@article{Fraser:125086,
      recid = {125086},
      author = {Fraser, Rob W.},
      title = {Moral Hazard and Risk Management in Agri-Environmental  Policy},
      address = {2002-02},
      number = {413-2016-26022},
      pages = {22},
      year = {2002},
      abstract = {This paper develops the key finding of Hogan, Ozanne and  Colman (2000) that risk aversion among farmers ameliorates  the moral hazard problem in relation to agri-environmental  policy compliance. It is shown that risk averse farmers who  face uncertainty in their production income are more likely  to comply with such a policy as a means of risk management.  In addition, it is shown that a principal who has control  over both the level of monitoring and the size of penalty  if detected can reduce non-compliance by adjustments to  these instruments which increase the variance of farmers’  income but leave the expected penalty unchanged. It is  concluded that risk management by both principals and  agents has the potential to diminish the moral hazard  problem, especially given proposed developments in  agri-environmental policy in the European Union.},
      url = {http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/125086},
      doi = {https://doi.org/10.22004/ag.econ.125086},
}