@article{Ghebru:126883,
      recid = {126883},
      author = {Ghebru, Hosaena H. and Holden, Stein T.},
      title = {Reverse-Share-Tenancy and Marshallian Inefficiency:  Bargaining Power of Landowners and the Sharecropper’s  Productivity},
      address = {2012},
      number = {1007-2016-79511},
      pages = {48},
      year = {2012},
      abstract = {Making use of a unique tenant-landlord matched data from  the Tigray region of Ethiopia, we are
able to show how  strategic response of tenants - to varying economic and  tenure security status of
the landlords - is important in  explaining productivity differentials of sharecroppers. The  results
show that sharecroppers’ yield are significantly  lower on plots leased from landlords who are
non-kin;  female; with lower income generating opportunity; and  tenure insecure households, than
on plots leased from  landlords with contrasting characteristics. While, on  aggregate, the result
shows no significant efficiency loss  on kin-operated sharecropped plots, a more  decomposed
analyses indicate strong evidences of  Marshallian inefficiency on kin-operated plots leased  from
landlords with weaker bargaining power and higher  tenure insecurity. This study, thus, shows
how failure to  control for such heterogeneity of landowners'  characteristics can explain the lack
of clarity in the  existing empirical literature on the extent of moral hazard  problems in
sharecropping contracts.},
      url = {http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/126883},
      doi = {https://doi.org/10.22004/ag.econ.126883},
}