@article{Shields:132244,
      recid = {132244},
      author = {Shields, Martin and Shideler, David W.},
      title = {Do Commuters Free-ride? Estimating the Impacts of  Interjurisdictional Commuting on Local Public Goods  Expenditures},
      journal = {Journal of Regional Analysis and Policy},
      address = {2003},
      number = {1100-2016-89623},
      pages = {16},
      year = {2003},
      abstract = {In an era of political pressure to reduce taxes while  increasing
government services, local officials face  difficult choices regarding what
services to provide and  how to finance them. One outcropping of this dilemma
is  that local citizens are expressing concerns that commuters  use
local government services but without paying for them.  In response,
some communities are considering taxing  commuters. In this study we
develop a basic model of  congestion in a two-city model to examine
commuters’  effects on the optimal provision of public goods. The  theoretical
result suggests that taxing commuters at the  difference in marginal
congestion costs between the two  cities can attain market equilibrium.
We then specify an  empirical model to determine this tax’s size  for
Pennsylvania municipalities. The econometric results  show differences in
marginal congestion costs between  workplace and resident communities,
providing evidence that  commuters may free-ride. The difference in
marginal  congestion costs, however, tends to be small, so we advise  policymakers
to be hesitant in adopting such a tax.},
      url = {http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/132244},
      doi = {https://doi.org/10.22004/ag.econ.132244},
}