@article{Nkuiya:132419,
      recid = {132419},
      author = {Nkuiya, Bruno},
      title = {The Effects of the Length of the Period of Commitment on  the Size of Stable International Environmental Agreements},
      address = {2012-08},
      number = {1643-2016-135253},
      series = {CREATE Working Papers},
      year = {2012},
      abstract = {This paper extends the standard model of self-enforcing  dynamc international environmental agreements by allowing  the length of the period of commitment of such agreements  to vary as a parameter. It analyzes the pattern of behavior  of the size of stable coalitions, the stock of pollution,  and the emission rate as a function of the length of the  period of commitment. It is shown that the length of the  period of commitment can have very significant effects on  the equilibrium. We show numerically that at the initial  date, as the length of commitment is increased, the  potential gain from cooperation tends to diminish,  increasing the disincentive to ratify the agreements. This  suggests that considerable attention should be given to the  determination of the length of such international  agreements.},
      url = {http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/132419},
      doi = {https://doi.org/10.22004/ag.econ.132419},
}