@article{Russell:124894,
      recid = {124894},
      author = {Russell, Noel P. and Sauer, Johannes},
      title = {Beneficial selection and the efficient procurement of  ecosystem services},
      address = {2012-08-12},
      number = {323-2016-11566},
      pages = {20},
      month = {Aug},
      year = {2012},
      abstract = {It has bee suggested by many authors that adverse  selection in government schemes for the
procurement of  ecosystem services impairs both the efficiency of these  schemes and the value for
money that they deliver to  taxpayers and funding agencies. However, recent research  considers that
these types of procurement system may not be  characterised by adverse selection but by what
might  labelled as “beneficial selection”. And this research goes  on to show that even with beneficial
selection there will  still remain potential inefficiency arising from a  continuing need for payment of
information rents to the  participating farmers in the scheme.
This paper presents  and analyses a model that represents the tradeoffs in  designing efficient
mechanisms for the procurement of  ecosystem services. A key characteristic is the payment  of
informational rents to participants so as to increase  overall efficiency. The impact of beneficial
selection is  carefully explored in this context, and we investigate  implications for policy makers. In
particular we suggest  that some conventional policy advice in this area, that  ignores the possibility of
beneficial selection, may be  mis-directed.},
      url = {http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/124894},
      doi = {https://doi.org/10.22004/ag.econ.124894},
}