution, and the emission rate as a function of the length of the period of commitment. It is shown that the length of the period of commitment can have very significant effects on the equilibrium. We show numerically that at the initial date, as the length of commitment is increased, the potential gain from cooperation tends to diminish, increasing the disincentive to ratify the agreements. This suggests that considerable attention should be given to the determination of the length of such international agreements.
PY  - 2012-08
PY  - 2012-08
T1  - The Effects of the Length of the Period of Commitment on the Size of Stable International Environmental Agreements
TI  - The Effects of the Length of the Period of Commitment on the Size of Stable International Environmental Agreements
UR  - https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/132419/files/CREATE2012-7.pdf
Y1  - 2012-08
T2  - CREATE Working Papers
T2  - 2012-7
ER  -