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Voter behavior, government capture and accountability in Sub-Sahara African States:

A comparative analysis based on cross-country estimations of probabilistic voting models

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Voter behavior, government capture and accountability in Sub-Sahara African States: A comparative analysis based on cross-country estimations of probabilistic voting models


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CAU

Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel Agrar- und Ernährungswissenschaftliche Fakultät

INTRODUCTION

We analyse the impact of voting behavior on governmental performance, in particular on governmental accountability and capture.



Theory

Different voting motives are distinguished: ideological voting, retrospective voting and policy-oriented voting

ideological voting


• non-policy voting, based on personal attributes like appearance, charisma, ethnicity etc.

retrospective voting

• past performance is evaluated and leads to voting decision

policy-oriented voting

• vote choice is determined by policy positions of voters and parties



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Methodology

Probabilistic voting model

The random utility model (RUM) is used to analyze voting behavior. It assumes that decision makers are utility maximisers. Furthermore the RUM presumes that error terms are distributed iid extreme value, which results in the following logit probabilities:

$$P_{ip} = \frac{e^{U_{ip}}}{\sum\limits_{q} e^{U_{iq}}}$$

Utility of voter i if he votes for party p results in:

$$U_{ip} = \alpha_p + \beta_I Z_I + \beta_R Z_R + \beta_P Z_P \tag{2}$$

 α_p is the ideological constant, β the coefficients and Z the variables (I=ideological, R=retrospective, P=policy oriented).

Finally voter i decides to vote party p, if p provides the highest utility.

$$P_{ip} = Prob(U_{ip} > U_{iq} \quad \forall \ j \neq i)$$

2 Ideology indicator

The indicator is supposed to measure non-policy voting within a single number. Including retrospective and policy oriented voting the indicator results in the following formula:

$$\frac{\Delta \alpha_p + \delta \Delta I D_{ip}|}{|\Delta \gamma_p| + |\beta|} = \lambda_{ip}$$

 λ measures how much policy distance and presidential approval have to be changed to compensate for non-policy differences between parties.

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
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RESULTS


(1)

(3)

(4)



Ratio between rural and urban ideology indicator



CONCLUSION

- \Rightarrow A regression of macro indicators on the ideology index resulted in ideological voting being more important in countries with a lower freedom index (Freedom House 2012) and with higher GDPs per capita (The World Bank 2010)
- \Rightarrow Greater ideological voting implies less governmental accountability
- \Rightarrow Differences between rural and urban regions can be found in all countries
 - In most countries urban regions vote more ideological than rural ones
 - This implies, that in these countries the government is captured by the rural population