@article{Romstad:126724,
      recid = {126724},
      author = {Romstad, Eirik},
      title = {Truthful revelation in nonmarket valuation},
      address = {2012},
      number = {1007-2016-79702},
      pages = {11},
      year = {2012},
      abstract = {A major criticism of contingent valuation methods relates  to their hypothetical nature, where truthful revelation of  willingness-to-pay is not secured because of the missing  link between stated willingness-to-pay and the respondent's  budget constraint. Large deviations between stated  willingness-to-pay and actual payments in both field and  experimental studies where actual payments were collected  lend support to these claims. In its utmost format this  lends contingent valuation studies vulnerable to strategic  behavior. This paper combines the truthful revelation  properties of multi-unit uniform price auctions and the  median voter theorem to induce truthful revelation. The  intuition is as follows : Let the price in the auction be  set by the median bid, and pass this price onto a  referendum. The expected net gains of passing the  referendum would then be positive, implying that the budget  constraint would be introduced in a probabilistic manner.},
      url = {http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/126724},
      doi = {https://doi.org/10.22004/ag.econ.126724},
}