000123595 001__ 123595 000123595 005__ 20210819132551.0 000123595 0247_ $$2doi$$a10.22004/ag.econ.123595 000123595 037__ $$a411-2016-25661 000123595 041__ $$aeng 000123595 245__ $$aDo Contracting Incentives Matter? 000123595 260__ $$c1999-11-12 000123595 269__ $$a1999-11-12 000123595 300__ $$a25 000123595 336__ $$aConference Paper/ Presentation 000123595 520__ $$aAgency theory explanations for agricultural contract designs are often observationally equivalent to perfect information explanations. Further in order to test properly the hypothesis that moral hazard is important one must first test and accept the hypothesis that agents respond to contract incentives. If agents do not respond to contract incentives then it is unlikely that moral hazard is significant. Accordingly we move beyond contract design and focus on whether or not we can reject the hypothesis that moral hazard is important by examining growers responses to price incentives for processing tomato quality. We utilize a natural experiment. In our data set growers deliver processing tomatoes under a price incentives contract and for a fixed price per ton. We compare the quality of the tomatoes delivered under the two arrangements. Our results suggest that growers indeed do respond to price incentives by improving tomato quality. 000123595 546__ $$aEnglish 000123595 650__ $$aDemand and Price Analysis 000123595 700__ $$aAlexander, Corinne E. 000123595 700__ $$aGoodhue, Rachael E. 000123595 700__ $$aRausser, Gordon C. 000123595 8564_ $$9445a5015-b74f-439d-9950-8e3740af2cf3$$s232685$$uhttps://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/123595/files/Alexander.pdf 000123595 887__ $$ahttp://purl.umn.edu/123595 000123595 909CO $$ooai:ageconsearch.umn.edu:123595$$pGLOBAL_SET 000123595 912__ $$nSubmitted by Elizabeth Hilber (hilb0033@umn.edu) on 2012-05-18T18:56:06Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Alexander.pdf: 232685 bytes, checksum: 8f7d2c424ca58c777df239e577a64818 (MD5) 000123595 912__ $$nMade available in DSpace on 2012-05-18T18:56:08Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Alexander.pdf: 232685 bytes, checksum: 8f7d2c424ca58c777df239e577a64818 (MD5) Previous issue date: 1999-11-12 000123595 913__ $$aLicense granted by Elizabeth Hilber (hilb0033@umn.edu) on 2012-05-18T18:49:24Z (GMT): <center> <h2> Deposit Agreement </h2> </center> I represent that I am the creator of the digital material identified herein (&ldquo;Work&rdquo;). I represent that the work is original and that I either own all rights of copyright or have the right to deposit the copy in a digital archive such as AgEcon Search. I represent that in regard to any non-original material included in the Work I have secured written permission of the copyright owner (s) for this use or believe this use is allowed by law. I further represent that I have included all appropriate credits and attributions. I hereby grant the Regents of the University of Minnesota (&ldquo;University&rdquo;), through AgEcon Search, a non-exclusive right to access, reproduce, and distribute the Work, in whole or in part, for the purposes of security, preservation, and perpetual access. I grant the University a limited, non-exclusive right to make derivative works for the purpose of migrating the Work to other media or formats in order to preserve access to the Work. I do not transfer or intend to transfer any right of copyright or other intellectual property to the University. If the Deposit Agreement is executed by the Author�s Representative, the Representative shall separately execute the following representation: I represent that I am authorized by the Author to execute this Deposit Agreement on behalf of the Author. 000123595 980__ $$a411 000123595 982__ $$gAustralian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society>2000 Conference (44th), January 23-25, 2000, Sydney, Australia